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For many, including the majority of the Supreme Court in the ADI 4650 case, 
war chest and dependence corruption apparently occurred in Brazil. This thesis 
investigates, through case studies, whether the appearance of those types of political 
finance corruption impacted the confidence we should have in the democratic integrity 
of antitrust legislation and its enforcement; and concludes that this confidence has been 
impaired, at least partially. 
Considering that, when it comes to political finance corruption, mere appearance 
is enough to justify regulatory reforms, the question that then arises is how the law of 
democracy should be framed to promote the appearance of electoral integrity. The thesis 
advances a proposal to foster the appearance that elections reflect a ‘free formation of 
public  opinion’,  and, in that sense, it argues that political finance and media regulation 
should adopt that as a paradigm. By arguing that legislation aimed to promote media 
access and impartiality of broadcast corporations during elections is not (and perhaps 
will never be) enough to satisfactorily diminish the influence of media economic power 
over elections in Brazil, the thesis proposes media regulation based on both democratic 
distribution and the power to impact public opinion. When it comes to the competition 
between political parties and their candidates, the thesis argues that vouchers could help 
to  solve   the  controversy  regarding  the  distribution  of  parties’  public  resources but that, 
in any event, caps should be introduced to prevent predominant influence on public 
opinion. The paradigm also provides an answer to the dilemma faced by judges 
whenever they must determine what level of illegal spending is sufficient to distort an 
election: under a Rawlsian account of democracy, if the illegal practice allowed the 
candidate to have more than 30% of total electoral spending, there is a presumption that 
it distorted the election — under a Schumpeterian perspective of democracy, that 
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In a capitalist democracy, people frequently lobby the government — both 
legislative and executive branches. They lobby mainly because those government 
institutions are responsible for the enactment of legislation and policies that regulate 
society. People can lobby individually or as a group, often organised as legal entities, 
such as corporations, associations and unions.  
There is a perception that corporate lobbying is quite effective. For example, 
Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page have recently conducted the largest empirical study of 
policy decisions by the US government in the history of political science.1 And they 
concluded   that   ‘economic   elites   and   organised   groups   representing   business   interests  
have substantial independent impacts on the US government policy, while mass-based 
interest groups and average citizens have   little   or   no   independent   influence’.2 The 
impression that corporate lobbying is more effective than others is shared by many, 
perhaps most, capitalist democracies.3  
But why may corporate lobbying be so effective? There might be two main 
reasons. Firstly, corporations have a structurally privileged position in capitalist 
                                                             
1 Lawrence Lessig, ‘Institutional   Corruption—Congress:   The   Paradigm   Case’ (The Randy L and 
Melvin R Berlin Family Lectures at the University of Chicago, 20 October 2014) at 34:30 
<https://youtu.be/CgAcGuxy-yo> accessed 4 November 2017. 
2 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I Page, 'Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, 
and Average Citizens' (2014) 12 Perspectives on politics 564 565. 




democracies. Secondly, corporations and businessmen tend to have greater economic 
resources than other groups and individuals, and they frequently use these resources in 
order to enhance political power.4  
The present chapter is introductory and aims to delineate the scope of the thesis. 
It will first try to explain some of the different forms of business influence over 
government. The next section will then delimit that the central focus of this thesis will 
be political finance. Finally, I will provide a structure of the thesis.  
 
1.2. The different forms of business influence over government 
This section will briefly address the different forms of business influence over 
government by discussing: (i) the privileged position of business in capitalist 
democracies and (ii) some of the corporate expenses. 
  
1.2.1. The privileged position of companies in capitalist democracies 
In his classic Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems, 
Charles Lindblom argued that business enjoys a structurally privileged position in 
capitalist democracies. His main point is that governments have a responsibility for 
avoiding inflation, unemployment, and economic depression; and a failure to achieve 
                                                             
4 I   take   political   power   as   ‘the   ability   to   influence   political   decisions’,   as   defined   by  David Copp, 
'Capitalism versus Democracy: The Marketing of Votes and the Marketing of Political Power' in John 
Douglas Bishop (ed), Ethics and Capitalism (University of Toronto Press 2000) 89. However, it 
should   be   noted   that   ‘political   power’   is   frequently   used   by   Brazilians   as   a   synonym   for  
‘institutionalised   political   power’,   that   is,   the   elected   politicians   who   occupy   the   legislative   and 
executive branches. Therefore, in some of the quotations from Brazilian actors along this thesis, 
‘political  power’  is  used  as  ‘institutionalised  political  power’. 
Another   term   that   will   be   extensively   used   throughout   this   thesis   is   ‘economic   power’.   I   take 
economic power as the power that derives from the private ownership of financial resources, or other 
forms of private assets. But many Brazilians use it as a synonym for corporations and businessmen. 
Therefore, in some of the quotations from Brazilian actors along this thesis, economic power is used 
in that sense. 
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these   goals   can   bring   governments   down.   As   a   consequence,   ‘government   officials  
cannot   be   indifferent   to   how  well   business   performs   its   functions’,   so   they   encourage  
businessmen to perform.5 
In this context, the argument follows, businessmen frequently  ask  ‘indulgences’  
from the government, such as tax offsets, weak antitrust enforcement, and so on. And 
governments in capitalist democracies will seriously weigh these requests. A 
government   official   ‘does   not   have   to   be   bribed,   duped   or   pressured   to   do so’.6 The 
government official will acknowledge that the unspoken adversity for business may 
result in misfortune for the government if it results in inflation, unemployment, or 
economic depression. Thus, the official may favour corporations on a certain issue 
because he believes in the economic importance of companies to generate jobs, promote 
growth, control inflation, generate production, tax revenues, and so forth. Businesses 
have, therefore, an organic advantage in capitalist democracies; a special political 
leverage.  
 As a rule, the larger the company is, the larger its importance for the economy of 
a given country may be. This notion has led to the so-called too big to fail problem — 
governments must save failing companies that are enormously important to the national 
economy.7 The bankruptcy of these companies would harm the national economy to the 
extent that governments feel compelled to provide publicly funded bailouts. Perhaps the 
foremost example is the US Government’s   bailout   in   response   to   the 2007–2008 
                                                             
5 Charles Edward Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (Basic 
Books 1977) 172.  
6 Ibid 174. 
7 L A Cunningham, 'Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the 
Industry Before It Unravels' (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 1698 1698. 
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financial crisis, formalised by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,8 
which arguably favoured financial corporations.9  
 There has also been discussion of whether globalisation has fostered the 
‘privileged’   position   of   companies.   According   to   this   view,   globalisation   would   have  
enhanced   ‘the   structural   power   of   corporate   capital   because   business   can   threaten   to  
invest   elsewhere   if   national   regulation   is   unfavourable’.10 As a consequence, states 
would  have  begun   to  compete   ‘for   the  approval   of   international  business  by  creating  a  
low-cost, business-friendly   environment   for   investment’.11 However, empirical studies 
have reached controversial conclusions — for example, researchers have found 
conflicting  results  regarding  countries’  ability  to  tax  business  or  business  executives  in  a  
globalised economy.12  
Finally, another structural issue is that there might be a collective action 
problem. As argued by Mancur Olson, smaller groups might be more capable than larger 
groups of clearly understanding what affects them, and organising themselves to pursue 
collective action to defend their interests.13 Since businesses are usually smaller in 
number than other groups, such as workers and consumers, they would also have a 
competitive advantage in lobbying in this regard.   
 
                                                             
8 Division A of Public Law 110–343, 122 Stat 3765, enacted October 3, 2008. 
9 See, eg, Lawrence J White, 'The Basics of Too Big to Fail', Perspectives on Dodd-Frank and 
Finance (MIT Press 2014). 
10 Gregory C Shaffer, 'Law and Business' in David Coen, Wyn Grant and Graham K Wilson (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government (Oxford University Press 2010) 4. 
11 Stephen Wilks, The Political Power of the Business Corporation (Edward Elgar 2013) 29.  
12 David Coen, Wyn Grant and Graham K Wilson, 'Political Science: Perspectives on Business and 
Government' in David Coen, Wyn Grant and Graham K Wilson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Business and Government (Oxford University Press 2010) 20, 20–21. Moreover, the authors have 
argued   that   ‘there   are   few   if   any   known instances of governments repealing environmental or 
consumer  protection  regulations  to  attract  or  retain  businesses’.  Ibid. 
13 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 
University Press 1965). 
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1.2.2. Corporate expenses  
There are many ways through which corporate and businessmens’ expenses may 
enhance their political power. This subsection will address four of them: (i) political 
donations and independent expenditures; (ii) the core business of media corporations; 
(iii) soft expenses, such as funding think-tanks; and (iv) influence over suppliers and 
employees. Although these strategies are particularly important in electoral periods, they 
are not limited to them. As the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) pointed out in 
Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom, ‘the   democratic   process   is   a  
continuing  one  to  be  nurtured  at  all  times  […]’.14   
 
1.2.2.1. Political donations and expenditures 
Companies and businessmen may try to directly influence the political process 
by making an effort to influence the cornerstone of democracy: elections. In this regard, 
they frequently make contributions to political parties and their politicians. And these 
donations help politicians to pursue more votes, by enabling the party and candidate to 
pay for the production of media content, media access, transportation, staff, and so forth. 
Similarly, corporations and businessmen can make independent expenditures to favour a 
given party or candidate in the political deliberation. 
When it comes to political finance, we can classify corruption under three 
different categories.15 There may be (a) quid pro quo corruption, (b) dependence and (c) 
                                                             
14 Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (2013) 203, paras 111. 
15 The   term   ‘political   finance’   includes   both   party   funding   and   campaign   finance,   since   it   refers   to  
‘disclosure,   transparency,   expenditure   and   contribution   limits,   as   well   as   direct   forms   of   public  
subsidies   to  parties  and  candidates’.  See,  eg,  Herbert E Alexander and Joel Federman, Comparative 
Political Finance in the 1980s (Advances in Political Science, Cambridge University Press 1989) 1. 
See also Timothy K Kuhner, 'The Corruption of Liberal and Social Democracies' (2016) 84 Fordham 
Law Review 2453 2456. 
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‘war  chest’  corruption,  as  the  majority  of  the  High  Court  of  Australia (the highest court 
in the Australian judicial system) defined in McCloy v New South Wales.16 
 Quid pro quo corruption  is  when  a  candidate  bargains  ‘with  a  wealthy  donor  to  
exercise his or her power in office for the benefit of the donor in return for financial 
assistance  with  the  election  campaign’.17 In other words, there is an illicit agreement that 
involves a donation by a wealthy donor and a subsequent (or previous) political benefit 
granted by the office-holder.  
 Dependence corruption,   in   turn,   is   subtler.   ‘It   arises   from   an   office-holder's 
dependence on the financial support of a wealthy patron to a degree that is apt to 
compromise the expectation, fundamental to representative democracy, that public 
power  will  be  exercised  in  the  public  interest’.18 This argument assumes that politicians 
are frequently trapped by a repetition game — since many politicians want to get re-
elected, or run for another office in the future, they will need money again in order to 
have a more competitive candidacy. As a result, this dependence on business donations 
or independent expenditures will constrain the politician while in office: he will think 
twice before taking a decision that will displease business interests, or he will give the 
                                                             
16 [2015] HCA 34. 
17 Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 26–27 (1976); McCutcheon v Federal Election Commission, 188 L Ed 
2d 468, 485, 495–498 (2014).  
18 McCloy v New South Wales at 47 [36]. In fact, the judges of the High Court of Australia have used 
the term clientelism to describe the phenomenon of dependence. However, clientelism has 
traditionally meant another thing within the social science scholarship on Brazilian politics: the term 
has been used to describe the situation in which a politician provides a personal favour to a voter 
(such as a public service, jobs and tax exceptions) in exchange for his vote. More broadly, clientelism 
has also been used to express the exchange of favours between politicians of different powers in 
Brazil: for instance, when a president of the republic grants a personal political favour to a federal 
deputy, in exchange for his political support. See Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the 
Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil (Stanford University Press 1999) 177. See also 
José Murilo de Carvalho, 'Mandonismo, Coronelismo, Clientelismo: Uma Discussão Conceitual' 
(1997) 40 Dados. Thus, within the Brazilian context, the term has always expressed inequality of 
powers where a politician is the most powerful actor in the relationship — eg, the politician who 
grants the favour is clearly more powerful than the other party, be it a less powerful politician or voter 
— which is quite different from the way the Australian judges have used the term. Since this thesis 
deals  mainly  with   the  Brazilian   scenario,   I  will,   therefore,  use   the   term   ‘dependence   corruption’   to  
express the phenomenon described by the majority of the High Court of Australia. Lawrence Lessig 
uses  the  term  ‘dependence  corruption’  in  a  similar  way  as  it  is  used  in  this  thesis.  Lawrence Lessig, 
Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to Stop It (1st edn, Twelve 2011). 
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donor privileged access to his decision-making on a given topic.19 A similar argument is 
that   it  might  be  ‘human’   to   feel grateful to those who helped you to achieve a goal. A 
politician’s   behaviour  would   thus be influenced by a psychological sense of gratitude 
towards the business that donated him money or made expenditures in his favour. The 
official, the argument follows, may grant privileged access to the financial supporter 
because of that sentiment.20 
It should be noted that, as with quid pro quo corruption, dependence corruption 
also   relates   to   the   lack   of   integrity   of   the   elected   politician’s   attitude.   But,   because  
dependence corruption is centred on the dependence of the politician on a wealthy 
patron,  it  ‘is  neither  easily  detected  nor  practical  to  criminalise.’21  
 Finally, there is war chest corruption,22 which attempts directly against political 
equality between parties and their candidates. It occurs when the volume of wealthy 
donations is so pronounced that distorts electoral competition, favouring parties and 
candidates aligned with business interests. Business-friendly candidates who are heavily 
funded by corporations will have more money to pay for the creation of media content, 
transportation, staff, and so forth. Similarly, corporations and businessmen may make 
overwhelmingly large independent expenditures favouring certain parties and 
candidates. As a consequence, there is an imbalance in public debate (that is, a 
predominant   influence   in   the   flow   of   political   communication)   and   ‘a   threat   to   the  
electoral  process   itself’.23 Within this kind of corruption, sometimes lobbying may not 
                                                             
19 As   put   by   Keith   Ewing,   ‘even   if   the   donation   does   not   directly   secure   policy   changes   or   other  
benefits for the donor in these systems, such access in itself may help to put the donor in an unrivalled 
position when  a  decision  is  taken’  (emphasis  added).  Keith D Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party 
Funding in Modern British Politics (Hart 2007) 24. 
20 For a similar argument, see Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to 
Stop It, 114. 
21 McConnell v Federal Election Commission, 540 US 93, 153 (2003). In this way, we never really 
know  if  a  corporate  donation  was  the  sole  factor  that  formed  the  official’s  opinion. 
22 McCloy v New South Wales at 47 [38]. 
23 Ibid, citing Federal Election Commission v Beaumont 539 US 146, 154–155 (2003). 
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even be necessary  since  the  politician’s  ideology would already be aligned with business 
interests.  
 
1.2.2.2. The media 
 We have just seen that companies can spend financial resources to influence 
elections. There is, however, a very special business sector that influences the 
democratic debate because of its core business: the media. Media companies influence 
the political debate not because they spend financial resources in the terms discussed 
above, but rather because their core business is related to mass communication. They 
maintain an active and informed citizenry, and divulge information and ideas.24 
Therefore,  media   companies   ‘are   particularly  well   positioned   to   exert   undue   influence  
on   the   political   debate’25 having a vital role in elections. The term media has usually 
meant the traditional media: that is, broadcast corporations and the press. However, the 
new media also plays an important role in political deliberation: that is, internet 
corporations, such as Google and Facebook, who do not focus on the production of 
content, but have the power to organise news and information that appear on their online 
platforms. 
Recently, another category of mass communication corporation has emerged: 
those related to behavioural research through big data. The year of 2015 has shown that 
elections can be impacted by technology companies whose aim is to change the 
behaviour of large groups, such as the company SCL (Strategic Communication 
                                                             
24 Jacob Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 174. 
25 David Cole, 'First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance' (1991) 9 
Yale Law & Policy Review 236 268. 
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Laboratories) Group and its affiliate, Cambridge Analytica.26 Press accounts report that 
these companies have worked for the Brexit campaign in the UK and for the Donald 
Trump campaign in the US.27 According to Emma Briant, these companies aim to model 
mass  populations  and  then  change  people’s  beliefs.28 However, this phenomenon is too 
recent for a solid analysis: we do not have enough evidence to define how effective these 
companies have really been29 and there are questions about their legality.  
 
1.2.2.3. The soft expenses 
Corporations and business elites from all economic sectors also can foster the 
creation and dissemination of information. For instance, they can publish opinion reports 
about governmental policies.  
Moreover, corporations and businessmen from all economic sectors may help to 
disseminate information that they do not create: they may fund academic scholars, 
universities and think-tanks.30 As the degree to which business controls the disclosure of 
information, there are at least four different possible interactions between business and 
                                                             
26 Frances  Stead  Sellers,   ‘Cruz  campaign  paid  $750,000   to   ‘psychographic  profiling’  company’  The 
Washington Post (19 October 2015) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cruz-campaign-paid-
750000-to-psychographic-profiling-company/2015/10/19/6c83e508-743f-11e5-9cbb-
790369643cf9_story.html?utm_term=.c2cdf1311e88> accessed 19 March 2017. 
27 Carole  Cadwalladr,  ‘Robert  Mercer:  the  big  data  billionaire  waging  war  on  mainstream  media’   
The Observer (26 February 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/26/robert-mercer-
breitbart-war-on-media-steve-bannon-donald-trump-nigel-farage> accessed 19 March 2017. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Editorial,   ‘The   Guardian   view   on   big   data:   the   danger   is   less   democracy’   The Guardian (26 
February 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/26/the-guardian-view-on-
big-data-the-danger-is-less-democracy> accessed 19 March 2017. Martin   Robbins,   ‘The   myth   that  
British   data   scientists   won   the   election   for   Trump’   Little Atoms (30 January 2017) 
<http://littleatoms.com/news-science/donald-trump-didnt-win-election-through-facebook> accessed 
19 March 2017. 
30 These think-tanks may include institutes founded by political leaders — such as former presidents 
and prime ministers. For example, many corporations have funded institutes of former presidents of 
Brazil (eg, the Institutes of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula) and of the United States (eg, the 
Institutes of Bill Clinton and George W Bush). These institutes frequently produce conferences, 
seminars, policy reports and so on.  
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academia/think-tanks. Firstly, companies may hire consultations of academic scholars in 
order to inform a particular issue. For example, in Brazil, corporations often hire legal 
scholars to write an opinion about a specific issue so they can present it to the court in a 
given case.31 In this case, corporations control the dissemination of information.  
The second category of interaction is when companies have financial links with 
specific scholars, whose research has been ideologically aligned with business interests 
on a given topic. For instance, press accounts report that many of the scholars who 
testified in congressional hearings about the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act had a professional link with financial institutions at the 
moment they were heard.32 Although companies might not have controlled what the 
scholars said, apparently their interests were ideologically aligned.  
A third category would be donations to a university department. For example, 
the   King’s   College   London   School   of   Law   received a gift of £20 million from Mr 
Dickson Poon, who owns a British department store chain. This gift was part of an 
investment   strategy   to   establish   the   ‘School   of   Law   as   a   leader   in   the   field   of  
transnational   law’.33 Although it can be argued that Mr Dickson Poon has a general 
interest in transnational law because his company benefits from globalisation, he does 
                                                             
31 A similar situation happens when a company funds the empirical research of academic scholars but 
controls what will be published. For example, an association of banks may hire a scholar or a group of 
scholars  to  research  the  mental  wellness  of  the  banks’  employees vis-à-vis the rest of the population; 
and insert a clause in the financing agreement that the academic scholars can only publish the results 
in  case  the  banks’  employees  have  equal  or  less  mental  diseases  than  the  rest  of  the  population.  In  this  
case, therefore, the banks control the disclosure of the research results. Letting the scholars publish 
results saying the contrary — ie,  the  banks’  employees  have  more  mental  illness  than  the  rest  of  the  
population — could lead banks to spend more on the health of their employees.  
32 Some academics were, for example, members of the board of a financial company, according to 
some   reports.   Lee   Fang,   ‘The   Scholars  Who   Shill   for  Wall   Street’   The Nation (23 October 2013) 
<https://www.thenation.com/article/scholars-who-shill-wall-street/> accessed 19 March 2017. See 
also   Emily   Flitter,   Kristina   Cooke   and   Pedro   da   Costa,   ‘Special   Report:   For   some   professors,  
disclosure   is  academic’  Reuters (20 December 2010) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-academics-
conflicts-idUSTRE6BJ3LF20101220> accessed 19 March 2017. 
33 Katherine  Barnes,  ‘£40m  investment  programme  for  School  of  Law’  The Dickson Poon School of 
Law|News (19 March 2012) 
<http://www.kcl.ac.uk/newsevents/news/newsrecords/2012/03March/40m-investment-programme-
for-School-of-Law.aspx> accessed 19 March 2017. 
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not control the content of the teaching and research, and the content might even go 
against his interests. 
Finally, a fourth category might be when a company funds research that appears 
to be against its interests in the short-term but brings long-term benefits. For example, a 
large brewery company might fund research on binge drinking, as a matter of marketing. 
The company does not control the dissemination of the results, and they may indeed 
work against   the  company’s  short-term interests. But the firm might enhance the value 
of its brand by being   viewed   as   a   ‘socially   responsible’   brewery.  This might give the 
company a better position to bargain future policies.34  
 
1.2.2.4. The influence of corporations over suppliers and the 
 labour market 
Corporations may enhance their lobbying power by staffing employees of and 
recruiting employees from the government. At least in theory, this revolving door may 
enable companies to influence government policies and law enforcement. However, as 
Teachout and Khan state, ‘it is difficult to prove that ties to corporations or aspirations to 
work for them’ shape any particular enforcement decision, ‘as officials can always offer 
explanations for why they believe a certain choice advanced the public interest’.35 Some 
scholars have argued that the influence might be subtle: non-rational forms — like 
                                                             
34 Coen, Grant and Wilson, 'Political Science: Perspectives on Business and Government' 10. 
35 Zephyr Teachout and Lina Khan, 'Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power' 
(2014) 9 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 37 45. Teachout and Khan have made a 
literature  review  of   the  empirical  research  on   that  matter  and   found  out  that  “at   least  one  study   has 
rebutted the idea that revolving door dynamics weaken SEC regulation. Some people even argue that 
the   desire   to   join   private   practice   actually   incentivises   tough   enforcement,   which   can   raise   one’s  
profile  and  showcase  one’s  expertise”.   
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identity, status, and relationships — could end up shaping policy according to corporate 
interests.36  
Big  firms  may  also  try  to   influence  their  suppliers’  political  choices,  especially  
in monopsony or oligopsony situations (when there is just one or few buyers but many 
sellers). Teachout and Khan noted that large food processing companies have 
constrained the political voice of their small and medium-sized suppliers (for example, 
chicken farmers). In 2009, the Obama administration began to measure the state of 
consolidation in agricultural markets. The Attorney General Eric Holder and Agriculture 
Secretary Tom Vilsack travelled around the country to hear directly from farmers about 
the conditions they faced. However, there are reports that in the days before the poultry 
hearing in Alabama, representatives from Tyson and Pilgrim’s  Pride  visited   farmers   to  
threaten them: if they spoke out at the hearing they would face retaliation. As a 
consequence, reportedly many farmers did not show up, or were afraid of speaking up 
because of said threats.  Thus,  arguably,  ‘for  many  farmers, their economic dependence 
lost  them  their  right  to   free  speech  and  assembly’.37 Similarly, corporations may try to 
influence  their  employees’  political  choices,  such  as  their votes in elections, in more or 
less subtle ways.  
 
1.3. The scope of the thesis  
This thesis will focus on elections, with a particular emphasis on political 
finance, though there will be important discussions on the role of the media. Problems 
such as the privileged position of companies in capitalist democracies will be discussed 
                                                             
36 Ibid.   In  addition,  Gregory  Shaffer  argues   that  companies’  great   financial  resources  also  may  help  
them  “to attract  the  best  lawyers  to  gather  evidence  and  put  forward  legal  arguments”  when  it  comes  
to litigation. Shaffer, 'Law and Business' 6.  He  also  claims  that   the  ability  of  companies  to  “impose  
costs   on   the   opponent  and   the   capability   of   absorbing   costs”  may   affect   how   the   law  operates.   For  
discussion and references, see ibid 8. 
37 Teachout and Khan, 'Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power' 51.  
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just briefly in some parts of the thesis. I will not focus on the influence of corporations 
over suppliers and the labour market; nor will I discuss corporate soft expenses.  
Since this thesis will focus on political finance, it will focus on business 
influence over the legislative and executive branches of government — including an 
independent government agency. The influence of companies and businessmen over the 
judiciary, though important, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 Brazil will be the country in focus. Between the 1994 and 2014 federal elections, 
corporate donations dominated the main financial resources of parties and candidates. 
To illustrate, corporate donations accounted for 74% of Brazilian political party and 
candidate funding in the 2010 general election,38 and 76% in 2014.39 For many, 
including the majority of the Supreme Court in the ADI 4650 case heard in 2015, war 
chest and dependence corruption apparently occurred in Brazil. 
The Constitution of 1988 structures the Brazilian capitalist democracy.40 
Already  in  article  1,  the  Constitution  establishes  that  Brazil  is  a  ‘legal  democratic  state’,  
founded  on  ‘citizenship’  and  ‘political  pluralism’,  among  other  values.  The  democratic  
feature of the Brazilian state is further reinforced by the Constitution several times 
throughout its text.41  
The  country’s  capitalism,  in  turn,  is  first  referred  to  at  item  IV  of  article  1,  which  
establishes that the Brazilian legal state is founded on the social value of free enterprise. 
Moreover,  the  Constitution’s  article  170 establishes that the economic order is based on 
                                                             
38 STF, ADI 4650/DF, Rel Min Luiz Fux, DJ 04/03/2016. Min Dias Toffoli, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 
89. 
39 Bruno Carazza, Dinheiro, Eleições e Poder: As Engrenagens do Sistema Político Brasileiro 
(Companhia das Letras 2018) 43.  
40 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, DF: Senado Federal, DOU 5/10/1988. For 
an official translation of the Constitution to English, see <http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-
constitution> accessed 17 February 2017. 
41 See, eg, articles 17, 24 and 34. For an analysis of the constitutional provisions that structure 
capitalism in Brazil, see, eg, Celso Antonio Bandeira de Mello, Curso de Direito Administrativo 
(Malheiros 2009) 788. 
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the  principles  of  ‘private  property’  and  ‘free  competition’,  among  others.  Structured  by  
the 1988 Constitution and by infra-constitutional legislation enacted in the 1990s,42 the 
Brazilian state is essentially a regulator of a liberal economy, though the government 
may occasionally implement industrial policies to foster certain industries (as the 
Workers’  Party  administrations  did).43  
Infra-constitutional  legislation  regulates  individual’s  political  donations (Laws n 
9096/1995 and 9504/1997).44 Donations by corporations were allowed from the 1994 to 
2014 federal elections (the Brazilian Supreme Court then ruled in 2015 that they violate 
the   Constitution   in   the   country’s   context).45 While companies and businessmen have 
been donating individually for the most part,46 lobbying is considered to be hybrid. 
Corporations and businessmen may lobby both individually and through business 
confederations, state federations and associations.47 Lobbying remains unregulated by 
legislation, however.  
In short, it is reasonable to assume that Brazilian business operates upon a plural 
structure. That is, that business sectors compete with other groups of society (workers, 
environmentalists, non-profit organisations, and so forth) for political influence.48 
However, this thesis will assume that companies and businessmen have a privileged 
                                                             
42 See, eg, the Competition Act 1994 (Lei nº 8884, de 11 de junho de 1994, DOU 13/6/1994), the 
Brazilian Consumer Protection Code (Lei nº 8078, de 11 de setembro de 1990, DOU 12/09/1990), the 
Antidumping Law (Lei nº 9019, de 30 de março de 1995, DOU 31/03/1995). 
43 Historically, the country’s capitalism was characterised by developmentalist economic policies 
implemented  by   the  government.  But   the  country’s  capitalism  shifted   to  a   liberal  economy  after   the  
1990s.   When   the   Workers’   Party   took   office,   in   2003,   it   combined   the   current   liberal   economic 
structure   with   some   developmentalist   policies,   such   as   the   ones   destined   to   foster   ‘national  
champions’  (ie,  the  state-­‐‑ owned Brazilian Development Bank/BNDES have provided lower interest 
loans for favoured companies, in order to assist them to compete internationally). It should be noted 
that some of these companies were large political donors — as will be addressed in chapter eight. 
44 Lei nº 9096, de 19 de setembro de 1995, DOU 20/9/1995 (Political Parties Act 1995). Lei nº 9504, 
de 30 de setembro de 1997, DOU 01/10/1997 (Elections Act 1997). 
45 STF, ADI 4650/DF. 
46 For exceptions to the rule, see section 3.4.  
47 Manoel Leonardo Santos, 'O Parlamento sob Influência: O Lobby da Indústria na Câmara dos 
Deputados' (Tese de Doutorado em Ciência Política, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco 2011) 83.  
48 Surely, there may also exist competition between economic sectors, corporations and businessmen. 
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structural position in the plural channels of the Brazilian capitalist democracy. It will 
further assume that companies and businessmen tend to have greater economic resources 
than other groups and individuals, and that they frequently spend these resources in 
order to influence the government.49 
Moreover, I should highlight that I will focus more on the non-criminal forms of 
political finance corruption (dependence and war chest) than the criminal one (quid pro 
quo). There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, in my view, quid pro quo corruption 
is just one part of the problem. Relying on decisions from the Supreme Court (not only 
the Brazilian one, but also those of other countries, such as Canada) that will be 
discussed in chapter four, this thesis will assume that dependence and war chest 
corruption are as disturbing as quid pro quo:  they  all  harm  people’s  trust  in  democracy,  
in one way or another. In this sense, it is no coincidence that, by protecting the electoral 
process from dependence and war chest corruption, we also help to protect it from quid 
pro quo corruption, as it will be argued in Part C of the thesis. Secondly, since this thesis 
relies on an electoral law approach, it can better contribute to academic debate by 
discussing how the quid pro quo cases fit into the whole context. Criminal lawyers are 
better trained to discuss, in a comprehensive way, the implications of quid pro quo cases 
and the material proof that those cases require.50 Thirdly, although relevant quid pro quo 
criminal cases have emerged in Brazil in the last years, many of them are still ongoing 
cases, which hinders proper academic analysis. Thus, we lack the proper temporal 
                                                             
49 These assumptions align the descriptive and empirical parts of the thesis (parts A and B) with the 
neo-pluralist account of democracy in political theory. For a description of this school of thought, see 
David Held, Models of Democracy (2 edn, Polity 1996) 214. Some of the most well-known works 
associated with neo-pluralism  are  Charles  Lindblom’s  Politics and Markets: The World's Political-
Economic Systems and   Robert   Dahl’s   later   publications,   particularly   A Preface to Economic 
Democracy (University of California Press 1986). My view is that the neo-pluralist approach best 
describes the current Brazilian reality. However, in the last part of the thesis (Part C) I argue that, 
according to the Constitution, the Brazilian society should aim the ideal democratic legitimacy from 
the Rawlsian point of view and, as such, I propose reforms.  
50 In this way, this thesis does not draw any conclusions about the involvement of any person in quid 
pro quo corruption, or if a given public officer has committed any kind of wrongdoing. 
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distance to completely rely on them; they should be part of an analysis of the whole 
political finance context. It is in this vein that the recent quid pro quo cases will be 
addressed in chapters six and eight. In other words, they will be addressed, but from the 
broader perspective of political finance corruption in general. 
 The thesis has three main questions. Firstly, it asks how the Brazilian law of 
democracy is framed, with a focus on political finance.  
 Businesses make political donations to have more political influence. One of the 
issues that businesses may seek to influence is antitrust legislation and its enforcement. 
Therefore, the  thesis’  second  main  question  is what were the implications, if any, of the 
political finance system based on corporate donations for the appearance of the 
democratic integrity of antitrust law. 
Finally, the question that then arises is how the law of democracy should be 
framed in order to promote the appearance of electoral integrity. 
 
1.4. The map of the thesis 
Therefore, to answer those questions, the thesis is organised into three parts. Part 
A addresses the Brazilian law of democracy, by which I mean the main norms that 
structure Brazilian democracy, with an emphasis on political finance legislation. Part B 
addresses one of the possible effects of this structure. Part C proposes a reform for this 
structure.  
The objectives of each chapter (and the methods implemented to meet them) will 
be explored in detail within each chapter,51 but the thesis is structured as follows: 
                                                             






In Part A, before seeing how they are financed, we will see who the Brazilian 
parties are (party system), where they compete (electoral system), what they compete for 
(system of government) and how this political competition is covered by the media 
(media system). This is the task of chapter two, which also tries to explain why money 
might be important for Brazilian politicians.  
 After the groundwork laid down by chapter two, chapter three presents an 
overview of political finance legislation in Brazil. It discusses the political finance 
system based on corporate donations that was in force between the 1994 and 2014 
elections. This chapter further elaborates how the system shifted to the current one based 
on mixed resources. 
  
Part B 
Part B of the thesis investigates, through case studies, what were the 
implications, if any, of the political finance system based on corporate donation, for 
another branch of law: antitrust. It explores, more precisely, if there were any 
consequences to the appearance of democratic integrity of antitrust law. These case 
studies remain topical because, although corporate donations are now banned, there are 
discussions as to whether they should be re-introduced.52 
                                                             
52 Considering that political finance laws are never-ending and generate permanent debates, some 
politicians and judges have been arguing that corporate donations should be re-introduced to the 
Brazilian political finance system. See, eg, Igor  Gadelha  and  Felipe  Frazão,  ‘Lideranças  do  PP,  PSDB  
e  PSD  saem  em  defesa  da  doação  empresarial  de  campanha’  O Estado de S. Paulo (16 August 2017) 
<https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,liderancas-do-pp-psdb-e-psd-saem-em-defesa-da-
doacao-empresarial-de-campanha,70001938801>   11   June   2018;;   Laryssa   Borges,   ‘Gilmar   Mendes:  




Before exploring the practical implications in chapters five and six, chapter four 
articulates a theory for matters involving political finance corruption. To put it in a 
metaphorical manner, chapter four offers the lenses that we shall use when reading the 
more empirical  chapters  five  and  six.  By  discussing  the   importance  of  people’s  trust  in  
elections to the perpetuation of representative democracy, chapter four tries to explain 
why the appearance of political finance corruption might be sufficient as a justification 
for a reform of the legislation.  
Chapter   five   then   investigates  whether  campaign  finance  has   impacted  Brazil’s  
antitrust legislation, focusing on the legislative process of the Competition Act 2011,53 
more specifically on amendments that shaped the Act’s  text.  
Chapter six, in turn, discusses whether corporate donations have affected 
enforcement of the antitrust legislation. It focuses mainly on the Brazilian competition 
agency, Cade (acronym in Portuguese for Conselho Administrativo de Defesa 
Econômica).  
 
 Part C 
Part C suggests a reform of part of the Brazilian law of democracy in order to 
enhance  people’s  trust  in  elections. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
<https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/proibicao-a-doacao-privada-pode-ser-revista-diz-gilmar-mendes/> 
accessed   11   June   2018;;  Edson  Sardinha,   ‘Gilmar  Mendes  e  Maia  articulam  volta  do   financiamento  
eleitoral   por   empresas’   Congresso em Foco (22 August 2017) 
<https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/amp/noticias/gilmar-mendes-e-maia-articulam-volta-do-
financiamento-eleitoral-por-empresas/> accessed 11 June 2018. In the academia, see, eg, Bruno 
Carazza,  ‘Interesses  Econômicos,  Representação  Política  e  Produção  Legislativa no Brasil sob a Ótica 
do  Financiamento  de  Campanhas  Eleitorais’  (Tese  de  Doutorado  em  Direito,  Universidade  Federal  de  
Minas Gerais 2016) 159 <http://www.bibliotecadigital.ufmg.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/1843/BUOS-
ASNHA2/bruno_carazza___tese___vers_o_para_defesa.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 1st August 2018.  
53 Lei nº 12529, de 30 de novembro de 2011, DOU 01/11/2011 e retificado em 02/12/2011. For an 
English version of the Act, see <http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/legislation/laws/law-no-12529-2011-
english-version-from-18-05-2012.pdf/view> accessed 17 February 2017. 
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Chapter seven sets the theoretical foundations for a Rawlsian interpretation of the 
Brazilian Constitution and, taking into account the constitutional text, proposes a new 
paradigm for regulation: to control concentrations of political speech to foster the 
appearance of free formation of public opinion.  
Chapter eight debates the consequences of this paradigm for political competition 
between non-candidate citizens and their groups — that is, those citizens who make a 
political donation or expenditure; or own media resources, particularly in the traditional 
media.  
Finally, chapter nine discusses the implications of this paradigm for the 
competition between political parties and their candidates, focusing on their financial 
























Chapter Two  




The discipline of campaign finance 
should consider not only the culture-
historical circumstances of each country 
but also the characteristics related to the 
system of government, the party system, 
the electoral rules in general and the 
political practices. 




Before seeing how political parties are financed, we must see who they are, 
where they compete, what they compete for, and how this competition is covered by the 
media.  
Thus, this chapter is organised as follows: the first section will cover the party 
system, while the second and third sections will respectively focus on the system of 
government and the electoral system. After looking at these systems, it will be possible 
to briefly address a controversy that takes place within the academic debate about 
                                                             
54 Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 176. All speeches quoted in this thesis that were made originally in 
Portuguese or in Spanish and that were not translated by the original author, have been translated to 
English by me. 
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Brazilian parties: whether they are weak or strong. Finally, the last section will discuss 
the   media   system,   since   the   media’s   coverage   is   central   to   political   competition. All 
those sections will be mainly based on relevant legislation and on interdisciplinary 
literature to understand how the Brazilian context works in practice. I will not 
particularly investigate Brazilian cultural political practices because they will be 
addressed throughout the thesis.55  
The chapter will principally cover the New Republic period, which began in 
1985 — that is, when a twenty-one-year-old authoritarian military rule fell and gave 
birth to the present democratic regime. 
Hopefully, this will serve as a background chapter for the thesis and will give the 
reader a brief description of the Brazilian context.  
 
2.2. The party system 
Political  parties  are  the  ‘bridge  between  government  and  society’.56 It is through 
political parties that people organise themselves to compete in elections and occupy the 
political institutions of the state — and, once in power, pass legislation and implement 
the policies that govern society.57 In Brazil, candidates are required to belong to a party 
to run for political office (article 14, paragraph 3, item V, of the Constitution of 1988).  
                                                             
55 The three most commonly referenced Brazilian cultural practices are clientelism, patronage and 
patrimonialism. For clientelism, see footnote 18 in chapter one; for patronage, see footnote 74 in this 
chapter; and for patrimonialism see footnote 230 in chapter three. 
56 David French, 'Foreword' in Peter Burnell (ed), Building Better Democracies: Why Political Parties 
Matter (Westminster Foundation for Democracy 2004) 1. 




 Brazilian  parties  were  suppressed  several  times  throughout  the  country’s  history,  
which led to constant changes of party systems.58 
 But, after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1985, a free multi-party system 
was established. Right after taking office that year, civilian president José Sarney and 
the Congress enacted the Constitutional Amendment n 25, which abolished all previous 
                                                             
58 The first Brazilian parties, created at the beginning of the ninetieth century, were suppressed by the 
leaders of the 1889 coup which abolished the Monarchy and introduced the Republic. All parties from 
the First Brazilian Republic, in turn, were banned by president Getulio Vargas in 1937, when he 
implemented an authoritarian regime. After 1945, mass political parties emerged in Brazil with the 
introduction of the Fourth Republic and its mass democracy. But they also had a short life: in a coup 
in 1964, the military took power and once again all parties were banned. 
After taking office, the military enacted the Institutional Act n 2 and the Complementary Act n 4, 
which implemented a controlled two-party system. The two-party system was formed by the pro-
government party National Renovating Alliance (ARENA), and the opposition Brazilian Democratic 
Movement (MDB) party, both artificially created by the military. Moreover, all elections for president 
and vice-president became indirect (article 9, Institutional Act n 2). Thus, by widely manipulating 
electoral laws to ensure the majority of the pro-military ARENA party and prevent the growth of 
opposition in Congress, the military were  ‘elected’  several  times  for  the  Presidency,  ruling the country 
for about twenty years. Ato Institucional nº 2, de 27 de outubro de 1965, DOU 27/10/1965, 
republicado em 28/10 e 05/11/1965. Ato Complementar nº 4, de 20 de novembro de 1965, DOU 
22/11/1965. 
The current multi-party system began to be formed in 1979. Worried by a close call at the 1978 
elections, military strategists decided that the two-party system was no longer working to their 
advantage, and thus opted to divide and conquer the opposition by ordering a return to a multi-party 
system. Therefore, in 1979 the Law n 6683 was enacted, giving back political rights to those 
politicians and parliamentarians that had had their political rights suspended. That same year, the 
bipartisan system was ended by Law n 6767, enabling the creation of other opposition parties, such as 
the  Workers’  Party  (PT).  Lei  nº  6683,  de  28  de  agosto  de  1979,  DOU  28/8/1979.  Lei  nº  6767,  de  20  
de dezembro de 1979, DOU 20/12/1979.  
In sum, the party system changed in all political transitions, since the Imperial period: it changed from 
the two-party format of the Empire; to the one-party per state of the First Republic; to the 
considerable flux of parties, with no crystallisation of a defined party structure in the early years of 
the Vargas Era; to the no-party state of Vargas’  Estado Novo; to the incipient three-party system of 
the Fourth Republic; to the artificially created two-party system of the military dictatorship; to the 
strictly controlled party system of the military regime after 1979; and, finally, to the current free 
multi-party system that has been developing since 1985. 
For a historical analysis about the Brazilian parties and its constant suppressions, see Mainwaring, 
Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Afonso Arinos 
de Melo Franco, História e Teoria dos Partidos Políticos no Brasil (Editora Alfa-Omega 1974). For 
the manipulation of election legislation by the military, see Timothy J Power, The Political Right in 
Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization (Pennsylvania State University 
Press 2000) 63. Eli Diniz, 'O Ciclo Autoritário: A Lógica Partidário-Eleitoral e a Erosão do Regime' 
in Olavo Brasil Junior de Lima (ed), O Balanço do Poder (IUPERJ: Rio Fundo Editora 1990). Bolivar 
Lamounier and Rachel Meneguello, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation: The Brazilian 
Case (Latin American Program, the Wilson Center 1985) 22. 
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restrictions on the creation of parties and legalised outlawed Marxist parties.59 Perhaps 
more importantly, a new Constitution was enacted in 1988, reinforcing that the creation 
of political parties is now free, and stating that parties have the autonomy to define their 
internal structure, organisation and operation, with a few conditions, such as a required 
‘national  character’.60 Moreover, in 1995, the current Political Parties Act was enacted, 
confirming that parties are now legal entities of private law (and not of public law, as 
previously).61 These  have  been  the  parties’  legal  basis  of  the  existing  democratic  regime.   
 In the current multi-party system, 35 political parties have obtained official 
registration,62 and around 26 were successful in obtaining representation in the Congress 
during the last legislature (that is, the 55th).63 Brazil has arguably been a world leader in 
the number of parties64 and in the fragmentation of Congress.65 
The three most important Brazilian parties in the New Republic have 
traditionally been the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement, the centre-right 
Brazilian Social Democratic Party and the centre-left Workers’   Party.   In   the   2018  
elections, the Social Liberal Party emerged as part of the rise of the world-wide new 
populist right-wing movement.  
                                                             
59 Emenda Constitucional nº 25, de 15 de maio de 1985, DOU 16/5/1985. For a more detailed account 
of the transition from the military dictatorship to the current democratic regime, see Power, The 
Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization, 69.  
60 Artigo 17 da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988.  
61 Lei nº 9096/1995. For a brief discussion about the evolution of legislation that has composed the 
parties’  legal  framework,  see,  eg,  Rogerio Schmitt, Partidos Politicos no Brasil (1945–2000) (Jorge 
Zahar 2000) 64. A possible explanation for this shift is that parties saw the need to protect themselves 
from the abusive interference of the state, considering the occurrence of the military authoritarian 
regime from 1964 to 1985, when the regime abusively manipulated the party system.  
62 TSE   (Tribunal   Superior   Eleitoral),   ‘Partidos   políticos   registrados   no   TSE’  
<http://www.tse.jus.br/partidos/partidos-politicos/registrados-no-tse> accessed 11 June 2018.  
63 The 55th legislature met from 1st February 2015 to 31st January 2019. Senado Federal, ‘Senadores’  
<https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/tablet/senadoresporpartido> accessed 11 June 2018. Câmara 
dos Deputados <http://www.camara.leg.br/Internet/Deputado/bancada.asp> accessed 11 June 2018.  
64 Barry Ames, Andy Baker and Lucio R Rennó, 'The Quality of Elections in Brazil: Policy, 
Performance, Pageantry, or Pork?' in Peter R Kingstone and Timothy J Power (eds), Democratic 
Brazil Revisited (University of Pittsburgh 2008) 109. 
65 Marcus   André   Melo   ‘O   queijo   suíço’   Folha de S. Paulo (15 October 2018) 
<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/marcus-melo/2018/10/o-queijo-suico.shtml> accessed 06 
January 2019.  
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2.2.1. The Brazilian Democratic Movement  
The   Brazilian   Democratic   Movement   (mostly   known   as   ‘MDB’,   acronym   in  
Portuguese for Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) was the largest party in the Senate, 
and the second largest in the Chamber of Deputies in the last legislature.66 It is a centrist 
heterogeneous catch-all party67 and, most frequently, lacks a unified party program and 
ideology. 
The MDB was founded in 1967 as the opposition party of the first round of the 
military dictatorship.   
But, after the decline of the military authoritarian regime, the MDB changed its 
opposition party feature,   to   transform   itself   into   arguably   the   ‘most   opportunistic   and  
internally diverse  of  Brazilian  parties’.68 The party is often divided between government 
and opposition supporters, as its members range from the centre-right to the centre-left 
of the political spectrum.  
Due   to   the   large   size   of   its   delegation   and   its   members’   flexibility on 
programmatic matters, the MDB is often sought out as a governing ally.69 Indeed, since 
the inauguration of the New Republic, the party has remained in the executive, in one 
way or another. The only administration that MDB did not join was Fernando  Collor’s  in  
1990, but he was impeached less than two years after taking office.70  
                                                             
66 UOL Eleições,   ‘O   mapa   completo   de   quem   vai   fazer   as   leis   do   Brasil’  
<http://eleicoes.uol.com.br/2014/raio-x/1-turno/congresso#capa> accessed 8 August 2017. The 
intention of mentioning the ranking above is only to give an idea of the size of the party. Some 
congressmen have changed party affiliations after taking office. 
67 Wendy Hunter, 'The Partido dos Trabalhadores: Still a Left Party?' in Peter R Kingstone and 
Timothy J Power (eds), Democratic Brazil Revisited (University of Pittsburgh Press 2008) 22. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Following   Collor’s   impeachment,   the   idea   that   it   is   considerably   more difficult for a Brazilian 
president to govern without the support of a large majority in Congress gained strength. See Marcus 
Andre de Melo and Carlos Pereira, Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty 




2.2.2. The Brazilian Social Democratic Party  
 The  Brazilian  Social  Democratic  Party   (mostly   known  as   ‘PSDB’,   acronym   in  
Portuguese for Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira) is a centre-right party, which 
was the third largest party in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in the 55th 
legislature.71  
The PSDB won the presidential elections in 1994 and 1998, with Fernando 
Henrique   Cardoso,   and   was   the   Workers’   Party   main   competitor   at   the   presidential  
elections until 2014.  
 The party was founded in 1988, by experienced politicians who broke away 
from the MDB.72 The  founders  of  the  PSDB  were  dissatisfied  with  some  of  the  MDB’s  
political decisions,73 including   the   ‘naked   patronage   politics’   of   the   Sarney  
administration at the time.74 
 In  the  beginning,  the  PSDB  was  considered  a  ‘social  democratic’  defection  from 
the MDB and acquired a centre-left reputation. But this changed around 1994 when 
Cardoso won the presidential election: the party shifted to the centre-right.75 The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
problematic for presidents to govern effectively without the support of the largest delegation in 
Congress,   which   has   frequently   been   the   MDB’s.   Marcos Nobre, Imobilismo em Movimento: Da 
Abertura Democrática ao Governo Dilma (Companhia das Letras 2013) 12, 55. Therefore, the MDB 
became a synonym of governance, similar to what the old Social Democratic Party was during the 
Fourth Republic (1945–64). 
71 UOL Eleições,  ‘O  mapa  completo  de  quem  vai  fazer  as  leis  do  Brasil’.   
72 Hunter, 'The Partido dos Trabalhadores: Still a Left Party?' 22. 
73 Celso Roma, 'A institucionalização do PSDB entre 1988 e 1999' (2002) 17 Revista Brasileira de 
Ciências Sociais 71.  
74 Power, The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization, 
197.   Patronage   is   ‘the   power   or   right   to   control   appointments   to   public   office   or   the   right   to  
privileges’.   ‘patronage,   n’   (OED Online, OUP 2018) 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/138931?rskey=CmM3Xa&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid> 
accessed 21 July 2018. 
75 See, eg, Hunter, 'The Partido dos Trabalhadores: Still a Left Party?' 22. 
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ideological shift of the PSDB was documented by empirical studies, such as one made 
by Timothy Power.76 
 Since its foundation, PSDB adhered (for the most part) to programmatic 
politics.77 
 
2.2.3.  The  Workers’  Party   
 The  Workers’  Party  (mostly  known  as  ‘PT’,  acronym  in  Portuguese  for  Partido 
dos Trabalhadores) is a centre-left party. It was the second largest party in the Senate, 
and the first in the Chamber of Deputies in the last legislature.78  
The party won the 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 presidential elections. The first 
two were won by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and the others by Dilma Rousseff.  
The PT is a rare case of a party that was created bottom-up (that is, outside the 
parliamentary/state institutions in Brazil).79 It was founded in 1980 by union members,80 
social movements, intellectuals, the progressive wing of the Catholic Church, and other 
opponents of the military regime.81  
                                                             
76 Timothy J Power, 'Centering Democracy? Ideological Cleavages and Convergence in the Brazilian 
Political Class' in Peter Kingstone and Timothy Power (eds), Democratic Brazil Revisited (University 
of Pittsburgh 2008) 89. 
77 Hunter, 'The Partido dos Trabalhadores: Still a Left Party?' 22. In other words, the party has been 
fairly relying on a party programme with clear policy proposals. 
78 UOL Eleições,  ‘O  mapa  completo  de  quem  vai  fazer  as  leis  do  Brasil’.   
79 Schmitt, Partidos Politicos no Brasil (1945–2000), 49. See also Benedito Tadeu César, PT: A 
Contemporaneidade Possível: Base Social e Projeto Político (1980–1991) (Editora da Universidade 
Federal do Rio Grande do Sul 2002) 372. 
80 The union members linked to PT claimed that the unions linked to the old Brazilian Labour Party 
(PTB) — emerged in 1945 in connection with Getulio Vargas — were co-opted by the government. 
See Bernardo Kucinski, 'The Rise   of   the  Worker’s   Party'   in   Sue   Branford,   Bernardo  Kucinski   and  
Hilary Wainwright (eds), Politics Transformed: Lula and the Workers' Party in Brazil (Latin America 
Bureau 2003) 23. 
81 Ibid 24. See also Kathryn Hochstetler, 'Organized Civil Society in Lula's Brazil' in Peter Kingstone 
and Timothy Power (eds), Democratic Brazil Revisited (University of Pittsburgh 2008) 33. 
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Although it emerged as a hard-left party, the PT started to moderate its policy 
proposals during the 2002 presidential campaign,82 and now is considered a centre-left 
party.83  
 
2.2.4. The Social Liberal Party 
 In the 2018, the presidential election was won by the far-right populist Jair 
Bolsonaro, from the Social Liberal Party (mostly   known   as   ‘PSL’,   acronym   in  
Portuguese for Partido Social Liberal). It was the first time since 1994 that the 
presidential election was won by a party that was neither the PT nor the PSDB. 
Benefiting from an atypical presidential election — boosted by the Car Wash and other 
quid pro quo corruption scandals, and a knife attack that threatened his life during the 
campaign84 –, Bolsonaro won   the   second   round   against   the   PT’s   candidate,   Fernando  
Haddad. 
The victory of the Brazilian version of the fresh worldwide populist right-wing 
movement was consolidated with an unusual performance in the elections for the 
Chamber of Deputies too, where the PSL got the second largest number of seats, closely 
                                                             
82 See Wendy Hunter, The Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, 1989–2009 (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 144.  The  PT’s  ideological  shift is symbolised by the publishing of the Carta 
ao Povo Brasileiro during the 2002 presidential elections. André Singer, 'A Segunda Alma do Partido 
dos Trabalhadores' (2010) Novos Estudos CEBRAP 89. The Carta was a manifesto in which Lula, the 
PT’s  presidential  candidate,  promised  to  maintain  the  economic  strategy  that  was  being  developed by 
his predecessor, the centre-right Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from the PSDB. See Benjamin 
Goldfrank and Brian Wampler, 'From Good Government to Politics as Usual: The Rise and Possible 
Demise of the Workers' Party' in Peter Kingstone and Timothy J Power (eds), Democratic Brazil 
Divided (University of Pittsburgh Press 2017). 
83 Power, 'Centering Democracy? Ideological Cleavages and Convergence in the Brazilian Political 
Class' 90. 
84 Dom  Phillips,   ‘Jair   Bolsonaro   stabbing:   knife   attack   plunges   Brazil's   election   into   disarray’   The 
Guardian (7 September 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/07/jair-bolsonaro-
brazil-stabbing-knife-attack-election> accessed 3 November 2018. Ernesto Londoño and Shasta 
Darlington,   ‘Jair   Bolsonaro,   Presidential   Candidate   in   Brazil,   Is   Stabbed’   The New York Times (6 
September 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/world/americas/brazil-jair-bolsonaro.html> 
accessed 3 November 2018. 
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lagging behind the PT.85 However,   the  PSL’s  performance  was   less   impressive   in   the  
elections for the Senate, where the party won only the 10th largest number of seats.86 
 
2.2.5. Other political parties 
 Because Brazil has had a quite fragmented Congress during the New Republic 
period, there are other parties that frequently compose the government coalition. For 
example, the conservative Democrats (DEM) and the Progressive Party (PP), which are 
successors of the ARENA party, who backed the military regime; the centre-left 
Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) and Democratic Labor Party (PDT); and other smaller 
parties.  
 
2.3. The system of government  
Now we will take a look at what political parties compete for.  
Brazil has a coalition-based presidential system, which developed after the 
country’s  redemocratisation  in  1985.87  
 The federal political bodies are composed of the Presidency of the Republic, 
which is the executive power;88 and the Congress, which is the legislative power. The 
                                                             
85 Jairo  Nicolau,  ‘O  triunfo  do  Bolsonarismo:  como  os  eleitores  criaram  o  maior  partido  de  extrema  
direita  da  história  do  país’  Revista Piauí (November 2018) <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/o-
triunfo-do-bolsonarismo/> accessed 15 December 2018.  
86 Agência Senado,  ‘Composição  do  Senado  salta  de  15  para  21  partidos  em  2019’  (3  January  2019)  
<https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2019/01/03/composicao-do-senado-salta-de-15-para-
21-partidos-em-2019> accessed 21 January 2019. 
87 The term coalition-based presidential system (presidencialismo de coalizão, in Portuguese) was 
first coined by Sérgio Abranches, 'Presidencialismo de Coalizão: O Dilema Institucional Brasileiro' 
(1988) 31 Dados 5 122. 
88 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, artigo 76. 
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Congress, in turn, is divided between a lower house (the Chamber of Deputies) and an 
upper house (the Senate).89 The Chamber has 513 seats,90 while the Senate has 81.91 
Those willing to pursue the Presidency of the Republic have two problems from 
the start: they need time on television to compete more effectively during the elections, 
and it is unlikely that their parties will have a majority in Congress.92  
Consequently, presidential candidates are stimulated to settle coalitions that go 
beyond their own parties in order to have the greatest time on television possible (the 
legislation grants access to television to all Brazilian parties during elections93 and 
presidential candidates can use the sum of the time assigned to the six largest parties of 
their coalitions94) and to be able to pass laws in case they get elected.  
Presidential candidates use patronage to forge political support. By offering a 
place in the cabinet (such as appointing an MDB politician to the Ministry of 
Tourism95), and/or offering other public jobs96 and resources to those willing to support 
them, presidential candidates form political alliances in order to have more time on 
                                                             
89 Ibid, artigo 44.  
90 Artigo 1 da Lei Complementar nº 78, de 30 de dezembro de 1993, DOU 05/01/1994. 
91 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, artigo 46, parágrafo 1º. 
92 Melo and Pereira, Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty System. 
Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil, 
190.  
93 Artigo 17, parágrafo 3, da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988. Artigo 44 e 
seguintes da Lei nº 9504/1997. This will be explored in chapter three and, in more detail, in chapter 
nine.  
94 Artigo 47, paragrafo 2º, inciso I, da Lei nº 9504/1997, atualizados pela Lei nº 13165 de 29 de 
setembro   de   2015,  DOU   26/11/2015.   For   a   discussion   about   the   coalitions’   time   on   broadcast,   see  
chapter nine. 
95 Santos and Vilarouca point out that almost all Brazilian presidential cabinets have reflected a 
parliamentary majority — Fabiano Santos and Márcio Grijó Vilarouca, 'Political Institutions and 
Governability from FHC to Lula' in Peter R Kingstone and Timothy J Power (eds), Democratic Brazil 
Revisited (University of Pittsburgh Press 2008) 69.  
96 It  should  be  highlighted  that  Brazilian  presidents  have  the  power  to  appoint  not  only  their  ‘minister  
or secretary-general  but  also  at   five,   six,  or  even  more  levels  down’.  Barry Ames, The Deadlock of 
Democracy in Brazil (University of Michigan Press 2002) 25.  In  a  comparative  perspective  ‘Brazilian  
presidents have the power to make roughly 20,000 appointments to the top layer of the federal 
bureaucracy,  compared  to  about  4,000  for  their  US  counterparts’.  Anthony W Pereira, 'Continuity Is 
Not Lack of Change' (2012) 38 Critical Sociology 777 780. In this context, appointments to the 




television (during the electoral campaign), and later have a majority in Congress (during 
the administration).97  
President Jair Bolsonaro, elected in November 2018 and who took office from 
January 2019, has been declaring that he intends to innovate such system of government 
by not forming permanent coalitions but instead negotiating each bill with the 
congressmen. However, as of February 2019, it is still unknown if that innovation will 
take place and, if so, to what extent.98   
 
2.4. The electoral system 
Presidents and congressmen are all elected directly by the people.99 
Parties compete in majoritarian elections when it comes to elections for the 
Presidency and the Senate.100  
By contrast, Brazil has an open-list proportional representation system when it 
comes to the election for the Chamber of Deputies.101 This means that there is no party 
list previously ordered, but rather an extensive open list from which voters choose their 
candidates   by   name.   Thus,   ‘it   is   the   number   of   votes   individually   obtained   by   each  
                                                             
97 Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil, 
190. Melo and Pereira, Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty System. 
Sometimes coalitions are not based on ideological alignment. For instance, the leftist PT made 
alliances with the conservative PP during the Lula and Rousseff administrations. The PT and the PP 
are almost in opposite sides of the Brazilian political spectrum, as we have seen. 
98 Joelmir  Tavares  ‘Bolsonaro  põe  presidencialismo  de  coalizão  à  prova  ao  arriscar  novo  estilo’  Folha 
de S. Paulo (24 November 2018) <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/11/bolsonaro-poe-
presidencialismo-de-coalizao-a-prova-ao-arriscar-novo-estilo.shtml> accessed 06 January 2019.  
99 Since the enactment of the Constitutional Amendment n 25/1985 and the subsequent enactment of 
the Constitution 1988. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988. Emenda Constitucional 
nº 25/1985.  
100 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988, artigos 46 e 77.  
101 Ibid, artigo 45.  
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candidate of a given party that determines his or her position on the party list and the 
chance  of  being  elected’,  as  Maria  Kinzo  puts  it.102  
 What I want to point out here is that the electoral system encourages the 
importance of money. Candidates for the Presidency need a large amount of money for 
the production of advertising material in the media,103 and transportation because their 
potential   voters   are   dispersed   all   over  Brazil’s   vast   territory   (Brazil   is   the   fifth   largest  
country in the world in terms of land area and the fourth biggest democracy in terms of 
the total number of votes cast in a national election).104  
 Candidates for the Congress, in turn, need a large amount of money because 
their constituency is also large: they need to reach potential voters dispersed all over 
their state (Brazil is a federal republic with 26 federal states and one federal district). 
The states are normally very large in terms of territory.105 For instance, the state of São 
Paulo,  which  is  an  ‘average’  one  in  terms  of  territory,  is around 248 thousand km , larger 
in territory than many countries, such as England. Moreover, states are also frequently 
quite large in terms of population and, consequently, electorate. For example, the state of 
Paraiba, an average one in terms of population, had about 2.5 million voters in 2014.106  
 
                                                             
102 Maria  D’Alva  Kinzo,  'Funding  Parties  and  Elections  in  Brazil'   in  Peter  J  Burnell  and  Allan  Ware  
(eds), Funding Democratization (Transaction Publishers 2007) 118. 
103 For example, presidential candidates need money to produce high-quality broadcast ads.  
104 International   IDEA   (International   Institute   for   Democracy   and   Electoral   Assistance),   ‘Voter  
Turnout  Database’  <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout> accessed 22 July 2018. 
105 IBGE   (Instituto   Brasileiro   de   Geografia   e   Estatística),   ‘Estrutura   territorial’  
<http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/geociencias/cartografia/default_territ_area.shtm> accessed 22 July 
2018.  
106 TSE   (Tribunal   Superior   Eleitoral),   ‘Estatísticas   Eleitorais 2016 — Eleitorado’  
<http://www.tse.jus.br/eleitor-e-eleicoes/estatisticas/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/estatisticas-eleitorais-
2016/eleicoes-2016> accessed 22 July 2018.  
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2.5. Are the current Brazilian parties strong or weak? 
Now that we have seen who the parties are, where they compete and what they 
compete for, I will briefly address a debate within the academic literature on Brazilian 
politics.  
 There is a school of thought which claims that Brazilian parties are weak.107 For 
these scholars, parties are weak because of: (i) the repeated suppression of parties 
throughout   Brazil’s   history,   as   we   have   seen;;   (ii)   the   country’s   late   industrialisation,  
with a lack of early-organised working-classes, and consequently an absence of strong 
labour parties as it occurred in northern European countries, which were arguably vital 
for the development of well-institutionalised party system in these countries;108 and/or 
(iii) an   arguably   recurrent   legislation   that   boosted   politicians’   independence   towards  
their parties.109 
The open-list proportional electoral system of the Chamber of Deputies 
stimulates this school of thought because this system encourages candidates to focus on 
their self-promotion instead of their party affiliation. For instance, in 2014, a voter from 
the state of São Paulo should choose one of the 1485 candidates for the Chamber. All 
these candidates competed for about 70 seats; and they competed not only with 
candidates from other parties, but also with candidates of their own party. Consequently, 
candidates for the Chamber of Deputies tend to give less emphasis to their party.  
I do not dispute that some of these phenomena and features have undermined 
party strength. But, in my view, this does not mean that parties are weak.  
                                                             
107 See, eg, Bolivar Lamounier and Rachel Meneguello, Partidos Políticos e Consolidação 
Democrática: O Caso Brasileiro (Brasiliense 1986). Scott Mainwaring, 'Brazil: Weak Parties, 
Feckless Democracy' in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R Scully (eds), Building Democratic 
Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford University Press 1995). Power, The Political 
Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization. For more references, see 
Fernando Guarnieri, 'A Força dos Partidos "Fracos"' (2011) 54 Dados 235.  
108 Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil, 
230.  
109 See, eg, Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. 
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To begin with, all candidates are required to belong to a party to run for office, 
as established by the Constitution.110 As such, parties are gatekeepers of who will run for 
office.111   
Moreover, parties do not seem weak when it comes to elections for president. 
The two main parties, the PSDB and the PT, financed a considerable part of their 
presidential  candidates’ campaigns in 2014.112 The presidential candidates of these two 
parties frequently emphasised their party affiliations and how their parties behaved once 
they were empowered in the presidency. All presidential candidates attack not only their 
rivals’   personal   skills   and   capability,   but   sometimes   even  more   the   rival   parties’   past  
administrations. And a fair part of the voters of the PT and the PSDB seems to vote for 
these parties, regardless of who their candidates are. Likewise, Bolsonaro was elected in 
2018 by arguing that he was the anti-PT candidate. 
Similarly, parties also seem to be strong when it comes to elections for the 
Senate. The three main parties — MDB, PSDB and PT — have frequently financed their 
senatorial candidates.113 In addition, parties seem to be a recurrent theme during the 
senatorial campaign, and many voters apparently take the party into account when 
placing their vote at the ballot box.  
Even when it comes to elections for the Chamber of Deputies, parties have some 
significance. The main candidates for the Chamber often publish campaign advertising 
materials   in  which   they   appear   next   to   the   parties’   presidential   candidates.  And   some  
voters also seem to take the party into account — they   choose   one   of   the   parties’  
candidates.  
                                                             
110 Artigo 14, parágrafo 3, inciso V. 
111 Some have argued that Brazilian parties have low intra-party democracy. Guarnieri, 'A Força dos 
Partidos "Fracos"'. Oswaldo Amaral, 'As Transformações na Organização Interna do Partido dos 
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Another important indication of party strength is that several works of empirical 
research have pointed out that Brazilian congressmen do behave cohesively and in a 
disciplined manner according to the indication of their party leaders.114 In other words, 
there is significant party discipline in Congress.  
Finally, parties — and not candidates — receive significant public resources for 
political competition. They receive not only a large amount of public financial funding 
during electoral and non-electoral periods, but also free-access to broadcasts during 
elections. The importance of public funding to the political competition increased even 
more after recent changes in political finance legislation, as will be seen in the next 
chapter. In this sense, although some have argued that parties have frequently had only a 
minor  role  in  financing  their  candidates’  campaigns  for  the  Chamber of Deputies,115 this 
has changed to a significant extent.116 
 To summarise, even acknowledging the existence of some setbacks to their 
development, parties are a key (perhaps the key) element of political competition in 
Brazil.  
 
2.6. The media system 
 As in any other mass democracy, in Brazil most democratic debate takes place 
within   the  media.   As   such,   the   structure   of   the   media   is   a   key   part   of   the   country’s  
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<https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/noticia/candidatos-com-mandato-terao-prioridade-na-
distribuicao-do-dinheiro-do-fundo-eleitoral-dizem-partidos.ghtml> accessed 25 July 2018. 
44 
 
democratic framework.117 In this section, I will give a brief account of the Brazilian 
media.  
 
2.6.1. The hegemony of the television sector 
Television has been the hegemonic media in Brazil. According to a 
comprehensive survey of the media consumption habits of the Brazilian population 
requested by the government in 2016, 63% of Brazilian citizens use television as their 
main source of information, while 26% mentioned the internet, 7% mentioned the radio 
and 3% mentioned the press.118 This is a significant hegemony, by international 
standards.119 
Although the 2018 elections indicated that the consumption of information 
online has increased, television still seems to be the hegemonic media, as will be 
discussed in detail in chapter eight.     
 
2.6.2. Media ownership is essentially private  
In Brazil, not only the press, but also the television and radio sectors are in 
private hands. From the start, private companies were the ones who essentially delivered 
broadcast services: press tycoons received radio and television concessions from the 
                                                             
117 This argument will be comprehensively explored in chapter eight. 
118 Presidência  da  República,  Secretaria  de  Comunicação  Social,  ‘Relatório  Final  Pesquisa  Brasileira  
de Mídia — PBM   2016’   (30   December   2016,   updated   at   7   June   2017) 
<http://www.secom.gov.br/atuacao/pesquisa/lista-de-pesquisas-quantitativas-e-qualitativas-de-
contratos-atuais/pesquisa-brasileira-de-midia-pbm-2016.pdf/view> accessed 4 November 2017, 14. 
Although only 3% said that the press was their main source of information, it should be noted that 
many internet users may read press news on the internet. Moreover, Laurindo Filho reports that some 
radios  ‘translate’  (ie,  explain  in  a  simpler  way)  press  news  to  their  audience.  Laurindo  Leal  Filho,  ‘O  
comunicador diante   do   monopólio   da   mídia’   (ECA Pela Democracia, 20 April 2016) 
<https://youtu.be/aHHg8K6ulkM> accessed 4 November 2017. 
119 In this sense, see Ames, Baker and Rennó, 'The Quality of Elections in Brazil: Policy, 
Performance, Pageantry, or Pork?' 112.  
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state to provide services.120 Therefore, Brazilian broadcasting developed as a private 
business — similar to the American model and in contrast to the European model 
centred on public broadcasting121 — and the Brazilian media as a whole developed 
organically as a cross-ownership122 sector. 
It was only in 1988, with the introduction of the new Constitution, that the 
‘principle  of  the  complementary  roles  of  private,  public  and  state  systems’  in  relation  to  
broadcasting was established (article 223). However, since this principle was never 
regulated by infra-constitutional legislation, it has been arguably ineffective.123 Public 
broadcasting remains underfunded and with low viewership ratings, despite some recent 
efforts to change this situation.124 
 
2.6.3. The concentration of television ownership  
 Among the most developed Latin American countries — Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Uruguay — Brazil has the most concentrated free-to-air television 
broadcasting market if we consider market share based on revenues.125  
                                                             
120 Venicio Artur de Lima, Grande Mídia vs. Nova Mídia na Política Brasileira (Paulus Editora 
2010). 
121 For a summary of the American and European models of broadcast, see Jill J McCluskey and 
Johan FM Swinnen, 'Media Economics and the Political Economy of Information' in David Coen, 
Wyn Grant and Graham Wilson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government (Oxford 
University Press 2010). 
122 Cross-media   ownership   means   ‘one   organization   owning   more   than   one   type of public 
communications   business’.   ‘cross-media   ownership,   n’   (Cambridge Dictionary Online) 
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/cross-media-ownership> accessed 21 July 2018. 
123 See Lima, Grande Mídia vs. Nova Mídia na Política Brasileira. The Telecommunications Act of 
1962 remains as the main legislation in force to regulate the broadcasting sector. Lei nº 4117, de 27 de 
agosto de 1962, DOU 17/12/1962.  
124 See subsection 8.3.4.  
125 Christof Mauersberger, Advocacy Coalitions and Democratizing Media Reforms in Latin America: 
Whose Voice Gets on the Air? (Springer 2016) 34, using data from 2004 from Martín Becerra and 
Guillermo Mastrini, 'Un Escenario Para Pocos: Estructura, Efectos e Indicadores de Concentracion 
Infocomunicacional Latinoamericana' in AMARC (ed), Las Mordazas Invisibles Nuevas y Viejas 
Barreras a la Diversidad en la Radiodifusión (Amarc-alc, Buenos Aires 2009) 317–334.  
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The privately owned126 Globo TV receives about 75% of the advertisement 
money in the broadcast television market.127 This concentration of advertisement reflects 
the audience: 56% of Brazilian television viewers have Globo TV channel as their main 
source of information.128 When asked about their first and second sources of 
information, 73% of the Brazilian television viewers mentioned Globo TV.129  
Although the  Constitution  of  1988  establishes  that  ‘social  communication  media  
may not, directly or indirectly, be subject to monopoly or oligopoly’,130 this provision 
was never regulated by infra-constitutional legislation, hindering its effectiveness.131  
The ownership limits currently in force were mostly established by a decree 
from 1967: television companies cannot own more than 10 concessions; no more than 
five in the open territorial spectrum and two per state.132 However, television 
corporations can overcome these limits because they are authorised to build networks of 
affiliate stations and retransmission stations (which are formally independent stations 
that nonetheless produce the same content), in order to broadcast their content to the 
                                                             
126 The Globo TV is controlled by the Marinho family. Grupo   Globo,   ‘Estrutura   Corporativa’  
<https://grupoglobo.globo.com/estrutura-corporativa/> accessed 24 July 2018.  
127 Cristiano Aguiar Lopes, Reflexoẽs sobre a Regulação da Radiodifusão no Brasil — Em Busca da 
Lei Geral de Comunicação Eletrônica de Massa (Consultoria Legislativa 2005) 21. 
128 The other top favourite television channels as sources of information have around one-fifth of 
Globo’s   preference:  Record  has  12%  of   the   total   preferences   and  SBT  has   11%  of   the   preferences.  
The survey asked participants to consider free-to-air and cable television channels all together in their 
answers.   Presidência   da   República,   Secretaria   de   Comunicação   Social,   ‘Relatório   Final   Pesquisa  
Brasileira de Mídia — PBM  2016’,  17. 
129 Ibid.  
130 Artigo 220, parágrafo 5. 
131 See C Matos, 'Media Democratization in Brazil: Achievements and Future Challenges' (2012) 38 
Critical Sociology 863.  
132 Artigo 12, inciso 2, do Decreto-Lei nº 236, de 28 de fevereiro de 1967, DOU 28/2/1967 e 
retificado em 9/3/1967. For more details and other legislation, see Alexandre Ditzel Faraco, 




entire country.133 Through these networks, television corporations are able to concentrate 
audience and advertising revenues.134 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning another peculiarity of the Brazilian 
broadcast structure: despite a constitutional ban, several elected politicians own the 
affiliate stations and retransmission stations mentioned above.135  
                                                             
133 A great part of the independence of those affiliate stations and retransmission stations is 
constrained by exclusive agreements that they sign with the television corporations who produce 
content. See ibid 172–173.  
134 I will use the TV Globo, the largest television group, as an example. The Globo TV has five 
concessions (which are based in the largest cities, such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), but more 
than 117 affiliate stations. These 117 affiliate stations, owned by other individuals, work like 
franchise companies:  they  not  only  broadcast  TV  Globo’s  signal  (including  news,  commercials  and  so  
on),   but  also   use  TV  Globo’s   logo.  As   observed   by  Mauersberger,   for   the   audience,   these   affiliate  
stations are not   distinguished   from   the   original   ‘Globo’.   Mauersberger, Advocacy Coalitions and 
Democratizing Media Reforms in Latin America: Whose Voice Gets on the Air? 193. Moreover, there 
are around 1405 retransmission stations that  are  part  of  TV  Globo’s  network,  and  several  of  them  are  
also independent but affiliate. These retransmission stations, authorised by the state, are located in 
more  remote  areas  and  simply  repeat  the  signal  of  Globo’s  concessions  or  of  its  affiliate  stations. As a 
result, TV Globo delivers its programming to 98.44% of Brazilian municipalities and over 183 
million Brazilians. See Grupo   Globo,   ‘Globo   in   Brazil’  
<http://redeglobo.globo.com/Portal/institucional/foldereletronico/ingles/g_globo_brasil.html> 
accessed 1 August 2018.  
135 After the issuance of the certificate of their electoral victory, deputies and senators are prohibited 
from signing or maintaining a contract with the state or a public utility company that holds a 
concession from the state. Artigo 54, inciso I, parágrafo a, da Constituição da República Federativa do 
Brasil, 1988. However, Brazilian authorities have constantly ignored that provision: in 2007, for 
instance, 10% of deputies and 31% of senators were owners of broadcast affiliate stations or 
retransmission affiliate stations. See, eg, Mauersberger, Advocacy Coalitions and Democratizing 
Media Reforms in Latin America: Whose Voice Gets on the Air? 160; Geraldo Magela Pierone and 
Andre Kron Marques Zapani, 'Coronelismo Eletrônico: a concentração do poder midiático nacional e 
no Paraná' (2016) 1 Ação Midiática–Estudos em Comunicação, Sociedade e Cultura 241 252; and 
Faraco, Democracia e Regulação das Redes Eletrônicas de Comunicação: Rádio, Televisão e Internet 
200. Many ADI (direct action of unconstitutionality) have been filed before the Brazilian Supreme 
Court (STF) contesting the issue, but the Court still have not analysed it.  
In this same vein, some legal scholars have been arguing that another unconstitutionality has been 
taking place: although the Constitution establishes that television and radio broadcasting are public 
utilities that should be exclusively operated by the Federal Government of Brazil, either directly or 
through authorisation, concession or permission (artigo 21 inciso XII), and that the concession or 
permission of public utility services will always be through public bidding (article 175), broadcast 
concessions and permissions have been granted without public bidding, independently of which 
political party is in office. See, eg, Mello, Curso de Direito Administrativo, 698–699.  
Several broadcast corporations are business partners of important politicians. Globo TV, for instance, 
has well-known links with important conservative political families, who own the affiliate stations 
that transmit the  Globo  TV’s  signal  in  their  states.  For example, the Collor family owns a TV Globo 
affiliate station in the state of Alagoas; the Magalhães family owns several TV Globo affiliate stations 
in the state of Bahia; and the Sarney family owns several TV Globo affiliate stations in the state of 
Maranhao. This framework allows these politicians to have an overwhelming influence over the 
public debate in their regional constituencies, especially through the local news programme. See Suzy 
Santos and Sérgio Capparelli, 'Coronelismo, Radiodifusão e Voto: A Nova Face de um Velho 




2.6.4. The conservative bias 
Historically the Brazilian media has had low diversity of content, leaning 
towards a conservative bias.136 It is illustrative that the three leading newspapers — 
Folha de S. Paulo,137 O Estado de S. Paulo,138 and O Globo139 — all supported the 1964 
conservative military  coup.  Similarly,  it  is  emblematic  that  the  country’s  main  television  
corporation, Globo TV, was founded by the owners of O Globo newspaper and 
developed during the conservative military regime as an ally of the government.140 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Poder e Hegemonia (Paulus 2005); Pâmela Araújo Pinto,   ‘Mídia   e   Política   no   Brasil:   Grande  
Imprensa  x  Coronelismo  Eletrônico’  (Congresso  Brasileiro  de  Ciências  da  Comunicação,  2009). 
Mauersberger has argued that the opposition of the traditional conservative media along with the 
opposition of conservative elected politicians helps to explain why in Brazil there has been no 
democratizing media reform so far, in contrast to what happened in other South American countries, 
such as Argentina and Uruguay. According to him: the dominant mass media largely neglect the 
debate, while reform demands are delegitimised in the formal political arenas as initiatives to censor 
the media. Mauersberger, Advocacy Coalitions and Democratizing Media Reforms in Latin America: 
Whose Voice Gets on the Air?, 38. A similar phenomenon may have happened in other countries. 
According to Brevini, for example, the initial optimism regarding two major media policy enquiries 
held between 2011 and 2012 in Australia was crushed by the hostility of big media corporations. For 
her, the concentration of media ownership enabled the big media corporations to establish the 
hegemonic policy narratives, undermining proposals for change. Media policy became Big Media 
Policy, she argues. Benedetta   Brevini,   'From  Media   Policy   to   ‘Big’  Media   Policy:   The   Battle   for  
Pluralism in Australia' in Steven Barnett and Judith Townend (eds), Media Power and Plurality: 
From Hyperlocal to High-Level Policy (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2015). 
Moreover, perhaps the progressive parties and politicians who do not own stations have made only 
shy attempts to change this system because they fear the reaction of broadcast corporations (as they 
depend on their favourable coverage to perform in elections and sometimes stay in government); and 
they fear losing the political support of those conservative politicians, who own affiliate stations, but 
who were also paradoxically a key part of progressive government coalitions, such as several 
conservative  politicians  were  to  the  Workers’  Party  administrations. 
136 Fernando Antônio Azevedo, 'Mídia e Democracia no Brasil: Relações entre o Sistema de Mídia e o 
Sistema Político' (2006) 12 Opinião Pública 88 89.  
137 Folha de S. Paulo,   ‘Editorial:   1964’   (30   March   2014)  
<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2014/03/1433004-editorial-1964.shtml> accessed 25 July 
2018.  
138 José  Maria  Mayrink  ‘'Estado'  rompeu  com  regime  após  cancelamento  de  eleições’  O Estado de S. 
Paulo (28 March 2014) <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,estado-rompeu-com-regime-
apos-cancelamento-de-eleicoes,1146309> accessed 25 July 2018. See also Maria Victoria de 
Mesquita Benevides, A UDN e o Udenismo: Ambiguidades do Liberalismo Brasileiro, 1945–1965 
(Coleção Estudos Brasileiros, Paz e Terra 1981) 128. 
139 O Globo,   ‘Apoio   editorial   ao   golpe   de   64   foi   um   erro’   (30   March   2014)  
<https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/apoio-editorial-ao-golpe-de-64-foi-um-erro-9771604> accessed 25 
July 2018. 
140 Power and Roberts argue that the conservative military regime helped Globo TV to build a virtual 
monopoly by boosting subsidised television purchasing and infrastructure, in exchange for favourable 
coverage. See Timothy J Power and J Timmons Roberts, 'A New Brazil? The Changing 
Sociodemographic Context of Brazilian Democracy' in Peter R Kingstone and Timothy J Power (eds), 
Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes (2000) 258. Many cite the coverage of the 




Surely, however, that conservative perspective may vary between a conservative liberal 
one (that is, more moderate) and an illiberal one (that is, less moderate). A deeper and 
updated analysis of this conservative tendency of the Brazilian media will follow in 
chapter eight. 
 
2.7. Conclusion of the chapter 
 To summarise, Brazil has a multi-party system, in which the main parties have 
been the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the centre-right Brazilian 
Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and the centre-left  Workers’  Party   (PT). In the 2018 
elections, the Social Liberal Party (PSL) emerged as part of the new worldwide populist 
right-wing movement and is now also a relevant actor. 
 At the federal level, Brazilian parties compete for seats in Congress (that is, the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) and for the Presidency, which is the executive 
body. The country has a coalition-based presidential system of government. Since 
Brazilian parties rarely have a majority in Congress, presidents are stimulated to settle 
inter-party coalitions in order to pass legislation. In fact, a great deal of these coalitions 
are formed during elections, when presidential candidates seek more time on television 
to compete effectively (the electoral legislation grants access to television to all 
Brazilian parties and the presidential candidates can use the sum of the time assigned to 
the six largest parties of their coalitions).  
                                                                                                                                                                            
the 1980s and took, in one day, more than a million people to the streets demanding direct presidential 
elections, Globo TV tried to hush the movement by ignoring its existence — see Mario Cesar 
Carvalho,   ‘Figueiredo   ameaçou   tirar   concessão   nas   Diretas-Já,   diz   Boni’   Folha de S. Paulo 
<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/especial/tv_14.htm> accessed 25 July 2018. See also Fábio 
Konder Comparato, 'Tocando no Ponto Nevrálgico: A Democratização da Informação e da 




 The electoral system stimulates the importance of money. Presidential 
candidates need to reach potential voters all over the large Brazilian territory. And 
candidates for the Congress also have a large constituency: they need to reach potential 
voters all over the states where they run, which are usually territorially large (for 
example, larger than some European countries), and large in population terms (in the 
millions, most frequently).  
Finally, we have seen that the media, which covers political competition, is led 
by the television sector. And one private television corporation (Globo TV), which 
produces most of its journalistic content from a conservative perspective and has 
business links with several politicians, concentrates more than 50% of the news audience 
in the television sector.  
Now that we have mapped the parties in Brazil, and where they operate (the 
electoral system, the system of government and the media system), in the next chapter 










3.1. Introduction  
 In 1955, political finance reportedly played a crucial role in the presidential 
campaign which ended with the electoral victory of Juscelino Kubitschek.141 Back then, 
Kubitschek essentially needed money to host campaign rallies, publish advertisements 
mostly on newspapers, travel around the country, and so forth.142  
 More than sixty years later, political finance is no less important. Today, 
presidential candidates need money not only to travel around the country, but also to 
produce high-cost advertising materials that are broadcasted on television and radio as 
well as published on the internet, among other spending.143 
As  put  by  Graeme  Orr,  perhaps  ‘across  the world, money in politics is the issue 
of  our  times’.144 
This chapter aims to give the reader a brief description of political finance 
legislation in Brazil, focusing on its most important aspects.145 Although the chapter will 
                                                             
141 Edward Anthony Riedinger, Como se Faz um Presidente: A Campanha de JK (Nova Fronteira 
1988) 242.  
142 Ibid 247.  
143 See, eg, Felipe  Ribas,  ‘Os  5  maiores  gastos  de  campanha  de  Bolsonaro  e  Haddad’  Gazeta do Povo 
(22 October 2018) <https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/eleicoes/2018/os-5-maiores-gastos-de-
campanha-de-bolsonaro-e-haddad-4fexm5vuc4nwiy9fjvcun6g3a> accessed 15 December 2018. 
144 Graeme Orr, 'Regulating Money in Politics: an International Perspective' (Indonesia's 5th National 
Conference on Constitutional Law, 2018) 1.  
145 Thus, this chapter does not aim to give a comprehensive account of the legislation by including 




mostly address legislation, decisions from the Brazilian Supreme Court, the STF 
(acronym in Portuguese for Supremo Tribunal Federal), which shaped the legislation, 
will also be discussed.  
The chapter is organised into three sections. Firstly, I consider what objectives 
political finance legislation might have. Secondly, I examine what strategies can be used 
to meet these objectives, and how they are implemented in Brazil.146 Finally, in the third 
section, I will summarise Brazilian political finance legislation to argue that there was a 
shift in the legal framework — from a system essentially based on corporate donations, 
to one grounded on mixed sources — and discuss the extent to which the Brazilian 
legislation has been meeting regulatory objectives.  
 
3.2. Regulatory objectives 
We may organise the objectives of political finance legislation into three main 
groups,  which  are   interdependent:  (i)   to  ensure   that  the  elected  politician’s  attitude  has  
not been impacted by the influence of private money; (ii) to promote equality of 
opportunity; and (iii) to improve the functioning of the party and electoral systems.   
 
3.2.1.  The  integrity  of  the  elected  politicians’  attitude 
 The first objective relates to the integrity of elected politician behaviour. The 
office-holder’s   conduct   should   not   be   corrupted   by   private   donations.   Therefore,   this  
                                                                                                                                                                            
be explored because this has not been an issue for the Brazilian democracy lately and will not be 
discussed throughout this thesis.  
146 The approach of organising the study of political finance legislation by focusing first on its 
objectives and later on the strategies implemented to meet these objectives was inspired by the 
reading of Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics. 
53 
 
objective consists of the prevention of quid pro quo and dependence corruption in the 
political process. 
As we have seen in chapter one, quid pro quo corruption occurs when a 
candidate agrees (the pro)  with  a  wealthy  donor  to  receive  a  ‘donation’  (the  quid) and, in 
return, exercise his power in office to benefit the donor (the quo). Under this 
circumstance, a donation is a form of bribe. And the agreement between the candidate 
and the donor is, therefore, a crime.  
Dependence corruption, in turn, is harder to detect. It occurs when an office-
holder  is  dependent  ‘on  the  financial  support  of  a  wealthy  patron  to  a  degree  that  is  apt  
to compromise the expectation, fundamental to representative democracy, that public 
power  will  be  exercised  in  the  public  interest’.147 Because politicians frequently want to 
get re-elected or run for another office in the future, they might feel disinclined to take a 
decision that will displease corporate interests, or might give the donor privileged access 
to their decision-making. Similarly, a politician might be psychologically grateful for 
such  a  large  donation,  which  may  impact  his  reaction  to  a  donor’s  lobbying.   
 
3.2.2. The equality of opportunity 
The second objective might be to promote equality of opportunity in the 
democratic process. The exact meaning of this objective will vary according to the 
conception of democracy underpinned. I will focus on two of the most common ones.  
The competitive elitism conception of democracy, perhaps mostly known as 
being advanced by Joseph Schumpeter, is a more restricted conception. For Schumpeter, 
democracy  means  ‘that  people  have   the  opportunity  of  accepting  and  refusing   the  men 
                                                             
147 McCloy v New South Wales at 47 [36].  
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who   are   to   rule   them…’.148 In this way, democracy is understood as the competition 
between rival political leaders, organised in parties, for the mandate to rule.149 As long 
as   people   can   choose   ‘between   (at   least   two)   broadly   different   party   platforms’   and 
citizens have the ability to replace one party by another in government, democracy 
exists.150 Thus, for those who advance a Schumpeterian conception of democracy, 
political finance legislation should aim for equality of opportunity between political 
parties, to a degree that enables the government to be changed. 
A more enlarged conception of democracy is proposed by John Rawls. For him, 
“citizens   similarly   gifted   and   motivated   [should]   have   roughly   an   equal   chance   of  
influencing   the  government’s  policy  and  of attaining positions of authority irrespective 
of  their  economic  and  social  class”.151 Thus, not only those who run for political office, 
but also citizens who are not politicians, should have equal opportunity to influence the 
government. Under a Rawlsian conception of democracy, political finance legislation 
should aim for the promotion of equality of opportunity for politicians and non-
politicians, as much as is practical. 
Under both conceptions of democracy, the objective of equal opportunity in 
political finance legislation relates to the prevention of war chest corruption, which 
occurs when the volume of wealthy donations is so high that it distorts electoral 
competition. The central idea is that the flow of political debate within the public sphere 
should not be dominated by a single voice or interest.152 
 
                                                             
148 Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (5th edn, Allen and Unwin 1976) 
284.  
149 Held, Models of Democracy, 179. See also John Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy, Theories of the 
Democratic State (Macmillan International Higher Education 2009) 43–44.  
150 Held, Models of Democracy, 179. 
151 John Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and their Priority' (1982) 3 The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values 3 73.  




3.2.3. The well-functioning of the political parties and the political process 
 Finally, political finance legislation may also assist the functioning of political 
parties and the political process.153 In this sense, we may argue that political finance 
legislation should ensure that political parties are adequately funded because they are the 
bridge between society and the state in representative democracies. Additionally, we 
may argue that political finance legislation must enhance citizen participation in the 
funding of parties because this gives legitimacy and stability to the process of 
government.154  
 
3.3. Regulatory strategies 
 In this section, I will briefly explore the regulatory strategies used to meet the 
above-mentioned objectives in Brazil.  
As it will be seen, the strategies used may simultaneously meet more than one of 
the objectives. For instance, a given legislation that   aims   to   protect   politicians’  
autonomy from corporate money may, at the same time, promote equality of opportunity 
in the democratic process.  
Moreover, I shall clarify: I will use deductive reasoning to discuss how the 
strategies meet the objectives previously mentioned. I will not explore justifications used 
by legislators in practice, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.155 In any event, the 
justifications used by legislators in practice will always relate to one of the objectives I 
                                                             
153 See, eg, Daniel  Zovatto,  ‘International  Congress  on  Electoral  Financing  and  Democracy’  (Tribunal 
Superior Eleitoral, 17 June 2015) at 1:35:10 <https://youtu.be/4B7w0YvKrac> accessed 4 November 
2017. 
154 Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics, 33. 
155 For a historical investigation of the evolution of part of the Brazilian legislation on political 
finance, and the political contextualisation and congressional justifications behind it, see Cíntia 
Pinheiro Ribeiro de Souza, 'A Evolução da Regulação do Financiamento de Campanha no Brasil 
(1945–2006)' (2013) n 3, jan/jun 2013 Resenha Eleitoral — Revista Eletrônica do TRESC.  
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have mentioned in the last section, and, more particularly, to one of the rationales that 
will be given below for each strategy.156 
This section has four parts: (i) it will begin with transparency and disclosure 
strategy; (ii) then it will examine private money controls; (iii) subsequently public 
funding legislation will be discussed; (iv) and, finally, spending controls are analysed. 
Each of these subsections, in turn, will explore the definition of each strategy, the 
rationales behind it157 and the Brazilian legislation on it.  
 
3.3.1. Transparency and Disclosure  
Definition and Rationale  
The main objective of transparency and disclosure is to protect the integrity of 
the elected politician’s attitude.158 In  this  sense,  the  enhancement  of  ‘transparency  in  the  
funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of 
political   parties’159 was agreed at the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC), which Brazil signed in 2003 and ratified in 2005.160 
                                                             
156 The rationales given for each strategy will relate to the Brazilian legislation that will be addressed 
in this chapter. Thus, they will not cover the rationales that might be behind other legislation that will 
not be discussed here. For a comprehensive discussion of the possible rationales for each strategy, see 
Magnus Ohman, 'Getting the Political Finance System Right' in Elin Falguera and others (eds), 
Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A Handbook on Political Finance (IDEA 
2014). 
157 Although the literature on political finance is broad, the concept and rationales of each strategy 
will  mostly  rely  on  Keith  Ewing’s  ‘The  Cost  of  democracy:  Party  Funding  in  Modern  British  Politics’  
and Magnus  Ohman’s   ‘Getting  the Political  Finance  System  Right’  because   of   their  comprehensive  
focus on the these issues.  
158 Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics, 44. See also Ohman, 
'Getting the Political Finance System Right' 28. 
159 UNGA United Nations Convention Against Corruption 31 October 2003 A/58/422 Article 7 item 
3.  
160 Decreto nº 5687, de 31 de janeiro de 2006, DOU 01/02/2006.  
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Moreover, the transparency strategy may assist the functioning of the electoral 
process because it allows voters to make informed decisions161 and enables the 
enforcement of private funding and spending controls.162 
At least some form of reporting requirements exist in nearly 90% of the 180 
countries analysed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA).163 Usually, reporting requirements are for political parties as well 
as candidates.  
 
The Brazilian legislation  
Currently, the Constitution of 1988,164 the Political Parties Act165 and the 
Elections Act166 constitute the regulatory basis for transparency and disclosure 
obligations.  
Parties are required to submit an annual report to the electoral courts.167  
In addition, during electoral campaigns, legislation requires parties, their 
candidates, and campaign committees to disclose on a website created by the Electoral 
Justice, within 72 hours, any financial resources received.168 Moreover, they must 
submit a detailed report within the middle of the election (that is, 15 September).169 
Finally, the campaign committees must submit, in up to 20 or 30 days after the elections, 
                                                             
161 Ohman, 'Getting the Political Finance System Right' 28. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Artigo 17, inciso III, da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988.  
165 Lei nº 9096/1995.  
166 Lei nº 9504/1997. 
167 Artigo 32 da Lei nº 9096/1995. Brazil has specialised electoral judges, who are a branch of the 
Judiciary (ie, the Electoral Justice), and are responsible for guaranteeing the legality of the electoral 
process. 
168 Artigo 28, parágrafo 4, inciso I, da Lei nº 9504/1997 atualizado pela Lei nº 13165/2015.  
169 Artigo 28, parágrafo 4, inciso II, da Lei nº 9504/1997 atualizado pela Lei nº 13165/2015. They 
must detail the transfer from the Parties Public Fund, the financial resources received, the non-
financial resources received, and the expenses made.  
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a final report about the candidates’ and committees’   funding.170 The electoral courts 
must analyse the accounts of all candidates in up to three days before the empowerment 
of the elected candidates.171 
According to a recent ruling of the Supreme Court, transparency and disclosure 
in candidate funding are crucial to the democratic and republican regime established by 
the Constitution. In 2018, the Court declared that a statutory provision introduced in 
2015, which allowed hidden donations, violated the Constitution. According to the 
statutory provision, parties would not be required to disclose the origin of their cash 
transfers   to   candidates’   campaigns.   It  would  be  possible   to   identify  which   individuals  
donated to which parties, but it would not be possible to identify which candidate used 
that money. Petitioned by the Brazilian Bar Association, the Supreme Court decided that 
the statutory provision was unconstitutional because: (a) it prevented the electoral courts 
from effectively exercising its supervisory power granted by the Constitution;172 and (b) 
it harmed the democratic and republican principles since it prevented voters from having 
full information about candidates.173   
 
3.3.2. Private Funding Controls  
Definition and Rationale 
                                                             
170 All committees must submit the final report up to 30 days after the elections. The exception is for 
the candidates for the executive who will decide the election in a runoff, who must submit the final 
report up to 20 days after the final round. Artigo 29, incisos III e IV, da Lei nº 9504/1997, atualizado 
pela Lei nº 13165/2015. 
171 Artigo 30, parágrafo 1º, da Lei nº 9504/1997, atualizado pela Lei nº 13165/2015.  
172 STF, ADI 5394/DF, Rel Min Alexandre Moraes, DJ 06/04/2018. Justice Alexandre Moraes, who 
was the rapporteur for the case and the leading vote for the majority, reaffirmed all the grounds 
argued by Justice Teori Zavascki when the latter granted the injunction. For the conclusion on Justice 
Teori Zavascki's opinion, see STF, ADI 5394 MC/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 16.  
173 STF, ADI 5394 MC/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 20. 
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Another  key  regulatory  strategy  ‘is  to  control  who  may  give  to  political  parties  
and how much  they  give’.174    
A ban on certain sources may   ‘help   to   ensure   that   the   parties   are   no   longer  
responsive  to  these  interests’.175 In addition, this strategy may sometimes help to ensure 
that campaign finance is grounded on contributions of citizens,176 rather than legal 
fictions, such as corporations and trade unions.  
A cap on contributions, in turn, may stimulate equality of opportunity between 
citizens, by guaranteeing their participation on an equal basis. Simultaneously, this 
strategy may protect the integrity of elected officials by ensuring that a given donation 
will not likely turn their heads.177  
Most of the countries analysed by the IDEA International ban at least one source 
of funding, while more than 40% adopt some form of cap on contributions.178 
 
The Brazilian legislation 
Very few countries allow corporate donations to political parties and candidates 
while completely banning donations from trade unions at the same time.179 Between 
1993 and 2015, Brazil was one of these countries. In 2015, the Supreme Court put an 
end to this peculiarity by declaring the unconstitutionality of the statutory provisions 
                                                             
174 Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics, 45.  
175 Ibid 46.  
176 Banning private donations altogether is exceptionally rare. The reason is that a total ban on private 
donations excludes  citizen’s  participation  in  the  funding  of  political  parties.  Besides,  it  may  encourage  
hidden donations. See Ohman, 'Getting the Political Finance System Right' 22.  
177 Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics, 46.  
178 Ohman, 'Getting the Political Finance System Right' 22. 
179 Only Argentina, Singapore, Uruguay and six Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia) have similar legal frameworks. See International IDEA 
(International   Institute   for   Democracy   and   Electoral   Assistance),   ‘Political   Finance   Database’  
<http://www.idea.int/political-finance/index.cfm> accessed 30 July 2016. 
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that regulate corporate donations.180 The opinion of all the justices who formed the 
majority181 had arguments appealing to the protection of the integrity of elected 
politicians and to equality of opportunity.182 
 But, while hearing the same case, the Court upheld the constitutional validity of: 
(i) a statutory provision that established contribution limits based on a percentage of the 
individual’s   income;;   and   (ii)   a   provision   that   enabled   candidates   to   use   their own 
resources up to the spending limit. Although most justices initially reasoned that those 
criteria violated the principle of equality of the Constitution because they benefited the 
wealthy,183 the   Court   eventually   found   problematic   the   plaintiff’s   demand — that is, 
asking the Court to urge the Congress to enact legislation establishing an uniform limit 
for   all   individuals’   donations   and   use   of   own   resources   by   candidates   at   a   level   low  
enough to not overly compromise equality in elections; and, if the Congress failed to 
enact the legislation within 18 months, the Superior Electoral Court would have the 
                                                             
180 STF, ADI 4650/DF.  
181 Justices Luiz Fux, Luís Barroso, Carmen Lúcia, Ricardo Lewandowski, Joaquim Barbosa, Marco 
Aurélio Mello, Dias Toffoli and Rosa Weber. 
182 In Brazil, frequently each justice publishes her own opinion, and they agree on whose opinion will 
be the leading one, as it occurred in this case. The opinion of Justice Luiz Fux, the rapporteur for the 
case, led the 8–3 majority. The centre-left  Workers’   Party   administrations   appointed   seven   of the 
eight  justices  that  constituted  the  majority.  For  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  Fux’s  opinion,  see  Arthur 
Guerra Filho, 'The Brazilian Supreme Court's ADI 4650 Decision: A Step Towards the End of 
Plutocracy?' (2017) 28 King's Law Journal 167.  One  of  Fux’s  main  arguments  was  that  there  was  an  
inequality between legal entities: while companies could donate, trade union contributions were 
banned. In this aspect, the ADI 4650 decision  contrasts  with  a  previous  ruling  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  
plenary of 1994, which held that the inequality between legal entities on political finance did not 
violate the Constitution (ADI 1076-0). The Court of 1994 unanimously held that the ban on trade 
union political donations was reasonable given that unions represent an entire category, regardless of 
individual voluntary membership, and receive compulsory union dues (established by legislation) 
from all members of the respective category. In addition, the majority of the Court held that non-
union trade associations, though representing only those who voluntarily pay membership dues, also 
should be banned from making donations because the legislator arguably intended to ward off non-
union trade associations from the political process, by distinguishing them from civil associations in 
general (eg, art 5, item LXX of the Constitution). All nine justices who took part in the judgment were 
appointed by presidents aligned with conservatism: Ernesto Geisel, João Figueiredo (military 
presidents who ruled during the authoritarian regime), José Sarney and Fernando Collor (the first two 
civilian presidents after democratisation). STF, ADI 1076-0/DF, Rel Min Sepúlveda Pertence, DJ 
07/12/2000. 
183 For a more detailed analysis about the reasoning and decision-making process of the Court on 
these matters, see Filho, 'The Brazilian Supreme Court's ADI 4650 Decision: A Step Towards the End 
of Plutocracy?'.  
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competence to temporarily regulate the issues. The justices preferred to act with self-
restraint and ruled that there is no constitutional basis for the Supreme Court to advance 
on typical duties of the Legislature, and delegate them to the Superior Electoral Court, in 
the manner requested by the plaintiff.184  
The statutory provisions on these issues have remained controversial since then. 
In the 2018 elections, individuals were able to donate up to 10% of the gross income 
earned in the year preceding an election.185 By maintaining this criterion, the Supreme 
Court and legislators have kept Brazil in an extremely small group of countries. Of the 
forty-two countries that are above Brazil in the Democracy Ranking 2015,186 only two 
(Lithuania and South Korea) adopt contribution limits based on a percentage of the 
individual’s   income.187 In contrast, twenty-two of them adopt a uniform limit for all 
individuals: Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, United States and Uruguay.188   
 And, so far as self-funding is concerned, candidates in the 2018 elections were 
able to use their own resources up to the spending limit established for the position to 
which they competed.189 As will be seen in subsection 3.3.4, spending limits were quite 
high, which raises questions of equality of opportunity between candidates. 
                                                             
184 ADI   4650/DF,   Inteiro   Teor   do   Acórdão   175.   The   Court’s   decision   was   strategic:   according   to  
Justice  Marco  Aurélio  Mello’s   understanding,  which   prevailed   during   the   deliberation   between   the  
justices on these issues, it would be left to the Supreme Court only to decide the constitutionality of 
the provisions. Under this scenario, declaring unconstitutionality would result in a complete lack of 
regulation  for  individuals’  donations.  Therefore, individuals would be unable to make donations, thus 
undermining the democratic participation of citizens instead of enhancing it. Therefore, this 
‘exchange  of  unconstitutional  situations’  would  not  be  worthwhile,  in  the  words  of  Justice  Mello.   
185 Lei nº 9504/97, artigo 23, parágrafo 1, atualizado pela Lei nº 13165/2015. 
186 David F J Campbell and others, Democracy Ranking 2015 (Scores) (Democracy Ranking 2015).  
187 IDEA, Political Finance Database — accessed 30 July 2016.  
188 Ibid. Seventeen other countries — such as the United Kingdom — do not limit contributions. 
IDEA did not register data on Hong Kong.  
189 Artigo 29, parágrafo 1º, da Resolução nº 23553, de 18 de dezembro de 2017, DJE-TSE, nº 25, de 
2/2/2018, 316–346.  
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 Finally, it should be noted that Brazil lacks clear regulation on third-party 
independent expenditures because the practice has not been very frequent so far, 
although the 2018 presidential election may have shown some signs that the practice 
could increase in the future.190 
 
3.3.3. Public Funding  
Definition and Rationale 
 The   state   might   have   a   ‘role   that   involves   supporting   rather   than   regulating  
parties. This can take the form of aid in kind for the parties by the State, or the direct 
subsidy of the parties  by  the  State’.191   
 Public funding may have three main justifications.192 Firstly, it may protect the 
integrity of elected politicians by making them less dependent on wealthy donations. 
 Secondly, it may stimulate equality of opportunity between competitors, 
depending on how resources are distributed. For instance, it may allow parties that are 
not business-friendly to compete more effectively with ones that are.  
 And, finally, it may ensure the proper functioning of political parties, by 
guaranteeing that they have enough resources to compete and reach potential voters.  
Almost every western democracy has some kind of public funding.193 However, 
there is controversy as to how resources are distributed. The eligibility criteria adopted 
around the world are diverse,194 and every criterion has mixed effects. 
                                                             
190 Patrícia  Campos  Mello,  ‘Empresários  bancam  campanha  contra  o  PT  pelo  WhatsApp’  Folha de S. 
Paulo (18 October 2018) <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-
campanha-contra-o-pt-pelo-whatsapp.shtml> accessed 15 December 2018. 
191 Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics, 52.  
192 For a discussion about the types of public funding and the rationales behind it, see Graeme Orr, 
'Full Public Funding: Cleaning Up Parties or Parties Cleaning Up?' in Jonathan Mendilow and Eric 
Phélippeau (eds), Handbook of Political Party Funding (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018). 
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The Brazilian legislation 
Public funding, particularly the criteria for its distribution, has been constantly 
changing over the years in Brazil and has been the subject of frequent judicial disputes 
within the Supreme Court, as will be seen in chapter nine. In the pages below, I will 
address how they are currently structured.  
Brazil has two types of public funding: (i) financial (also known as direct public 
funding); and (ii) free-access to broadcasts (also known as indirect public funding).   
In 1965,195 the Fundo Partidário (‘Parties’   Fund’) was created, consisting of 
public financial resources for parties. The existence of the fund now has constitutional 
recognition, as it was incorporated into the Constitution of 1988.196 It is designed to 
cover various party expenses, such as political advertisements, the maintenance of an 
institute or foundation of research, the payment of tuition and annuities to international 
party organisations, and expenses with food.197 In 2018, around R$ 888 million (about 
£184 million) in total were distributed through the Fundo Partidário,198 according to the 
following criteria: 5% of the funds allocated on an equal basis to all parties that are 
registered at the Superior Electoral Court, and 95% allocated in proportion to the votes 
                                                                                                                                                                            
193 Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics. All countries that are 
members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) adopt public 
funding. OECD, Financing Democracy (2016) 39. It should be noted, however, that exclusive public 
funding is highly controversial. The fear is that parties might become distant from society and 
excessively dependent of the state. Thus, this would harm parties' raison d'être — ie, to be the bridge 
between the society and the state. 
194 Ohman, 'Getting the Political Finance System Right' 24. 
195 Lei nº 4740, de 15 de julho de 1965, DOU 19/07/1965. See de Souza, 'A Evolução da Regulação 
do Financiamento de Campanha no Brasil (1945–2006)'. For a brief account of the evolution of the 
legislation on this matter, see also Adla Youssef Bourdoukan, 'O Bolso e a Urna: Financiamento 
Político em Perspectiva Comparada' (Tese de Doutorado em Ciência Política, Universidade de São 
Paulo 2009) 77; and Sídia Maria Porto Lima, Prestação de Contas & Financiamento de Campanhas 
Eleitorais (2014) 89. 
196 Artigo 17, parágrafo 3, da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988.  
197 Artigo 44 da Lei nº 9096/1995. 
198 André   de   Souza,   ‘Candidatos   terão   dois   fundos   públicos   para   financiar   campanha   em   2018’  O 
Globo (14 February 2018) <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/candidatos-terao-dois-fundos-publicos-
para-financiar-campanha-em-2018-22396526> accessed 11 June 2018.  
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obtained in the previous election for the Chamber of Deputies.199 But, from 2019 
onwards, a barrier clause will be in force. The barrier clause will gradually increase in 
2023, 2026, and finally, in 2030, so that entitlement for this public fund will apply only 
to the parties that have obtained a minimum 3% of the valid votes in the elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies, distributed in at least 1/3 of the states, with a minimum of 2% of 
the valid votes in each of them; and the parties that have elected at least 15 federal 
deputies distributed in at least 1/3 of the states of the federation.200  
In 2017, the Congress and president Michel Temer created an additional 
financial  public   funding,  destined  exclusively  to  cover  parties’  expenses  in  elections.   It  
is called Fundo Especial de Financiamento de Campanha (‘Special  Fund  for  Campaign  
Financing’).201 Congressmen were arguably concerned about a lack of financial 
resources  due  to  the  Supreme  Court’s  corporate  contributions  ban  in  2015.202 In the 2018 
elections, this new financial public funding was around R$ 1.7 billion (around £350 
million).203 The   fund’s distributive criterion was the following: 2% equally divided 
among all parties registered at the Superior Electoral Court; 35% divided among parties 
that have at least one representative in the Chamber of Deputies, in proportion to the 
percentage of votes they obtained in the last election for the Chamber of Deputies; 48% 
divided among the parties in proportion to the number of seats that they have in the 
                                                             
199 Artigo 7, parágrafo 2º, e artigo 41-A da Lei nº 9096/1995, este último atualizado pela Lei nº 
12875, de 30 de outubro de 2013, DOU 31/10/2013 e pela Lei nº 13165/2015. Moreover, 30% of the 
fund should be assigned to women candidates, in each party. See STF, ADI 5617/DF, Rel Min Edson 
Fachin, DJ 23/03/2018. 
200 Artigo 3 da Emenda Constitucional nº 97, de 4 de outubro de 2017, DOU 05/10/2017.  
201 Lei nº 13487, de 6 de outubro de 2017, DOU Edição Extra de 06/10/2017. 
202 Carol   Siqueira,   ‘Eleição   de   2018   será   a   primeira   disputa   com   fundo   público   para   campanhas’  
Agência Câmara Notícias (22 January 2018) 
<http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/POLITICA/551780-ELEICAO-DE-2018-SERA-
A-PRIMEIRA-DISPUTA-COM-FUNDO-PUBLICO-PARA-CAMPANHAS.html> accessed 11 June 
2018.  
203 Thiago  Faria,  ‘Fundo  público  eleitoral  dá  mais  dinheiro  a  21  partidos’  O Estado de S. Paulo (29 
January 2018) <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,fundo-publico-eleitoral-da-mais-
dinheiro-a-21-partidos,70002169284> accessed in 11 June 2018. 
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Chamber of Deputies; and 15% divided among the parties in the proportion to the 
number of seats that they have in the Senate.204 
Adding   up   the   ‘Parties   Fund’   and   the   ‘Special   Fund   for   Campaign’,   parties  
received in total more than R$ 2.5 billion (more than £520 million) in 2018.205  
 Apart from the financial public funds, parties also receive free-access to 
broadcasts during elections, as established by the Constitution and regulated by electoral 
legislation.206 Currently, 10% of the time is distributed equally to all political parties; 
and 90% is distributed in proportion to the number of representatives in the Chamber of 
Deputies of the last legislature.207 The same barrier clause mentioned above for the 
Parties’   Fund   will   be   in   force   for   the   granting   of   the   free-access to broadcast from 
2019.208 Paid broadcast advertisement is banned during elections, which takes us to the 
next subsection.209 
 
3.3.4. Spending Controls  
Definition and Rationale 
 Finally, the last regulatory strategy focuses on the demand side, rather than the 
supply side. As defined by Keith Ewing,  
 
                                                             
204 Lei nº 13488, de 6 de outubro de 2017, DOU Edição Extra de 6/10/2017.  
205 Souza,  ‘Candidatos  terão  dois  fundos  públicos  para  financiar  campanha  em  2018’. 
206 Artigo 17, parágrafo 3, da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988. Artigo 44 e 
seguintes da Lei nº 9504/1997. Parties also had free access to broadcasts during non-electoral periods, 
but this was revoked in 2017. Congressmen transferred the money that was used to pay broadcasters 
to the new Special Fund for Campaign Financing. Agência Senado,   ‘Senado   e  Câmara   têm  15  dias  
para   votar   reforma   eleitoral’   (21   September   2017)  
<https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2017/09/21/senado-e-camara-tem-15-dias-para-votar-
reforma-eleitoral/tablet> accessed 11 June 2018. 
207 Artigo 47, parágrafo 2º, da Lei nº 9504/1997, atualizado pela Lei nº 13165/2015.  
208 Emenda Constitucional nº 97/2017. 
209 Artigo 44 da Lei nº 9504/1997.  
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 Here the aim is to regulate by controlling the spending which the parties 
 may lawfully incur, principally, though not exclusively, through the 
 medium of spending limits, particularly at election time. This strategy 
 may entail banning certain kinds of expenditure, or the amount that may 
 be spent by electoral actors, or both.210  
 
There may be three main rationales behind the implementation of spending bans 
and limits. Firstly, spending limits may promote equality of opportunity between 
competing parties and competing candidates.211  
Secondly, as spending limits reduce overall spending on campaigns, this may 
lessen  politicians’   temptation   to   ‘seek   or   accept   funding   from   tainted   sources,   or  with  
strings’.212 Thus, it may protect the integrity of elected politicians. In addition, we may 
argue that, if every party/candidate has the same cap, it is easier to supervise spending, 
and consequently those whose spending originated from a slush fund. 
Thirdly, spending bans and limits may encourage the proper functioning of the 
electoral process by promoting a democratic deliberation more centred on the 
candidates’   capabilities   and   qualifications   to   the   public   post   and   the   content   of   their  
policy proposals; and less centred on overly advertised campaigns and media 
pyrotechnics.213  
                                                             
210 Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics, 49–50. 
211 Ibid 50. Under a Rawlsian conception of democracy, cheaper campaigns might encourage regular 
citizens to run for political posts. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Bruno Speck, 'O Financiamento de Campanhas Eleitorais' in José Jairo Gomes (ed), Direito 
eleitoral (5 edn, Del Rey 2010) 154 (as cited in Cláudio Pereira de Souza Neto and Daniel Sarmento, 
'A Inconstitucionalidade do Financiamento de Campanha por Empresas e o Financiamento 
Democrático de Campanha ' in Aldo Arantes and others (eds), A OAB e a Reforma Política 
Democrática (OAB, Conselho Federal 2014) 29).  
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Around 30% of all countries limit the amounts that political parties may spend, 
while over 40% limit candidate spending.214  
 
The Brazilian legislation215 
 The Electoral Code of 1950 introduced spending limits in Brazil.216 But it 
established that parties should fix their own caps. Thus, there were no de facto spending 
limits.217 And this remained the rule for more than 65 years.  
 But in 2015, the Congress and president Dilma Rousseff introduced the first de 
facto spending caps.218 For presidential candidates, the spending limit was R$ 70 million 
(around £14.5 million) in the 2018 election.219 The two candidates that passed to the 
second round were able to spend about R$ 35 million (around £7.25 million) more. The 
spending limits for candidates for the Senate varied in accordance with the population 
size of the state in which they competed. They could spend up to between R$ 2.5 million 
(around £520 thousand) in smaller states, and R$ 5.6 million (around £1.16 million) in 
larger states.220 And the spending limits for candidates for the Chamber were settled at 
                                                             
214 Ohman, 'Getting the Political Finance System Right' 27.  
215 Although the Brazilian legislation does ban certain types of spending, I will focus this subsection 
on spending limits, which are a pillar of every political finance system. The spending bans will be 
mentioned accordingly during the thesis.  
216 See Bourdoukan, 'O Bolso e a Urna: Financiamento Político em Perspectiva Comparada' 75. 
Artigo 143, inciso I, da Lei nº 1164, de 24 de julho de 1950, DOU 26/07/1950.  
217 Although the legislation in force between 1997 and 2015 established that the spending limits 
would be settled by the Congress every electoral year, in practice Congress never settled such limits. 
As a consequence, each political party was responsible for setting its own spending limits and 
reporting them to the electoral courts. In other words, political parties ended up with full autonomy to 
fix their spending limits. Parties and candidates usually established a high limit, so they could spend 
the amount they wanted to, without being concerned about the limit. See Aline Osório and Daniel 
Sarmento, 'Eleições, Dinheiro e Democracia: A ADI 4.650 e o Modelo Brasileiro de Financiamento 
de Campanhas Eleitorais' (2014) 26 Direitos Fundamentais & Justiça 15 21; Daniel Sarmento and 
Aline Osório, 'Uma Mistura Tóxica: Política, Dinheiro e o Financiamento das Eleições' in Daniel 
Sarmento (ed), Jurisdição Constitucional e Política, vol 1 (1 edn, Forense 2015); Denise Goulart 
Schlickmann, Financiamento de Campanhas Eleitorais (Juruá 2014) 310.  
218 Artigos 5, 6, 7 e 8 da Lei nº 13165/2015.  
219 Artigo 5 da Lei nº 13488/2017. 
220 Artigo 6, parágrafo 2, da Lei nº 13488/2017.  
68 
 
R$ 2.5 million (around £520 thousand) for those who competed in states,221 and R$ 1 
million (around £210 thousand) for those who competed in the federal district.222  
 
3.4. The transformation of the political finance system: from corporate to mixed 
 As we have seen in the last section, the Brazilian political finance framework has 
changed from one which was largely centred on corporate donations, to a configuration 
based on public  funding,  use  of  own  resources  and  individuals’  donations.  
 
3.4.1. The system based on corporate donations 
 The system centred on corporate donations was in force from 1993 to 2015. As 
mentioned in the last section, during that period, Brazil had a controversial legal 
framework: while private corporations were allowed to donate a great amount of 
money,223 contributions from trade unions, professional associations and non-profit 
organisations were banned. This framework enabled corporate donations to be 
hegemonic during that cycle. In other words, most of the money circulated in the 
elections came from companies.224 Unsurprisingly, corporate donations were the bulk of 
the funding of the three main parties — the Brazilian Democratic Movement party, the 
                                                             
221 Artigo 7, inciso I, da Lei nº 13488/2017. 
222 Artigo 7, inciso II, da Lei nº 13488/2017. 
223 In addition, caps on corporate donations were quite loose: companies could donate to political 
parties  and  candidates  up  to  2%  of  their  previous  year’s  gross  revenue.   
224 For an empirical analysis based on data from the Electoral Superior Tribunal, see Carazza, 
‘Interesses   Econômicos,   Representação   Política   e   Produção   Legislativa   no   Brasil   sob   a   Ótica   do  
Financiamento   de   Campanhas   Eleitorais’ 48. Although the author technically   uses   the   term   ‘legal  
fictions’   in   the   chart,   they   basically  mean   ‘corporations’   since   companies  were   the   ones  who  were  
legally able to donate, which is inferred by the author throughout his thesis. For a discussion about the 
legal hegemony of corporations in the former Brazilian political finance system, see Min Luiz Fux, 
STF, ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 55. 
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Brazilian   Social  Democratic   Party,   and   the  Workers’   Party.225 For instance, corporate 
donations accounted for 76% of Brazilian political party and candidate funding in the 
2014 general elections.226 
Moreover, there were no de facto spending   limits.  As  Supreme  Court’s  Justice  
Luiz Fux pointed out during the deliberation of the ADI 4650 in 2015, per capita 
spending on Brazilian campaigns back then surpassed the ones in France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom. And, as far as the ratio between the campaign costs and GDP227 is 
concerned, Brazilian campaigns were more expensive than the ones in the United 
States.228 
 For  Mr   Fux,   who   led   the   Court’s   majority   in   the   ADI 4650 case, the above-
mentioned context could be characterised as a ‘plutocratisation’   of   the   political  
process.229 What perhaps Justice Fux and others tried to say is that the political process 
could be characterised as plutocratic because dependent and war chest corruption 
apparently occurred. In other words, apparently most candidates felt they were 
dependent on corporate money, and the balance of political deliberation was distorted in 
favour of those parties and candidates aligned with business interests.  
                                                             
225 Carazza,   ‘Interesses  Econômicos,  Representação  Política   e  Produção  Legislativa  no  Brasil   sob   a  
Ótica do Financiamento de Campanhas Eleitorais’ 59. It is true that, until 2002, corporate donations 
were  not  the  major  source  of  the  Workers’  Party’s  electoral  fund.  In  the  1998  elections,  for  example,  
corporate   donations   accounted   for   about   35%   of   the   party’s   fund;;   while   almost   50%   came   from 
donations   from   individuals.   However,   back   then   the  Workers’   Party   was   a  mid-sized party: it had 
never won a presidential election and was a mid-sized party in the Chamber of Deputies. It was only 
in the 2002 elections, when corporate donations accounted for   around   70%   of   the  Workers’   Party  
electoral fund, that the party became a more dominant force: it won the presidential election for the 
first time in history and became the party with most seats in the Chamber of Deputies, also for the 
first time (not to mention  an  increase  of  about  75%  in  the  Senate  seats).  In  sum,  the  Workers’  Party  
only became dominant after it started receiving most of its funds from corporations. See ibid 58–60. It 
should be noted that, in contrast to the British Labour Party, the Brazilian  Workers’  Party  never  had  
formal funding links with trade unions. Kucinski,  'The  Rise  of  the  Worker’s  Party' 19. 
226 Carazza, Dinheiro, Eleições e Poder: As Engrenagens do Sistema Político Brasileiro, 43. 
227 Gross domestic product. 
228 STF, ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 25. 
229 Ibid 4. Justice Marco Aurélio Mello, who had an important influence on the decision of the 
majority of the Court, also stated that the Brazilian system could be characterised as a plutocracy. See 
Ibid 171. Mr M Mello based most of his opinion on Timothy K Kuhner, 'The Democracy to Which 
We Are Entitled: Human Rights and the Problem of Money in Politics' (2013) 26 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 39. 
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From the eleven justices of the Supreme Court, only three (Luís Barroso, Teori 
Zavascki and Gilmar Mendes) made arguments related to quid pro quo corruption. Their 
arguments  were  not  central  to  the  majority’s  reasoning — Justices Zavascki and Mendes 
were part of the dissent; and Justice Barroso was part of the majority and followed, for 
the most part, the central arguments made by Justices Fux and Marco Aurélio Mello. For 
Mr Barroso, who advanced a view that many in the media seem to hold, the corporate 
political finance system (combined with the Brazilian electoral system and the system of 
government) stimulated quid pro quo corruption.230 If we assume that this is true, 
perhaps we may say that, when it comes to political finance, this occurred because the 
legislation ended up allowing concentration of donations, as will be explored in chapters 
seven and eight.  
 
3.4.2. The system with mixed sources 
 In the 2018 elections, party and candidate financial resources came from public 
funding, individual donations and the use of candidates’   own resources. Moreover, 
Brazilian federal elections had de facto spending limits for the first time. 
 As  we  have  seen   in   the   last   section,  congressmen  recently   created   the   ‘Special  
Fund   for   Campaign’   to   add   up   to   the   ‘Parties   Fund’.   Consequently,   public   funding 
                                                             
230 Min Luís Barroso, STF, ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 121–134. Mr Barroso argued that 
quid pro quo corruption practices related to political finance in Brazil are boosted by an element of 
the Brazilian political culture: patrimonialism. Patrimonialism occurs when a public authority, such as 
an elected politician, treats the state (eg, his public office) as if it were his own property. See 
Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil, 
179. The use of the term in the scholarship about Brazilian political culture was consolidated through 
the works of scholars such as Raymundo Faoro and Sérgio de Holanda. See Raymundo Faoro, Os 
Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro (3 edn, Editora Globo 2001 (1957)) and 
Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Raízes do Brasil (2 edn, Editora José Olympio 1948 (1936)). Although 
most of the scholars who research Brazil have been assuming that Brazilian politicians indeed have a 
patrimonial element in their practices, some have opposed it: see, eg, Jessé Souza, A Tolice da 
Inteligência Brasileira: ou como o País se deixa manipular pela elite (LeYa 2015). I will avoid this 
controversy and develop this thesis   without   addressing   the   alleged   ‘genesis’   of   the   Brazilian  
politicians, since this is usually a complex task designated to historians and sociologists. 
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represented  73%  of  the  candidates’  total  financial  funding  in  the  first round of the 2018 
elections.231 As Brazilian parties have low intra-party democracy,232 some have argued 
that this new configuration has eventually benefited those who have close relations with 
party leaders.233 Although public funding was the hegemonic source in the 2018 
elections, perhaps it   is   still   too   soon   to   claim   that   this   new  configuration   is   a   ‘system  
based   on   public   funding’   because   we   do   not   know   if   this   proportion   will   remain the 
same in the next elections. 
 In addition, the mixed system also continued to benefit the wealthy in the 2018 
elections. By keeping the above-mentioned private money criteria, the Supreme Court 
and the political bodies enabled economic inequalities to be translated into political 
inequalities, which is always problematic for a country that is the 14th most unequal in 
the world.234  
In other words, by force of law, wealthy individuals continued to have the 
privilege of being able to donate more than poorer ones. The criterion chosen by 
legislators ended up prohibiting a poorer individual from donating the same amount as 
someone wealthier, even if she had the resources. For example, if two individuals, on the 
year before the election, had an income of R$ 100 thousand and 20 thousand 
respectively, a donation of R$ 5 thousand was lawful to the richer individual, but not for 
the poorer one. In this perspective, the legislation still enabled owners of large 
                                                             
231 Ranier  Bragon  and  Camila  Mattoso,  ‘Com  73%  de  dinheiro  público,  primeiro  turno  custou  R$  2,82  
bilhões’  Folha de S. Paulo (14 October 2018) <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/com-
73-de-dinheiro-publico-primeiro-turno-custou-r-282-bilhoes.shtml> accessed 06 January 2019.  
232 See, eg, Amaral, 'As Transformações na Organização Interna do Partido dos Trabalhadores entre 
1995 e 2009. Diogo Rais argues that members have little or no protection before the decisions of the 
party   leaders.  Diogo  Rais,  ‘Liberar  o  autofinanciamento  deverá  elitizar  as  candidaturas’  Folha de S. 
Paulo (17 February 2018) <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/02/liberar-o-
autofinanciamento-devera-elitizar-as-candidaturas.shtml> accessed 17 June 2018.  
233 Reynaldo   Turollo   Jr,   ‘Divisão   de   fundo   eleitoral   privilegiará   os   caciques,   admitem   partidos ao 
TSE’  Folha de S. Paulo (24 July 2018) <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/07/divisao-de-
fundo-eleitoral-privilegiara-os-caciques-admitem-partidos-ao-tse.shtml> accessed 24 July 2018.  
234 World   Bank   Development   Research   Group,   ‘GINI   index   (World   Bank   estimate) (1981–2013)’  
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI> accessed 30 July 2016.  
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companies to donate a significant amount of money (not through their corporations, but 
as individuals). For example, a millionaire who earned USD 20 million could donate 
USD 2 million. In this respect, it is worrying to hear reports of corporation directors 
bundling to donate as a group in the 2018 elections.235  
Wealthy candidates also had more chance of competing effectively in the last 
election because they could use their own financial resources up to the spending limits 
established for the position to which they were competing — which were quite high, as 
we saw in the last section.236   
Even considering that the 2018 election was atypical due to an unprecedented 
knife attack during the campaign   that   boosted   the   election’s anti-system traits, 
apparently money continued to be important, as early analyses have been showing.237 
 Finally, it should be noted that there are ongoing investigations about the 
occurrence and the legality of third-party expenditures allegedly made by corporations 
and businessmen, such as the alleged dissemination of paid messages through WhatsApp 
in order to favour Bolsonaro.238 
 
                                                             
235 Ranier  Bragon  and  Camila  Mattoso,  ‘Dirigentes  de  empresas  fazem  doações  e  ajudam a eleger 53 
parlamentares’   Folha de S. Paulo (14 October 2018) 
<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/dirigentes-de-empresas-fazem-doacoes-e-ajudam-a-
eleger-53-parlamentares.shtml> accessed 17 January 2019.  
236 Political bodies  have  been  discussing  the  introduction  of  uniform  limits  for  individuals’  donations  
and use of own resources by candidates. But the rules for the 2022 federal elections are still uncertain, 
since elected politicians and the Superior Electoral Tribunal have constantly changed the electoral 
legislation from one election to another. 
237 For  instance,  Carazza’s  analysis  using  data  separated  by  party  and  state  indicates  that,  in  general,  
the candidates with more money were more likely to be elected during the 2018 elections. Bruno 
Carazza,   ‘Onda   antissistema   que   varreu   o   Congresso   também   se   deve   a   novas   regras’   Folha de S. 
Paulo (14 October 2018) <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrissima/2018/10/onda-antissistema-
que-varreu-o-congresso-tambem-se-deve-a-novas-regras.shtml> accessed 17 January 2019.  
238 See,   eg,  Ricardo  Della  Coletta,   ‘TSE   e  PF  vão   investigar   se   empresas   bancaram  esquema   ilegal  
pró-Bolsonaro   no   WhatsApp’   El País (20 October 2018) 




3.5. Conclusion of the chapter 
From 1993 to 2015, Brazil had a political finance system based on corporate 
donations. It seems safe to say that, within this period of six federal elections,239 war 
chest and dependence corruption apparently occurred, harming equality of opportunity 
and risking the integrity of elected politicians, respectively. 
 A decision from the Supreme Court in the ADI 4650 and the enactment of recent 
legislation has changed the legal framework, although the new system based on mixed 
sources of funding continued to allow economic inequalities to be translated into 
political inequalities in the 2018 elections. 
The next part of the thesis will investigate, through a case study, whether the 
political finance system based on corporate donations impacted the democratic integrity 
of  a  branch  of  law  that  grounds  the  country’s  capitalism:  the competition law.  
Considering that there is debate as to whether corporate donations should be re-
introduced,240 the following case study remains topical. 
  
                                                             
239 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 federal elections.  

























In a recent survey of thousands of citizens of 18 Latin American countries, 
Brazilians were the ones who expressed the lowest rate of trust in their elected 
representatives: 86.1% of Brazilians perceive that their country is governed for a few 
powerful groups in their own interest; and only 11.7% perceive that the country is 
governed for the good of all people. By contrast, in Uruguay, 38.2% of the population 
perceive that the country is governed for a few powerful groups in their own interest, 
while the majority of Uruguayans (55.2%) perceive that the country is governed for the 
good of all people.241 
As  I  will  argue  in  this  chapter,  a  great  deal  of  the  people’s  lack  of  confidence  in  
their representatives has to do with a lack of confidence in the electoral process.  
The other main argument of this chapter is: lack of confidence in the electoral 
process not only harms confidence in representatives, but also might impair confidence 
                                                             
241 Latinobarómetro,  ‘2015  Database’  <http://www.latinobarometro.org>  accessed  22  July  2018. 
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in the rules they set regarding the  country’s  capitalism and confidence in the integrity of 
the enforcement of those rules.  
This chapter is important to set the theoretical basis for matters involving 
political finance corruption, before exploring the implications of those forms of 
corruption for competition law. In other words, before addressing the case studies which 
will empirically explore the implications of political finance corruption on competition 
law (which will follow in chapters five and six), we need to know the parameters for 
matters involving political finance issues and the consequences of these parameters.  
The present chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I will try to 
demonstrate that, according to the Brazilian Supreme Court, the mere appearance of 
electoral corruption is sufficient to justify changes in political finance legislation.  
In the second section, I discuss why is this so. That is, I will try to answer why 
mere appearance is enough to justify changes in legislation.  
In the last section, I will argue that the appearance of dependence and war chest 
corruption might also result in the appearance of corruption of the rules of capitalism. 
Thus, the appearance of electoral integrity is key  not  only  for  the  country’s  democracy,  
but, more broadly, for the capitalist democracy set out in the Brazilian constitution.  
 
4.2. The sufficiency of appearance in matters involving political finance law in 
Brazil 
As we have seen in chapter three, the majority of the Brazilian Supreme Court 
has recently ruled that the political finance system based on corporate donations violated 
the Constitution.  
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The  majority’s   arguments   implied   that   the  appearance of dependence and war 
chest corruption is sufficient to validate changes in political finance legislation.242 The 
justices did not examine political science literature while deciding the case. A small 
amount of data on campaign finance was enough to convince the justices that corporate 
donations were corrupting the electoral process — either by risking the elected 
politicians’   decision-making integrity towards the public or apparently harming the 
equality of opportunity.   
 
4.2.1. The appearance of dependence corruption 
Justice Fux, who delivered the leading opinion of the majority, concluded that 
corporate donations have had an anti-republican intent because many of the largest 
donors contributed to all the main parties simultaneously.243 In other words, the 
donations intended to build political connections, indicating a corrupting feature in the 
sense  of  harming  the  integrity  of  elected  politicians’  decision  making.   
And that was enough for him. Mr Fux did not discuss if there were studies 
showing whether corporate donations have actually corrupted   the  politicians’   decision  
making, that is, if there was evidence that corporate donations have indeed shaped the 
minds and attitudes of elected politicians. The apparent intent of corrupting was enough. 
The other justices who formed the majority — for example, Marco Aurélio Mello, who 
also  played  an   influential  role  for  the  majority’s  decision244 — concurred in expressing 
the same interpretation.  
The majority of the High Court of Australia took a similar path in McCloy v New 
South Wales,   when   it   ruled   that   ‘removing   the   risk   and   perception of   corruption’  
                                                             
242 STF, ADI 4650/DF. 
243 Ibid, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 53. 
244 Ibid 174. 
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(including of dependence corruption) is a constitutionally valid justification for enacting 
political finance legislation.245 
 
4.2.2. The appearance of war chest corruption 
The Brazilian justices also did not examine empirical studies in depth to find the 
unconstitutionality of corporate donations due to war chest corruption (that is, due to an 
imbalance in the political debate in favour of those parties and candidates aligned with 
business interests).  
Justice Fux concluded that corporate donations have distorted competition in 
elections based on the fact that (a) a few companies provided a large amount of the total 
funds of the elections, (b) candidate and party spending have been rising beyond 
inflation and GDP, and (c) there is a strong correlation between the amount of money 
spent on campaigns and the votes hoarded by candidates.246 For Mr Fux, this was 
sufficient to conclude that the overwhelming amount of corporate money in elections 
benefits the candidates aligned with business interests, unbalancing the electoral 
competition between candidates, and impacting results. He did not consider, for 
instance,   that  the  ‘strong  correlation  between  money  and  votes’  might  be  explained  by  
the fact that a candidate might have attracted corporate money because of his well-
known ability to win votes and get elected; and not the opposite (see subsections 5.4.1 
and 5.4.2).  
                                                             
245 McCloy v New South Wales at 66 [93] (emphasis added). In paragraph 62, the majority of the 
Court  reasoned  that  ‘Limiting  restrictions  on  political  donations  to  acts of bribery would undoubtedly 
reduce the efficacy of the statutory scheme. The difficulties inherent in detecting and proving bribery 
in the context of political donations do not suggest that it can be considered a reasonable alternative to 
capping. Further, it is not the subjective intention of the donor so much as the objective tendency of 
large payments of money to corrupt both government and the electoral system which is the 
justification   for   the   restriction.’   (emphasis   added).  The   legislation   discussed   by   the  High  Court   of  
Australia concerned a cap on political donations, a prohibition to property developers from making 
such donations, and a restriction on indirect campaign contributions. 
246 ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 50. Justice Weber used the same argument. Ibid 302. 
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The other justices who formed the majority adopted a similar view. For Mr 
Toffolli, it was self-evident that, 
 
Authorizing the influence of business on the electoral process is to 
concede the breach of equality in electoral disputes and the imbalance in 
the election, since it is undeniable that candidates and political parties 
with greater ability to raise funds from the interest groups with greater 
economic power have more chances of winning the elections.247  
 
The opinions of Justices Marco Aurélio Mello248, Ricardo Lewandowiski249 and 
Joaquim Barbosa250 were in this same vein.  
No justice discussed in depth if corporate donations did in fact favour certain 
political   parties   or   candidates,   and   which   ones,   by   impacting   the   voters’   decision-
making. Therefore, again, the mere appearance of an imbalance in electoral competition 
was enough to find unconstitutionality. 
The Supreme Court of Canada took a similar view in Harper v Canada (AG),251 
as will be seen in the next section.  
 
                                                             
247 Ibid 84. 
248 Ibid 171 
249 Ibid 178. 
250 Ibid 64. 
251 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 SCR 827. 
80 
 
4.3. Why is the mere appearance enough?  
 To answer in one sentence the  question  formulated  at  this  section’s  title,  we  can  
summarise that appearance is enough because: although citizens need to maintain 
confidence in the electoral process, dependence and war chest corruption are difficult to 
measure scientifically.  
Thus, in this section, we will first look at the difficulty in measuring dependence 
and war chest corruption. Subsequently, we will explore why it is important that people 
trust elections. Next, how political finance regulation may increase public confidence in 
the democratic regime will be discussed. Lastly, I will try to delimitate the meaning of 
an   ‘appearance   based   on   logic,   reason   and   social   science   evidence’   as   sufficient   to  
justify political finance reforms.  
 
4.3.1. The difficulty in measuring dependence and war chest corruption  
 Dependence corruption is hard to measure scientifically because of the 
difficulties in asserting that money was the sole factor that altered the decision-making 
of an elected politician. In other words, it is difficult to isolate money from other factors 
that  might  have  contributed  to  the  elected  politician’s  change  of  mind.  It  is  unlikely  that  
an elected politician will publicly admit that he felt dependent on the campaign 
contribution while taking a decision in government or in Congress. Moreover, politicians 
might even lack self-awareness: sometimes they might have the feeling [of dependency] 
but not realise it. This difficulty in measuring dependence corruption becomes even 
harder when dealing with a large number of representatives, such as the whole Congress. 
As it will be seen in chapter five, statistical studies might try to control for other factors 
(such as ideology), but they have relied on somewhat imprecise approximations (for 
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instance, they have determined a politician’s   ideology  based   on   his   party,   and   not   his 
ideology as an individual), which may undermine the confidence in the results.  
 War chest corruption, in turn, is hard to measure scientifically due to the 
difficulty in determining the extent to which people were in fact influenced by political 
ads. As put by Justice Michel Bastarache, while writing for the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Harper v Canada (AG), the harm of wealth monopolising the 
political  discourse  ‘is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  measure  because  of  the  subtle  ways  
in  which  advertising  influences  human  behaviour’.252 
 It is noteworthy that similar problems might arise when trying to draw causation 
between media content and electoral results. As argued by Nadia Urbinati: 
 
Although we can hardly prove beyond any reasonable doubt that there is 
a causal relationship between media content, public opinion, and 
political results or decisions (no data can prove that Berlusconi won 
three electoral competitions because of his media television empire), the 
barriers to equal opportunity to participate in the formation of public 
opinions should be kept low and their level permanently monitored.253 
 
4.3.2. The importance of public confidence in elections  
 The survival of the democratic regime depends on the people’s confidence in it. 
If people do not trust democracy, this can open possibilities for the rise of non-
                                                             
252 at 79. 
253 Nadia Urbinati, 'Free Speech as the Citizen's Right' in Robert C Post (ed), Citizens Divided: 
Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Harvard 
University Press 2014) 139.  
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democratic political regimes.254 The erosion of constitutional liberal democracy may be 
gradual and start with the public support for candidates who flirt with authoritarian 
regimes and fight against some of the constitutional   liberal   democracy’s   pillar  
institutions, such as the free press and the judiciary.255 This is even more worrying in 
countries with a recent past of authoritarianism, such as Brazil, where not too long ago a 
military dictatorship was in force.256  
The cornerstone of representative democracy is elections. This is why citizens 
need to maintain confidence in elections. In this aspect, the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada reasoned in Harper v Canada (AG) that lack of confidence in the 
electoral process (1) discourages citizens from participating in a meaningful way in 
democracy and, perhaps more importantly, (2) results in lack of faith in elected 
representatives. If elections apparently lack integrity, trust in representative democracy 
falls. As a result, alternative (non-democratic) political regimes might have more 
opportunities to arise.  
 Within the Brazilian Supreme Court, Justice Fux inferred that same rationale 
when he argued that citizens should trust and believe in the political system of the 
Brazilian constitutional democracy.257  
                                                             
254 I must register that I had the insight for this argument while listening to Politiquês Nexo Jornal 
podcast,   ‘Democracia   no   Brasil   e   no  mundo:   conceitos,   avanços   e   ameaças’   (23   September   2018)  
comments by Heloísa Starling, history professor at Federal University of Minas Gerais 
<https://www.nexojornal.com.br/podcast/2018/09/23/Democracia-no-Brasil-e-no-mundo-conceitos-
avan%C3%A7os-e-amea%C3%A7as> accessed 14 February 2019. 
255 What we are talking here, more precisely, is about the Brazilian constitutional liberal democracy. I 
take   a   ‘constitutional   liberal   democracy’   as   a   country   where   there   are:   (1)   ‘periodic   free-and-fair 
elections   in  which  a   losing   side   cedes   power’;;   (2)   ‘liberal   rights   to   speech   and association that are 
closely   linked   to   democracy   in   practice’;;   and   (3)   ‘stability,   predictability,   and   integrity   of   law   and  
legal institutions — the rule of law — functionally necessary to allow democratic engagement without 
fear  or  coercion’.  Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, 'How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy' (2018) 65 
UCLA Law Review.  
256 See chapter two for a brief account of the Brazilian historical context.  
257 STF, ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 25. 
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And, for Mr Fux, a political finance legal framework that permits the capture of 
political power by economic power,258 attempts against that trust. As I have been 
arguing throughout this thesis, the so-called   “capture   of   political   power   by   economic  
power”  can  happen  both  through  corruption  of  the  elected  politician’s  attitude  or  through  
corruption  of  the  election’s  flow  of  communication.  In  other  words,  it  can  occur  through  
quid pro quo and dependence corruption; or through war chest corruption.  
 Because we are talking about trust, the mere appearance is enough.  
  
4.3.3. How political finance regulation may increase public confidence in the 
democratic regime  
Talking about dependence corruption within American politics, Lawrence Lessig 
argued that money in the wrong places makes people trust less.  
He argued that the judicial system protects itself from distrust by avoiding the 
appearance of conflicts-of-interest. For example, he says, if a judge deciding a billion-
dollar lawsuit brought against Exxon has any financial connection with the corporation, 
however small, that is enough to disqualify her from that suit. 
Therefore, as Lessig puts it,  
 
The   legal  system  doesn’t  assume   that   a   judge   is  partial  merely  because  
her   “impartiality  might   reasonably   be   questioned.”  But   it   does   assume  
that  the   fact  that  her  “impartiality  might  reasonably  be  questioned”  will  
affect  people’s  trust  of  the  judicial  system.  And  so  to  protect  the  system,  
                                                             
258 Ibid 51. 
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or, more precisely, to protect trust in the system, the system takes no 
chances.259  
 
Indeed,  ‘financial  connection’  has  been  widely  recognised  in  several  countries  as  
a cause for disqualification when it comes to the judiciary. For instance, in the United 
Kingdom, while deciding if a judge was apt for hearing a case (considering that he had 
previously given advice, in his capacity as a solicitor, to parties who would benefit from 
the  case’s  decision),  Lord  Denning  MR  ruled  that: 
 
The court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly. 
Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. 
Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right 
minded  people  go  away  thinking:  ‘The  judge  was  biased’.260 
 
In  Brazil,   several   forms  of   financial   links   lead   to   a   judge’s   disqualification, as 
established in article 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure.261 The legislation does not take 
risks. It simply forbids these financial connections, in order to protect the judicial 
system. 
In sum, the judicial system protects itself from the appearance of a corrupted 
decision. And, in this fashion, so should the political system.262 
                                                             
259 Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to Stop It, 30. 
260 Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 599. 
261 Lei nº 13105, de 16 de março de 2015, DOU 17/03/2015.  
262 Aside from the protection of the democratic and judicial systems, Lessig argues that in practice we 
also adopt a similar rationale to other things that are of great value to us. For instance, if you find out 




However,   in   my   view,   Lessig’s   argument   should   be   expanded   a   bit   more.  
Political finance regulation should protect against lack of trust not only regarding 
dependence corruption (as argued by Lessig), but also from war chest corruption. Those 
citizens who perceive that overwhelming corporate money in elections dominates the 
flow of communication will distrust elections as they would if they had the perception of 
dependence  corruption.  Here,  the  problem  is  not  the  corruption  of  the  elected  politician’s  
attitude; but instead the corruption of the political debate. 
Protection from an appearance of war chest corruption was precisely the point 
made by Justice Bastarache while writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Harper v Canada (AG). As he pointed out, war chest corruption harms both 
listeners and potential speakers: 
 
The [spending] limits also prevent the possibility that the wealthy can 
dominate the electoral discourse and dictate the outcome of elections. 
(…)  Thus,  third  party  advertising  expense  limits  advance  the  perception 
that access to the electoral discourse does not require wealth to be 
competitive with other electoral participants. Canadians, in turn, 
perceive the electoral process as substantively fair as it provides for a 
reasonable degree of equality between citizens who wish to participate 
in that process.263 
                                                                                                                                                                            
your  child  should  get  on  his  bus.  As  Lessig  puts   it,  ‘even   if   you   think  the  charge  is   likely   false,   the  
mere chance that it is true may well be enough (and rationally so) for you to decide to drive your kid 
rather  than  risk  his  life  on  the  bus’.  The  charge  will  not  lead  you  to  think  that  the  driver  is  guilty,  but  
it will make you think about whether it is sensible to let him drive your child. In other words, you will 
not  want   to   take   the   risk   because   your   child’s   life   is   too   valuable   to   you.   Therefore,   although   the  
driver’s   guiltiness   has   not   been   accessed,   the  mere   lack   of   trust   will   change   your   attitude.   Lessig, 
Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to Stop It, 30.  
263 At para 109 (emphasis added). John Rawls made a similar argument when commenting that the 





In other words, protecting the electoral system from the perception of war chest 
corruption stimulates non-wealthy people to participate as speakers and even run for 
office. Furthermore, it stimulates everyone, including listeners, to trust that the election 
was fair and, thus, to have more confidence in their elected representatives.264 
To summarise my claim: both forms of corruption (dependence and war chest) 
undermine trust in the democratic system. The mere presence of money suggesting 
potential outcomes (either   representatives’   dependence   or   candidates’   overwhelming  
advantage  in  elections)  affects  people’s  trust  in  the  electoral  process  and,  consequently,  
in the elected representatives. Consequently, the preservation of the constitutional 
democratic regime gets threatened, either by non-democratic practices or even 
eventually by the implementation of a non-democratic regime. In sum, as with the 
judicial system, what is at stake here (the democratic system) is too valuable for the 
Constitution, so it should be protected as such.  
 
4.3.4. The sufficiency of appearance based on logic, reason and social 
science evidence 
 We have just seen that the appearance of political finance corruption is enough 
to justify reforms to legislation. That said, the  affirmation  of  what  is  ‘apparent’  must  be  
grounded on good reasoning265 from some social science evidence.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
protection from the appearance of war chest corruption. Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and their Priority' 
76. 
264 It should be noted that, even if those who perceive elections as unfair end up voting for anti-
business candidates, they might still not trust elected representatives: they might think that several 
potential candidates did not eventually dare to compete because of lack of proper financial resources. 
In this sense, those people might still have the perception that the result was unfair. 
265 As argued by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, given the difficulties in measuring the 





War chest corruption  
 An example of good reasoning on apparent war chest corruption comes from the 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Harper v Canada (AG). Given the 
difficulties in scientifically measuring the extent to which money influences public 
opinion, the majority allowed themselves to rely on   ‘logic,   reason   and   some   social  
science   evidence’,   as   the  Court  worked   in   several   cases.266 For example, the majority 
reasoned   that   ‘surely, political parties, candidates, interest groups and corporations for 
that matter would not spend a significant amount of money on advertising if it was 
ineffective’.267  
  
Dependence corruption  
 An example of good reasoning involving dependence corruption, in turn, was 
articulated by Justice Fux, when he argued that the fact that many of the largest 
corporate donors made simultaneous contributions to all main political parties indicated 
a corrupting intent in the sense of building connections with elected politicians, and, as 
such, an attempt to affect their behaviour during the term of office.268 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
advertising limits will lead to electoral unfairness is sufficient’.  Harper v Canada (AG) at para 88 
(emphasis  added).  A  reasoning  is  ‘any  process  of  drawing  a  conclusion  from  a  set  of  premises’.  Good  
reasoning  occurs  when  ‘the  premises  support  or  even  entail  the  conclusion  drawn’.  Simon Blackburn, 
'Reasoning' in Simon Blackburn (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford University Press 
2008). Good reasoning involves logic, which  is  ‘the  general  science  of  inference.’  Simon Blackburn, 
'Logic' in Simon Blackburn (ed), The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford University Press 
2008).  
266 At para 77. 
267 Ibid at para 106 (emphasis added). 
268 ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 53. 
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4.4. The appearance of corruption of the rules of the economic system 
The problem of appearance of dependence and war chest corruption has an 
additional dimension: it may result in the appearance of corruption of the rules of 
capitalism.269 
Like most western countries today, Brazil is a constitutional capitalist 
democracy. In a constitutional capitalist democracy, political institutions set the infra-
constitutional rules of the economic system and even, sometimes, amend the 
constitutional ones.270 Consequently, political finance corruption has the potential to 
harm   not   only   the   people’s   confidence   in   political   institutions, but also in capitalism 
itself. 
In addition, the rules of capitalism can be enforced by the government, state 
bodies and regulatory agencies, or the judiciary. In this sense, there is no question that 
apparent political finance corruption can harm the appearance of integrity of the rules 
that are enforced directly by the government itself. Nonetheless, they can also harm the 
appearance of integrity of rules enforced by other institutions, considering that these are 
usually under democratic control — for instance, the government might be responsible 
for  appointing  the  agency’s  top  officers  and/or  setting its budget.  
Therefore, the appearance of election integrity may be essential not only to 
maintain   people’s   confidence   in   the   democratic   system, but also more broadly in the 
capitalist democracy established by the Constitution.  
 
                                                             
269 For an account of how the corruption of American democracy might have led to the corruption of 
that country’s   capitalism,   see,   generally,   Timothy K Kuhner, Capitalism v. Democracy: Money in 
Politics and the Free Market Constitution (Stanford University Press 2014). 
270 In Brazil, Congress also can amend the Constitution, as long as this amendment does not violate 
any of the immutable clauses of the Constitution. However, the legislative process to amend the 
Constitution is stricter than the one regarding the infra-constitutional law. Constituição da República 
Federativa do Brasil, 1988, artigo 60. 
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4.5. Conclusion of the chapter  
 We have seen that the majority of the Brazilian Supreme Court has implied that 
the  ‘appearance’  of  dependence  and  war  chest  corruption are sufficient justifications for 
political finance reform; and that the Australian and Canadian Supreme Courts have 
adopted similar reasoning in landmark decisions. 
The reasoning behind those decisions is basically the following: considering that 
citizens need to maintain confidence in the electoral process to encourage the 
continuation of the democratic system itself; but that dependence and war chest 
corruption, which harm that confidence, are hard to measure scientifically; it follows 
that changes in legislation in order to strike the appearance of those forms of corruption 
are constitutionally valid. Nevertheless, statements on what  is  ‘apparent’  must  be  made  
on reasonable grounds and be based on some social science evidence.  
I have argued that the appearance of dependence and war chest corruption might 
also potentially result in the appearance of corruption of the rules of capitalism because 
elected politicians are the ones who formulate many of those rules and have great 
influence on determining who will enforce them and how.  
In this sense, the next two chapters will implement case studies on whether the 
appearance of political finance corruption has impacted the confidence we should have 
in the democratic integrity of the rules governing one of the key elements of capitalism: 
economic competition related to antitrust law and its enforcement.271 
 
   
                                                             
271 Please note that I am not discussing here the hypothetical lack of confidence in capitalism itself, 
but rather the lack of confidence in the rules set for capitalism in the country, and how they are 
enforced. Nor I am arguing that competition law should be more or less interventionist. This is a 




The impact of corporate donations on the Competition Act 2011 
 
 
That’s   the   way   it   is.   Somebody   gives   them  
money. Not anything wrong, just 
psychologically, when they go to that person, 
they’re   going   to   do   that,   (...)   They   owe   them,  
and by the way, they may therefore vote 
negatively towards the country. 
Donald Trump272 
 
Let’s  not  insult  the  intelligence  of  the  American  
people.  People  aren’t  dumb,   (...)  Why   in  God’s  
name does Wall Street make huge campaign 
contributions? I guess just for the fun of it, they 




Both speeches above illustrate a view that many people around the world 
currently hold: contributions and expenditures in elections result in political benefits for 
the donor or the third-party spender.  
                                                             
272 Eugene   Scott,   ‘Trump   on   public   financing:   'I   don't   know   yet'’   CNN (17 January 2016) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/17/politics/donald-trump-public-financing/> accessed 22 November 
2016. 
273 Hunter   Walker,   ‘Hillary   Clinton   and   Bernie   Sanders   spar   over   super-PACs   and   megadonors’  
Yahoo News (12 February 2016) <https://www.yahoo.com/news/hillary-clinton-and-bernie-sanders-
spar-over-super-043334749.html> accessed 22 November 2016. 
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Public law scholars have turned their attention to the potential corruption of 
elections and have observed that money in politics may seek not only to produce certain 
government interventions, but also to prevent them.274  
One possible regulatory area that business elites might try to produce or prevent 
is antitrust. And, when dealing with this matter, perhaps the first thing some 
corporations might want to influence is the enactment of an antitrust legislation.  
The present chapter will try to investigate whether campaign finance has 
impacted   Brazil’s   antitrust   legislation,   by   exploring   social   science   evidence; and 
reflecting on it.  
This is not a simple task, however. Firstly, because the data is precarious. Data 
on campaign finance only began to be published online after 2002.275 This leaves us to 
examine the sole major antitrust legislation enacted after that: The Competition Act 
2011.  
A second limitation is that the Competition Act 2011 was approved in Congress 
through an agreement between party leaders.276 Therefore, it is not possible to know how 
each congressman voted. This rules out the possibility of implementing a statistical 
study to investigate the correlation between money and votes in Congress.  
                                                             
274 See, eg, Kuhner, Capitalism v. Democracy: Money in Politics and the Free Market Constitution, 
251. Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin's Snuff Box to Citizens 
United (Harvard University Press 2014) 145. 
275 Political scientist David Samuels has a database of the 1994 and 1998 elections, but this is useless 
for us. The congressmen who participated in the legislative process of the Competition Act 1994 (the 
former antitrust legislation) were elected in 1986 and 1990. Moreover, those congressmen did not 
receive any donations from corporations, at least not on books, because they were not elected under 
the corporate political finance system: corporate donations became legal only after 1993.  
276 The core of the bill was approved through an agreement of party leaders, with only two 
amendments being put to the vote in the plenary. Those amendments do not clearly or directly relate 
to more or less antitrust intervention.  
92 
 
Considering the limitations above, the present chapter will implement a case 
study277 to make an in-depth investigation on the legislative process of the Competition 
Act 2011. It will try to draw insights on whether the corporate political finance system, 
which was in force between the 1994 and 2014 federal elections, had any impact on the 
lawmaking of the Act. The focus will be on the amendments proposed, which shaped the 
text of the legislation.  
The   chapter   is   organised   as   follows.   Section   5.2   looks   at   Congress’   records,  
academic literature and press archives; and finds that business elites consistently 
monitored and tried to influence the outcome of competition bills; and that the 
hegemonic lobbying was for a less interventionist legislation.  
 In section 5.3, I claim that the hegemonic lobbying for less intervention 
continued during the legislative process of the Competition Act 2011. And, looking at 
campaign finance data and congressional records, I find that the more money a 
congressman received from companies that had been a defendant in an antitrust case, the 
more he tended to be concerned about excessively punishing companies for 
anticompetitive practices while proposing amendments to the consolidated version of the 
competition bill.  
In section 5.4, I then try to understand the pattern found through four angles: 
corruption  of  the  congressmen’s  attitude,  war  chest  corruption,  the  possibility  of  a  mere  
coincidence, and the nature of the houses of Congress. 
I will try not to overclaim and, as such, I will not make any claim about 
causation. Drawing causal inferences when investigating politics is particularly difficult 
                                                             
277 I  take  case  study  as  ‘a  strategy   for  doing  research  which  involves  an  empirical  investigation  of  a  
particular   phenomenon  within   real   life   context   using  multiple   sources   of   evidence’.  Colin Robson, 




because of the complexity of the political world.278 As seen in the last chapter, when it 
comes to campaign finance it is difficult to isolate money from other factors that caused 
the  politician’s  attitude  and  safely  affirm  that  money  was  the  main   factor.  Likewise,   in  
war chest corruption cases, it is hard to assess the extent to which people were 
influenced by political ads. 
Instead, by shedding light on the legislative process, my aim is to ask: do the 
data gathered in this chapter undermine our ability to believe that corporate donations 
had nothing to do with a less interventionist Competition Act 2011?279 
  
5.2. The business elites’ lobby on competition bills (1945–1994) 
 To begin with, we must ask whether competition law is relevant for business 
elites at all. Although the data on lobbying practices is precarious due to lack of 
regulation in Brazil, lobbying was traditionally corporatist in the country — that is, 
centred on a business confederation and state federations, with other business 
associations also playing important roles. Thus, it is possible to look at congressional 
records, academic literature and press archives to see how those business organisations 
lobbied on antitrust bills.  
 
5.2.1. The Decree-Law n 7666/45 
The   country’s   first   competition   legislation280 (the Decree-Law n 7666/45) was 
criticised by business elites.281 The National Confederation of Industry (CNI), the 
                                                             
278 For a discussion on causal theories and the complexity of the political world, see Michael 
Coppedge, Democratization and Research Methods (Cambridge University Press 2012) 49. 
279 The structure of this question was inspired by the reading of Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money 
Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to Stop It. 
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Federation of Trade Associations of Brazil, and the Union of Agricultural Associations 
of Central Brazil sent a note to president Getúlio Vargas repudiating the legislation.282 
They lobbied against what they viewed as excessive state intervention: 
 The Decree-Law would disrupt companies that create wealth.  
 There were no trusts or cartels in the country. Trusts, cartels, and other 
manifestations   of   concentrated   economic   power   only   existed   in   ‘super  
capitalised’   economies,  which  was   not   the   case   in  Brazil,   according   to  
them. 
 Trusts, cartels and agreements were frequent in depressing economies, 
and the Brazilian economy was prospering at the time. 
 The Decree-Law was arguably too restrictive: they argued against 
merger control, dissolution of companies, expropriation, seizure of 
documents and ledgers, control of land acquisition by agribusiness, and 
so on.283 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
280 Though prior legislation did establish provisions forbidding cartels, price predatory and bundling 
practices, these provisions were part of a broad economic criminal law that had other provisions 
unrelated to competition. Decreto-Lei nº 869, de 18 de novembro de 1938, DOU 21/11/1938. The 
Decree-Law of 1945 was the first legislation to have provisions concerning only competition. 
Moreover, it created a Brazilian competition authority, and introduced merger review.  
281 Decreto-Lei nº 7666, de 22 de junho de 1945, DOU 22/06/1945.  
282 The full opinion is available at Edgard Carone, A Terceira República (1937–1945): Documentos 
(Difel 1976) 369. According to Francisco Corsi, president Getulio Vargas enacted the Decree-Law in 
order to get closer to workers, since he felt he was becoming politically isolated. Francisco Luiz 
Corsi, 'O Fim do Estado Novo e as Disputas em Torno da Política Econômica' (1996) 6/7 Revista de 
Sociologia e Política 30. 
283 They also argued that there was already a criminal legislation (Decreto-Lei nº 869/38), which 
established  the  ‘attacks  against  free  competition’  as  a  crime,  and  nobody  was  ever  condemned  within  
that legislation at that time. In addition, those associations complained they were not heard about the 
bill; and stated that, although the producing  classes  were  not  against  the  idea  of  an  ‘antitrust  law’,  the  
Decree-Law   differed   from   the  United   States’   antitrust   law   (therefore,   they   proposed   an   alternative  
version of the antitrust bill). 
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In addition, several media companies reportedly criticised the provision which 
established a pre-merger notification system for the sector (article 8).284 Foreign 
companies,  in  turn,  complained  that  the  legislation  was  protectionist.  The  United  States’  
Ambassador in Brazil even reportedly sent president Vargas a telegram.285 
Arguably,   business   elites’   disapproval   was one of the factors that influenced 
president  Vargas’  removal  from  office  in  October  of  that  same  year.286 With Vargas out 
of  office,  the  legislation  was  revoked  a  month  later.  Brazil’s  first  competition  legislation,  
thus, was in force only for three months.287 
 
5.2.2. The Competition Act 1962 (Law n 4137/62) 
 In 1948, a new competition bill was presented (n 122/48). Corporate elites 
lobbied against it, according to congressional records.  
 The Federation of Industries of the State of Pernambuco (FIEPE), the Trade 
Association of Pernambuco (FACEP) and the Federation of Wholesale of the Eastern 
Northeast promptly filed a brief, arguing that the bill intended to transform industries 
‘into   slaves   of   the   political   power   [that   is,   the   government]’.288 Similarly, the Trade 
                                                             
284 Othon Jambeiro and others, 'O Estado Novo, o Rádio e seus Órgãos Reguladores' (2003) 1 
Contemporanea : Revista de Comunicação e Cultura 205 215. See, also Heber Ricardo da Silva, A 
Democracia Impressa: Transição do Campo Jornalı́stico e do Polı́tico e a Cassação do PCB nas 
Páginas da Grande Imprensa, 1945–1948 (Editora UNESP 2009) 111; and Mário André Machado 
Cabral,   ‘Primeiro   passo   na   política   antitruste   brasileira,   Lei   Malaia   completa   70   anos’   Consultor 
Juridico (12 December 2015) <http://www.conjur.com.br/2015-dez-12/mario-cabral-primeira-
antitruste-lei-malaia-completa-70-anos> accessed 22 November 2016. 
285 Corsi, 'O Fim do Estado Novo e as Disputas em Torno da Política Econômica' 32–33. 
286 Ibid. See also Francisco Ribeiro Todorov and Marcelo Maciel Torres Filho, 'History of 
Competition Policy in Brazil: 1930–2010' (2012) 57 The Antitrust Bulletin 207 215. José Linhares, 
the president of the Supreme Court, acted as temporary president of the Republic for three months; 
and  one  of  his  acts  was  the  revoke  of  the  Vargas’  antitrust  Decree-Law. 
287 Although the legislation was published in June, it came into force in August. 
288 Pages 58–66 of the bill’s dossier. Câmara dos Deputados, Projeto de Lei nº 122/1948. The 
Federation of Industries of the State of Pernambuco, the Trade Association of Pernambuco and the 
Federation of Wholesale of the Eastern Northeast particularly criticised the provisions that would give 




Association of Santos (ACS) filed a brief arguing that the bill aimed at economic 
dirigisme.289 The Federation of Industries of São Paulo (FIESP) also reportedly lobbied 
against it.290  
The bill n 122/48 was discussed for over a year in the   Chamber   of   Deputies’  
committees, but it was eventually forgotten.291 In 1955, a new competition bill (n 3/55) 
was presented with a similar content, but it also ended up overlooked by congressmen.292  
In 1961, president Janio Quadros proposed another competition bill to Congress, 
which   was   again   promptly   criticised   by   business   elites’   associations.   The   Trade  
Association of São Paulo (ACSP) published an opinion arguing that:293 
 The Brazilian economy was small. Therefore, it would be impossible/impractical 
to have a large number of players competing in such small markets. 
 The competition bill proposed by Quadros would impede corporations from 
earning profits, thus blocking future investments. 
 Economic freedom would be the best way to achieve social welfare. 
 The existent Brazilian criminal legislation was sufficient to inhibit 
anticompetitive acts. 
 The concept of abuse of economic power in the bill was too broad and 
interventionist. 
 They feared political harassment by the state. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
relation to production costs for the purpose of determining the maximum limit of these prices and to 
fix the normal percentage of profit.  
289 Pages 9 and 10 of the bill’s dossier. Câmara dos Deputados, Projeto de Lei nº 122/1948.  
290 FIESP’s   brief   isn’t   attached   in   the   bill’s   records   at   the   Congress,   but   the  Trade  Association   of  
Santos mentioned that FIESP filed a brief against to the bill as well. 
291 Vinı́cius Marques de Carvalho and Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo, Defesa da Concorrência 
no Brasil: 50 anos (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica 2013) 40. 
292 Ibid.  
293 The full opinion is available at O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 3 May 1961) 21. 
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 The provisions which established seizure   of   corporate’s   books   would   be   an  
excessive state intervention. 
 All competition bills that have been discussed by the parliament (bill n 122/48, 
bill  n  3/55,  and  the  executive’s  bill)  were  inadequate.   
 
Likewise, the National Confederation of Commerce (CNC) argued that president 
Quadros’  competition  bill  was  too  interventionist:294 
 The competition bill constrained basic liberties protected by the Constitution. 
 There would be an undue punishment of pro-competitive practices. 
 There would be excessive state intervention in the seizure of books and files. 
 They feared political persecution and arbitrariness in the enforcement of the 
legislation by the Brazilian antitrust agency (then named as CADEC), with 
potential excessive enforcement.295 
 
Finally, press accounts reported that the High Council of the Producing Classes 
(CONCLAP)   argued   that   Quadros’   bill   would   be   a   danger   to   free   enterprise,   and   an  
obstacle to national development.296  
Perhaps  at   least  partially   influenced  by  business’  emphatic  repudiation  of  Quadros’  
bill, congressmen then re-started discussion of bill n 3/55, which was reportedly 
considered a less interventionist one.297  
                                                             
294 CNC’S  full  opinion  is  also  available  at  O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 3 May 1961) 21. 
295 Thus, they argued that it would be more reasonable to grant the judiciary the power to interpret and 
enforce the legislation. 
296 O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 3 May 1961) 21.  
297 According  to  Magalhães,  Quadros’  bill  was  ‘terrible’  because  judges  would  have had the power to 
order the preventive detention of businessmen and interdict his establishment. Businessmen could 




The  FIESP  then  published  an  opinion  praising  this  ‘evolution’.298 But the Federation 
criticised the fact that bill n 3/55 had increased the list of anticompetitive acts, when this 
should have been reduced. Consequently, FIESP suggested the removal of many 
provisions related to the definition of anticompetitive practices.299 
The Federation of Brazilian Commerce Associations (FAC) also lobbied against bill 
n 3/55, arguing that:300 
 Several sectors have one or a few players because there was a shortage of capital 
in Brazil. The elimination of monopolies and oligopolies in those sectors should 
be made through industrial policy to inject more capital into the markets, and not 
through antitrust enforcement. 
 The legislation should consider that many industries were monopolised or 
oligopolistic because they were still developing. Thus, provisions of the 
legislation should be flexible to consider specific structural, cyclical and regional 
variations.301 
                                                                                                                                                                            
wage. It can be inferred, therefore, that Magalhães, who was the author of the bill n 3/55, considered 
Quadros’  bill  more  interventionist.   'Entrevista com Paulo Germano Magalhães' (1986) Nova Fase, n 
1, Jan/Fev Revista do CADE (as cited in Pedro Henrique Navarrete, 'As Origens do Sistema 
Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: o CADE (1962–1994)' (Dissertação de Mestrado em 
Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 2013) 23).  
298 The full opinion is available at O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 9 May 1961) 27.  
299 The FIESP argued that the following provisions should be removed: cartel bidding, since it was 
already   established   to   be   a   crime   by   another   legislation;;   the   provision   that   tied   ‘price   increase’   to  
‘increase  on  costs’;;  the  provisions  on  competition  between traders, since it was already regulated by 
another law; the provision related to tax evasion, since it was already regulated by another legislation; 
the provision that would allow Cade to take administrative and judicial actions in order to terminate 
intellectual property, or monopoly granted by the state (FIESP argued that it was a constitutional right 
to enter into exclusive-dealing   agreements);;   and   the   provision   that   banned   ‘the   termination   of  
corporate activities with the intent of monopolising markets’   (FIESP  argued   that   the   termination   of  
corporate activities may frequently be normal and lawful; and that the provision harmed property 
rights). Moreover, FIESP also argued that the conceptualisation of economic power abuse was broad 
and unclear. 
300 The full opinion is available at O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 26 April 1961) 22.  
301 Moreover, they argued, there should be a distinction between minor abuses that harm just a few 
individuals and entities, and major abuses that harm the community. 
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 The creation of an administrative competition authority would violate the 
Constitution; and abuse of political power by the state would be worse than 
abuse of economic power by corporations.302 
 The Federation further argued that other provisions should be removed due to 
excessive punishment.303 
 
 After years of parliament discussions, bill n 3/55 finally passed in 1962 and 
became  Brazil’s  first  Competition  Act  (Law  n  4137/62).304 
The Competition Act 1962 prematurely  became  ‘dead  law’,  however.  Two  years  
after its enactment, business elites backed a military coup that resulted in an 
authoritarian regime (1964–1985).305 With the support of business elites — who 
reportedly viewed competition law with distrust306 — the military administration 
                                                             
302 Therefore, they argued, the judiciary should be responsible for the enforcement of the legislation, 
and the economic aspects of the case should be dealt with by a technically qualified body, with 
representatives from the producing classes. 
303 They  argued  that  the  legislation  should  not  ban  ‘exaggerated  profits’;;  the  provision  related  to  tax  
planning and tax evasion should be removed; and business associations should be heard in order to 
elaborate an antitrust law. It should be noted that they expressed that they were in favour of an 
antitrust law, but not the one proposed through the bill.  
304 Lei nº 4137, de 10 de setembro de 1962, DOU 27/11/1962 e retificado em 30/11/1962. Felipe 
Pereira Loureiro, 'Relativizando o Leviatã: Empresários e Polı́tica Econômica no Governo Jânio 
Quadros' (2010) 40 Estudos Econômicos (São Paulo) 561. According to Loureiro, FIESP, FAC, 
ACSP, CNC, and CONCLAP handed out their written opinions to the president of the republic, the 
president of the lower house (Chamber of Deputies), the vice-president of the Senate, party leaders 
and deputies and senators in general. In addition, Loureiro mentions that FIESP and the Federation of 
Trade  Associations  (FAC)  sent  lobbyists  to  the  Congress’  committees  of  justice,  economy  and  finance  
(where the bill was intensively discussed), and also directly approached congressmen of these 
committees. Franceschini also reports that the Federation of the Industries of the State of Guanabara 
attended the meeting at the economy committee. José Inácio Gonzaga Franceschini and José Luiz V 
de A Franceschini, Poder Econômico: Exercício e Abuso: Direito Antitruste Brasileiro (Editora 
Revista dos Tribunais 1985) 11. 
305 See, eg, Ben Ross Schneider, Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) 107. Leigh A Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic 
Change (Johns Hopkins University Press 1994) 16. Eli Diniz, 'Empresariado Industrial, 
Representação de Interesses e Ação Política: Trajetória Histórica e Novas Configurações' (2010) 9 17 
Política & Sociedade 101, 104.  
306 Luiz Carlos Delorme Prado,  ‘Defesa da Concorrência e Desenvolvimento: Notas Sobre o Debate e 
sua Aplicação no Caso Brasileiro’  in  Dulce  Monteiro  Filha,  Luiz  Carlos  Delorme  Prado  and  Helena  
M M Lastres (eds), Estratégias de Desenvolvimento, Política Industrial e Inovação: Ensaios em 
Memória de Fabio Erber (BNDES 2014) 266. 
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implemented developmentalist economic policies that established price controls on 
many industries.307 The competition authority (that is, Cade), on the other hand, 
significantly lacked in human and financial resources during this period.308 Cade 
frequently lacked minimum quorum due to delays in military presidents appointing new 
commissioners to vacant places.309 Thus, during the military regime, the country had a 
de jure competition law, but not a de facto one. 
 
5.2.3. The Law n 8158/91 
 With re-democratisation, Brazil began a process of economic liberalisation310 
and, in 1991, government agency price fixing was completely extinct.311 New legislation 
(n 8158/91)312 was enacted introducing merger reviews, in order to complement the 
Competition Act 1962, which only regulated cartels and unilateral conduct. The Law n 
8158/91 derived from several provisional measures that had been enacted by president 
Fernando Collor in 1990.313  
                                                             
307 The military government created the Interministerial Price Council (the CIP), which organised 
cartels in many industries, fixing minimum and maximum prices. The military regime also used the 
National Superintendency (SUNAB) to establish price-controlled cartels in other industries. See 
Navarrete, 'As Origens do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: o CADE (1962–1994)' 106. 
Todorov and Filho, 'History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 1930–2010' 222. 
308 Navarrete, 'As Origens do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: o CADE (1962–1994)' 
28. 
309 Carvalho and Ragazzo, Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil: 50 anos, 48.  
310 President Collor privatised state-owned companies and adopted a trade liberalisation agenda. See 
Todorov and Filho, 'History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 1930–2010' 232. 
311 Navarrete, 'As Origens do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: o CADE (1962–1994)' 7. 
See also Carvalho and Ragazzo, Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil: 50 anos, 54.  
312 Lei nº 8158, de 8 de janeiro de 1991, DOU 9/1/1991. 
313 See Todorov and Filho, 'History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 1930–2010' 231. Navarrete, 'As 
Origens do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: o CADE (1962–1994)' 108. In 1987, José 
Sarney,  Brazil’s  first  civilian  president  after  re-democratisation, reportedly threatened to draft a new 
antitrust   law  because   he   thought   ‘the  Brazilian   business   do  not   know  how   to live with a free price 




 I could not find any full opinion from a business entity about the Law n 8158/91 
filed on congressional records or published in the press, or any academic article that 
referred to it.  
I have found only one press article briefly reporting that FIESP supported the 
enactment of the legislation.314 Assuming that the report is accurate, we can speculate 
that  business’  support  of the legislation may be related to the process of liberalisation of 
the economy. In this sense, perhaps Brazilian industrial companies feared that foreign 
companies with more capital would acquire them. On the other hand, Brazilian 
companies that wanted to receive foreign investments might have thought that 
institutions, such as a merger review, would attract more foreign investment.  
 In any event, the enactment of the new legislation had little effect: Cade still 
faced difficulties in enforcing competition legislation,315 with significant impairment of 
human and financial resources.316 
 
5.2.4. The Competition Act 1994 (Law n 8884/94) 
In 1993, president Itamar Franco and some members of the Congress started to 
build a consensus to unify competition provisions across both Acts (Laws n 4137/62 and 
8158/91) into one Act and grant to Cade more resources to enforce it, in order to finally 
introduce effective competition law in Brazil.317 
                                                             
314 Folha de São Paulo (São Paulo, 4 August 1990).  
315 Navarrete, 'As Origens do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: o CADE (1962–1994)' 
102. 
316 Carvalho and Ragazzo, Defesa da Concorrência no Brasil: 50 anos, 53. See also Todorov and 
Filho, 'History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 1930–2010' 231. 
317 President Franco and many congressmen viewed the bill as helpful to put an end to the 
hyperinflation problem originated in the 1980s, therefore assisting the implementation of the Real 
currency, which was created in 1994 to fix the problem. Carvalho and Ragazzo, Defesa da 
Concorrência no Brasil: 50 anos, 55. 
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Once again, business elites lobbied against this competition bill. The bill 
suffered systematic opposition from the CNI and the FIESP, according to Ruy Coutinho, 
president of Cade at the time.318 Press accounts report that FIESP lobbied senators and 
the president of the republic to   block   provisions   that   would   give   Cade   ‘too   much  
power’.319 CNI’s  and  FIESP’s  leaders  also  gave  statements against the bill to the press. 
The president of FIESP reportedly said that the competition bill was unnecessary 
because Brazil already had a competition   legislation:   ‘the   problem   in   Brazil   is   not  
legislation,   but   its   enforcement’.320 Similarly, the president of CNI considered the bill 
unnecessary   and   ‘draconian’   (that   is,   excessively   harsh).321 In addition, congressional 
dockets show that the Trade Association of São Paulo (ACSP) filed a brief claiming that 
the bill should be entirely rejected.322 
Despite the lobbying from those large business associations against it, the bill 
passed.323 Brazil finally had its first effective antitrust legislation (the Competition Act 
1994324).325 
                                                             
318 Ruy Coutinho, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE (Singular 2009) 31. 
Prado also reports the intense lobby from CNI and FIESP. Prado, 'Defesa da concorrência e 
desenvolvimento: notas sobre o debate e sua aplicação no caso brasileiro' 295. 
319 Folha de São Paulo (São Paulo, 9 June 1994). Ibid, 10 June 1994.  
320 Ibid, 9 June 1994. 
321 Ibid.  By  contrast,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies’  decision  to  admit  the  competition  bill  was  cheered by 
workers and consumers, according to newspaper Estadao, O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 9 June 
1994). 
322 Brief filed in the congressional bills’  records in 27 July 1993. Câmara dos Deputados, Projeto de 
Lei nº 3712/1993, fls 393–397. The ACSP argued   against   Cade’s   prerogative   to   determine   the  
preventive  cessation  of  the  practice  that  restricts  competition,  Cade’s  prerogative  to  apply  fines  if  the  
corporation does not stop the practice after a preventive order, and so on. 
323 Press accounts reported that the right-wing Liberal Front Party (PFL) influenced the bill by 
reducing the fine for cartels and abuse of dominant position practices. At the Chamber of Deputies 
stage, the centre-left Social Democrat Party (PSDB) and the left-wing Workers Party (PT) at the time 
were in favour of a minimum fine of 10% (PSDB) and 15% (PT), and maximum fine of 50% (both 
parties  agreed)  of  the  firm’s  pretax  gross  sales  of  the  exercise  prior  to  the  filing  of  the  administrative  
proceeding. The PFL, on the other hand, stated that would only approve the bill if the fines were 
reduced  to  1%  (minimum)  and  30%  (maximum)  of  the  firm’s  annual  revenue  of  the  previous  year  of  
the   filing  of   the  lawsuit.  The  provision  was   then  changed   to  accommodate  PFL’s  request.  Folha de 
São Paulo (São Paulo, 8 June 1994). The press article only reports that PSDB was in favour of the 
10–50%  fines.  But  Senator  Eduardo  Suplicy  from  PT  said  in  the  Senate’s  plenary  that  PT  was  arguing  
for similar fines — ie, between 15–50%. Congresso Nacional, Diário, 10 de junho 1994, 2900. 
Suplicy proposed the same amendment in the Senate. Ibid 2888.  
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Nevertheless, after the enactment of the Act of 1994, the CNI continued to fight 
against some of its provisions. The Confederation filed a Direct Unconstitutionality 
Action (ADI) at the Supreme Court, claiming that seven provisions of the Act violated 
the Constitution:326 
 The  cap  of  the  fine  (that  is,  30%  of  the  of  the  firm’s  pretax  gross  sales  of  
the exercise prior to the filing of the administrative proceeding) was 
arguably confiscatory and violated the right to property, which is 
protected by article 150, IV, of the Constitution. The CNI argued that 
this cap could be in practice more than the annual income of many 
industrial sectors. As a consequence, the fine would lead many 
companies to bankruptcy, harming employers and workers.327 
 The term  ‘notwithstanding  malicious  intent’  on  article  20  would  violate  
the Constitution because it would establish strict liability to those who 
practised an anticompetitive act.328  
 And other provisions that the Confederation viewed as excessive 
interventions by the state, which would violate the Constitution.329  
                                                                                                                                                                            
324 Lei nº 8884/1994. For an English translation of the 1994 Act, translated by Cade — see, 
<http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/legislation/laws/law-8884-1994b.pdf/view> accessed 17 February 2017. 
325 Todorov and Filho, 'History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 1930–2010' 233. The press reported 
that industrial companies linked to FIESP were disappointed with Cardoso — then Senator, and future 
candidate for the Presidency, backed by business — for voting in favour of the competition bill. O 
Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 11 June 1994). 
326 STF, ADI 1094-8/DF, Rel Min Carlos Velloso, DJ 20/04/2001. The Supreme Court denied all 
CNI’s  claims.  The  Court’s  decision  was  preliminary  since   it  regarded  CNI’s  request   for  provisional  
remedies. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever place a final decision on the case because 
Brazil now has a new Competition Act, enacted in 2011.  
327 CNI’s  complaint  at  the  ADI  1094-8/DF, 8.  
328 Ibid 3–5. 
329 The other CNI claims were the following: (a) Article 21, item XXIV, which established that it 
would   be   unlawful   ‘to   impose   abusive   prices,   or   unreasonably   increase   the   price   of   a   product   or  
service’ should be removed. For CNI, the item was too vague, and could be mistakenly interpreted by 
the competition authority and judges, resulting in price control, and thus confronting articles 173 and 
174 of the Constitution, which establishes a market economy (pages 5–8). (b) The Constitution was 
violated by items II and IV of article 24 of the Act which established that Cade could apply additional 





Moreover, CNI and FIESP also expressed dissatisfaction with the enactment of 
the Competition Act through opinions published in the press,330 and reportedly at a 
conference attended by the minister of justice.331 
It is noteworthy, however, that press accounts reported three exceptions to those 
business   association’s   reactions   against   what   they   viewed   as   the excessive state 
intervention of the Competition Act 1994. And these exceptions came from 
organisations of small and medium companies, and their leaders. After the Act was 
enacted, the Union of Small and Micro Industries (Simpi) launched an official note 
supporting it.332 Moreover, Emerson Kapaz, who was then the coordinator of the 
National Thought of Entrepreneurial Base (PNBE), an association of small and medium 
businessmen,333 reportedly said that the legislation enacted was very positive.334 
Likewise, Eduardo Capobianco, who was a founding member of the PNBE and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
ineligible   ‘for   official   financing   or   participation   in   bidding   processes   involving   purchases,   sales,  
works, services or utility concessions with the federal, state, municipal and the Federal District 
authorities  and  related  entities,   for  a  period  equal   to  or  exceeding   five   years’,  and/or  to  suggest   that  
the proper public agencies should grant compulsory licences for patents held by the violator; and deny 
the violator instalment payment of federal overdue debts, or order total or partial cancellation of tax 
incentives or public subsidies. The CNI argued that the provisions banned the free exercise of 
business activity, namely the free exercise of professional activity, harming article 5, items XIII, 
XVII, XVIII and XIX of the Constitution (pages 10–11). (c) The provision that stated that the 
clearance   of   a  merger  may   be   reviewed   by   Cade   if   ‘the   intended   benefits   have   not   been   attained’  
(article 55) violated vested rights protected by the Constitution (article 5, item XXXVI) (pages 11–
13). (d) The part of article 64 that established that the judicial review would take place in the district 
chosen by Cade, would violate article 109, first paragraph, of the Constitution (pages 13–14). (e) The 
article 60 of the Act, which established that the lawbreaker should deposit the fines (instead of 
designate assets) as a requirement to pursue judicial review, would violate the constitutional guarantee 
of access to justice (article 5, item XXXV, of the Constitution) (pages 14–15). 
330 The FIESP published an opinion expressing discontentment with articles 20 and 21 of the Act. 
Folha de São Paulo (São Paulo, 15 June 1994). 
331 The president of CNI said, at the Conference, that the Competition Act 1994 was confiscatory. O 
Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 19 August 1994) O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 19 August 
1994). 
332 Ibid, 11 June 1994.  
333 Fabrícia  Guimarães,  ‘Verbete:  Pensamento  Nacional  das  Bases  Empresariais  (PNBE)’  (Centro  de  
Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil da Fundação Getúlio Vargas) 
<http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/pensamento-nacional-das-bases-
empresariais-pnbe> accessed 15 April 2018. 
334 Gazeta Mercantil (São Paulo, 19 August 1994) (as cited in Carlos Alberto Bello, Autonomia 
Frustrada: O CADE e o Poder Econômico (Boitempo Editorial 2005) 129).  
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president of the Civil Construction Industry Union of the State of São Paulo 
(SindusCon-SP) at the time, reportedly expressed support for the new legislation after its 
enactment.335 
 
5.2.5. Conclusion of the section 
 We have seen that business representative organisations have consistently 
monitored and tried to influence the outcome of antitrust bills from 1945 to 1994. 
 The overwhelming majority (more than 80%)336 of business representative 
bodies’   comments were against excessive antitrust intervention. If we consider only 
those comments from business representative bodies that occurred during the legislative 
process and ignore the ones that were made after the legislation was enacted, more than 
94% were against excessive state intervention.337  
Interventions from the CNI, which is the largest and leading business 
representative organisation in Brazil,338 have always been against (what they viewed as) 
potential excessive antitrust intervention.  
This lobbying pattern continued in the legislative process of the Competition Act 
2011, as will be seen next.  
 
                                                             
335 O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 15 June 1994) B-8.  
336 17 out of 21 manifestations.  
337 17 out of 18 manifestations.  
338 Created in 1938, CNI embraces 27 state industrial federations and the federal district, and about 
1,300   industrial   employers’   unions.  Santos, 'O Parlamento sob Influência: O Lobby da Indústria na 
Câmara dos Deputados'. 
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5.3. The legislative process of the Competition Act 2011 
The Competition Act 2011 (Law n 12529/11),339 the current Brazilian antitrust 
legislation, is in many ways less interventionist than the Act of 1994. For example, the 
new   legislation   not   only   reduced   the  minimum   and  maximum   fines   for   corporations’  
anticompetitive practices set forth in the Act of 1994 (from 1% and 30%, to 0.1% and 
20%),   but   also   narrowed   the   fine’s   base   calculation.  Consequently,   corporations have 
been penalised with weaker fines than when the Competition Act 1994 was in force, as 
has been confirmed by Cade case law.340 There are informal estimations that some 
corporations convicted by Cade in cartel cases were fined 20% less in the Act of 2011 
than they would have been fined if the Act of 1994 was still in force.341  
This softening in the legislation matches the fact that the Competition Act 1994 
was made by politicians elected without corporate funding (because it was prohibited at 
the time), while the Act of 2011 was made by politicians who received such funding.342 
In this section, we will try to examine a bit deeper if corporate donations had 
anything to do with these lesser interventions.  
I will start looking at the industrial lobbying on the antitrust bill n 3937/2004 
(the bill which originated the Competition Act 2011). Subsequently, I will examine the 
amendments proposed by congressmen. Then, we will see if there is any pattern between 
how congressmen were financed and the amendments they proposed. And, finally, I will 
briefly discuss the impact of the amendments on the bill.  
  
                                                             
339 Lei nº 12529/2011. 
340 See footnote 402. 
341 According to informal conversations with Brazilian antitrust lawyers.  
342 Some may argue that congressmen who passed the Competition Act 1994 might have received off-
books donations from companies. However, until evidence concerning each of the congressmen 
arises, we can never know it for sure and investigate what role corporate money has played in the 
legislative process.  
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5.3.1. The industrial lobbying 
The CNI, which is the largest and leading business representative organisation in 
Brazil as we have seen, expressly considered the competition bill n 3937/2004 a priority 
due   to   its   ‘high   impact   on   the   business   environment’. The Confederation intensely 
monitored the competition bill and lobbied congressmen in order to try to modulate the 
provisions according to industry interests.343  
 The CNI admittedly lobbied for the reduction   of   the   fine’s   cap and base 
calculation during the legislative process of the bill. The Confederation lobbied that the 
cap (which was 30% in the Act of 1994) and the base calculation (which was the total 
revenue of the company) should be reduced to 20% of the gross sales obtained in the 
relevant  market.   They   argued   that   this  would   be   a  measure   of   ‘fiscal   justice’   for   two  
reasons.  Firstly,  they  argued,  because  the  fine’s  cap  and  base  calculation  established  by  
the Competition Act 1994 could interrupt company operations, since it would intensely 
impact their economic capacity — from the capacity to invest, fund and improve; to the 
attractiveness of the production and provision of services as a whole. 
                                                             
343 The  competition  bill  was  part  of  CNI’s  minimum agenda, that is, bills that should be treated with 
priority. From the 117 bills monitored by the Confederation in 2008, 20 of them were considered as 
being part of the minimum agenda. Moacyr  Oliveira,  ‘CNI  lança  Agenda  Legislativa  da  Indústria  com  
Pauta   Mínima’   Sistema Federação das Indústrias do DF (Fibra) (7 April 2010) 
<http://www.sistemafibra.org.br/fibra/sala-de-imprensa/noticias/258-documento-lista-117-projetos-
em-tramitacao-no-congresso-nacional-de-interesse-do-setor-industrial.html> accessed 22 November 
2016. According  to  its  online  agenda,  the  competition  bill  was  part  of  CNI’s  minimum  agenda  at  least  
from 2008 until 2011, when the bill finally passed (CNI began to publish its agenda online only from 
2008 onwards). CNI (Confederação Nacional da Indústria), Unidade de Assuntos Legislativos, 
‘Agenda  legislativa  da  indústria’  <http://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/cni/canais/agenda-legislativa-
home/> accessed 22 November 2016.  
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Secondly,  the  CNI  argued,  ‘it  makes  no  sense  to  impose  a  fine  on  the  company's  
total revenue, which includes activities that have no relation to the anticompetitive 
offence’.344 
 Moreover, the CNI also lobbied for the elevation of the thresholds for merger 
control. The Confederation argued that there was an excess of merger control, since 90% 
of the merger cases analysed by Cade were cleared without conditions.345   
 As we have seen in the last section, lobbying practices are not regulated in 
Brazil. Therefore, it is not possible to know precisely all the business associations and/or 
companies that lobbied on the competition bill, and what they lobbied for. However, we 
do know that, according to the evidence available, business organisations — particularly 
large corporations through the associations in which they belong — have tended to 
lobby for less antitrust intervention. Thus,  there  is  a  good  chance  that,  if  other  business’  
lobbying occurred, they were lobbying in this same direction. In any event, the lobbying 
from the largest and leading business representative organisation in Brazil (that is, CNI) 
is already significant enough on its own to potentially influence any congressmen, 
particularly ones funded by corporations. 
 
5.3.2. The amendments proposed  
After 2002, the Brazilian Electoral Superior Tribunal (TSE) began publishing 
online data about who funded candidates and parties.346 Therefore, it is possible to 
compare   the   congressman’s   funding   with   his   behaviour   towards   a   bill,   such   as   the  
                                                             
344 Ibid, ‘Agenda   legislativa   da   indústria   2010’ 
<http://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/publicacoes/2015/12/agenda-legislativa-da-industria/#agenda-
legislativa-da-industria-2010%20> accessed 18 March 2018. 
345 Ibid. 
346 The data on Brazilian political finance is precarious before 1994, when the previous major 
competition legislation was enacted — see de Souza, 'A Evolução da Regulação do Financiamento de 
Campanha no Brasil (1945–2006)'. 
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competition bill n 3937/2004. It is not possible, however, to analyse how each 
congressman voted because the bill was approved by an agreement between the party 
leaders (a common practice in Brazil), in both congressional houses, which impairs our 
capacity to analyse their votes and draw any meaning from it.347  
But  another  way  to  address  the  congressmen’s  attitude  towards  the  bill  is  looking  
at the amendments proposed.348 Amendments are a key part of the legislative process 
because, if they pass, they end up shaping the legislation’s  text.  Not  surprisingly  the  CNI  
frequently lobbies congressmen by suggesting amendments in the  industry’s  interest.349  
This section will focus on the congressmen who proposed amendments and the 
justifications they used.350 
 By 2007, there were two competition bills dispersed in the Chamber of Deputies: 
bill n 3937/2004, proposed by deputy Carlos Eduardo Cadoca (MDB); and bill n 
5877/05, proposed by the executive during the Lula Administration (PT). Deputy Ciro 
                                                             





20&dtHoraQuarto=21:30&txEtapa=Com%20reda%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20final> accessed 22 
November 2016. Senado Federal, Diário, 2 de dezembro de 2010, 54812. Retificado em Senado 
Federal, Diário, 8 de dezembro de 2010, 57512. 
348 I will not consider congressmen’s  ‘separate  vote’  (voto em separado) in congressional committees 
because   the  congressmen’s  motivation  may  be   just   to  mark  position.  The  rapporteur  of   the  bill  in  a  
congressional committee is not required to analyse the separate vote. The separate vote can be 
ignored, simply. Therefore, the congressmen may vote in separate merely for the record to indicate 
disagreement. The aim of impacting the bill through a separate vote is therefore questionable. By 
contrast, amendments are binding, in the sense that, once proposed, they will be part of the bill until 
they are analysed. The rapporteur of the bill is obligated to analyse the amendment.  
349 Santos, 'O Parlamento sob Influência: O Lobby da Indústria na Câmara dos Deputados' 103. 
350 I will focus on the amendments published in the online records of the bill, both in the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate. In this aspect, the chapter will not consider information that is not on 
records. One example of off-records information is a report from Vinícius de Carvalho that, on the 
day that the bill passed in in the Chamber of Deputies, a Senator presented an amendment. According 
to Carvalho, the content of the amendment was not known at the time but it was eventually revealed 
behind closed   doors   that   the   amendment   removed   the   feature   of   Cade’s   decisions   as   being  
extrajudicial enforcement instruments that have a presumption of legitimacy and self-enforceability. 
According to Carvalho, after a closed doors discussion between the party leaders, the bill passed 
without the amendment. Vinı́cius Marques de Carvalho, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Zanotta (ed), 
Conversando  com  o  CADE…e  com  a  SDE (Singular 2017) 184–185. 
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Gomes (PSB) then analysed the two bills, merged them into one and proposed new 
amendments. That is, he proposed a substitute bill (but it remained with n 3937/2004), 
which consolidated the separate prior bills. Though it is not possible to determine a 
pattern before the consolidation  of  the  bills  and  a  pattern   for  Gomes’  amendments  and  
decisions,351 it is possible to track the subsequent amendments proposed by other 
congressmen  on  the  consolidated  version  of  the  bill  that  emerged  after  Gomes’  analysis. 
 After the consolidation of the bill, the following congressmen proposed 
amendments: deputies Cezar Silvestri, Guilherme Campos, and senators Romero Juca, 
Wellington Salgado, João Pedro, Cícero Lucena, José Agripino Maia and Francisco 
Dornelles. Deputy Pedro Eugênio, in turn, was   responsible   for   reviewing   all   Senate’s  
amendments after the bill returned to the Chamber of Deputies. Since the rejection of an 
amendment has the same impact as its proposition, I will also consider Eugênio’s  and  
other congressmen justifications for rejecting amendments.  
 However, many amendments concerned matters that were not related to the 
extent   of   the   state’s   intervention   in   the   economy.   Or, their impact   on   the   state’s  
intervention in the economy is rather indirect. Or, it is unclear if the amendment would 
have positively or negatively impacted the extent to which the state would have 
                                                             
351 Gomes’   analysis   has  mixed   results,  with  an   equal   concern   for   both   insufficient   punishment   and  
excessive punishment. Moreover, Gomes said that his substitutive was actually a consolidation of the 
opinion of all members of a special committee created for the competition bill. Gomes also took into 
account suggestions from experts on competition law, who were heard by the committee. Gomes 
states  that  his  substitutive  can  be  called  a  ‘collective  work’,  and  that  it  represents  an  ‘average’  of  all  
deputies’  suggestions. However, these suggestions were mostly made off-the records, in background 
meetings between party leaders and members of the committee.  
Before the creation of the special committee, only Deputy Bernardo Ariston proposed amendments. 
On 15 December  2004,  he  proposed   two  amendments:  one  to  exclude   ‘to  impose  abusive  prices,  or  
unreasonably   increase   the  price  of  a  product  or   service’  as  an  anticompetitive  practice,  and  another  
one  to  exclude  the  ‘increase  profits  on  a  discretionary  basis’  as  an  anticompetitive effect of a practice. 
However, no other deputy proposed an amendment. This deficiency of amendments indicates that the 
bill was not relevant to deputies and political parties before the creation of the committee and the 
subsequent consolidation of dispersed competition bills. 
Thus, I will consider the amendments proposed after the consolidation of the competitions bills 
because of the lack of significant political debate on the competition bills before their consolidation; 
because of the lack of  transparency  on  the  procedures  of  the  special  commission;;  and  because  Gomes’  
analysis has mixed results. 
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intervened in the economy. Thus, I will focus on the amendments that related to 
provisions that: (a) established the practices considered as anticompetitive; (b) 
established the fines for an anticompetitive practice; and (c) which mergers should be 
notified to the competition authorities.352 As a consequence, I will not consider the 
amendments proposed by Campos, Juca,353 Pedro and Lucena, since they do not fit these 
criteria.  
Moreover, I will focus on the justifications for the amendment, rather than the 
amendment itself. By adopting this approach, I aim to improve precision, reduce the 
margin of subjectivity and avoid controversy. I will consider, therefore, when politicians 
expressly argue that a provision should be introduced, changed or deleted because 
corporations or businessmen will be excessively or insufficiently regulated/punished. I 
will try to avoid tacit arguments due to potential overwhelming subjectivity and 
consequent controversy.  
Actually,   the   congressmen’s   justifications   indicate   the   actual   effect   of   the  
amendment, most of the time. For example, if the politician explains that he is concerned 
about excessive punishment, his amendment will likely make the bill less interventionist. 
Even if the congressman is hiding his real motivation (for example, to benefit a given 
donor), his formal justification for proposing an amendment will necessarily express its 
likely effect (for example, less intervention). It would be quite unlikely that one single 
congressman could fool all other members of Congress, the press, and the antitrust 
                                                             
352 Other provisions that could indicate a clear concern with excessive or insufficient enforcement, 
such as remedies for a merger, were not amended. 
353 Although there is an ongoing lawsuit in which a leniency agreement alleges that senator Romero 
Juca intervened in the competition bill n 3937/2004 to favour the construction company Odebrecht in 
exchange for campaign finance, the documents found in this research were not able to grasp any 
confirmation on how the senator would have done this. MPF (Ministério Público Federal), Delação 
Premiada,  Cláudio  Melo  Filho.  To  read  the  document,  see  ‘Leia  a  íntegra  da  delação  do  ex-diretor da 
Odebrecht Cláudio Melo Filho’  Poder360 (10 December 2016) <https://www.poder360.com.br/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Delacao-ClaudioMelo-Odebrecht-dez2016.pdf> accessed 16 February 2018. 
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community354 by justifying that a given amendment would result in more intervention if 
it would actually result in less.  
In any event, in this case study there were only two exceptions to the rule that 
the congressmen’s  justifications  indicate  the  actual  effect  of  the  amendment. As we are 
going to see, in one amendment deputy Eugênio is concerned about excessive merger 
control,   but   paradoxically   ends   up   accepting   the   Senate’s   amendment   that   will   likely  
result in more merger control; and in contrast, in another amendment, he is concerned 
about insufficient regulation, but paradoxically   ends   up   accepting   the   Senate’s  
amendment that will likely result in less regulation. Moreover, in another amendment, it 
is unclear if senator Mercadante is concerned about excessive or insufficient antitrust 
regulation. And, finally, another amendment proposed by senator Dornelles lacks 
justification. Nonetheless, these four peculiar cases do not have any relevant impact on 
the results found. Because they are in such a small number, even if we hypothetically 
had considered each of them as an argument for less intervention or an argument for 
more intervention, this would have not changed the pattern found.  
 In addition, because I want to compare campaign finance with congressman 
behaviour, I will not consider the substitute senators355 who are eventually holding office 
but did not run for it, since they did not receive campaign donations. It is not possible to 
compare elected politicians, who dispute elections, with substitute senators, as it is 
unclear if they would have the same motivations. For instance, elected politicians most 
frequently run for more elections after leaving office, which is not the case for a 
substitute senator.  
                                                             
354 Many members of the antitrust community (lawyers, economists, commissioners and academics) 
followed with interest the legislative process of the bill. 
355 In   Brazil,   ‘each   Senator   shall   be   elected   with   two   substitutes’   (article   45,   paragraph   3   of   the  
Constitution 1988). The substitute shall be called in cases of vacancy; of investiture in the office of 
minister of state, governor of a territory, secretary of a state, of the Federal District, of a territory, of a 
state capital or head of a temporary diplomatic mission; or of leave of absence exceeding one hundred 
and twenty days (Article 56 of the Constitution 1988).  
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 Finally, I assume that not all companies would be concerned about excessive 
antitrust intervention. Several small and micro companies, for example, have never 
faced an antitrust case. Therefore, I will focus the analysis on donations from companies 
that faced an antitrust case at Cade, as a defendant, before the amendment was proposed. 
I assume that these companies   would   be   more   concerned   about   a   competition   bill’s  
potential excessive intervention, and who would therefore lobby in this direction 
(directly, or indirectly, through the CNI or other business associations). Of course, there 
might be exceptions — for example, a cartelist company that was never caught would 
also be concerned about cartel fines. But this is hard to control for and consider. And it 
is unclear if this hypothetical company would actually lobby because this could raise 
questions about the company’s  motivation  for  lobbying  and  risking the hidden ongoing 
cartel.  
 In sum, I will focus the analysis on (i) the amendments proposed or rejected by 
Silvestri, Mercadante, Maia, Dornelles and Eugênio that concern the definition of 
anticompetitive behaviour, the fines for an anticompetitive behaviour, and the mergers 
that should be notified to the competition authority; and (ii) how much money these 
politicians received from companies — that have been a defendant on an antitrust case 
— or their top administrators,356 in the campaign that got these politicians elected.357 
 To   establish   the   congressmen’s   donors,   I   used   the   data   on   campaign   finance  
published by the think tank Transparência Brasil, who collected it at the Superior 
                                                             
356 I consider as a donation from the economic group/corporation not only the donations made strictly 
by the corporation itself as a legal entity, but also the donations made by the individuals who are 
shareholders that control de company, by the individuals who are part of the board of the company, or 
are top executives (starting from a director of the company to the top of the hierarchical structure). 
357 When delimiting how much total funding a candidate received, I consider the use of own resources 
by candidates. But I do not consider donations from political parties or other campaigns because it is 
not possible to identify the original donor or source. For example, the origin could be a corporate 
donation that was made through the party, as well as it could be a public fund, and so on.  
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Electoral Tribunal, organised it and published it.358 I considered only corporations who 
donated in the campaign for the mandate in which the congressmen proposed the 
amendment. For instance, if the amendment was proposed in 2008 by a congressman 
elected in 2006, I looked for the donors who donated during that campaign.359  
 Subsequently,   I   searched   Cade’s   data   through   their   institutional   online   search  
engine, looking for proceedings in which the corporate donors were defendants.360 If the 
search returned negative,  I  looked  at  the  company’s  website  or  at  websites  who  publish  
data on corporate ownership (such as the S&P Global Market Intelligence, which is 
published by Bloomberg) to check if the donor is part of a corporate group who faced an 
antitrust case.361 I considered any antitrust case faced by the corporation, or by its group, 
before the amendment was proposed.  
 
Deputy César Silvestri 
 Silvestri, from the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), received 28.05% of his 
campaign fund from companies that have been a defendant in an antitrust case. 
 On 17 December 2008, Silvestri presented an amendment to extend the 
provision on predatory pricing. Since the bill was referring only to predatory practices of 
products, Silvestri argued that the ban should be expanded to sectors who offer 
                                                             
358 Transparência  Brasil,  ‘Às  Claras  — Quem  financia  quem  nas  eleições’. 
359 It   is  not   feasible   to  analyse   the  politician’s  campaign  right  after  he   finished  his  mandate  because  
not all of them ran for reelection. Therefore, this case study will not consider the supposed 
circumstances when politicians use their mandate as a platform to raise money for the next election.  
360 Cade   (Conselho   Administrativo   de   Defesa   Econômica),   ‘Pesquisa   Processual’  
<http://www.cade.gov.br/assuntos/processos-1> accessed 22 July 2018.  
361 I searched the most reliable online sources. Brazil lacks an official online platform gathering 
corporate structures. The official data on Brazilian corporate structures are dispersed among the state 
commercial registries and are difficult to access. See Carazza, Dinheiro, Eleições e Poder: As 
Engrenagens do Sistema Político Brasileiro, 49.  
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services.362 He argued that sectors who offer services also can suffer from predatory 
price practices in the same way as sectors who offer products: they both harm the 
economy.  
 Therefore, he was concerned about insufficient punishment.363  
 
Senator Aloizio Mercadante  
 Mercadante received 73.91% of his campaign fund from companies that have 
been a defendant on an antitrust case.  He  was   the  Workers’   Party   (PT)   leader   in   the  
Senate at the time he proposed his amendments.364 
On 21 December 2009, Mercadante, proposed an amendment to reduce the 
minimum fine for anticompetitive acts — from  1%   to  0.1%   of   the   company’s   annual  
revenue (of the year previous to the start of the administrative proceeding).365 On the 
other hand, he raised the base calculation for the fine, from the gross sales in the relevant 
market, to the total revenues of the company excluding taxes.  
Mercadante’s  justification to change the base calculation was that the fine should 
have a clear and objective criterion, because companies need to have some level of 
predictability of state action and also because frequently companies appeal to the 
                                                             
362 Câmara dos Deputados, Projeto de Lei nº 3937/2004, Emenda nº 5, pg 4 
<http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=627695&filename=EMP+
5/2008+%3D%3E+PL+3937/2004> accessed 22 November 2016. 
363 Silvestri proposed other amendments, but  their  impact  on  the  state’s  intervention  in  the  economy  
would be rather indirect. Three amendments established that only public servants could hold office for 
certain top positions in the competition authority; another amendment removed a provision that 
established that Cade could sell its publications and use the money received for their future budget; 
and   finally   another   amendment   established   that   Cade’s   president   should   attend   two   congressional  
committees’   sessions   per   year   in   order   to   provide   clarification on antitrust cases enforced by the 
competition authority.  
364 Zero Hora,   ‘A   pedido   de   Lula,   Mercadante   segue   líder   do   PT   no   Senado’   (21   August   2009)  
<http://zh.clicrbs.com.br/rs/noticia/2009/08/a-pedido-de-lula-mercadante-segue-lider-do-pt-no-
senado-2626207.html> accessed 22 November 2016. 
365 Emenda nº 33 — Plenário ao Projeto da Câmara nº 6, de 2009, pg 4 




judiciary to review the fine applied by the competition authority. For him, a criterion 
that uses the relevant market concept as a base does not guarantee this objectivity 
because frequently economic analyses disagree about what the relevant market is in a 
given case. Mercadante then concluded that the reduction of the minimum level of 1% to 
0.1% would be enough to guarantee what he called as proportionality between the 
conduct and the penalty imposed. Finally, he excluded taxes also to maintain the 
proportionality of the fine. 
We can notice that Mercadante was concerned about two issues: predictability 
and proportionality of the fine. His concern about proportionality is a concern to not 
excessively punish companies: he reduced the minimum level and also excluded taxes, 
arguing for proportionality.  
On the other hand, his predictability concern infers that he was also concerned 
about insufficient punishment: when he says that frequently companies appeal to the 
judiciary to review the fine applied by the competition authority, he is inferring a 
concern  about  the  effectiveness  of  Cade’s  fine  towards  the  judiciary  review.   
Finally, his statement that “companies  need  to  have  some  level  of  predictability 
of   the   state’s   action”   does   not   clearly relate with either a concern with excessive or 
insufficient punishment. Therefore, per our methodology we shall not take this 
justification into account. 
In sum, we can conclude that Mercadante had two evident concerns about 
excessive punishment, and one concern about insufficient punishment.  
Another amendment presented by Mercadante raised the criterion of minimum 
revenue for notification of mergers and acquisitions to Cade: from R$ 150 million to R$ 
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400 million.366 That is, only companies that earned R$ 400 million or more in the year 
previous  to  the  deal  should  submit  the  merger  or  acquisition  for  Cade’s  analysis. 
 Mercadante argued that by adopting the criterion of R$ 400 million minimum 
revenue for notification of mergers and acquisitions, the previous competition legislation 
(Act of 1994) led Cade to clear without conditions 90% of the cases (that is, most cases 
did not present anticompetitive concerns). Thus, the argument follows, the reduction of 
the limit to 150 million certainly make Cade analyse mergers harmless to competition, 
wasting public resources. We can observe, therefore, that Mercadante was concerned 
about excessive merger control.367  
 
Senator Francisco Dornelles  
 Dornelles, from the conservative Popular Party (PP), received 95.40% of his 
campaign fund from companies that had been a defendant in an antitrust case. He was 
the rapporteur of the bill in the committee  of  infrastructure’s  services  of the Senate.368 
 
Fines for cartel and abuse of dominant position cases  
 Dornelles proposed an amendment to reduce the maximum fine for 
anticompetitive acts, from 30% to 20%.369 This amendment also reduced the base 
                                                             
366 Ibid 5. 
367 Mercadante   proposed   other   amendments,   but   their   impact   on   the   state’s   intervention   in   the  
economy would be rather indirect. One granted the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring of the 
Ministry of Finance (SEAE) the prerogative to give a non-binding opinion on competition matters of 
any public or private entities. And another amendment established that Cade’s   plenary   (and   not  
Cade’s   president   alone)   should   have   the   authority   to   sign   administrative   contracts   and   cooperation  
agreements with other national and international entities, such as foreign competition authorities.  
368 Dornelles was heavily lobbied by the CNI, as the Confederation publicly declared. See CNI 
(Confederação  Nacional  da  Indústria),  CNI  em  Ação,  ‘Aprovada  nova  estrutura  do  Sistema  Brasileiro  
de   Defesa   da   Concorrência’   (14   October   2011)  
<http://admin.cni.org.br/portal/data/pages/FF808081272B58C0012730BE20A57BDA.htm> accessed 
22 November 2016. The final versions of his amendments were proposed on 30 November 2010. 
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calculation — for Dornelles, the fine should be calculated considering only the gross 
sales obtained in the field of the business activity on which the infringement took place in 
the latest financial year (for example, the cement market), and not the total gross pretax 
revenue of the company (for example, not only the sales on the cement market, but also 
of all other business that the company might have).370 Consequently, the same 
amendment further reduced the minimum fine proposed by Mercadante, by establishing 
it on 0.1% of the gross sales obtained in the business activity in which the infringement 
occurred — Mercadante suggested the same percentage, but of a larger base calculation, 
which was the total gross pretax revenue of the company.371 
 Dornelles’   justification   for   the   amendment  was   that   ‘the   payment   of   a   fine   of  
30% of the annual gross revenue would certainly lead the company to halt its activities 
(wholly or in substantial part), and would lead the company to fail to comply with 
labour, social security and tax debts, among others, as well as debts with business 
partners’.372 As a consequence, the argument follows, 30% of the annual gross revenue 
cap   ‘is   excessive   and   violates   the   constitutional   principles   of   free   economic   initiative,  
the social function of property and enterprise, and the pursuit of full employment of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
369 All  Dornelles’  amendments  were  formally  presented  as  sub-amendments, which does not change 
our analysis. 
370 Dornelles presented four versions of his opinion, from 31/08/2010 to 30/11/2010. The last version, 
presented   on   30/11/2010,   was   the   one   read   and   approved   by   the   committee   of   infrastructure’s  
services. It is puzzling that between the penultimate opinion presented in 08/11/2010 and the last one 
presented   in   30/11/2010,   he   changed   the   base   calculation   from   ‘relevant   market’   to   ‘field   of   the  
business  activity’.  He  did  not  justify  this  change  in  opinion.  Therefore,  we  can  only  speculate  as to his 
motivation — perhaps he was concerned  about  the  uncertainty  of  the  term  ‘relevant  market’,  which  is  
frequently  a  controversial  issue  on  antitrust  cases,  for  example.  Nonetheless,  Dornelles’  solution  has  
not  been  very  effective.  As  the  term  ‘field  of  the  business  activity’  is  exotic  to  antitrust scholarship, 
this gave Cade wide discretion to interpret it. Several competition lawyers have been arguing that 
Cade  has  been  illegally  interpreting  ‘field  of  the  business  activity’  as  more  broadly  than  the  ‘relevant  
market’   standard   — for example, see the petition filed by the defendants on the Processo 
Administrativo nº 08012.011027/2006-02,   requesting   for   resolution   of   conflict   in   Cade’s   decision.  
Perhaps   Dornelles   was   not   able   to   foresee   this   problem.   But,   again,   as   Dornelles’   change   on   this  
matter lacks justification, we do not know what his motivation was — we can only speculate it. What 
we do know is that he reduced significantly the base calculation proposed by Mercadante, who 
presented the last amendment on the matter.  
371 Parecer cj2010-05566, Comissão de Serviços de Infraestrutura 
<http://legis.senado.leg.br/mateweb/arquivos/mate-pdf/84379.pdf> accessed 22 November 2016.  
372 Ibid 5.  
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production  factors’.373 Thus,  ‘by  setting  the  cap  at  20%  of  the  gross  sales  obtained  in  the  
field of the business activity, the amendment meets the principle of proportionality in 
economic matters  and   is  able   to   inhibit  the  practice  of   illicit  competitive’.374 Similarly, 
Dornelles argues that a reduction in the   minimum   fine   also   serves   the   ‘principle   of  
proportionality in economic matters, granting to Cade the discretion in adopting a fair 
value and  reasonable  fine’.375 
 Therefore,   Dornelles   reduced   the   fine’s   cap,   floor   and   the   base   calculation  
because he was concerned that companies would be excessively punished.  
 Subsequently, Dornelles proposed another amendment to reduce the fine 
imposed on the administrator of the company, both the cap and the floor.376 His 
amendment  reduced  the  fine  for  the  company’s  administrator  from  10  %  (minimum)  and  
50% (maximum), to 1% (minimum) and 20% (maximum). Although he did not 
elaborate a long justification for the amendment, Dornelles used the connector 
‘similarly’  at  the  beginning  of  his  sentence  (that  is,  similar  to  the  justification  presented  
above for the reduction of company fines), which indicates that he also reduced the 
administrator fine to attend the so-called principle of proportionality. In other words, he 
indicates that he proposed this amendment also concerned with excessive punishment.  
 Finally, this amendment established that the competition authority needs to 
demonstrate wilful misconduct or gross negligence of the administrator (in the former 
legislation, Cade would only have to demonstrate strict liability). Dornelles argued that 
the  previous  legislation  was  ‘contrary  to  the  legal  tradition  which  determines  the  liability  
of the administrator of the company only when he behaved with wilful misconduct or 
                                                             
373 Ibid 4. 
374 Ibid 5. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid.  
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gross   negligence’.377 Again,   Dornelles’   motivation   here   is   to   avoid   excessive 
punishment,  particularly  in  view  of  what  he  calls  the  ‘legal  tradition’.   
 Therefore, while proposing amendments to the fines for cartels and abuse of 
dominant position cases, Dornelles was always concerned with excessive punishment.  
 
Merger control 
 Another amendment proposed by Dornelles raised even more the criterion of 
minimum revenue for notification of mergers and acquisitions to Cade: only companies 
that have earned R$ 1 billion (and not R$ 400 million, as proposed by Mercadante) or 
more should be required to submit the merger to Cade. In addition, Dornelles increased 
the second threshold: the other company involved in the merger must has had revenue of 
R$ 40 million or more (and not R$ 30 million as it was established in the bill). 
Therefore, only mergers involving a company that has had revenue of R$ 1 billion or 
more, with another company that has had revenue of R$ 40 million or more should be 
notified to Cade. Dornelles argued that the criterion established by the legislation in 
1994 (R$ 400 million) should be adjusted because of inflation. This adjustment and the 
introduction   of   the   second   threshold   would   be   “consistent with the current financial 
situation   of  mergers   and   facilitate  Cade’s  work  by   extirpating   the   analysis   of  mergers  
harmless   to   competition”.378 Therefore, he was concerned about excessive merger 
control.379  
                                                             
377 Parecer cj2010-05566, p 5. 
378 Ibid 6.  
379 His concern about excessive merger control is also evident in his  speech  to  the  Senate’s  plenary  on  
15/06/2011,  when  he  said  that  ‘Cade  is  an  institution  with  archaic  thinking  that  does  not  understand  
that strong   and   large   companies   are   necessary   to   compete   in   the   international   market’,   and   that  
‘because  of  petty,  delayed,  minor  issues,  Cade  creates  embarrassment  to  every  great  merger,  bringing  
great harm to the development and strengthening of Brazilian companies’.   Agência Senado, 




 Moreover, Dornelles changed a provision to grant antitrust immunity for 
consortia   formed   for  public  bids  because  “they  have  proposals   that   have  deadlines   for  
qualification   and   decisions   that   are   too   short   for   Cade’s   [timely]   clearance”,   which  
indicates a concern with excessive merger control.380 In this same aspect, he also granted 
antitrust immunity for associative contracts, consortia or joint ventures created for a 
temporary specific project. Dornelles, however, did not justify why he gave this last 
immunity. Although it indicates a concern with excessive enforcement, I will not 
consider it, in accordance with the methodology I established for this case study.  
In sum, Dornelles was concerned about excessive merger control when it comes 
to the minimum revenue criteria for the main company; excessive merger control when it 
comes to the absence of a threshold for the second company; and excessive merger 
control when it comes to public bids.  
 But, on the other hand, Dornelles re-introduced merger review for corporate 
capital restructuring. Dornelles argued that corporate capital restructuring should be 
submitted  to  Cade  analysis  because  ‘they  have  the  potential  to  impact  competition  in  the  
relevant  markets’.381 Thus, he was concerned about insufficient merger control when it 
comes to more corporate capital restructuring.382 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
<http://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2011/06/15/dornelles-defende-mudancas-do-senado-
em-projeto-que-agiliza-atuacao-do-cade> accessed 22 November 2016.  
380 Parecer cj2010-05566, p 6. 
381 Ibid 7. 
382 Dornelles  proposed  other  amendments,  but  their  impact  on  the  state’s  intervention  in  the  economy  
would  be  indirect:  he  reduced  Cade’s  deadline  to  review  mergers;;  made more flexible the guarantee 
required  to  contest  Cade’s  fines  in  the  judiciary;;  and  removed  a  provision  which  established  vacation 
legis for   the   new   legislation.   Moreover,   he   accepted   Mercadante’s   amendments   about   SEAE’s 
prerogative to give non-binding opinions, and about the authority   of   Cade’s   plenary   to   sign  
administrative contracts and cooperation agreements.  
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Senator José Agripino Maia  
 Maia, from the right-wing Democrats Party (DEM), received 80.01% of his 
campaign fund from companies that had been a defendant in an antitrust case. 
 On 01 December 2010, Agripino Maia proposed an amendment to exclude 
exclusive-dealing agreements from the list of examples of anticompetitive practices 
(article 36, paragraph 3, item XIX, of the bill). He argued that exclusive-dealing 
agreements bring the following benefits: they incentivise companies to invest, result in 
more employment, give companies better conditions to negotiate, and enhance consumer 
welfare.383 Thus, he was concerned about excessive punishment.384  
 
Deputy Pedro Eugênio  
 When the bill returned to the Chamber of Deputies, Pedro Eugênio, from the 
Workers’   Party   (PT),   was   its rapporteur. He was responsible for reviewing all 
amendments that came from the Senate, and published his opinion on 05 October 2011.  
 Eugênio received 28.42% of his campaign fund from companies that had been a 
defendant in an antitrust case. 
 
Fines for cartel and abuse of dominant position cases  
                                                             
383 Diário do Senado Federal, 2 de dezembro de 2010, p 54817–54818. 
384 Agripino Maia proposed no other amendment.  
123 
 
 Eugênio opined   for   the   rejection   of   Dornelles’   amendment   that   reduced   the  
maximum and minimum fines for anticompetitive acts, and changed the base calculation 
of the fine.385  
 Eugênio was concerned about excessive punishment in one respect. For him, 
while the relevant market calculation base only considers products that are a substitute, 
the  term  ‘in  the  field  of  the  business  activity’  may  also  consider  complementary  products  
that belong to other parts of the production chain in the case of vertically integrated 
companies. Therefore, as undue incomes from a given anticompetitive infraction are 
restricted   to   the   relevant   market   where   it   took   place,   Dornelles’   amendment   may  
excessively punish companies.386 
 On the other hand, Eugênio was even more concerned about insufficient 
punishment.   Firstly,   he   argued,   the   Senate’s   reduction   of   the   maximum   percentage  
would indicate that Cade would impose less rigorous fines, while Congress should aim 
for the opposite.387 The  fines’  deterrence  effect  would  be  reduced,  according  to  him.388 
And Eugênio argued  the  same  with  respect  to  Dornelles’  reduction  of  the  minimum  fine.     
 Eugênio also   rejected   Dornelles’   reduction   of   administrator fines — both the 
maximum and the minimum fine — by arguing that it reduces the deterrent effect of the 
law.389  
In addition, he argued that the imposition of more requirements to fine the 
administrator — that is, demonstration of wilful misconduct or gross negligence — 
might result in impunity. Eugênio argued   that  while   the  United  States’  antitrust  policy  
                                                             
385 Câmara dos Deputados, Parecer Pedro Eugênio 
<http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=928019&filename=PSS+
1+PL393704+%3D%3E+PL+3937/2004> Accessed 22 November 2016.  
386 Ibid 45. 
387 Ibid. 
388 He also argued that the establishment of the higher percentages seems to be adequate from a 




prioritises the criminal liability of individuals (even with prison) when it comes to 
cartels,   Brazil  would   be   reducing   the   ‘pressure’   on   individuals  who   are,   after   all,   the  
ones who decide to take the anticompetitive practices. 
 In sum, he had one concern about excessive punishment; and five concerns about 
insufficient punishment, when it comes to fines for anticompetitive practices.  
 
Exclusive dealing as a possible abuse of dominant position practice 
 Eugênio rejected   Agripino’s   amendment   that   excluded   exclusive-dealing 
agreements from the list of anticompetitive practices. He basically argued that 
companies with large market share can make exclusive-dealing agreements that have the 
potential to close the market to competitors, and that Cade has condemned the practice 
in some important cases.390 Therefore, he was concerned about insufficient punishment.   
 
Merger control 
 Eugênio also  opined  for  the  rejection  of  Dornelles’  amendment  that  changed  the  
criteria for the  mergers’  submission.   
 Firstly, Eugênio rejected the increase of the minimum revenue criteria — from 
R$ 400 million and R$ 30 million, to R$ 1 billion and R$ 40 million.  
 He claimed that  Dornelles’   argument   that   ‘the R$ 400 million criterion of the 
1994 law should be updated due to inflation, by using the Extended National Consumer 
Price Index — IPCA’ should not be accepted because the appreciation of corporate 
assets may not have followed the appreciation of the IPCA. Moreover, by using the R$ 1 
                                                             
390 Ibid 44. 
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billion criterion, mergers that were cleared with conditions by Cade in 2010 would not 
have had been reviewed by the competition authority. Similarly, Eugênio argued that the 
R$ 1 billion criterion would significantly reduce the universe of companies that will 
come under the scrutiny of Cade: only about 450 Brazilian companies have had a 
turnover of R$ 1 billion [in 2010]. 
In addition, Eugênio argued, the increase of the second threshold from R$ 30 to 
40 million would prevent the review of mergers in which a large company progressively 
acquires medium-sized corporations, until it entirely eliminates competition in a given 
relevant   market.   According   to   him,   ‘this   [the   thresholds   at   R$   1   billion   and   R$   40  
million] means that a significant portion of the Brazilian economy will be unprotected 
from  preventive  competition  enforcement’.391 
 Secondly, Eugênio rejected  the  part  of  Dornelles’  amendment  that  gave  antitrust  
immunity for associative contracts, consortia or joint ventures created for a temporary 
specific project. He argued that these agreements might facilitate the exchange of 
information between competitors, facilitating cartels; or might be created to avoid 
merger control (for him, it is very plausible that some association contracts, consortia or 
joint ventures that are intended to be permanent, end up appearing ‘temporary’   just   to  
escape  Cade’s  merger  review).392 
 Thirdly, Eugênio accepted  the  part  of  Dornelles’  amendment  that  gave  immunity  
for consortia formed for public bids. Not because they do not have the potential to harm 
competition, however. For Eugênio, the potential competition problem is independent of 
the consortium: for example, the owner of the concession of a highway should not be 
able to bid for the concession of another road that is parallel to the first one in most of its 
length; regardless of whether there is a consortium or not. Nevertheless, the most 
                                                             
391 Ibid 52. 
392 Ibid 54. 
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effective form of intervention, according to Eugênio, would be ex ante within the sphere 
of   the   call   for   tenders/bids,   which   run   off   the   conventional   format   of   Cade’s   merger  
review. Therefore, the Secretary for Economic Affairs, SEAE (acronym in Portuguese 
for Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico) of the Ministry of Finance would be 
better institutionally suited to advocate for competition within the sphere of the call for 
tenders/bids.393 
 Lastly, Eugênio accepted  the  part  of  Dornelles’  amendment  that  established  the  
submission of mere corporate capital restructuring. Although Eugênio was concerned 
about excess merger control (he argued that mere corporate capital restructuring should 
not be submitted   for   Cade’s   review   due   to   its   lack   of   impact   on   competition),   he  
concluded that Cade can edit a resolution, as it has done in the past, regulating corporate 
capital restructuring immunity.394  
 In short, Eugênio was concerned about insufficient merger control when it comes 
to the minimum revenue criteria for both the main company and the second company; 
insufficient merger control when related to mergers aimed to a temporary specific 
project; insufficient merger control when it comes to public bids (though he concluded 
that SEAE should be the institution accountable for it); and excess of merger control 
when it comes to more corporate capital restructuring (though he concluded that Cade 
could edit a resolution granting immunity to that kind of deals).395 
                                                             
393 Ibid 55. 
394 Ibid 55. 
395 It is noteworthy that  Eugênio’s  pattern  — of predominant concern about insufficient punishment in 
cartel and abuse of dominance cases, and insufficient merger control — remained while he analysed 
other amendments that do not relate directly with those issues but that may relate indirectly. That 
occurred when he addressed the provisions that established the procedural norms of the legislation: 
eg, he was against the Senate’s  amendment  that  made more flexible the guarantee required to contest 
Cade’s   fines   in   the   judiciary   (for   Eugênio,   the   Senate’s   amendment   could   turn   Cade’s   decisions  
entirely ineffective, extending the harm caused by the anticompetitive conduct) (48–49). Eugênio also 
maintained this same pattern while analysing provisions related to institutional organisation that could 
indirectly weaken or strengthen Cade enforcement: for instance, he was against the provision that 




5.3.3. The pattern between campaign finance and amendments 
With respect to the list of anticompetitive practices and the fines for 
anticompetitive practices, we may observe that there is a clear correlation between 
money and the concern about excessive antitrust intervention (figures 5.1 and 5.2): 
 
Figure 5.1 
List of anticompetitive practices 
 Percentage of campaign 
fund from companies that 
had been a defendant in an 
antitrust case 
Percentage of justifications 
manifesting concern with 
excessive punishment when 
proposing amendments 
Silvestri 28.05 0 
Eugênio 28.42 0 






                                                                                                                                                                            
There are other amendments proposed by Eugênio that I have not considered here because it is 
unclear if the provisions would  positively  or  negatively  impact  the  ‘punishment  on  cartel  and  abuse  of  







































Fines for anticompetitive practices 
 Percentage of campaign 
fund from companies that 
had been a defendant in an 
antitrust case 
Percentage of justifications 
manifesting concern with 
excessive punishment when 
proposing amendments 
Eugênio 28.42 16.66 
Mercadante 73.91 66.66 







































Money from corporations that had been a defendant in an antitrust case
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But, with respect to the criteria for submission   of   mergers   to   Cade’s   review,  
there is no clear correlation between money and the concern about excessive merger 
review (figure 5.3): 
 
Figure 5.3 
Submissions of cases to merger review 
 Percentage of campaign 
fund from companies that 
had been a defendant in an 
antitrust case 
Percentage of justifications 
manifesting concern with 
excessive punishment when 
proposing amendments 
Eugênio 28.42 20 
Mercadante 73.91 100 











































The lack of correlation in the chart above might be due to a limitation of the 
method I have used: it does not consider that Mercadante proposed an amendment to 
increase the threshold to R$ 400 million, while Dornelles proposed an amendment to 
increase the threshold to R$ 1 billion. That is, Dornelles, who received more money, 
introduced a higher threshold than Mercadante, who received less money. In any event, 
neither Mercadante nor  Dornelles’  amendments  had  much  impact  on  the  final  version  of  
the bill, as we will see next. Therefore, I will not consider the amendments concerning 
submissions of merger review due to the lack of a clear correlation between corporate 
money and congressmen behaviour on this matter, and due to the little impact of 
Mercadante and Dornelles’  amendments  concerning merger control on the final version 
of the bill. 
 
5.3.4. The impact of the amendments  
 As the public law scholar J. A. G. Griffith once wrote,  
 
In the examination of institutions like the House of Parliament, statistics 
may be more than usually misleading. In considering such amendments 
moved to a bill, what is important is their relative effect on the bill, not 
their number.396  
 
                                                             
396 John Aneurin Grey Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (Allen and Unwin for 
PEP and the Study of Parliament Group 1974) 14. 
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In our case study, the amendments proposed by the heavily corporate funded 
congressmen had a full impact on bill n 3937/2004 so far as anticompetitive practices are 
concerned. I am not claiming that the amendments were the sole factor that made the 
legislation less interventionist. In other words, I am not claiming that they were the 
exclusive cause — actually, there is no such thing in real life, as many philosophers of 
science have argued. Or, to put it in another way: I am not claiming that the amendments 
explain everything about the legislative process of the Competition Act. I am saying that 
they are a key element of that explanation. For instance, we may note that almost all 
other congressmen did nothing to try to stop the amendments. However, those kinds of 
factors are difficult to grasp because they lack evidence on why such a thing (for 
example, the omission of other congressmen) occurred. Consequently, our analysis 
would become more speculative. By contrast, the amendments are not only graspable 
but also explicitly justified by the congressman, as we have seen.  
Agripino’s  amendment  to  exclude exclusive-dealing agreements from the list of 
anticompetitive practices had full effect. Although Eugênio rejected it, the amendment 
ended   up   being   accepted   by   the   party   leaders.   Consequently,   Agripino’s   amendment  
became part of the Competition Act.  
Likewise,   Dornelles’   amendment   concerning   the   fine   for   anticompetitive   acts  
had   full   effect.   The   Dornelles’   amendment   was   key   to   shaping the Competition Act 
2011, not only by reducing the minimum and maximum fines set forth in the 
Competition Act 1994 (from 1% and 30%, to 0.1% and 20%) for anticompetitive acts, 
but  also  by  narrowing  the  fine’s  base  calculation.  While  in  the  former  legislation  the  fine  
was calculated in reference to the total gross pretax revenue of the company in the latest 
financial year, the new legislation now only considers the gross sales obtained in the 
field of the business activity in which the infringement took place.  
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The   Dornelles’   amendment   also   benefited   company administrators.397 Firstly, 
administrators were benefited because the fine established for the administrator is a 
percentage of the fine established for the company. In other words, the fine applied to 
the company is the base calculation for  the  administrator’s  fine.398 Therefore, as the fine 
for the company was generally reduced, so it was the fine for the administrator. 
Secondly, the minimum and maximum percentages established for administrators were 
also reduced from 10% (minimum) and 50% (maximum) in the former legislation, to 1% 
(minimum) and 20% (maximum) in the new one.  
It should be noted that press accounts reported that the approval (against 
Eugênio’s  wishes)   of  Dornelles’   amendment   regarding   fines  was   a   procedural  mistake  
made at the Chamber (that is, they intended to reject, but a formal mistake was made, 
leading to its approval);399 while others reported that the party leaders at the Chamber of 
Deputies ended up agreeing with Dornelles.400 In any event, the fact is that the Chamber 
of Deputies approved  Dornelles’  amendment,  which  ended  up  shaping the final text on 
that matter.  
While enforcing the new legislation,401 Cade has recognised that the Act of 2011 
is indeed more beneficial to corporations and their administrators when it comes to fines 
                                                             
397 On the other hand, those who do not exercise business activity had their fine increased. The fine 
for individuals, non-business public and private legal entities, as well as any association of persons 
and non-business de facto and de jure legal entities, was increased from a minimum of R$ 18 
thousand and a maximum of R$ 18 million, to a minimum of R$ 50 thousand and a maximum of R$ 2 
billion. We can speculate that companies did not lobby this matter, since corporations would lack 
legitimacy or interest to do so. 
398 Artigo 23, inciso II, da Lei n° 8884/94. Artigo 37, inciso III, da Lei n° 12529/11.  
399 O Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 8 October 2011) B8. 
400 Julio Wiziack   and  Filipe  Oliveira,   ‘Pressão   fez   governo   tirar   poderes   do  Super  Cade’,  Folha de 
São Paulo (31 May 2013) <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013/05/1287632-pressao-fez-
governo-tirar-poderes-do-super-cade.shtml> 16 February 2018. 
401 Cade has been doing that analysis particularly in cases opened during the Competition Act 1994 
but concluded when the Competition Act 2011 was already in force, to decide which legislation is 
more beneficial to the defendants and, therefore, should prevail. 
133 
 
regarding anticompetitive practices.402 The point is: corporations and their administrators 
have,  in  practice,  benefited  from  Dornelles’  amendments.   
Finally, another amendment proposed by Dornelles also benefited 
administrators: the competition authority now needs to demonstrate that the 
administrator acted with wilful misconduct or gross negligence, while in the former 
legislation Cade only had to demonstrate strict liability.403 
 On the other hand, Mercadante and   Dornelles’   amendments   with   respect   to  
merger review had little impact on  the  final  version  of  the  bill.  Mercadante’s  amendment  
was  completely  changed  by  Dornelles.  And  Dornelles’  amendment,  in  turn,  was  rejected  
by Eugênio to a significant extent. While Eugênio accepted  the  parts  of  the  Dornelles’  
amendment concerning the merger control of corporate capital restructuring, and 
concerning antitrust immunity for consortia formed for public bids; Eugênio rejected the 
merger thresholds suggested by Dornelles, as well as the immunity for temporary 
associative contracts/consortia/joint ventures. The party leaders at the Chamber of 
Deputies agreed with Eugênio’s   opinion   on   those  matters,   so  Eugênio’s   rejection  was  
approved by the plenary of the Chamber, eventually shaping the final text.  
                                                             
402 See  commissioner  Ana  Frazão’s  opinion  in  the  Processo  Administrativo  n°  08012.009834/2006-5, 
Rel Cons Ricardo Ruiz, fls 734–738. As pointed out by Mrs Frazão, although the legislation changed 
from  ‘revenue  of  the  company’  to  ‘revenue  of  the  company,  group  or  conglomerate’,  this  change  was  
merely rhetorical, since Brazilian jurisprudence and scholarship had already consolidated the view 
that corporate groups must be considered as one company, even if composed of several distinct legal 
entities. Moreover, although the previous legislation considered the fine based on the gross sales after 
tax and the new one establishes the fine based on the pretax gross revenue (which partially increases 
the base calculation), this increase is marginal and has little impact on the fine vis-à-vis the changes 
on  the  percentage  and  the  major  aspect  of  the  base  calculation  (ie,  the  change  from  the  ‘total  revenue  
of   the  company’   to   just   the   ‘field  of   the  business  activity  on  which   the   infringement’),  as  has  been  
recognised by Cade case law grounded on commissioner   Frazão’s   opinion. For discussion and 
summary of the Cade case law on this matter, see Flávia Chiquito dos Santos, 'Aplicação de Penas na 
Repressão a Cartéis: Uma Análise da Jurispudência do CADE' (Dissertação de Mestrado em Direito, 
Universidade de São Paulo 2014) 160. 
403 For a discussion about that change in the legislation, see Maria Cecília Andrade, Caroline 
Sanselme Vieira, and Ricardo Ferreira  Pastore,  ‘A  responsabilidade  dos  administradores  perante  a  Lei  
de  Defesa  da  Concorrência  e  o  Programa  de  Prevenção  de  Infrações  à  Ordem  Econômica’  Migalhas 
(28 May 2004) <http://www.migalhas.com.br/dePeso/16,MI4858,31047-





5.3.5. Conclusion of the section 
 In sum, we have seen the following pattern: the more money the elected 
congressman received from companies that had been a defendant in an antitrust case, 
the more he tended to be concerned about excessively punishing companies when 
proposing or rejecting amendments in the consolidated competition bill on issues that 
involved the list of anticompetitive practices and the fines for anticompetitive practices. 
In other words, the more corporate donations a congressman received from companies 
that had been a defendant in an antitrust case, the more he tended to argue for a less 
interventionist competition legislation regarding the list of anticompetitive practices and 
the fines for anticompetitive practices, in accordance with the interests of the CNI.  
This pattern has impacted the final version of the competition bill, shaping the 
text of the Competition Act 2011 with respect to anticompetitive practices.  
In the following section, I will explore possible explanations for the pattern 
found. 
 
5.4. The possible explanations for the pattern found 
I will now try to understand the pattern found in our case study through four 
perspectives:  (a)  corruption  of  the   legislators’  attitude,  (b)  war  chest  corruption,  (c)  the  
possibility of a mere coincidence, and (d) the nature of the houses of Congress. I will 
engage with the empirical literature on Brazilian campaign finance, to see the extent to 





5.4.1. The corruption  of  the  legislators’  attitude   
The association between corporate contributions and political benefits 
 If we want to understand whether corporate donations have corrupted the 
attitude of legislators (either through quid pro quo or dependence corruption), it is 
necessary to look at what political science statistical studies tell us. Political scientists 
have frequently asked whether contributions buy political favours in Brazil. And, in a 
nutshell, at least five papers404 have found a statistically significant association between 
corporate contributions and subsequent political benefits from the federal government in 
general, such as obtaining government contracts,405 tax benefits,406 and finance from 
public banks.407 
                                                             
404 The research for this section was mostly done in 2016. I  have  used  Wagner  Mancuso’s  article  as  a  
reference and starting point to my review of political science literature on campaign finance. Wagner 
Mancuso, 'Investimento Eleitoral no Brasil: Balanço da Literatura (2001–2012) e Agenda de Pesquisa' 
(2015) 23 Revista de Sociologia e Política 155. 
405 Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson have found positive association between corporate contributions to 
elected deputies of the Workers Party in 2006 and subsequent construction contracts with the 
government.   They   claim   that   ‘firms   specializing   in   public-works projects can expect a substantial 
boost in contracts — at least 14 times the value of their contributions — when they donate to a 
federal-deputy   candidate   from   the   ruling  Workers’   Party   (PT)  and   that   candidate  wins   office’.  T C 
Boas, F D Hidalgo and N P Richardson, 'The Spoils of Victory: Campaign Donations and 
Government Contracts in Brazil' (2014) 76 Journal of Politics 415. 
406 Maetê  Gonçalves  have  found  that  the  industries  that  obtained  tax  social  contribution  during  Lula’s  
administration — aerospace, beverage, construction, pharmaceutical, and petrochemical industries — 
all  donated  to  his  campaigns  or   to   the  Workers’  Party  during the 2002 and 2006 elections. Maetê P 
Gonçalves, 'Financiamento Político e Benefícios Tributários: Uma Análise da Atuação de Setores 
Contemplados com Benefícios Tributários no Financiamento de Campanhas Eleitorais (2003–2010)' 
(2011) 35º Encontro da Anpocs.  
407 According to Stijn Claessens, Erik Feijen and Luc Laeven, companies that made contributions to 
(elected) federal deputies in the 1998 and 2002 elections had their public bank leverage substantially 
increased during the four  years  following  the  elections,  which  ‘suggests  that  contributing  firms  gained  
preferential   access   to   [public]   finance   from   banks’.   Stijn Claessens, Erik Feijen and Luc Laeven, 
'Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions' 
(2008) 88 Journal of Financial Economics 554 577. 
Similarly,   Sérgio  Lazzarini  and   others   concluded   in   their  paper   that   ‘politically-connected firms [ie 
campaign  donors]  are  also  more  able  to  obtain  BNDES  [Brazilian  Development  Bank]   loans’  while  
analysing the 2002 and 2006 elections. Sérgio G Lazzarini and others, 'What Do Development Banks 
Do? Evidence from Brazil, 2002—2009' (2011) Harvard Business School Working Paper n 12-047 
30. 
And   Danylo   Rocha,   in   the   same   sense,   has   found   a   correlation   between   BNDES’   expenditures   in  
Lula’s  second  mandate  (2007–2011)  and  the  funding  of  the  national  campaign  of  the  Workers’  Party  
(PT) in the second half of 2010. Danylo Rocha, 'Relações entre Dispêndios do BNDES e 




But there is a problem with causation. Perhaps the politician (and the part of the 
state to which he had influence) behaved in favour of the corporation because of 
ideological reasons, for example. Under this view, companies might have donated to the 
politician because of his ideology (a pro-business one, or sympathetic to a certain 
economic sector or a type of company). The more a politician has ideological affinities 
with corporations, the more he attracts corporate money. This might be a problem of fair 
competition in elections, and not  of  corruption  of  legislators’  attitude.408  
 
The attempt to overcome part of the causation problem 
 A paper by Santos and others has tried to overcome part of the causation 
problem, by isolating money from ideology. That is, they considered both money and 
ideology as independents variables, and analysed the money variable while controlling 
the  ideology  variable.  They  also  controlled  a  variable  that  they  called  ‘background’,  that  
is, if the politician was a businessman before joining politics. 
But they found two conflicting results. On the one hand, they found a positive 
association between corporate contributions in general (that is, from both the industrial 
and service sectors) and cooperation in matters of the of the interest of CNI.409 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Araújo, on the other hand, did not find significant association between campaign contributions and 
protection tariffs — which   ‘does   not   mean,   however,   that   this   relationship   does   not   exist’,   in   the  
words of the author, since he acknowledges that he may have chosen the wrong variable (campaign 
donations   for   Lula/PT’s   campaign   for   president   in   2002).  Gustavo Batista Araújo, 'O Déficit entre 
Acordado e Realizado no Mercosul' (Dissertação de Mestrado em Ciência Política, Universidade de 
São Paulo 2008) 94.  
408 It is noteworthy that corporate money can reinforce the already pro-business ideology. In this case, 
there is a dependence corruption   problem,   since   money   would   have   impacted   the   politician’s  
behaviour.  
409 Manoel Leonardo Santos and others, 'Financiamento de Campanha e Apoio Parlamentar à Agenda 
Legislativa da Indústria na Câmara dos Deputados' (2015) 21 Opinião Pública 33 51. The authors 
analysed the behaviour of 1,171 congressmen, totalling 9,903 votes in the plenary.  
137 
 
 On the other hand, when they looked exclusively at donations from the industrial 
sector (thus excluding those from service sectors), their results did not show a positive 
correlation   between   donations   and   cooperation   in   matters   of   the   CNI’s   interest.   The 
authors speculated that this negative association may have occurred due to errors in their 
variables: for example, they might have made mistakes while identifying which 
companies are indeed from the industrial sector.410  
If we assume their explanation to be plausible and consider their statistically 
significant finding as a strong one, their article has much to inform our discussion, since 
both our case study and their paper have concluded that the proportion of corporate 
money received correlated with a politician’s   behaviour   in   favour   of   the   interests   of  
CNI. Although there are differences between the studies — while they focus on nominal 
voting of deputies between 1999 and 2007, our case study focuses on amendments 
proposed by deputies and senators between 2008 and 2011 — we can argue that money 
would similarly impact a deputy between 1999 and 2007 while voting, and a deputy or 
senator between 2008 and 2011 while proposing an amendment.  
 
Other possible factors 
We   should   also   assure   that   other   factors   have   not   affected   the   politician’s  
behaviour.  
For instance, political science literature on American elections suggests that if 
the  bill  was   ‘significantly  exposed   to  public   opinion’,   this  might   restrain   the  politician  
from following their   donor’s   interests.411 If the bill is exposed to public opinion, the 
argument follows, this undermines the influence of campaign funding on the actions of 
                                                             
410 Ibid 48. 
411 For references, see ibid 41. 
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parliamentarians because, under the scrutiny of the general public, the issue arouses the 
interest of multiple groups, who are directly or indirectly affected by the decision. 
Ultimately, these multiple interests increase the costs to the congressman if he supports 
an issue that may displease his constituency.412  
Similarly, another set of political science papers have argued that money impacts 
politicians mainly in technical and specialised topics, because they usually pass off the 
public interest, and scrutiny by uninformed groups is harder due to complexity 
(asymmetry of information).413 
It is hard to tell the extent to which the provisions we discussed in our case study 
are  ‘technical  and  specialised’,  or  technical  enough   to  be   ignored  by   the  public   interest  
and the scrutiny of uninformed groups. However, it seems that the media did not report 
on competition bill n 3937/2004 to a degree that affected public opinion. It would be 
highly unlikely people going to the streets in order to protest in favour of a more or less 
interventionist antitrust law — as, in fact, they did not. Nor was there any significant 
debate about the bill on broadcast, in the press or on social media. Moreover, there are 
no reports of lobbying from interest groups — other than CNI — on the bill. Therefore, 
competition bill n 3937/2004 seems to not fit in the category of bills that were 
significantly  ‘exposed  to  the  public  opinion’. 
                                                             
412 Politicians   seem   to   consider   both   their   donors’   and   voters’   interests  while   voting   in  parliament,  
proposing amendments, and so on. So why would politicians follow donor interests? They follow 
because money usually matters for electoral success, as we will see in the next subsection. Donations 
help politicians to pursue more votes, by enabling the candidate to buy access to the media, 
transportation (the Brazilian states are large geographically), staff, and so on. If this assumption (that 
money matters) is right, there might be two explanations for why politicians would follow their 
donors’   interests. Firstly, politicians are frequently trapped by a repetition game. Thus, if the 
politician wants to get re-elected, or run for another office in the future, he will need money again, in 
order to have a competitive candidacy. A second explanation would be that it might be normal — ie, 
human — to have some sense of gratitude to those who helped you to achieve your goal, which might 
(perhaps  even  psychologically)  influence  the  politician’s  sense  of  public  interest. 
413 For references, see Santos and others, 'Financiamento de Campanha e Apoio Parlamentar à Agenda 
Legislativa da Indústria na Câmara dos Deputados' 41. 
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But humans are complex, and may have different perspectives on the same 
phenomenon. For instance, it is possible that Eugênio thought that the bill was 
sufficiently exposed by the media, and decided that it would be a better strategy to vote 
according to his view of the public interest or  his  voters’  view  of  the public interest. But 
say, on the other hand, that another congressman thought that the bill was not 
sufficiently exposed by the media, and decided it would be a good opportunity to please 
his donors. However, in this case, we still have a problem, since money would have 
impacted the   congressman’s behaviour — I am not discussing here a quid pro quo 
practice, but rather a problem of dependency.  
Finally, it should be noted that although unequal lobbying conditions — such as 
the collective action problem414 — might explain the overall success of bills that concern 
business, it does not explain different behaviours among politicians on a given bill. It 
does  not  explain  why  the  politicians’  proportion  of  convergence  with  business  interests  
correlates with the proportion of money received.  
 
Conclusion 
If we accept the justification of Santos and others for their conflicting results, 
their paper might help to corroborate the hypothesis that corporate money impacted 
congressmen’s  behaviour   in   the   legislative  process  of   competition  bill   n  3937/2004.415 
                                                             
414 So far as the competition bill is concerned, businesses usually have small and organised groups, 
while final consumers are more diffuse. Another possible inequality in lobbying conditions is that 
business usually have more resources than other interest groups to spend on lobbying. See section 1.2. 
415 We  still  do  not  know  how  exactly  the  donation  affects  the  congressmen’s  behaviour  in  Brazil.  Do  
contributions buy more access to the politician? Perhaps the lack of lobbying regulation (and thus 
data) harms the feasibility of empirical studies on this subject. See Mancuso, 'Investimento Eleitoral 
no Brasil: Balanço da Literatura (2001–2012) e Agenda de Pesquisa' 175. In the US, the literature 
suggests that money indeed buys more access to politicians. See Richard L Hasen, Plutocrats United: 
Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American Elections (Yale University 
Press 2016) 54. 
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The context of our case study apparently rejects the influence of other potential factors: 
for instance, the competition bill was not significantly exposed to public opinion. 
 But   even   if   we   discard   Santos   and   others’   article   due   to   its   conflicting  
conclusions, we still have four other papers that found statistically significant 
associations between corporate donations and subsequent political benefits. And those 
statistical studies may help to corroborate the hypothesis that the pattern found in our 
case  study  might  be  either  a  matter  of  corruption  of  the  politician’s  attitude  or  a  matter  
of war chest corruption, which will be analysed in the subsection below. That is, there is 
a  chance  that  either  (i)  politicians’  dependence  on  corporate  donations  helped  business  
to achieve desirable political outcomes, or (ii) the congressmen already had a pro-
business ideology, and, for that reason, they received more corporate donations. 
  
5.4.2. The war chest corruption  
Money matters 
 The other main question that political scientists have asked while studying 
Brazilian political finance is whether money results in votes and electoral victory. 
Perhaps the best conclusion to date is that money is an important factor to win elections, 
but  not  the  only   factor,  since  political  capital  and  ‘candidate  quality’  play  a  significant  
role.416 Money is usually necessary, but not sufficient.417 
                                                             
416 Bruno Speck and Wagner Mancuso, 'Financiamento, Capital Político e Gênero: Um Estudo de 
Determinantes do Desempenho Eleitoral nas Eleições Legislativas Brasileiras de 2010' (2012) 
XXXVI Encontro Anual da ANPOCS, Águas de Lindoia/SP. Daniel Marcelino, 'Sobre Dinheiro e 
Eleições: Um Estudo dos Gastos de Campanha para o Congresso Nacional em 2002 e 2006' 
(Dissertação de Mestrado em Estudos Comparados sobre as Américas, Universidade de Brasília 2010) 
93.  
According to Mancuso, the statistically significant association between money spending and the 
amount or proportion of votes received by candidates in Brazil is one of the most solid findings in the 
literature — for discussion and references, see Mancuso, 'Investimento Eleitoral no Brasil: Balanço da 





The predominance of corporate funding 
As we have seen in chapter three, between the 1994 and 2014 general elections, 
corporations were the chief providers of this essential item (that is, money) for 
candidates.418  
In each of the general elections that occurred during this period, corporate 
donations have accounted for more than at least 62% of Brazilian political party and 
candidate total funding.419 In contrast, no other source (that is, donations from 
individuals, use of own resources or public funding) accounted for more than 20% of the 
parties  and  candidates’  total  funding, during the same period.420  
 All congressmen analysed in our case study were elected during that period: 
senators Agripino and Mercadante in 2002; senator Dorneless and deputy Silvestri in 
2006; and deputy Eugênio in 2010.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
associations between spending and electoral victory — ie, the candidate for Congress ending up being 
elected or re-elected — see, ibid 159. Though all these studies have shown that money matters, there 
is a problem with causation. On one hand the candidates who spend more money on campaigns are 
the ones who get more votes, but on the other hand those who have more political capital (eg, 
leadership  within  a  party  and  loyal  voters)  or  ‘candidate  quality’  (for example, charisma to win votes 
and ability to avoid gaffes) may attract more money. In other words, a candidate wins more votes 
because she received more money, or she receives more money because she can win votes? See 
Wagner   Mancuso,   ‘Fórum   Brasilianas   — Eleições 2012 — Wagner   Pralon’   (Brasilianas, 26 
September 2012) at 10:00 <https://youtu.be/wIsKLFkQLC0> accessed 22 November 2016.  
But   political   capital   or   ‘candidate   quality’   alone   seems   to   be   usually   insufficient   to   win   federal  
legislative elections in Brazil. Very few candidates are successful spending little money. Only those 
who have very strong grassroots (a few left-wing candidates, religious pastors, and so forth) and 
candidates who are in the media (celebrities, broadcasters, and so on) usually win elections with little 
money. Candidates who are celebrities or have strong grassroots are clear exceptions. See Mancuso, 
‘Fórum  Brasilianas.org  — Eleições 2012 — Wagner  Pralon’.   
417 As in the United States, according to Hasen, Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the Supreme 
Court, and the Distortion of American Elections, 42.  
418 Carazza,   ‘Interesses  Econômicos,  Representação  Política   e  Produção  Legislativa  no  Brasil sob a 
Ótica  do  Financiamento  de  Campanhas  Eleitorais’ 48. 
419 See, Carazza, Dinheiro, Eleições e Poder: As Engrenagens do Sistema Político Brasileiro, 43. 
According to calculations from Justice Dias Toffoli, that number would be 65%. See Min Dias 
Toffoli, STF, ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 88. 
420 Carazza,   ‘Interesses  Econômicos,  Representação  Política   e  Produção Legislativa no Brasil sob a 
Ótica  do  Financiamento  de  Campanhas  Eleitorais’ 48. Min Dias Toffoli, STF, ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro 
Teor do Acórdão 88. 
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The concentration of corporate funding on conservative parties and 
their candidates 
Corporate contributions were made mostly to conservative parties and their 
candidates, as empirical studies have found. David Samuels found that candidates from 
left-wing parties received fewer campaign contributions in general and fewer 
contributions from corporations than other candidates/parties in the 1994 and 1998 
elections for the Chamber of Deputies.421 Similarly, Cláudio Weber Abramo found that, 
during the 2010 elections, top-donor companies donated to all parties (from right-wing 
to centre-left parties), except the ones on the hard left.422 This last finding converges 
with  Mancuso   and   others’   finding   that   candidates   of   right-wing parties received more 
corporate donations than those of the left in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies in 
2010.423 There are no studies showing the contrary — that is, that left-wing parties were 
the ones who received more corporate donations in elections for the Congress (or one of 
its Houses), in any election.  
 The imbalance in contributions results in an imbalance in spending. For instance, 
Lemos, Marcelino and Pederiva have found that candidates of parties with conservative 
features (DEM/PFL, PSDB and PMDB) spent much more than candidates of the centre-
left PT and PDT during the 2002 and 2006 elections for Congress.424  
 
 
                                                             
421 David Samuels, 'Money, Elections, and Democracy in Brazil' (2001) 43 Latin American Politics 
and Society Latin American Politics and Society.   
422 Cláudio Weber Abramo, 'As Rotas das Doações Eleitorais' (2014) Transparência Brasil 2. 
423 Wagner Mancuso and others, 'Corporate Dependence in Brazil's 2010 Elections for Federal 
Deputy' (2016) 10 Brazilian Political Science Review.  
424 Leany Barreiro Lemos, Daniel Marcelino and João Henrique Pederiva, 'Porque Dinheiro Importa: 
A Dinâmica das Contribuições Eleitorais para o Congresso Nacional em 2002 e 2006' (2010) 16 
Opinião Pública 366 389. 
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The limitations of the statistical studies  
Although the empirical studies have demonstrated an imbalance in the electoral 
competition, as far as I am aware no statistical study has unquestionably shown the 
occurrence of war chest corruption: that is, proven that political advertisements paid 
with corporate money indeed influenced the behaviour of voters.  
Moreover, as far as I am concerned, there are no statistical studies confirming 
that the politician’s   ideology, when considered individually, affects his performance 
(particularly in the proposal of amendments, which is what concerns us here). For 
instance,   although   the   article   from   Santos   and   others   found   that   the   ‘rightmost   the  
congressman is placed on the ideological spectrum, the more likely he will cooperate 
with  the  interests  of  the  CNI  in  the  nominal  voting’;;  they  determined  the  ideology  of  the  
politician based on his party.425 In this aspect, their article has little to further inform our 
case study — in fact, we have shown that senator Mercadante and deputy Eugênio were 
both   from   the   Workers’   Party   and   yet   had   different   attitudes   when   proposing  
amendments.426 The finding from Santos and others may only be helpful to us when 
trying to understand why the amendments have passed. That is, it may help to explain 
the distribution of power within Congress that made it possible to pass the amendments: 
if more left-wing parties had more seats, perhaps the amendments would not have 
passed.  
                                                             
425 Santos and others, 'Financiamento de Campanha e Apoio Parlamentar à Agenda Legislativa da 
Indústria na Câmara dos Deputados' 49. The ideological positioning of the deputies in the left-right 
scale was based on data from Power and Zucco, which measured the average ideology of the political 
parties. The scale goes from 1 to 10, being completely left the parliamentary position 1 and fully right 
parliamentary at position 10. Ibid 45.  For  Power  and  Zucco’s  methodology  and  data,   see  Timothy J 
Power and Cesar Zucco, 'Elite Preferences in a Consolidating Democracy: The Brazilian Legislative 
Surveys, 1990–2009' (2012) 54 Latin American Politics and Society 1.  
426 In this way, Graziella Testa argues that congressmen seem to have more freedom to act in the 
committees (when proposing or rejecting an amendment) than in the plenary of the houses, where 
they are more constrained by the orders of the party leaders on how to vote towards a bill. See 
Politiquês Nexo Jornal podcast,  ‘A  importância  das  comissões  temáticas  no  Congresso’  (17  February  
2019) <https://www.nexojornal.com.br/podcast/2019/02/17/A-import%C3%A2ncia-das-




 In sum, between the 1994 and 2014 general elections, companies hugely 
impacted the level playing field of political competition, to benefit candidates and 
parties that were ideologically aligned with business interests. Thus, the congressmen 
who participated in the lawmaking of competition bill n 3937/2004 were elected through 
competitions that had been imbalanced by corporate donations.  
 It is difficult to prove that this imbalance has impacted the results of the 
elections. As far as I am aware, no statistical study has done it so far. Thus, war chest 
corruption is apparent. Moreover, there are no statistical studies confirming the intuitive 
perception that ideology affects the behaviour of congressmen while proposing 
amendments, which is what concerns us. 
That said, although we cannot affirm that the apparent war chest corruption 
explains the pattern we have found, we cannot rule it out either.  
 
5.4.3. The possibility of coincidence  
We should also consider if the pattern found in our case study could be 
explained by coincidence. For instance, those congressmen might have coincidentally 
favoured corporations because of the privileged position that companies hold in 
capitalist democracies. More specifically, they might have favoured business because 
they believe in the key role that corporations have in generating jobs, promoting growth, 
controlling inflation, generating production, tax revenues, and so on.427 
There might be two main arguments to reject this possibility. 
                                                             
427 For a brief discussion of the privileged position that companies possess in capitalist democracies, 
see chapter one. 
145 
 
Firstly, there might be a pattern on the concern with companies. As Charles 
Lindblom  pointed  out,   ‘clearly  businessmen  have  commonly  demanded  of  government  
more indulgences than are actually necessary  to  motivate   their  required  performances’;;  
and   ‘as   some   of   these   indulgences   have   been   taken   away,   their   performance   has   not  
faltered’.428 In this sense, most business requests are quite controversial.429 And ideology 
plays a key role in solving those controversies — that is, if the business demands are 
plausible or not. 
The matters amended in our case study fall in this grey area: it is very 
controversial whether antitrust legislation should consider exclusive-dealing agreements 
as being anticompetitive, and what the fines for cartel and abuse of dominant cases 
should be.  
Perhaps  our  intuition  tells  us  that,  the  rightmost  the  congressman’s  ideology,  the  
more pro-business he tends to be; although, as mentioned in the previous subsection, 
there are no empirical studies confirming that the ideology of the politician (when 
considered the ideology of the politician individually and not the ideology of his party), 
affects his attitude towards bills that concern corporations.  
Secondly, another argument to try to reject the possibility of coincidence is the 
fact that the pattern found in our case study is aligned with the finding from Santos and 
others that the higher the proportion of resources from companies, the greater the 
cooperation of the deputies in matters of interest to the industry.430 This finding from 
Santos and others is statistically significant (although not all models applied by the 
                                                             
428 Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems, 177. 
429 Some business requests might be more controversial than others. For instance, if a business 
organisation currently requests a complete absence of antitrust legislation, as the Trade Association of 
São Paulo did in 1961, very few would think that the demand is plausible. By contrast, regulating the 
abuse of dominant position practices is typically very controversial.  
430 Santos and others, 'Financiamento de Campanha e Apoio Parlamentar à Agenda Legislativa da 
Indústria na Câmara dos Deputados'. 
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authors have confirmed it). Due to the similarity between the conclusion of our case 
study and the conclusion of Santos and others, this might be an indication that our 
finding is not a matter of coincidence.  
That said, this second argument also does not rule out the alternative of mere 
coincidence, because the correlation found in our case study cannot be submitted to 
statistical scrutiny. 
 
5.4.4. The nature of the houses of Congress 
 Finally, one could argue that the different pattern between deputies (Eugênio and 
Silvestri) and senators (Mercadante, Dornelles, and Agripino) can be explained by the 
nature of their houses. Historically, the Senate is the legislative house that has had a 
‘moderator’  role  (senators have an eight-year mandate, and its renewal is alternated, thus 
only half of the Senate is renewed every four years), in order to block abrupt turns that 
may occur through a radical change in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, 
which renews all its members every four years.431  
 Nonetheless, competition bill n 3937/2004 was not introducing any sudden 
change to the law so far as the provisions regarding anticompetitive acts were 
concerned.  
Firstly, the Competition Act 1994 already had established the maximum fine for 
anticompetitive acts as 30% of the total revenues of the company, excluding taxes, in the 
previous year to the filing of the lawsuit. Thus, competition bill n 3937/2004 was not 
introducing any innovation in this aspect, before Dornelles proposed his amendment to 
                                                             
431 José Luiz Quadros de Magalhães, 'Bicameralismo e Unicameralismo' Doutrina Programa de Pós-
Graduação em Direito UFRGS.  
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reduce the maximum fine to 20% of the gross sales obtained in the field of the business 
activity on which the infringement took place in the latest financial year. 
Secondly, exclusive-dealing agreements have repeatedly been condemned by 
Cade since 1999, with the competition authority applying the rule of reason in each 
case.432 And competition bill n 3937/2004 was doing nothing more than translating that 
consolidated procedure into the text of the legislation.433 Therefore, the competition bill 
was not introducing any de facto novelty, before Agripino excluded the practice from 
the list of anticompetitive infractions. 
Thus, senators Dornelles and Agripino were not preserving the status quo (in 
fact, Dornelles even changed the status quo). Therefore, the pattern found cannot be 
explained by the nature of their houses.  




                                                             
432 Processo Administrativo n° 08000.018480/97-28, Rel Cons Mércio Felsky 
<http://anexos.radaroficial.com.br/b935345fe8aeee7f523483837f8bd83a.pdf> Accessed 22 November 
2016. Cade condemned exclusive-dealing practices in several cases. For instance, cases regarding 
Unimed,  a  physicians’  cooperative  and  one  of  the  largest  health  insurance  companies  in  Brazil;;  those 
which involved   ‘radius   clauses’   imposed   by   shopping   centres   on   their   tenants   (for   example,   the  
decision on the Processo Administrativo n° 08012.006636/1997-43, in 2007); and most famously the 
condemnation   of   AmBev,   Brazil’s   largest   beer   producer   with   a   70%   of   market share, in 2009, 
imposing a record fine of R$ 352m — ie, around £73m, (Processo Administrativo n° 
08012.003805/2004-10). For a discussion about this topic, see Ana Paula Martinez, 'Abuse of 
Dominance: The Third Wave of Brazil's Antitrust Enforcement' (2013) 9 Competition Law 
International 169 172. 
433 It  is  true  that,  although  Agripino’s  amendment  had  full  impact  on  the  Competition  Act,  it  may  have  
little impact on the enforcement of the legislation, since the list of anticompetitive practices in the Act 
is not fully comprehensive, and Cade can condemn any practice (even if not listed) that has as an 
objective or may have the following effects, in spite of having been achieved: (i) limit, restrain or in 
any way injure free competition or free initiative; (ii) control the relevant market of goods or services; 
(iii) arbitrarily increase profits; or (iv) exercise a dominant position abusively. This procedure was 
already established in the Competition Act 1994, which enabled Cade to condemn exclusive-dealing 
practices in several cases. 
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5.4.5. Conclusion of the section 
In sum, I have argued that we cannot rule out the possibility that the pattern 
found in our case study was a matter of coincidence. However, we also cannot discard 
the  possibility  that  it  was  a  matter  of  corruption  of  the  congressmen’s  attitude  or  of  war  
chest corruption.  
 
5.5. Conclusion of the chapter 
I tried to show that, throughout Brazilian history, business organisations have 
constantly lobbied against what they viewed as excessive interventions of antitrust bills. 
This has been the hegemonic business’   lobbying,  as  far  as  the  documentation  collected  
for this chapter showed us. 
 The CNI, which is the largest and most important Brazilian business association, 
continued this lobbying tradition during the legislative process of the antitrust bill that 
resulted  in  the  enactment  of  the  Competition  Act  2011.  And,  in  accordance  with  CNI’s  
lobbying, the more money an elected congressman received from companies that had 
been a defendant in an antitrust case, the more he tended to be concerned about 
excessively punishing companies when proposing or rejecting amendments on issues 
that involved the list of anticompetitive practices and the fines for anticompetitive 
practices. These amendments shaped the text of the Competition Act 2011. 
 Yet the correlation found may be a matter of coincidence because it could not be 
scrutinised through statistics.  
Surely the data showed here also does not authorise us to make any claim about 
causation.   In   other   words,   I   am   not   claiming   that   corporate   donations   ‘bought’   the  
above-mentioned amendments.  
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 Nevertheless, I ask: did the data shown here undermine our ability to believe that 
corporate donations had nothing to do with a less interventionist Competition Act 2011? 
In  my  view,  the  answer  is  ‘yes’,  because  of  the  possibility  that dependence or war chest 
corruption might explain the pattern found. This harms the confidence we have in the 
democratic integrity of one of the elements of Brazilian capitalism, that is, antitrust 
legislation. 
Corporate donations may affect not only the enactment of legislation, but also its 






The repercussion of elections on antitrust enforcement 
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
The year was 1971 and president Richard Nixon was at the White House 
speaking with Charles Colson, his special counsel, about the negative coverage that the 
main television broadcasters in the United States (ABC, NBC and CBS) were giving to 
his administration. During the conversation, Nixon argues that his administration should 
threaten the broadcasters with an antitrust suit to make the coverage more favourable: 
 
If the threat of screwing them is going to help us more with their 
programming than doing it, then keep the threat ... Our gain is more 
important   than   the   economic   gain.   We   don’t   give   a   goddam   about   the  
economic gain. Our game here is solely political ... As far as screwing them 
is concerned, I'm very glad to do it.434 
 
That same year, president Nixon allegedly attempted to settle an antitrust case 
involving the International Telephone & Telegraph Co (ITT) in exchange for campaign 
                                                             
434 Walter   Pincus   and   George   Lardner   Jr,   ‘Nixon   Hoped   Antitrust   Threat   Would   Sway   Network  
Coverage’,  Washington Post Staff Writers (1 December 1997) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/nixon/120197tapes.htm> accessed 16 February 2018. See brief comments about 
the case in Ariel Ezrachi, 'Sponge' (2017) 5 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 49 56.  
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finance contributions.435 But Nixon was not the only American president who reportedly 
attempted to use antitrust enforcement as a bargaining chip to gain resources for political 
competition: president Lyndon Johnson, for instance, allegedly promised DOJ 
(Department of Justice) clearance   to   a  merger   in   exchange   for   a   newspaper’s   political  
support.436  
Attempts to use antitrust enforcement for political purposes are surely not 
exclusive to American antitrust history. This has happened in Europe.437 And also in 
Brazil, as it will be seen throughout this chapter.  
 In the last chapter, we have discussed if political finance has impacted the 
lawmaking of the Brazilian Competition Act of 2011.438 This chapter will discuss 
whether corporate donations have affected the enforcement of antitrust legislation. I will 
                                                             
435 George  Lardner  Jr,   ‘On   tape,  Nixon  outlines  1971  'deal'   to   settle  antitrust  case  against   ITT’,  The 
Washington Post (4 January 1997) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/01/04/on-
tape-nixon-outlines-1971-deal-to-settle-antitrust-case-against-itt/246628a9-8abf-47f3-80ec-
379569e0f350/?utm_term=.2a517172ea4d> accessed 16 February 2018.  All  of  Nixon’s  conversations  
were recorded by an internal White House tape which later became public. 
436 For a brief discussion of that case and other records of political pressures on American antitrust 
enforcement, see Steven C Salop, 'What Consensus? Why Ideology and Elections Still Matter to 
Antitrust' (2014) 79 Antitrust Law Journal 601 637. For a comprehensive analysis of the influence of 
American presidents on the DOJ, see James F Rill and Stacy L Turner, 'Presidents Practicing 
Antitrust: Where to Draw the Line?' (2014) 79 Antitrust Law Journal 577. 
437 For instance, writing about European competition law, Maier-Rigaud   argued   that   ‘no   attentive  
observer or competition practitioner either on the side of an authority or defending clients is able to 
overlook the highly political nature of  large  antitrust  and  merger  cases’.  Frank P Maier-Rigaud, 'On 
the Normative Foundations of Competition Law: Efficiency, Political Freedom and the Freedom to 
Compete', The Goals of Competition Law (ASCOLA Competition Law Series, Edward Elgar 2012) 
167. In this sense, the then-commissioner Mario Monti for the Directorate-General for Competition 
reportedly said that one of his prime functions was to protect the merger task force from political 
pressure. Alec Burnside, 'GE, Honey, I Sunk the Merger' (2002) 23 European Competition Law 
Review 107. For reported examples of interference with the independent functioning of European 
National Competition Authorities (NCAs) on anticompetitive conduct cases, see European 
Commission,   Commission   Staff   Working   Document,   ‘Impact   Assessment   — Accompanying the 
document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning   of   the   internal   market’   SWD   (2017)   114,   26  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/impact_assessment_report_en.pdf> accessed 16 February 
2018. 
438 Lei nº 12529/2011. 
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focus primarily on Cade, the Brazilian competition authority, which is an independent 
government agency.439  
The first section will address how political finance might impact antitrust 
enforcement due to the democratic controls on Cade. To influence antitrust enforcement, 
elected politicians do not necessarily have to contact or exert pressure on  Cade’s  officers 
— I will argue that the Presidency of the Republic and the Congress have channels to 
influence  antitrust  enforcement  because  Cade’s  powers  are  under  democratic  controls.   
Subsequently, section 6.3 will explore situations in which elected politicians 
approach   Cade’s   officers.   In   this   sense,   it   will   discuss   the   potential   impact   of   the  
campaign finance over the pressure or contact made by politicians on the competition 
agency.  
Since a few large corporate donors have dominated donations in the Brazilian 
federal elections,440 it is inescapable to take a closer look at how politicians have 
attempted to influence the antitrust enforcement of cases of their interests. Because the 
attempt to influence antitrust enforcement frequently involves not only a single 
company, but also a whole sector, I will focus on the five main economic sectors in 
terms of donations. This will be done in the last section of the chapter, 6.4. 
I must say that I had good and bad luck while researching this chapter. To better 
understand the political pressure on Cade, I had the idea of submitting an anonymous 
survey  to  Cade’s  former  commissioners  and,  thus,  I  asked  for  the  approval  of  the  King’s  
College London Law Research Ethics Subcommittee on 27 February 2017, which was 
granted on 8 May 2017.441 However, nine days later on 17 May 2017, a massive quid 
                                                             
439 Lei nº 12529/2011, artigo 4. 
440 See footnote 530. 
441 REC Reference Number: HR-16/17-2546. See the appendix, to see the questionnaire and 
information sheet sent to former commissioners. 
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pro quo corruption scandal broke out, in which the president of the republic Michel 
Temer and a member of his staff, contacted and arguably influenced a few of Cade’s  
top-officers.442 The scandal had great repercussion within the media, audio recordings of 
conversations between   the   politicians   and   Cade’s   officers   were   revealed,   and   the  
president of the republic Michel Temer ended up being charged with quid pro quo 
corruption.443 Consequently, perhaps there could be no worse time to submit a survey to 
former commissioners asking about political pressure. That said, even after the scandal, 
and even bearing in mind that the willingness to disclose information about this sensitive 
topic may be naturally low, one in four respondents has answered the survey — ten out 
of the 39 former commissioners to whom I sent it.444  
The aim of the survey was not to draw any conclusive estimate of the frequency 
of political pressure on Cade, or make any other kind of statistical analysis; but rather 
just to hear reports from some of the former commissioners about their experiences 
while holding office, in order to qualitatively improve discussions as to how political 
pressure over Cade might work in practice. For this reason I have used the information 
provided by former commissioners only where appropriate, to ground some of the 
discussions in this thesis — see pages 166, 174, 175, 176, 177, 184 and 243. As the 
survey was designed to protect respondent anonymity because of the sensitive nature of 
the topic, I will identify the commissioners with numbers according to the order of their 
                                                             
442 G1/Jornal Nacional,   ‘Dono   da   JBS   grava   conversa   com  Michel  Temer,   diz  O  Globo’   (17  May  
2017) <http://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2017/05/dono-da-jbs-grava-conversa-com-michel-
temer-diz-o-globo.html> accessed 16 February 2018.  
443 The decision on the accusation is pending as of June 2018. Due to political reasons, the Congress 
decided  to  suspend  the  accusation  until  the  end  of  Temer’s  term,  when  the  case  is  going  to  be  sent  to  a  
judge. See subsection 6.4.5 for a discussion of the case. 
444 I have tried to contact by e-mail all former chairmen and commissioners who were appointed and 
approved to Cade between 1994 and July 2012. The following four former commissioners have 
passed away: Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho, Leonidas Rangel Xausa, Miguel Tebar Barrionuevo 
and Luiz Fernando Schuartz. Moreover, I could not find e-mail or other contact information of the 
five following former commissioners: Marcelo Monteiro Soares, Edgard Lincoln de Proença Rosa, 
Antonio Carlos Fonseca da Silva, Paulo Dyrceu Pinheiro and Mércio Felsky. The remaining 39 
former commissioners were all contacted.  
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appearance in the thesis — for  example,   ‘anonymous former commissioner 1’,  and  so  
forth. To further protect their identity, I will also not quote their responses verbatim.   
The former commissioners’  survey responses are only one of many sources that 
will be used throughout this chapter. In addition to the survey, it will also be consulted 
Pedro  Dutra’s  book  ‘Conversando com o CADE’445 and  Pedro  Zanotta’s  ‘Conversando 
com  o  CADE…e  com  a  SDE’,446 which contain interviews with former commissioners 
and high-ranking Cade officers; academic books and articles about the politics of 
competition   law,   such   as   William   Kovacic’s   paper   ‘Competition   agencies,  
independence,  and  the  political  process’;;  news  articles; legislation; and court and Cade 
records.  
Lastly, I shall clarify: when I use the term commissioner throughout this chapter, 
I  am  referring  to  all  members  of  Cade’s  board,  including  its  chairman.  Although  Cade’s  
board is technically composed of one chairman and six commissioners, I will use the 
term  ‘commissioner’  generically to enhance the reading of this chapter. What is relevant 
for this chapter is the fact that the commissioners and chairman together compose 
Cade’s board and, therefore, have a final say on the agency’s  cases.447 Also, to improve 
the reading of the chapter, I will use   the   pronoun   ‘he’   for all anonymous former 
commissioners, though they may be male or female.448  
 
                                                             
445 Pedro Dutra, Conversando com o CADE (Singular 2009). 
446 Pedro Zanotta, Conversando com o CADE...e com a SDE (Singular 2017). 
447 All members have the same voting rights but, in case of a draw, the chairman has an extra vote. 
Nonetheless,  the  chairman’s  casting  vote  is  rarely  necessary.   
448 Female representation  within  Cade’s  board  has followed the sad, old patriarchal cliché. Of the 39 
former commissioners I reached, only five were women.  
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6.2. The impact of political finance on the democratic controls on Cade 
As argued by Bill Kovacic, no strong competition agency around the globe will 
likely be entirely insulated from the political process.449 As he puts it,  
 
It is difficult to imagine that a jurisdiction would give broad powers to a 
competition agency — for example, to gather business records, to review 
a wide range of business behaviour, and to impose strong sanctions — 
without also creating some mechanisms that press the agency to exercise 
its  powers  in  ways  that  serve  society’s  interests.450  
 
 Therefore, channels of political influence451 will inevitably exist in most 
jurisdictions — even   in   the   case   of   competition   agencies   created   as   ‘a   stand-alone 
commission’ and if ‘its  members  have  tenured  appointments’.452 
What are the channels of political influence within Brazilian legislation then? 
The first and most obvious one is lawmaking. But we have already discussed that in the 
previous chapter. Our main concern here is, once the legislation is already set, could 
political finance impact how this legislation is enforced.  
                                                             
449 William E Kovacic, 'Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process' in Josef 
Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber and Rupprecht Podszun (eds), Competition Policy and the Economic 
Approach: Foundations and Limitations (Edward Elgar 2011) 299. For an in-depth discussion of 
arguments in favour and against the independence of European national competition authorities 
towards political interference, see chapter 3 at Christopher Townley, A Framework for European 
Competition Law: Co-ordinated Diversity (Bloomsbury Publishing 2018).  
450 Under   this   view,   the   ‘more   insulated   the   competition   agency   is   from   the   political   process,   the  
narrower  will  be  the  powers  that  a  legislature  is  likely  to  entrust  to  the  agency’.  Kovacic, 'Competition 
Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process' 303. 
451 Kovacic  calls  these  channels  as  ‘pressure  points’.  I  will  not  use  this  term  because  for  the  purposes  
of this chapter I will  call  pressure  a  contact  made  by  a  politician  to  influence  Cade’s  enforcement  in  
which there is a promise or threat. See subsection 6.3.1. 
452 Kovacic, 'Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process' 299. 
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In this perspective, there are two main channels of political influence within the 
Brazilian legal framework. The Presidency of the Republic and the Congress may 
influence the enforcement of the legislation (i) through the appointment process, and (ii) 
by setting the budget and human resources of the agency. In addition to these channels 
of political influence, I will argue that the prerogative of the Presidency of the Republic 
and   the  Congress   to  extend  or  diminish   the  agency’s  power   through   the  approval   of   a  
bill, may be a natural and tacit restraint on Cade’s   decision-making. Consequently, 
elections could also impact the antitrust enforcement through this subtler channel.  
 It is true that elected politicians have also tried to impact antitrust enforcement 
through three other exotic methods: (i) President Fernando Henrique Cardoso tried to 
grant an antitrust immunity to the financial sector, by approving an opinion of the 
attorney general of Brazil;;   (ii)   Cardoso’s   minister   of   justice   once   accepted   a  
hierarchical appeal to cancel a decision of Cade; and (iii) Congress has threatened to 
enact a legislative decree to cancel a decision of Cade. But I will not focus on these 
instruments in this section because they were either only a threat (the legislative decree), 
were ineffective (hierarchical appeal), or their constitutionality and legality are subject 
to a   quite   controversial   judicial   discussion   (the   president’s   approval   of   the   attorney  
general’s   opinion). In any event, those exotic instruments will be discussed in section 
6.4.  
 
6.2.1. The appointment process  
 To address this first channel of influence, firstly I will explain which 
antitrust enforcement positions politicians can appoint; and, subsequently, what roles 
these positions have in enforcing legislation. Next, I consider whether empirical 
evidence affirms that   the   ideology  of  Cade’s  enforcers  indeed   impacts  the  enforcement  
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of the legislation. I conclude by discussing whether the corruption of elections has 
impacted the democratic integrity of antitrust enforcement, through this channel of 
influence.  
 
The appointment processes 
Elected politicians are empowered to appoint and confirm three crucial positions 
in antitrust  enforcement:  (a)  the  Cade’s  general  superintendent;;  (b)  the  Cade’s  chairman  
and the six commissioners, who compose the tribunal of the competition agency; and (c) 
the judges of the appellate and superior federal courts, who may eventually hear cases 
when there is a judicial review of Cade decisions.453 
The  Presidency  of  the  Republic  gets  to  appoint  Cade’s  chairman,  commissioners 
and general superintendent. And the Senate has the power to confirm the nominations.454 
The chairman and the commissioners have a four years tenure, with no option of renewal 
(until 2012, they had a two-year tenure, which could be renewed once). And the general 
superintendent has a two-year term, which can be renewed once. They all may only be 
removed by a decision of the Senate upon request of the President of the Republic, or in 
view   of   ‘an   undisputable   criminal   conviction   for   intentional   crimes, or disciplinary 
proceeding as determined by Law No 8112, of December 11th, 1990 and Law No 8429, 
of  June  2nd,  1992’,  or  due   to  a  violation  of  prohibitions455 during the exercise of their 
                                                             
453 In Brazil, cartels are not only an administrative offence but also a crime, which is heard by the 
judiciary. However, in practice, the criminal enforcement of cartels through the judiciary has been 
much less intense than antitrust enforcement through Cade.  
454 Lei nº 12529/2011, artigo 6. In the former Competition Act 1994, the appointment process was 
established in article 4. Lei nº 8884/1994. 
455 The chairman, commissioners and the superintendent are prohibited from practicing several 
activities, such as receiving fees; engaging in the practice of other professional service; holding 
interest, as a controller, director, manager, or agent, on corporations or companies of any kind; acting 
as a consultant in any type of company; state, by any means of communication, an opinion on cases 
pending trial; and exercising political party activities. Lei nº 12529/2011, artigos 8 e 13, parágrafo 3. 
Lei nº 8884/1994, artigo 6. 
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mandate. As far as I am aware, no chairman, commissioner or superintendent has been 
removed since 1994, when the first de facto antitrust legislation was enacted.456   
Although   the   antitrust   officers’  mandates   are   not   coincident,   each president of 
the republic gets to appoint and the Senate gets to confirm all the above-mentioned 
antitrust positions in a four-year timeframe, that is, during a legislature.  
 The judiciary is apparently less vulnerable to political influence. All lower court 
judges are nominated after tough entrance examinations largely insulated from the 
influence of the political bodies. The political branches have a relative influence on the 
composition of the appellate federal courts457 and the Superior Tribunal Court (STJ), 
which is the highest court of appeal on non-constitutional issues: The president of the 
republic gets to choose the nomination from a list of three candidates which is sent by 
the courts themselves.458 Afterwards,  the  Senate  gets  to  approve  the  president’s  choice. 
Political influence on the composition of the Supreme Court (STF), which is the highest 
court of appeal for cases which discuss constitutional matters, is greater:459 the president 
of the republic is free to choose his nomination for the STF, which must be approved by 





                                                             
456 For an account of the evolution of the Brazilian antitrust legislation, see chapter five.  
457 That is, the Regional Federal Courts (TRFs) and the Tribunal of Justice of Federal District in 
Brasília. 
458 The list is formed of the three candidates who received the most votes in the plenary of the court 
(all judges that sit on the court get to vote).  
459 The Supreme Court also has the authority to discuss non-appeal cases, such as the direct 
unconstitutionality action (ADI), which is a lawsuit filed to declare that legislation is contrary to the 
Constitution, and regular criminal offences committed by public authorities such as the president of 
the republic. Nonetheless, those kinds of cases are not relevant to our analysis in this chapter.  
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A brief introduction to the structure of Brazilian antitrust enforcement  
 Before discussing whether political finance has impacted the composition of 
antitrust enforcers, a little background information is needed to define who are they and 
what are their roles. 
Cade’s  general  superintendent  is  the  gatekeeper:  he  has  the  power  to   investigate 
and to instruct antitrust cases. If the General Superintendence issues an opinion 
recommending the approval without conditions of a merger and no commissioner 
manifests the opinion   that   the  case  should  be   analysed  by  Cade’s   tribunal,   the  general 
superintendent’s  decision will be legally considered the final decision of the agency.460  
The general   superintendent’s   power is also significant when it comes to 
anticompetitive conduct cases, that is, cartel and unilateral anticompetitive conduct 
cases. Since the deadlines to close an anticompetitive conduct case (article 46 of the 
Competition Act 2011) are much longer than those for mergers (article 88, item II, 
paragraph 2, and paragraph 9), the General Superintendence has more discretion to 
decide when a given anticompetitive case will   make   it   to   the   competition   agency’s  
tribunal. 
Until 2012, this power to investigate and to instruct cases concerning 
anticompetitive conduct was granted to the Secretariat of Economic Law, SDE (acronym 
in Portuguese for Secretaria de Direito Econômico) of the Ministry of Justice.461 
Considering that the head of the SDE did not have a tenure and, therefore, could be fired 
anytime by the minister of justice,   many   have   questioned   how   political   were   SDE’s  
decisions. For instance, Neide Mallard, former commissioner of Cade, said that she 
declined an invitation to become the head of the SDE because  she  ‘knew  the  difficulties  
                                                             
460 Lei nº 12529/2011, artigo 65, inciso II.  
461 Lei nº 8884/1994, artigo 14.  
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of effectively enforcing anticompetitive practices when there is no hierarchical 
independence  and  autonomy  to  make  decisions’.462  
Indeed, the lack of formal decision-making autonomy has prevented SDE from 
investigating certain matters: for example, the Secretariat refused to investigate a case in 
the banking sector, claiming that, as a body of the direct public administration, it was 
bound by an opinion of the Attorney General Office which gave antitrust immunity to 
that economic sector.463 Ambiguously, however, the SDE did oppose the government’s  
opinion in a few cases.464 Although it is unclear what level of dependence SDE had from 
the government in practice,465 the fact that the Secretary did not have formal decision-
making autonomy certainly did not enhance its insulation from political influence.  
Cade’s tribunal, in turn, has the final  say  on  all  the  agency’s  cases — even when 
the General Superintendence decides to dismiss a merger or conduct case, the 
commissioners have the power to ask for a hearing of the case in the tribunal.466 
                                                             
462 Neide Terezinha Mallard, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 41.  
463 Processo Administrativo n° 08700.003070/2010-14. See subsection 6.4.3.  
464 The case regarding the merger between Brahma and Antarctica, the two largest Brazilian brewery 
companies,  is  an  example.  Although  Cardoso’s  ministers  and  the  head  of  the  ruling  Brazilian  Social  
Democracy   Party’s   reportedly   contacted   the   Cade’s   chairman   Gesner   Oliveira   arguing   for   a   non-
interventionist clearance of the merger (see subsection 6.4.2), SDE issued an opinion for a quite 
strong intervention: the merger should be cleared with the condition that the companies sell the brand 
and assets of Skol, Brahma or Antarctica beers, which were the three most popular Brazilian beers at 
the   time.  The  SDE’s  opinion  was  similar   to   the  one   issued  by   the  SEAE  (Secretariat   for  Economic  
Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance), who advocated for the sale of the brand and assets of Skol, 
which was the most popular Brazilian beer at the time. Ato de Concentração n° 08012.005846/1999-
12. For reports about situations when, despite the intuitional vulnerability of the Secretary, the 
Minister of Justice assured the autonomy of the Secretariat in practice, see Arthur Badin, 'Entrevista' 
in Pedro Zanotta (ed), Conversando  com  o  CADE…e  com  a  SDE,  49; Barbara Rosenberg, 'Entrevista' 
in Pedro Zanotta (ed), Conversando  com  o  CADE…e  com  a  SDE, 208. 
465 As  noted   by  Kovacic,   ‘a variety of informal customs, norms, and habits can either increase or 
decrease the amount of independence that formal organisational structures and operating procedures 
might   indicate’.   Kovacic, 'Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process' 297. 
Moreover, the level of independence at the time might have varied according to who occupied the 
head of the Secretariat and according to who was the head of the Ministry of Justice.  
466 Lei nº 12529/2011, artigo 65, inciso II (with respect to merger cases). Lei nº 12529/2011, artigo 
67, parágrafo 1o (with respect to investigations regarding anticompetitive conducts). When an 
investigation is concluded with respect to anticompetitive conduct, and the General Superintendence 
of Cade opens a formal administrative proceeding but eventually decides to dismiss it, the case will 
be automatically sent to the analyses of Cade tribunal. Lei nº 12529/2011, artigo 13, inciso VII. Under 
the former Competition Act 1994, all mergers and conduct cases were automatically sent to the 
analyses of Cade tribunal, after the SDE issued its opinion. 
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Therefore, the commissioners in Cade tribunal have the power to have the final say on 
whether to clear a merger; and deliberate on whether to impose fines in cases involving 
anticompetitive  practices.  The  competition  agency’s  final  decision  is  dispersed  between 
seven commissioners (including the chairman) — at least three of them are required to 
deliberate on a case. This dispersal of decision-making may turn political influence more 
difficult, as illustrated by an audio recording revealed during the JBS scandal, in which 
the   politician   Rodrigo   Loures   said   to   businessman   Joesley   Batista   that   ‘what   matters  
there  [at  Cade]  is  the  number  of  votes  that  are  sufficient  to  be  able  to  approve  things’.467 
 Cade’s   decisions   can   be   potentially   reviewed   by   the   judiciary,   which is 
apparently less vulnerable to political influence, as we have just seen. Although the ratio 
of  Cade’s  decisions  that  are  changed  by  the   judiciary is subject to debate,468 it is a fact 





                                                             
467 Julia   Affonso   and   Luiz   Vassallo,   “Aliado   de   Temer   sugeriu   a   Joesley   dar   ‘missão’   para   testar  
presidente   do   Cade”   O Estado de S. Paulo (27 May 2017) < 
http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/aliado-de-temer-sugeriu-a-joesley-dar-missao-
para-testar-presidente-do-cade/> accessed 16 February 2018. 
468 For example, after analysing judicial verdicts in 2006 and 2007 on Cade decisions taken between 
1999 and 2007, Caroline Viera concluded that most decisions of the agency were upheld by the 
judiciary. Caroline Sanselme Vieira, 'CADE X Judiciário: estudo sobre a revisão judicial das decisões 
do CADE no contexto da globalização' (Dissertação de Mestrado em Direito, Pontifícia Universidade 
Católica de São Paulo — PUC/SP 2008). By contrast, a study co-authored by Cade, the research 
think-thank Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Público (SBDP) and the Federação das Indústrias do 
Estado de São   Paulo   (FIESP)   has   found   mixed   results   on   the   judiciary’s   verdicts   about   Cade’s  
decisions that were taken between 1994 and 2000. Fabrício Antonio Cardim de Almeida (editor), 
Revisão Judicial das Decisões do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE): Pesquisa 
empírica e aplicada sobre os casos julgados pelos Tribunais Regionais Federais (TRFs), Superior 
Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) e Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) (Fórum 2011) (as cited in Andréia 
Henriques,   ‘Para   Badin,   Justiça   é   "loteria"   ao   definir   decisões   do   Cade’   DCI — Diário Comércio 
Indústria e Serviços (8 November 2010) <https://www.dci.com.br/servicos/para-badin-justica-e-















Figure 6.1. The structure of Brazilian antitrust enforcement 
 
 
That   said,   this   does   not   reduce  Cade’s   importance,   as   firms   certainly   seem   to  
have an interest in closing cases in  the  agency’s  sphere.  Firstly,   if  a company wants to 
prosecute another firm for unilateral abuse of dominance, it has no option but to a file a 
case at Cade, since this violation is exclusively established by the Competition Act, and 
the competition agency has exclusive authority to enforce its provisions (it had in the 
1994 Act, and it has in the 2011 one). Likewise, if a merger meets the thresholds for 
antitrust analyses, merger firms are obligated to file a case at Cade to obtain legal 
clearance. 
Secondly, firms might want to avoid a damaging litigation dispute in court 
following a Cade decision, be it in a merger, cartel or abuse of dominance case. The 
Superintendence of Cade 
(investigation and instruction of cases) 
Tribunal of Cade 
(last say on all antitrust cases within the agency) 
Judiciary 
 (can  potentially  review  Cade’s  decisions,  although  




competition  agency’s  decisions  are  extrajudicial  enforcement  instruments,  as  established  
by   article   93   of   the   Competition   Act   2011.   As   such,   according   to   Caroline   Viera’s  
research, the judiciary has usually ruled that a decision from Cade has a presumption of 
legitimacy and self-enforceability, and therefore should be reformed by the judiciary 
only  when  there  is  unequivocal  and  concrete  evidence  of  Cade’s  illegality.469  
Thirdly, companies might want to prevent the rise of other potential lawsuits 
analogous to a Cade case, such as a criminal investigation in a cartel case and/or a 
lawsuit concerning potential damages. Although these proceedings are formally 
independent of Cade’s decision, they may use evidence that has emerged during the 
agency’s  investigation.  
Finally, firms might want to avoid the negative media coverage that the report of 
a  Cade’s  contrary  investigation  and/or  decision  usually  results.   
Later in this subsection, I will try to show that   Cade’s   enforcement   is   indeed  
relevant to corporations.  
 
  The  ideology  of  Cade’s  enforcers 
It is fair to assume that those appointed to Cade will share the ideology of the 
administrations who appointed them or will at least have a similar one.470 We may say 
that the administration and the nominees will tend to generally agree on how 
                                                             
469 Vieira, 'CADE X Judiciário: estudo sobre a revisão judicial das decisões do CADE no contexto da 
globalização' 158–159. 
470 I   use   ideology  here   as  Steven  Salop  has   defined   it:   ‘the   political  and   economic   philosophy   and  
experience  that  frames  one’s  preferred  enforcement  policy  and  antitrust  legal  standards’.  Salop, 'What 
Consensus? Why Ideology and Elections Still Matter to Antitrust' 603.  
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competition law should be enforced,471 though this does not mean that the party in 
government will agree with every decision the appointee makes after he takes office.   
 As we have just seen, those appointments need to be confirmed by the Senate. 
Since 1994, no name has ever been rejected by the Senate, probably because as the 
executive frequently asks the opinion of senators before making an appointment, they 
can gauge beforehand if the name will be approved or not.472 If the appointment has 
already been made and the government foresees a significant risk of the name being 
rejected by the Senate, the government may back down on putting the nomination for 
voting or may change the nomination. For instance, in 2004 the Lula administration 
initially reappointed commissioner Cleveland Teixeira, but then later refused to put the 
nomination for voting. Reportedly, this was to prevent a rejection by the Senate, since 
some  senators  were  clearly  dissatisfied  with  Teixeira  and  other  commissioners’  decision 
to block the acquisition of Garoto by Nestlé.473 Likewise, the media reported that, after 
talking with senators, the Temer administration cancelled the nomination of Amanda 
Athayde for the General Superintendence of Cade, nominating Alexandre Cordeiro in 
her place because he was backed by key senators that formed the government 
coalition.474 In any event, the executive most frequently has a majority in the Senate, 
                                                             
471 The president of the republic and the senators can also ask potential enforcers for their views on 
certain antitrust cases involving particular economic sectors.  
472 The executive avoids making nominations that will likely be rejected by the Senate because 
rejections  will  be  interpreted  by  the  media  and  part  of  the  public  opinion  as  a  government’s  defeat. 
473 Ato de Concentração n° 08012.001697/2002-89.  See  Juliano  Basile,  ‘Cade  está  sem  quórum  para  
julgar   criação   da   Brasken’   Valor Econômico (25 November 2004) 
<https://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/458315/noticia.htm?sequence=1> accessed 16 
February 2018.  
474 Lorenna   Rodrigues   and   Eduardo   Rodrigues,   ‘Pressionado,   Temer   muda   indicação   para  
superintendência   do   Cade’   O Estado de S. Paulo (12 September 2017) 
<http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pressionado-temer-muda-indicacao-para-
superintendencia-do-cade,70001987717> accessed 16 February 2018. There are several media reports 
indicating that senators aim to influence the appointment of Cade’s   board.   See, eg, G1/Jornal 
Nacional,   ‘Comissão   do   Senado   aprova   indicado   do   PMDB   para   a   presidência   do   Cade’   (14   June 
2017) <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/comissao-do-senado-aprova-indicado-do-pmdb-para-a-
presidencia-do-cade.ghtml> accessed 16 February 2018.  
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which forms the government coalition.475 Thus, the ideology of the executive most often 
overlaps  with  the  ideology  of  the  Senate’s  majority.   
  Another question is whether ideology affects enforcement. To begin with, the 
impact of ideology on enforcement is only possible because the former Competition Act 
(1994) and the current one (2011) were both promulgated with provisions that have 
abstract terms, which have left enforcers with a broad discretion to interpret the 
legislation.  
 For instance, it is up to enforcers to decide whether a merger will tend to 
eliminate  the  ‘competition  in  a  substantial  portion  of  the  relevant  market’;;  may  ‘create  or  
strengthen  a  dominant  position’;; or  may  ‘result  in  the  domination  of  the  relevant  market  
of   goods   or   services’.  Enforcers   should   also  decide  whether   the  merger  will   ‘increase  
productivity  or  competitiveness’;;  ‘improve  the  quality  of  goods  or  services’;;  ‘encourage  
efficiency and technological  or  economic  development’;;  or  will  revert  a  significant  part  
of  the  merger’s  benefits  to  consumers  and should therefore be cleared.476  
 Similarly, when it comes to anticompetitive conduct cases, the Acts granted to 
enforcers the power to decide whether a conduct had the objective or the effect of 
limiting, restraining or  ‘in  any  way  injure  free  competition  or  free  initiative’;;  ‘control  the  
relevant   market   of   goods   or   services’;;   ‘arbitrarily   increase   profits’;;   or   ‘exercise   a  
dominant  position  abusively’.477 Thus, enforcers do have broad discretion to interpret the 
legislation.  
Nevertheless, do we have evidence that ideology impacts antitrust enforcement 
in practice? Brazil still lacks empirical studies on this topic, but an article from Marcio 
Moran and others have recently made a solid case. They statistically analysed 5,091 
                                                             
475 See chapter two.  
476 Lei nº 12529/2011, artigo 88. The 1994 Act had equally abstract terms.  
477 Lei nº 12529/11, artigo 36; Lei nº 8884/1994, artigo 20.  
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merger control cases scrutinised by Cade and found that, the more commissioners seated 
on   the  Cade’s  plenary  appointed by the centre-left  Workers’  Party  administrations,   the  
more interventionist tended to be the decision; and, the more commissioners seated on 
Cade’s   plenary appointed by the centre-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party 
administrations, the less interventionist tended to be the decision.478  
 Another indication that ideology impacts antitrust enforcement in Brazil is big 
business lobbying around Cade nominations. An anonymous former commissioner has 
reported that large beverage (Ambev), mining (Vale) and food (Nestlé) corporations 
have   lobbied   senators   against   various   nominations   for   Cade’s   board.479 Vale even 
reportedly sent a letter to the minister of justice against the nomination of Arthur Badin 
for the head of the agency in 2008.480 In a more recent case, the media reported audio 
recordings in which a senator (Ciro Nogueira481)   offered   influence   on   Cade’s  
appointment process to meat-packing businessman Joesley Batista, who was a large 
                                                             
478 M R Moran, A Seth and A A Fischmann, 'Does Antitrust Commission Structure Bias Merger 
Reviews? The case of Brazil' (Discussion paper — INSEAD, 2016). The impact of ideology on 
antitrust enforcement has seen some controversy among empirical studies in the United States. For 
instance, scholars such as Steve Salop, and Jonathan B Baker and Carl Shapiro have found statistical 
evidence that antitrust enforcement has varied according to the administration in office (Salop looked 
at the at Clinton DOJ, G W Bush  DOJ   and  Obama  DOJ;;   and  Baker   and   Shapiro’s   conclusion   are  
particularly  with  respect   to  the  DOJ,   from   the  Reagan  administration  to  Obama’s   first   term).  Salop, 
'What Consensus? Why Ideology and Elections Still Matter to Antitrust'. Jonathan B Baker and Carl 
Shapiro, 'Reinvigorating Merger Enforcement That Has Declined as a Result of Conservative 
Economic Analysis' in Robert Pitofsky (ed), How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect 
of Conservative Economic Analysis on US Antitrust (Oxford University Press 2008). Jonathan B 
Baker and Carl Shapiro, 'Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration' (2012) 
65 Stanford Law Review Online 28. 
On the other hand, Ronan Harty, Howard Shelanski and Jesse Solomon looked at the data on merger 
review by the FTC and DOJ across political administrations from 1981 through 2010, and found no 
important differences in enforcement among the administrations. Ronan P Harty, Howard Shelanski 
and Jesse Solomon, 'Merger Enforcement Across Political Administrations in the United States' 
(2012) 2 Revue des Droits de la Concurrence. In a similar vein, Daniel Crane looked at the G W Bush 
and   Obama   administrations   and   found   that   ‘although   there   will   be   tweaks   at   the   margin   from  
administration  to  administration’,  most  of  the  antitrust  enforcement  has  seen  no statistical difference 
between the administrations. Daniel A Crane, 'Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated 
Antitrust Enforcement' (2012) 65 Stanford Law Review Online 13. 
479 Anonymous former commissioner 1.  
480 Juliano  Basile,  Raquel  Ulhoa  and  Paulo  de  Tarso  Lyra,  ‘Genro  garante  que  indicação  de  Badin  ao  
Cade   será   mantida’   Valor Econômico (29 July 2008) <https://www.pressreader.com/brazil/valor-
econ%C3%B4mico/20080729/281659660818991> accessed 16 February 2018.  
481 From the right-wing Popular Party (PP). 
167 
 
donor   for   his   campaign   and  was   concerned   about   Cade’s   composition.482 Thus, some 
firms  seem  to  believe  that  Cade’s  composition  impacts  antitrust  enforcement.   
Politicians and their parties also have revealed a belief in the impact of the 
officers’   ideologies   on   antitrust   enforcement.   In   2008,   all   sixteen   votes   against the 
nomination  of  Arthur  Badin  to  Cade’s  head  came  from  the  opposition  parties  Brazilian  
Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and the Democrats (DEM), according to senator José 
Agripino Maia, the leader of DEM. Senator Agripino argued that Badin was inflexible 
against certain companies, which would be problematic in the current mega-merger era. 
A more flexible person would be better suited for the job, he said.483 In other words, 
Agripino wanted a less interventionist Cade chairman.484 
The   ideology  of  Cade’s  enforcers is particularly important considering that the 
agency’s  decision  is  assumed  to  be  right  within  judicial  review,  as  we  have  seen. 
 
The impact of corrupted elections on the democratic integrity of antitrust 
enforcement 
Since elections determine who will occupy the Presidency of the Republic and 
the Senate; since the politicians empowered in those offices are responsible for 
appointing and confirming the names for key positions of the antitrust enforcement; 
                                                             
482 Hugo  Marques,   Thiago   Bronzatto   and   Laryssa   Borges,   ‘Exclusivo:   Em   áudio,   Joesley   promote  
repassar   dinheiro   para   Ciro   Nogueira’   Revista Veja (6 October 2017) 
<https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/em-audio-joesley-promete-repassar-dinheiro-para-ciro-nogueira/> 
accessed 16 February 2018. See also subsection 6.4.5. 
483 Juliano   Basile,   ‘Arthur   Badin   é   aprovado   para   presidência   do   Cade’   Valor Econômico (5 
November 2008) A10. 
484 Notwithstanding the votes against his nomination, Badin received the support of the majority of 
the Senate. The approval of his nomination by the Senate took four months and a half of deliberation 
and negotiation between the government and the senators. Revista Veja,   ‘Senado   finalmente  aprova  
Badin’   (4   November   2008)   <https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/radar/cade-senado-finalmente-aprova-
badin-2/> accessed 16 February 2018. Perhaps   Cade’s   composition   would   have   been   more  
interventionist in general, or even more interventionist than Badin was (ie, seemed to be for some 
corporations), in the absence of dependence and war chest corruption.  
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since presidents and the Senate tend to appoint and confirm those names with which 
they tend to share the same or a similar ideologies; and since there is evidence that the 
ideology   of   Cade’s   officers   impact   enforcement;;   the   democratic   integrity   of   antitrust  
enforcement is compromised if  the  elections  are  not  ‘normal  and  legitimate’.485   
Thus, if war chest corruption apparently occurred (that is, if the amount of 
corporate donations is so overwhelming that it distorts the level playing field in 
elections), the democratic integrity of the enforcement of the competition law was 
apparently compromised.  
 There also might be a problem in the case of dependence corruption (that is, the 
dependence of the politician on the financial support of wealthy patrons) if top donors, 
such as the brewery Ambev and the mining company Vale, are granted with privileged 
access to the executive or to senators, to lobby in favour or against a certain nomination 
for Cade.486 Moreover, due to the dependence corruption, the elected politician might 
surrender to the corporate lobby more easily. The politician may make a pro-donor 
choice even in the absence of any lobbying, so to have business as a frequent donor in 
future elections. Similarly, there is no question about the harm on the democratic 
integrity of antitrust enforcement in the case of a quid pro quo campaign finance 
corruption  related  to  a  nomination  for  Cade,  since  it  corrupts  the  politicians’  attitude.   
Nevertheless, we do not have evidence suggesting that corporations indeed had 
more access to politicians; or that those politicians who received more corporate money 
were   indeed   convinced   more   easily   by   the   businessmen’s   lobbying or felt more 
                                                             
485 To   use   the   words   written   in   the   Constitution.   As   I   discuss   in   chapter   seven,   a   ‘normal’   and  
‘legitimate’  election  is  one  where  there  is  an  appearance  of  integrity.   
486 It should be noted the Olsonian intuition that business might already have an initial advantage due 
to the fact that they are in a smaller number, more organized, and with more resources to spend on 
lobbying, vis-à-vis consumers — see section 1.2. This intuition has been extensively explored by the 
Public Choice Antitrust School — see footnote 529. 
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dependent, impacting their decision-making; or clear evidence that corporate money 
corrupted the decision-making of politicians and blocked a given nomination to Cade.  
 
6.2.2.  The  Cade’s  budget  and  human  resources 
 Those forms of political finance corruption may impact not only the appointment 
process   but   also   Cade’s   budget   (which,   in   turn,   may   relate   to   the   agency’s   human  
resources).  
Both members of the executive and legislative branches are responsible for 
setting   Cade’s   budget.   The   agency’s   budget   is   determined   through   annual   legislation  
written by the executive and subsequently reviewed, amended and approved by the 
legislature. The Presidential Chief of Staff Office and the Ministry of Planning are 
responsible for initially setting the budgetary limits for each body of the federal state, 
including Cade. Based on this limit set by the government, Cade writes a budget 
proposal for the next year, and sends it back to the Ministry of Planning. The president 
of the republic then reviews the draft of the budget bill and sends it to Congress. 
Congressmen have the power to amend the bill.487  
 Politicians that are in favour of more antitrust intervention may support more 
money to Cade, and those politicians that are in favour of a less interventionist antitrust 
enforcement may support a tighter budget. Therefore, elections might impact antitrust 
enforcement also because the Presidency and the Congress are the ones who establish 
Cade’s   budget;;   and   because   the   amount of resources to Cade may impact antitrust 
enforcement. 
                                                             
487 For an overview of the budget legislative process, see Câmara dos Deputados, Consultoria de 
Orçamento e Fiscalização Financeira, ‘Entendendo o Orçamento’  
<http://www2.camara.leg.br/orcamento-da-uniao/leis-orcamentarias/entenda/cartilha/cartilha.pdf> 
accessed 16 February 2018.  
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 Nevertheless, up to now, there is no empirical evidence to confirm the intuition 
that different parties in government may set different levels of budget and that different 
levels  of  budget  cause  an  increase  or  decrease  of  Cade’s  enforcement.   
 
6.2.3. The natural restraint  
 According  to  a  model  proposed  by  Alexandre  Gheventer,  Cade’s  officers  tend  to 
consider how their antitrust enforcement will echo on the political branches because 
elected   politicians  might   ‘punish’   the   agency   if they get upset.488 Kovacic apparently 
embraces a similar model when he argues that, 
 
If the agency must submit its budget estimates through an executive 
branch ministry, the process gives that ministry the ability to reward or 
punish the competition agency for past behaviour. If the legislature is the 
final gatekeeper for budget approval, the agency must consider how 
legislators  might   take   the  agency’s   behaviour   into   account   in   deciding  
how to vote on the budget.489  
 
 Along   these   lines,   Cade’s   top   officers   may   be   indirectly   influenced   by   the  
composition of the executive and legislature: the agency might take into account the fact 
that, if a certain decision will likely upset the political bodies, it may thus financially 
impact   the   Cade’s   budget   in   the   next   year.   Therefore,   according   to   this   model,   the  
                                                             
488 Alexandre Gheventer, Autonomia versus Controle: Origens do novo marco regulatório antitruste 
na América Latina e seus efeitos sobre a democracia (Editora UFMG 2005) 179. According to 
Gheventer’s  model,  Cade’s   decision  may  displease   the   executive   or   the   legislative,   but   it  must  not  
displease both political bodies simultaneously — otherwise, they will punish the agency. 
489 Kovacic, 'Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process' 301 (emphasis added).  
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agency might shape its decisions in accordance with the expectations of the executive 
and the legislative wishes. For instance, around 2016–2017 the then commissioner and 
interim chairman Gilvandro Araújo met with politician Rodrigo Loures, a key member 
of the Temer  Administration,   to  discuss  Cade’s  budget   (Araújo  said   that   he wanted to 
prevent possible cuts).490 Under  the  Gheventer’s  model,  if  Cade  decided  a  case  in  a  way  
that disappointed the Temer Administration, the agency could have been punished 
through cuts to next year’s  budget.   
 Similarly,   the   agency’s   top   officers   would also be tacitly restrained because 
Congress and the Presidency have the prerogative to  extend  or  diminish  Cade’s  power  
through the approval of a bill.  
  Therefore, elections might impact antitrust enforcement through the natural 
restraints that Cade might have.  
 Nonetheless,   it   may   be   hard   to   detect   this   subtle   effect   of   Cade’s   officers  
‘wanting   to   remain   in   the   good   graces’   of   the   political   branches.491 Moreover, it is 
questionable   to   what   extent   Cade’s   officers,   during   antitrust enforcement, will give 
significance to potential rewards or punishments given by either branch. 
 
6.2.4. Conclusion of the section  
This section has argued that there are democratic controls on Cade, which might 
be impacted by political finance corruption. However, there is a lack of evidence to 
sustain that the democratic controls through budget/resources and natural restraint have 
really been harmed. By contrast, there is evidence suggesting that elections might indeed 
                                                             
490 As reported by Araújo himself. DPF (Departamento de Polícia Federal), Inquérito Policial nº 
4483/DF (RE 91/2017-1), fls 476. 
491 As argued by Salop with respect to the Assistant Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission. Salop, 'What Consensus? Why Ideology and Elections Still Matter to Antitrust' 637. 
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impact antitrust enforcement through the   democratic   control   on   Cade’s   composition.  
Therefore, if war chest corruption has apparently occurred, it is possible to argue that the 
democratic integrity of antitrust enforcement has apparently been harmed in this sense.  
 
6.3. The impact of political finance on the pressure or contact made by politicians 
on Cade  
 In the last section, we saw that there will inevitably exist channels of political 
influence, by which politicians may influence antitrust enforcement: politicians get to 
choose   the   agency’s   heads and set its budget,   and   Cade’s   officers  might   be   naturally  
constrained  by  the  politicians’  prerogative  to  curb  the  agency’s  power  and  resources.  In  
all those three situations, politicians may influence antitrust enforcement without having 
to contact or exert pressure  on  Cade’s  officers.   
In this section, we will look at situations in which elected politicians pressure or 
contact  Cade’s  officers  to  try  to  influence  the  agency’s  decision-making, be it in general 
or regarding a specific case.  
In Brazil, the view that antitrust enforcement should   be   ‘independent’ has 
gradually gained strength.492 That said, as the degree of independence is always an open 
question, there is no consensus on the legitimacy of political pressure and contact. What 
is safe to say is that political pressure and contact have been occurring in Brazil, as it 
will be shown below.  
I will begin this section by analysing the different ways by which a politician can 
approach Cade — I  will  argue   that  we  must  differentiate  mere  political   ‘contact’   from  
‘pressure’.  Next,   I  will   claim   that   there   are   limitations   to the two main safeguards of 
                                                             
492 For a historical account of the gradual process of Cade gaining more independence, see Navarrete, 
'As Origens do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: o CADE (1962–1994)'. 
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Cade’s   independence — that   is,   the  commissioners’  tenure  and  the   transparency  of  the  
agency. Subsequently, I will theoretically explore how political finance might impact the 
pressure or contact made by politicians on Cade. In the end, however, I will argue that 
there are questions about how effective political pressure and contact really have been.  
 
6.3.1. The difference between pressure and contact 
Before analysing how political finance might impact the pressure or contact 
made by politicians on Cade, we must differentiate the two types of communication 
which  may  take  place  when  an  elected  politician  approaches  a  Cade’s  officer.   
In the complexity of everyday life, it is not always possible to draw a clear line 
between what is aggressive and what is not. The position that a politician occupies 
within the government and/or in Congress, the occasion (time and place) that the 
politician addresses the commissioner, the tone of the voice, the way the politician faces 
and looks at the commissioner and his manners, are all characteristics that may indicate 
a greater or lesser aggressiveness. But the interpretation of such behaviours and 
circumstances also depends on the personality of the listener, in this case, the 
commissioner.  For  one  commissioner,  a  given  politician’s  behaviour  may  indicate  great  
aggressiveness. But for another commissioner, that same contact could have been 
completely normal. It is subjective. That is why I will propose that it is more prudent to 
draw a line in the following terms: when a threat or promise is not explicitly made, that 







A pressure occurs when an elected politician or a member of his team 
approaches a Cade officer with a promise or a threat. For instance, politicians may 
promise that they will: (1) work to provide more funding and/or human resources to 
Cade; (2) give political support for the approval of a competition bill or a specific 
provision of the competition bill that will benefit or is in the interests of the agency; 
and/or (3) give political support for the reappointment process493 or in the appointment 
for another public office job. And politicians may threaten that they will: (1) draft 
legislation to   curb   the   agency’s   powers   or   even   a   decision;;   (2)   work   to   cut   Cade’s  
funding and/or human resources; (3) work against the commissioner’s reappointment or 
appointment for another public office job; and/or (4) open a parliamentary inquiry 
committee494 or produce parliamentary hearings about the case.  
Some of these  pressures  have  occurred  in  practice.  During  the  agency’s  decision  
on the Nestlé-Garoto merger, commissioners were publicly threatened with the opening 
of a parliamentary  inquiry  committee;;  and  a  threat  of  legislative  decree  to  cancel  Cade’s  
decision.495 In addition, an anonymous former Cade commissioner has reported that 
                                                             
493 Until 2012, when the Competition Act 1994 was in force. See subsection 6.2.1.  
494 According to article 58 paragraph 3 of the Constitution, the parliamentary inquiry committees, 
known in Brazil as CPI (acronym in Portuguese for Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito),  ‘shall  be  
created by the Chamber of Deputies and by the Federal Senate, jointly or separately, upon the request 
of 1/3 of its members, to investigate a given fact and for a certain period of time, and their 
conclusions shall, if the case may be, be forwarded to the Public Prosecution to determine the civil or 
criminal   liability   of   the   offenders.’  CPIs have   the   ‘powers   of   investigation   inherent   to   the   judicial  
authorities,   in   addition   to   other   powers   set   forth   in   the   regulations   of   the   respective   Houses’.  
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. The CPI usually involves hearings, which in 
general  ‘tend  to  require  extensive  preparation  within  the  agency  and  compel  top  leadership  to  devote  
substantial   effort   to   preparation’.  Kovacic, 'Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political 
Process' 302.  
495 Julianna  Sofia,  ‘Cade  diz  que  poderá  reavaliar  caso  Garoto’  Folha de S. Paulo (12 February 2004) 
<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi1202200423.htm> accessed 16 February 2018. O 
Estado de S. Paulo,   ‘Presidente   da   Nestlé   diz   que   terá   a   Garoto   de   volta’   (11   February   2004)  
<http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,presidente-da-nestle-diz-que-tera-a-garoto-de-
volta,20040211p17818> accessed 16 February 2018. Cade’s   chairman   at   the   time,   João  Rodas,  and  
then commissioner Thompson Andrade attended a public hearing at the Senate about the case. Ibid.  
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there were cases in which commissioners were pressured by politicians through an 
explicit threat to make legislation to   restrain   the  agency’s  powers;;  an  explicit   threat   to  
accept a hierarchical appeal; and with explicit promises of political support for the 
approval of a competition bill (or a specific provision of the competition bill) that would 
benefit or was in the interests of the competition authority.496 
 
 Contact 
By contrast, contact is when such promises or threats are not made — for 
example, the politician just wants to express his point of view regarding a certain 
antitrust case.  
 This differentiation between pressure and contact may be inferred from an 
account made by former Cade chairman João Rodas, when he said that during his four 
years in office (two and a half years during centre-right  Cardoso’s  second  term  and  one  
and a half during centre-left   Lula’s   first   term),   he   received   ‘several   contacts   from   the  
minister of justice and other bodies of the government, but not one single pressure on 
Cade’s  decisions’.497 The former commissioner Luiz Prado also seemed to assume that 
there is a  difference  between  pressure  and  contact  when  he  says  that  ‘to  hear  the  opinion  
of  a  politician  or  a  member  of  his  team  is  a  duty  of  the  commissioner’,  and  that  this  form  
of  communication  ‘does  not  characterise  pressure’.498  
The anonymous reports from former commissioners corroborate the view that a 
contact is not necessarily a pressure. One said that all the contacts he received from 
politicians were completely normal and that it  is  part  of  the  duties  of  the  Cade’s  board  to  
                                                             
496 Anonymous former commissioner 1. 
497 João Grandino Rodas, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 136. 
498 Luiz Carlos Delorme Prado, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 261.  
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listen to all versions and views about the cases.499 Another has said that politicians 
pleaded for adequate antitrust solutions in all contacts.500 Similarly, one former 
commissioner said that he was contacted by politicians or lobbyists in about ten cases, 
and only in one did he consider the contact improper.501 Another anonymous former 
commissioner reported that most frequently contacted him to ask information about the 
progress of a given case.502  
Therefore, a contact made by a politician may be natural: he might have a 
legitimate argument to make. Moreover, a contact made by a politician is often 
inevitable:  for  instance,  a  member  of  Cade’s  board,  usually  the  chairman,503 will have to 
be  in  contact  with  the  executive  and/or  Congress  to  discuss  the  agency’s  budget,  and  it  is  
reasonable to assume that a politician might seize the opportunity to ask for information 
about the development of a case. And, finally, a contact made by a politician is often 
even salutary: it may be helpful for Cade to hear new arguments and opinions, from 
different perspectives. 
Nonetheless, even in the situations where a threat or promise is not made, a 
contact made by an elected politician always has a subtle special feature: his 
communication  with  the  member  of  Cade’s  board  is  made  with tacit knowledge that he 
has the  authority  to  make  decisions  that  may  improve  or  diminish  Cade’s  power.  In  other  
words, even if the elected politician says nothing in relation to a promise or a threat, it 
                                                             
499 Anonymous former commissioner 2.  
500 Anonymous former commissioner 3. 
501 Anonymous former commissioner 4. He claimed that the contact was improper because the 
politician mentioned that a parliamentary inquiry committee could be opened about the case.  
502 Anonymous former commissioner 1. 
503 Former  commissioner  Luis  Schuartz  reported  that  Cade’s  chairman  is usually the one who receives 
the most political contacts. Luis Fernando Schuartz, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando 
com o CADE, 269. Reports from several other former commissioners have confirmed that dynamic. 
For instance, an anonymous former commissioner (who is not Schuartz, since he was not heard by the 
survey due to his passing) reported that he had a private meeting with a senator about a case, but the 
chairman, who was also at the meeting, was the one who was first contacted by the politician 
(Anonymous former commissioner 5). In this same vein, former interim chairman Gilvandro Araújo 
reported several contacts with Loures (a politician) in the JBS case. DPF (Departamento de Polícia 
Federal), Inquérito Policial nº 4483/DF (RE 91/2017-1), fls 479–480. 
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remains  tacit  the  fact  that  he  has  the  power  to  work  to  increase  or  decrease  Cade’s power 
and  resources.  The  mere  fact  that  the  elected  politician  has  this  power  may  lead  Cade’s  
officers to listen more carefully to what the elected politician has to say vis-à-vis a 
contact made by an unelected person. 
Anonymous   former   members   of   Cade’s   board have reported situations that 
illustrate this subtle special feature. One has said that a deputy contacted him and 
initially brought legal arguments about a case. However, realising that his arguments did 
not convince the Cade officer, the congressman used his position to voice non-technical 
arguments, but without making explicit threats or promises. That said, to the former 
commissioner,  the  congressman’s  behaviour  during   the  meeting   left  an   impression  of  a  
certain abuse of power.504  
Another anonymous former commissioner has reported that, although the deputy 
(who was also a minister of the Presidency of the Republic at the time) did not make 
promises to him or threaten him, he felt that this would have happened had they 
disagreed.505 Coincidentally, the politician and the commissioner shared the same view 
about the case, but the antitrust officer felt that there would have been consequences had 
they disagreed. 
 In addition, contact by elected politician might also be considered special 
because of its potential symbolic value: the elected politician represents at least part of 
the population. The population has elected him to participate in the parliament or lead 
the executive body of the state. Although one could argue that they were not elected to 
influence  Cade’s  decision-making,   the  agency’s   officers  may   interpret   that   the  opinion  
of the elected politician has a democratic feature — that is, his opinion on a particular 
case might represent, in theory, the opinion of a portion of the population.  
                                                             
504 Anonymous former commissioner 6. 
505 Anonymous former commissioner 7. 
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 Therefore, because of the tacit power of the elected politician to increase or 
decrease  Cade’s  power  and/or  because  of   its  symbolic  democratic  feature,  a contact by 
an elected politician is a special one, and this may subtly influence   Cade’s   antitrust  
enforcement. 
 
6.3.2.  The  limitations  of  Cade’s  transparency  and  of  the  reappointment  ban 
 Several former commissioners have argued that their tenure506 and   Cade’s  
transparency507 enhance  the  agency’s  autonomy   from political pressures and contacts. I 
do  not  dispute  that.  Indeed,  those  features  are  crucial  to  Cade’s  independence.     
But  few  words  must  be  said  about  the  limitations  of  Cade’s  transparency  and  the  
vulnerability that some commissioners might face even after the Competition Act 2011 
removed the provision which enabled their reappointment.  
 
Transparency  
Cade has a reputation for being a transparent agency, especially vis-à-vis other 
Brazilian agencies, such as the ones designed to exclusively regulate certain economic 
sectors (for example, the telecommunications sector). Cade’s   trial sessions are open to 
the public and audio recordings of trial sessions are available online alongside written 
                                                             
506 See, eg, Cleveland Teixeira, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 217. Luis 
Rigato Vasconcellos, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 240. Roberto 
Pfeiffer, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 178. Ricardo Cueva, 'Entrevista' 
in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 250; Elizabeth M M Q Farina, 'Entrevista' in Pedro 
Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 230. 
507 See, eg, Arthur Barrionuevo Filho, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 91. 
Thompson Almeida Andrade, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 167. 
Farina, 'Entrevista' 230. 
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decisions. In addition, the diary of  Cade’s  high-ranking officers is posted online. Those 
transparency features unquestionably help to avoid political pressure. 
However,   Cade’s   transparency   does   have   limitations.   The   Access   to   Public  
Information   Act   2011   enables   Cade’s   chairman   to   keep sensitive information (for 
instance, a sensitive meeting with a politician) confidential for a period of 15 years; and 
enables commissioners to keep sensitive information confidential for a period of five 
years.508  
As the Public Information Act came into force only in 2012, at the time of 
writing (that is, June 2018) we still do not have much information about the extent to 
which Cade’s   top  officers  have  used   them.  But,  according   to   the  media,   in  2013  Cade  
issued an official note stating that, if the disclosure   of   a  meeting  might   ‘harm   an   on-
going  investigation’,  the  occurrence  of  that  meeting  will not be disclosed.509  
Moreover, meetings may be informal and out of office, such as a coffee between 
friends. For instance, the media reported that,   in   2013,   Cade’s   chairman   Vinícius 
Carvalho met with Gilberto Carvalho, then a key minister of the Rousseff 
administration, at a café.510 Yet, the meeting, which occurred on 7 October 2013 
according to the media, was not published by Vinícius Carvalho on  Cade’s  website.511 
                                                             
508 Artigo 24, paragrafo 1, incisos II e III, e artigo 27, incisos II e III, da Lei nº 12527, de 18 de 
novembro de 2011, DOU 18/11/2011. According to article 23 of the legislation, the security of the 
society or of the state is indispensable, and therefore, it should be kept as confidential the information 
if its disclosure may: risk an ongoing investigation or inspection, related to the prevention or 
repression of infractions; offer high risk to the country's financial, economic or monetary stability; or 
jeopardize the security of institutions. 
509 Revista Veja,   ‘Registros   comprovam   reuniões   entre   presidente   do   Cade   e   petista’   (5  November  
2013) <https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/registros-comprovam-reunioes-entre-presidente-do-cade-e-
petista/> accessed 16 February 2018.  
510 Revista Veja,  ‘Conselho  amigo’  (12  October 2013) <https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/radar/conselho-
amigo-2/> accessed 16 February 2018.  
511 Cade   (Conselho   Administrativo   de   Defesa   Econômica),   ‘Agenda   2013,   Presidente   Vinícius  
Marques   de   Carvalho’   <http://www.cade.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/agendas/agendas-
arquivos-pdf/2013/agenda-presidente-vinicius-marques-2013.pdf> accessed 16 February 2018. Mr 
Carvalho was being criticised by the opposition and part of the media for arguably been implementing 




This is not to say that Vinícius Carvalho acted wrongly, but simply to show that there 
might  be  limits  to  Cade’s  transparency.   
 
The removal of the reappointment option 
Until 2012, Brazilian legislation allowed reappointment for another term, which 
could be a form of pressure: the politician could promise the commissioner political 
support for their reappointment or could threaten to work against it.512 Moreover, the 
possibility of reappointment could have a subtler effect: even without any explicit 
pressure, it could foster in the commissioner a desire to please the Presidency (who 
appoints) and the Senate (who approves), tempting him to alter his behaviour towards a 
certain case.513  
The new Competition Act 2011 removed the option of reappointment for 
commissioners and extended their tenure from two to four years. As noted by former 
commissioner Lúcia Helena  Salgado,  the  removal  of  the  reappointment  option  helps  ‘to  
prevent any feeling of pressure from the commissioner who wanted to be reappointed, to 
accommodate, to relativise his positions on a case that is in the interest of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Party) and the part of the media, Vinícius Carvalho has omitted from his resume (submitted to the 
Senate  for  the  confirmation  of  his  nomination)  the  fact  that  he  was  a  member  of  the  Workers’  Party  
and  that  he  worked  as   the  chief  of  cabinet   for  Simão  Pedro,  the  politician  member  of   the  Workers’  
Party who made the complaint about a cartel scheme that arguably involved the Brazilian Social 
Democratic Party in São Paulo. Some blamed Vinícius Carvalho for being responsible for leaking 
confidential documents about the investigation to the press. See Andreza Matais and Fábio Fabrini, 
‘Chefe   do   Cade   omite   ligação   com   denunciante   de   cartel   dos   trens’   O Estado de S. Paulo (25 
September 2013) <http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/eleicoes,chefe-do-cade-omite-ligacao-com-
denunciante-de-cartel-dos-trens-imp-,1078513>  accessed  16  February  2018.  Bruno  Ribeiro,  ‘Governo  
de  SP  acusa  Cade  de  vazamento  e  compara  órgão  a  'polícia  política'’  O Estado de S. Paulo (2 August 
2013) <http://sao-paulo.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,governo-de-sp-acusa-cade-de-vazamento-e-
compara-orgao-a-policia-politica,1059926> accessed 16 February 2018. Carolina Gonçalves, 
‘Deputados  querem  que  Gilberto  Carvalho  esclareça  conduta  do  presidente  do  Cade’  Agência Brasil 
(11 December 2013) <http://www.ebc.com.br/noticias/politica/2013/12/deputados-querem-que-
gilberto-carvalho-esclareca-conduta-do-presidente-do> accessed 16 February 2018.  
512 Under the Competition Act 1994, the commissioner had a mandate of two years, which could be 
renewed once. Lei n° 8884/1994, artigo 4, parágrafo 1.  
513 Kovacic, 'Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process' 300. 
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government   or   parts   of   the   government’.514 Or, as former commissioner Renault de 
Castro has put it, the removal   helps   to   minimise   ‘the   risk   of   the   commissioner   who  
wants to be reappointed to relativise his or her understanding in any case that is in the 
interest  of  the  political  power  [that  is,  elected  politicians]’.515  
However, it should be noted that the general superintendent, a central figure in 
the antitrust enforcement system (as he is the gatekeeper), still has a two-year term, 
which can be renewed once. Therefore, under the same rationale, the general 
superintendent’s reappointment option increases his vulnerability to political pressure or 
contact.  
In addition, although the Competition Act 2011 forbids reappointment for the 
same position, it does not forbid appointment to other  positions  within  Cade’s  structure.  
For instance, a Cade commissioner   who   wants   to   be   appointed   as   the   agency’s  
superintendent will still face the risk of becoming vulnerable to succumb to political 
pressure or contact. Commissioner and interim chairman Gilvandro Araújo apparently 
faced this risk when he was contacted by politician Loures, from the Temer 
Administration, to discuss his permanent nomination for the position of Cade head; and 
later   received   from   Loures   a   request   regarding   JBS’   antitrust   case.516 Although as of 
June 2018 there is no evidence of any form of illegality involving Araújo,517 my point is 
that this could potentially be a vulnerable situation for some officers.  
 The JBS case also shows that certain officers of Cade might have frequent 
contact with members of the executive to discuss, for example, potential nominees to the 
agency’s  top  positions.  Araújo,  as  interim  chairman  of  Cade,  and  Eduardo  Frade,  as  the  
                                                             
514 Lúcia Helena Salgado, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 65. 
515 Renault de Freitas Castro, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 74. 
516 DPF (Departamento de Polícia Federal), Inquérito Policial nº 4483/DF (RE 91/2017-1), fls 475–
477. For a description of the case, see subsection 6.4.5.  
517 Procuradoria-Geral da República, Inquérito Policial n° 4483/DF (RE 91/2017-1), pg 19. The 
practice is under investigation — see pages 62–63 of the document.  
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agency’s   superintendent,   had   several   contacts   with   Rodrigo   Loures   to   discuss   the  
applicants   for  Cade’s   top  positions.518 In this context, if a Cade officer wants to have 
influence on the future composition of the agency, there is a risk that he will be in a 
vulnerable situation if the politician has a request about a given antitrust case. I am not 
claiming that Araújo and Frade felt vulnerable — merely that a given officer could 
potentially feel vulnerable in this situation.  
 Therefore, even after the Competition Act 2011 removed the provision that 
enabled  commissioners’  reappointment,  they  may still face vulnerable situations because 
the legislation enables the appointment of commissioners to other positions within the 
agency. Equally worryingly, the Competition Act still enables the reappointment of the 
general superintendent. Finally, a high-ranking Cade officer might also feel vulnerable if 
he has  frequent  contact  with  politicians  to  discuss  the  agency’s  structure. 
 
6.3.3. How political finance might impact the pressure or contact made by 
politicians on Cade 
 There are at least three reasons why political finance might impact political 
pressure on or contact with Cade.  
Firstly, because elections determine who will occupy political offices. Different 
electoral winners may have different views on whether to approach Cade or not and, if 
they approach, the content of their arguments might also differ. For instance, say a given 
presidential election was impacted by war chest corruption; and that this furthered the 
victory of a pro-business candidate who is sceptical of antitrust laws. It is likely that if 
                                                             




he decides to pressure or contact Cade about a given case, he will argue that Cade should 
adopt a non-interventionist approach. 
 From this perspective, the fact that some politicians might be more sceptical 
about the  importance  of  Cade’s  independence  than  others  may  influence  the  selection  of  
Cade’s  officers.  As they have the  power  to  select  Cade’s  top  officers,  the  Presidency  and  
the Senate may select those people that will be more willing to hear what politicians 
have to say. In other words, the executive and the Senate have an opportunity to choose 
those   individuals   who   are   likely   to   be   open   to   political   contact;;   and   to   ‘filter   out  
candidates  who  seem  certain  to  ignore’  it.519 In Brazil, this may be illustrated by the JBS 
scandal, when the politician Rodrigo Loures said to businessman Batista that the 
government  should  give  a  ‘mission’  to  Cade’s  interim  chairman,  Gilvandro  Araújo (who 
was   appointed  by   the  previous   administration),   to   see   if   he   ‘responds  well’.   If  Araújo 
responded   well,   Loures   argued,   the   government   should   then   appoint   him   as   Cade’s  
permanent chairman.520 In other words, Loures apparently said that the government 
should test the interim chairman to see if he would be receptive to government contact. 
Secondly, political finance might impact political pressure on or contact with 
Cade if the donation gives the donor privileged access to the elected politician. After 
being lobbied by the donor, the politician may pressure or contact the agency because he 
was convinced ideologically by the argument (that is, convinced that the argument has 
merit). Thus, the competitive advantage of big donors in lobbying may impact political 
pressure on or contact with Cade. 
                                                             
519 Kovacic, 'Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process' 299–300. Even if a 
politician gets to appoint an antitrust officer, there are antitrust issues that might arise after the 
appointment, which can potentially cause disagreement between them. Moreover, politicians may 
sometimes change their mind about what they want. 
520 Julia Affonso   and   Luiz   Vassallo,   “Aliado   de   Temer   sugeriu   a   Joesley   dar   ‘missão’   para   testar  
presidente  do  Cade”. 
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Or, thirdly, the elected politician might surrender to the corporate lobby or 
perhaps simply approach Cade absent any lobbying, because he wants to have the 
business as a frequent donor in future elections. Borrowing from the rent-seeking model 
described by Kovacic in relation to the FTC (Federal Trade Commission),521 we may 
speculate that politicians might pressure or contact Cade in exchange for campaign 
finance contributions — in   Brazil,   the   JBS   scandal   shows   that   influence   on   Cade’s  
enforcement may generate resources for politicians, as will be seen in the subsection 
6.4.5.  
 
6.3.4. The uncertain relevance of political pressure or contact on Cade 
The frequency of political contact with or pressure on Cade remains unknown.522 
In any event, even if we assume that political contact or pressure on Cade are rare,523 
there is still reason to worry. If political contact or pressure are rare, those corporations 
that may benefit from them will have greater advantages over their competitors. For 
instance, if the political pressure or contact occurs only in a few cases involving large 
companies, it may be disturbing if this leads to a more favourable antitrust enforcement 
for them. Under these lines, antitrust enforcement would somewhat serve, in the end, as 
a competitive advantage for large companies. 
                                                             
521 Kovacic, 'Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process' 294. 
522 According to some reports, political pressure on or contact with Cade can be quite rare — for 
example, two former commissioners said that they were never contacted by politicians (anonymous 
former commissioners 8 and 9). By contrast, another former commissioner reported that he was 
contacted by politicians or lobbyists in around 200 different cases (anonymous former commissioner 
10). Commissioners can have sat on   Cade’s   board   from   a period of two years (eg, those 
commissioners that served Cade for just one term before the introduction of the Competition Act 
2011) to around seven years (for example, Vinícius de Carvalho, who worked three years as a 
commissioner and then four years as Cade’s  chairman).   
523 Perhaps political contact is rarer because the antitrust officers were filtered during the appointment 
process  to  reflect  the  politicians’  preferences. 
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Nonetheless, it is also unknown how effective political pressure and contact 
really are. It is one thing to say that commissioners were pressured or contacted by 
politicians. It is another thing to say that commissioners have succumbed to such 
pressure or contact. Even if a commissioner believes that a given enforcement of an 
antitrust case would lead to negative political consequences,524 it is still questionable 
whether the commissioner would give these factors much significance in his decision 
making.525 
It is also hard to tell when a commissioner has taken this pressure or contact into 
consideration. It is extremely unlikely that a commissioner who succumbs to such 
pressure or contact will admit it publicly. As argued by Salop while discussing the 
antitrust enforcement in the US, a commissioner who succumbs to pressure or contact 
will  probably  ‘have  a  strong  incentive  to  keep  it  secret  to  avoid  being  tarred  as  someone  
who  can  be  controlled’.526  
The questionnaire I have sent to former commissioners is no exception: the 
willingness to disclose self-surrender was low. Even though I designed the questionnaire 
to protect respondent anonymity and the confidentiality of the responses, I informed all 
respondents that no method can guarantee 100% anonymisation and confidentiality and 
therefore the absolute absence of risks in this sense.527 Thus, the survey I sent to former 
commissioners surely had the limitation of not overcoming the low willingness to 
disclose self-surrender to political pressures. 
                                                             
524 For  example,  a  significant  impact  on  the  agency’s  budget. 
525 Lawrence Frankel makes this argument in relation to merger enforcement in the United States. 
Lawrence M Frankel, 'Flawed Institutional Design of US Merger Review: Stacking the Deck against 
Enforcement, The' (2008) Utah Law Review 159 185–186.  
526 Salop, 'What Consensus? Why Ideology and Elections Still Matter to Antitrust' 637. 
527 I informed the respondents that all methods (online survey, physical mail or reunite all former 
commissioners in a room to respondent the questionnaire) have their weaknesses. I opted to use an 
online platform designed for academic research, which adopts safeguards to protect the anonymity 
and confidentiality of the responses.  
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Due to the low willingness to disclose,   Salop   speculates   that   the   ‘incidence  of 
successful  political  pressure  may  be  understated’.528  
In addition, it is equally hard to detect the subtle effect of pressure or contact on 
those Cade officers who, although they do not want to succumb consciously or 
explicitly, end up implicitly affected by it.  
Therefore, it is difficult for a legal scholar to estimate how effective political 
pressure on and contact with antitrust enforcement truly has been. Perhaps an economist, 
a political scientist or investigative journalist might have better instruments to detect the 
responses by the competition authorities to such political pressures or contacts.529 At 
                                                             
528 Salop, 'What Consensus? Why Ideology and Elections Still Matter to Antitrust' 637. 
529 Ibid. Public choice scholars have researched the impact of these political pressure or contact on the 
American antitrust authorities, through statistical studies. For instance, Roger Faith, Donald Leavens 
and Robert Tollison applied statistical tests to examine case bringing activity of the FTC from 1961 to 
1969 and from 1970 to 1979, and concluded that the agency favoured those companies located in the 
jurisdictions of the politicians that had a seat on key congressional committees (ie, the ones 
responsible  for  overseeing  the  FTC’s  activity  or  controlling  its budget). Those politicians with a seat 
in  such  committees  would  ‘pressure’  FTC’s  officers  to  drop  the  cases  that  could  impact  their  voters  or  
contributors. Roger L Faith, Donald R Leavens and Robert D Tollison, 'Antitrust Pork Barrel' (1982) 
25 Journal of Law and Economics 329. In a similar vein, Malcolm Coate, Richard Higgins and Fred 
McChesney have applied statistical tests on the FTC decisions concerning mergers between 1982 and 
1986,   and  have   argued   that   congressmen’s   ‘pressures’  have   impacted   the   agency’s   enforcement  — 
greater  political  ‘pressure’  by  members  of  the  Congress  did  cause  the  FTC  to  challenge  more  mergers.  
Malcolm B Coate, Richard S Higgins and Fred S McChesney, 'Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC 
Merger Challenges' (1990) 33 Journal of Law and Economics 463. More recently, Mihir Mehta, Suraj 
Srinivasan and Wanli Zhao have researched mergers reviews by the FTC and the DOJ (Department of 
Justice) between 1998 and 2010 and argued that the firms in the constituencies of US politicians who 
had a seat at the congressional judiciary committees have received favourable outcomes. For the 
authors, their tests suggest that politician incentives to influence merger control enforcement 
apparently was driven by lobbying, campaign finance, and prior business connections. The authors 
‘cannot observe if the outcomes are the result of explicit effort by congressional members to influence 
antitrust regulators or because of actions by antitrust regulators who anticipate politician preferences 
but are not explicitly influenced by congressional members’.  Mihir N Mehta, Suraj Srinivasan and 
Wanli Zhao, Political Influence and Merger Antitrust Reviews (2017). For a discussion on the natural 
restraint that a competition agency might have, see subsection 6.2.3.  
The public choice approach has been criticized for making the assumption that elected politicians and 
antitrust officers basically behave based on self-interest, without pursuing the public interest. For a 
description   of   the   public   choice’s   assumption,   see   Louis De Alessi, 'The Public Choice Model of 
Antitrust Enforcement' in F S McChesney and W F Shughart (eds), The Causes and Consequences of 
Antitrust: The Public Choice Perspective (University of Chicago Press 1995) 190. For a critic of that 
assumption, see, eg, Albert A Foer, 'The Politics of Antitrust in the United States: Public Choice and 
Public Choices' (2000) 62 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 475; as well as Robert A Katzmann, 
Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy (MIT Press 1980). 
Similarly, public choice scholarship has been criticized for ignoring the fact that members of 
competition agencies might have incentives to not succumb to political pressure. See, eg, Russell 




least at the time of writing, there is not enough evidence to affirm whether political 
pressure on or contact with Cade has indeed been effective.  
 
6.4. The efforts of politicians to influence antitrust enforcement concerning big 
donors 
In the last two sections, I have discussed how political finance might have 
impacted  Cade’s  enforcement  through  (i)  channels of political influence, and (ii) through 
the action of politicians in approaching the agency to make contact or pressure it.   
But, considering that a few large corporate donors have dominated electoral 
donations in Brazilian federal elections,530 it may be proper to have a closer look at how 
politicians have attempted to influence the antitrust enforcement concerning those large 
donors.  
As the attempt to influence antitrust enforcement frequently involves not only a 
single company, but also a whole sector, I will focus on these sectors. The top five 
donors in the 2014 federal elections531 were the following sectors: (i) construction, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
447. In this sense, Pittman published an empirical research where he attempted to enhance the 
precision   of   the   statistical   conclusions   about   antitrust   enforcement.   Since   ‘it   is   difficult   to   isolate  
direct evidence of the factors determining  enforcement  decision’,  Pittman  argued  that  he  would  look  
at the indirect evidence, such as the evidence on firms' belief on influencing antitrust enforcement 
through campaign finance. And, after applying regression equations, he found ambiguous results. 
Russell Pittman, 'Antitrust and the Political Process' in David B Audretsch and John J Siegfried (eds), 
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization: Essays in Honor of Leonard W Weiss / edited by 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992).  
Recent empirical scholarship has indeed recognized that, apart from self-interest, elected and non-
elected public officials might also be motivated by other factors, such as public interest. See, eg, 
Marcio Roberto Moran, 'Determinants of Merger Review Decisions: An Assessment of the Brazilian 
Antitrust Authority's Capabilities and the Influential Role of Antitrust Commissioners' (PhD Thesis in 
Business, Universidade de São Paulo 2015) 123.  
530 Mancuso, 'Investimento Eleitoral no Brasil: Balanço da Literatura (2001–2012) e Agenda de 
Pesquisa' 177. On average only 0.4% of Brazilian companies used to make donations. Carazza, 
‘Interesses   Econômicos,   Representação   Política   e   Produção   Legislativa   no   Brasil   sob   a   Ótica   do  
Financiamento  de  Campanhas  Eleitorais’  49.  In the 2010 general elections, only 191 companies (1% 
of the donors) accounted for 61% of the total amount donated. Rel Min Luiz Fux, STF, ADI 4650/DF, 
Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 50. 
531 That is, the elections for the Presidency, the Federal Senate and the Federal Chamber of Deputies. 
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engineering and urban infrastructure; (ii) agribusiness; (iii) finance, insurance, and 
consortia; (iv) beverages; and (v) mineral extraction, steel, metallurgy and metal 
products.532 Apparently, those sectors have been top donors for a fairly long time. For 
instance, corporations from the banking, construction, steelwork, beverage and 
agribusiness   sectors   were   the   top   funders   of   Lula’s   presidential   campaign   in   2006.533 
There is evidence suggesting that those sectors have been large donors at least since 
1994.534 
  This section will show that, in cases involving four of the top five donor sectors, 
politicians have made efforts to influence antitrust enforcement by granting an antitrust 
immunity,  cancelling  Cade’s  decision  or  contacting/pressuring  the  agency.  This  does  not  
mean that there was causation between donations and a   given   politician’s   attempts to 
influence antitrust enforcement: there is a chance that the politician behaved in such a 
way not because of campaign finance but because of his view of the public interest,535 or 
to enhance his popularity (since some antitrust cases are significantly covered by the 
media).   I   also   am   not   arguing   that   the   attempts   to   influence  Cade’s   enforcement   have  
only occurred in cases involving these top donors: the acquisition of Garoto by Nestlé, 
one of the most controversial cases in the  agency’s  history,  shows  that  other  economic  
sectors have experienced this phenomenon.536  
                                                             
532 Getulio   Vargas   Foundation,   Department   of   Public   Policy   Analysis   (FGV/DAPP),   ‘Mosaico  
Eleitoral’  <http://dapp.fgv.br/transparencia-politica/mosaico/> accessed 16 February 2018.  
533 Silvio  Navarro  and  Fábio  Zanini  ‘Setor  bancário  deu  maior  doação  à  campanha  de  Lula’  Folha de 
S. Paulo (29 November 2006) <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u87203.shtml> 
accessed 16 February 2018.  
534 For campaign finance data and analysis on the 1994 and 1998 federal elections — see Samuels, 
'Money, Elections, and Democracy in Brazil' 36.  
535 Although Carazza has argued that economic sectors such as construction and financial activities 
have accounted for a larger share of political donations vis-à-vis their share of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), these sectors nonetheless account for a large share of the GDP and, as such, are very 
important to the Brazilian economy. Carazza,   ‘Interesses   Econômicos,   Representação   Política   e  
Produção  Legislativa  no  Brasil  sob  a  Ótica  do  Financiamento  de  Campanhas  Eleitorais’  53. 
536 Contrary to other competition authorities, such as the British Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA), Cade does not list priority sectors that it will focus on in its annual plan. 
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What I will hopefully show is that the top five donor economic sectors seem to 
have had a concern with antitrust enforcement. As will be seen, in two of these sectors 
(construction and financial services) the concern was dispersed among the key players, 
as the cases relate to cartel practices and an attempt for antitrust immunity; while in the 
other three sectors the concern was concentrated on the leading company, with cases 
relating to mergers and unilateral abuse of dominance.  
   
6.4.1. Mineral Extraction, Steel, Metallurgy and Metal Products 
 After the enactment of the Competition Act 1994, which gave birth to the first 
effective antitrust agency in Brazil, the acquisition of the steelwork Pains by Gerdau was 
perhaps  Cade’s  first  controversial  case.537 
Gerdau, a Brazilian worldwide provider of steel-related products, was one of the 
largest donors to  Cardoso’s  successful presidential campaign in 1994.538 
In 1995, Cade vetoed the deal and ordered Gerdau to discontinue the acquisition 
of Pains because it would lead to a high concentration in the flat-steel market. Although 
the   Competition   Act   established   that   Cade’s   decisions could not be reviewed in the 
administrative sphere (that is, by any other organ of the executive branch), Gerdau filed 
a  hierarchical   appeal   to  Cardoso’s  minister   of   justice,  Nelson   Jobim,  who   surprisingly  
accepted it and suspended the competition  agency’s  decision.539 Subsequently, however, 
Cade sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice saying that the agency did not recognise the 
minister’s competence to review its decisions and, as consequence, it would forward the 
                                                             
537 Ato de Concentração n° 16/1994.  
538 Folha de S. Paulo,   ‘Área   de   siderurgia   ajuda   a   eleger   20’   (8   October 1995) 
<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1995/10/08/caderno_especial/15.html> accessed 16 February 
2018.  
539 Alexandre Gheventer, 'A Dimensão Política da Regulação Antitruste' (2004) 18 Boletim Latino-
Americano de Concorrência 26.  
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case’s  docket to the Public Prosecutor’s  Office  in  order  to  execute  the  decision,  instead  
of to the Ministry of Justice, as requested.540 In   1996,   Cade’s   plenary   had   a   new  
composition (that is, new commissioners), and they made an agreement with the Gerdau 
Group. Gerdau could buy Pains, but under two conditions: they would have to sell the 
transportation company Transpains, and drop the hierarchical appeal against the 
agency.541 
The crisis between Cade and the Ministry of Justice reportedly led to the 
formation of an inter-ministerial group during the Cardoso administration composed of 
members of the Ministries of Planning, Finance, Justice, and Industry and Commerce, 
whose purpose was to study changes in the legislation to reduce the powers of Cade, in 
particular in relation to mergers, which would be transferred to the Secretariat of 
Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice and to the president of the republic himself. 
According to the press, the Cardoso administration was displeased with the excessive 
interventionism of Cade.542 The media reported that the government even outlined a 
provisional measure (that is, temporary legislation that the president of the republic can 
enact without congressional approval) on the subject, although it was never issued.543  
Nevertheless, there were also reported reactions against the minister of justice 
(Nelson  Jobim)’s  attempt  to  cancel  Cade’s  decision.  Miguel  Rosseto,  a  Workers’  Party  
deputy, reportedly petitioned the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Office noting that 
Gerdau was the main donor to the 1994 campaign for governor of Antonio Britto, who 
                                                             
540 Mallard, 'Entrevista' 47. 
541 Gheventer, 'A Dimensão Política da Regulação Antitruste' 26. 
542 Ibid. 
543 Fernando Rodrigues  ‘FHC  quer  superpoder  com  lei  antitruste’  Folha de S. Paulo (5 March 1996) 
<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/1996/3/05/dinheiro/9.html> accessed 16 February 2018. For a 
discussion   about   the   government’s   reaction   with   respect   to   the   provisional   measure, see Bello, 
Autonomia Frustrada: O CADE e o Poder Econômico, 149.  
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was  Jobim’s   friend   and  colleague  at   the  Brazilian  Democratic  Movement Party in Rio 
Grande do Sul state.544  
 
6.4.2. Beverages  
 After the Gerdau-Pains case, Cade faced another big challenge in 2000: the 
merger between Brahma and Antarctica, which gave birth to the Brazilian multinational 
Ambev.545 The merger had the political support of Brazil’s   then   president, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, who thought Brazil should have a multinational beverage company. 
As he reportedly said  to  the  press  before  Cade’s  decision: 
 
Brazilian companies will have to restructure. See what is happening 
today with Brahma and Antarctica. ... But the world today works in 
terms of oligopoly. Coca-Cola, what is it? How are they going to 
compete later with Coca-Cola, if they are not strong here? The market is 
internationalized, so you must look at whether there are competitors in 
the market or not, for which there is Cade, to prevent this (monopoly) 
from occurring, I do not want to anticipate whether this is going to be 
legal or not, let's discuss it, I'm telling you what the global trend is, the 
mega-mergers. I mean, we will need Brazilian multinationals.546 
 
According to former commissioner Ruy Santacruz, ministers of the Cardoso 
administration and the leader  of  Cardoso’s  Brazilian  Social  Democracy  Party  have  made  
                                                             
544 Bello, Autonomia Frustrada: O CADE e o Poder Econômico, 146. 
545 Ato de Concentração n° 08012005846/1999-12. 
546 Jornal do Brasil (5 July 1999) (as cited in Gheventer, 'A Dimensão Política da Regulação 
Antitruste' 27–28).  
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calls to the head of Cade at the time, Gesner de Oliveira.547 For  some,  Cade’s  decision  
on  the  merger  was  considered  ‘weak’  because  it  did  not  impose  strong  conditions  for  its  
clearance.548 Santacruz thinks  that  Cade’s  decision  on  the  Ambev  merger  left  the  feeling  
that it is always possible to approve a large merger when there is political and media 
pressure.549  
This was not the first antitrust case involving Brahma in which the Cardoso 
administration had contacted Cade, since this had reportedly already occurred in 1997. 
Although former commissioner Renault de Freitas Castro did not report any explicit 
threat or promise, he felt pressured by the government and by politicians because he was 
ordering severe conditions for the clearance of the Brahma-Miller joint venture.550 We 
may dispute if those were indeed pressures, since apparently there was no explicit threat 
or promise. But it is less disputable the aggressiveness of one of the contacts: on the 
weekend before the trial that would re-examine the case, a minister of the Cardoso 
Administration   called  Castro’s   residence   to   ask   for   ‘a   special   treatment’   for   the   joint-
venture (and the commissioner replied that he would give the same treatment that he 
gives to all cases).551  
 After Cardoso left the government, Ambev was one of the companies that 
financed his think tank, the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Foundation.552 Moreover, 
                                                             
547 Ruy Santacruz, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 103. 
548 See, eg, Salgado, 'Entrevista' 61–62, who did not vote in the decision.  
549 Santacruz, 'Entrevista' 104. 
550 Ato de Concentração n° 58/1995. Castro, 'Entrevista' 71.  
551 Ibid 71. 
552 Daniel  Bramatti  ‘Estatal  doou  R$  500  mil  a  instituto  de  FHC’  Terra magazine (17 January 2007) 




Ambev has been thereafter a top donor in Brazilian federal elections,553 donating to the 
main  parties,  including  Cardoso’s  Brazilian  Social  Democratic  Party.554  
 
6.4.3. Financial, Insurance and Consortia 
In 2001, antitrust enforcement in the financial sector came into focus. 
Reportedly triggered by the Central Bank (which was, in turn, allegedly influenced by 
commercial banks),555 the Brazilian attorney general, as head of the AGU (acronym in 
Portuguese for Advocacia-Geral da União) published an opinion stating that the Central 
Bank has exclusive authority to regulate competition in the financial sector.556 
Subsequently, the president of the republic Fernando Henrique Cardoso approved the 
AGU’s   opinion   and   gave   it   binding   legal   force,   benefiting   the   financial   sector,  which  
was the top donor to his 1994 and 1998 electoral campaigns for president.557 Among 
Cardoso’s   top   donors,   were   the   three   leading   banks   (Itaú,   Real/ABN-Amro, and 
Bradesco). 
                                                             
553 See, eg, using  official  data  from  Superior  Electoral  Court  (TSE),  Mariângela  Gallucci,  ‘Campanha  
de   Marina   declara   R$   24   mi   em   doações’   O Estado de S. Paulo (1 November 2010) 
<http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,campanha-de-marina-declara-r-24-mi-em-
doacoes,633369> accessed 16 February 2018. José Roberto de Toledo, Lucas de Abreu Maia and 
Rodrigo  Burgarelli,   ‘Campanha  de  Marina  declara  R$  24  mi  em  doações’  O Estado de S. Paulo (8 
November 2014) <http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,as-10-empresas-que-mais-doaram-em-
2014-ajudam-a-eleger-70-da-camara,1589802> accessed 16 February 2018.  
554 Transparência  Brasil,  ‘Às  Claras  — Quem financia quem nas eleições’. 
555 Celso Campilongo, 'Entrevista' in Pedro Dutra (ed), Conversando com o CADE, 153. For Cláudio 
Monteiro Considera and Paulo Corrêa, the banking industry ‘was particularly interested in keeping 
competition   policy   under   Central   Bank   responsibility’   at   that   moment   because   Febraban   (the  
association   of   banks)  was   being   ‘prosecuted   by  SDE   for fixing   the   interest   rate’.  Cláudio Monteiro 
Considera and Paulo Corrêa, 'The Political Economy of Antitrust in Brazil: From Price Control to 
Competition Policy' (2002) 28 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 533. 
556 AGU (Advocacia-Geral da União), Parecer no AGU/LA-01/2001 (Anexo ao Parecer GM-020), 
Processo n 00001.006908/2000-25 <http://www.agu.gov.br/atos/detalhe/8413> accessed 16 February 
2018. 
557 Folha de S. Paulo,   ‘Bancos   lideram   doações   para   campanha   de   FHC’   (26   November   1998)  
<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc26119803.htm> accessed 16 February 2018.  
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For former commissioner Celso Campilongo, the government made it clear: it 
did not want Cade to have jurisdiction over the banking market.558 In other words, the 
government tried to grant to the financial sector an immunity from the Competition Act 
and its enforcement by Cade.  
 When Cade was about to hear the first banking sector case after the presidential 
approval   of   the   AGU’s   opinion,559 commissioner Campilongo accidentally met 
Cardoso’s  minister  of   justice  at  a  restaurant.  According  to  Campilongo,  the  minister  of  
justice, José Gregori, made the following joke:560 
 
– Gregori: ‘how many floors does Cade's building have?’ 
– Campilongo: ‘two.’  
– Gregori: ‘And how many floors does the  Bacen  (Central  Bank)’s  
building have?’  
 
Commissioner  Campilongo   then   laughed  because  Bacen’s  building   is   the   tallest   in  
Brasília, with twenty-one  floors;;  while  Cade’s  building  had  only  two  floors  at  the  time.  
The minister of justice was implying that the Bacen is much more important or powerful 
than Cade. Subsequently, the minister reportedly said: 
 
– ‘Look, pay attention to what you are going to do with that case.’ 
 
                                                             
558 Campilongo, 'Entrevista' 154. 
559 Ato de Concentração n° 08012.006762/2000-09. 
560 Celso   Campilongo,   ‘Painel   7  — Antitruste   no   setor   bancário   e   de  meios   de   pagamento’   (22° 
Seminário Internacional de Defesa da Concorrência do IBRAC, 12 December 2016) at 31:25 
<https://youtu.be/KUXaTcLSDRg> accessed 7 March 2018. 
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 Although Campilongo   and   other   Cade’s   commissioners   have   challenged   the  
constitutionality and legality of the presidential approval of the AGU’s   opinion, the 
antitrust immunity for the financial sector since then has been the object of a judicial 
dispute, which is now being analysed by the Supreme Court (STF), as of June 2018.561  
 
6.4.4. Construction, Engineering and Urban Infrastructure sector 
Perhaps the first controversial antitrust case in the construction sector emerged 
in 2014, when Operation Car Wash began and revealed cartelisation practice in the 
sector, as part of a massive quid pro quo corruption scandal.562  
The cartel between the largest Brazilian construction corporations in public bids 
conducted by Petrobras (for contracting onshore engineering, construction and industrial 
assembly services) was the one which most affected democratic game in the country, as 
it will be seen in chapter eight.563 Although there is certainly no evidence from which to 
draw any causation as of February 2019, it is disturbing that the same government 
coalition  parties  (led  by  the  Workers’  Party)  who  benefited  from  the  scheme,  were also 
in charge of the  maintenance  of  Cade’s  structure   (that did not discover the cartel). On 
the one hand, the ruling coalition was in charge of nominating   people   for  Cade’s   top  
                                                             
561 STF, RE 664189. For a brief analysis of the progress of the judicial dispute — see Jean-Paul Veiga 
da  Rocha,   ‘Bancos,   lei  antitruste   e  a   decisão   do  ministro’  O Estado de S. Paulo (19 August 2014) 
<http://www.valor.com.br/opiniao/3658802/bancos-lei-antitruste-e-decisao-do-ministro> accessed 16 
February 2018. 
562 Jonathan   Watts,   ‘Operation   Car   Wash:   Is   this   the   biggest   corruption   scandal   in   history?’   The 
Guardian (1 June 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-
wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history> accessed 16 February 2018.  
563 Processo Administrativo n° 08700.002086/2015-14. The corruption scheme between the cartel, 
politicians and Petrobras bureaucrats will be described in more details in chapter eight. The 
unleashing of the Car Wash cartel unfolded other antitrust investigations concerning other alleged 
construction cartels involving the same large corporations, such as on the construction of facilities for 
the 2014 FIFA World Cup (Inquérito Administrativo n° 08700.006630/2016-88), on public bids for 
the construction of railroads (Inquérito Administrativo n° 08700.001836/2016-11), on the public bids 
of the City Hall of Rio de Janeiro (08700.003344/2017-41) and on the metro and monorail 




positions  and  setting   the  agency’s  budget. On the other hand, the longer the cartel and 
corruption scheme lasted, the more donations from construction companies the ruling 
government coalition would have to win elections (see the dynamics of the quid pro quo 
scheme in section 8.2).  
Nonetheless, the unfolding of Operation Car Wash revealed evidence that the 
construction sector may have impacted bill n 3937/2004, which resulted in the 
Competition Act 2011. Cláudio Melo, who was a director of the Odebrecht corporation 
(the leader of the cartel), declared in a leniency agreement that senator Romero Juca 
intervened in the competition bill to favour the company, in exchange for campaign 
finance.564 However, as of June 2018, Melo’s  declaration  lacks  any  further  explanation,  
and has yet to be confirmed by the investigation.  
Moreover, there is a chance that Odebrecht also had links with two other 
congressmen that were involved in the drafting of the bill. As we have seen in the last 
chapter, senator Francisco Dornelles565 introduced an amendment that gave immunity 
for consortia formed for public bids. And, when the bill returned to the Chamber of 
Deputies, deputy Pedro Eugênio566 accepted   this   part   of  Dornelles’   amendment.567 At 
least in theory, this amendment would be in the interest of construction companies, as 
they often need to arrange themselves in a consortium to compete for public works.568 
Although it is still an ongoing investigation, it should be noted that Dornelles and 
                                                             
564 MPF (Ministério Público Federal), Delação Premiada, Cláudio Melo Filho. If   Melo   Filho’s  
declaration eventually gets confirmed by other pieces of evidence, a potential free-rider problem will 
have  to  be  explained:  while  Melo  Filho  is  referring  only  to  Odebrecht’s  donation  and  lobbying,  other  
construction might have benefited from it.  
565 From the right-wing Populist Party. 
566 From the centre-left Workers Party. 
567 See subsection 5.3.2. 
568 See Inquérito Administrativo n° 08700.004468/2017-44, Inquérito Administrativo n° 
08700.003240/2017-37 and Processo Administrativo n° 08700.003241/2017-81.  
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Eugênio are now being investigated for possibly having received illegal electoral 
contributions from Odebrecht.569 
Nevertheless, while it might be tempting to state that Odebrecht impacted the 
legislative process of the Competition Act 2011, this cannot be determined from the 
evidence provided by the ongoing investigations as of June 2018.  
 
6.4.5. Agribusiness  
In 2017, another quid pro quo scandal shocked Brazil: it involved Joesley 
Batista, who is the controller of JBS, the world’s largest meat producer and the top 
donor of the 2014 federal elections; Michel Temer, the president of Brazil, and a key 
member of his staff, deputy Rodrigo Loures; and members of Cade. In a leniency 
agreement, Batista declared that Temer and Loures agreed to deliver a Cade decision, in 
exchange for money. More specifically, Temer and Loures would make Cade issue a 
preventive measure to stop Petrobras from practising alleged anticompetitive practices 
against a company in Batista’s   group,   EPE (acronym in Portuguese for Empresa 
Produtora de Energia).570 And, in return, the businessman offered the politicians 5% of 
the  profit  that  his  company  would  get  as  a  result  of  Cade’s  preventive  measure.   
Batista first met Temer in a non-registered out of office hours appointment, 
when the businessman exposed his worry about the appointment of the new Cade head, 
among other topics.571 At   the   end  of   the   conversation,  Temer   said   to  Batista   that   ‘the  
                                                             
569 Fernando  Rodrigues,  ‘Documentos  da  Odebrecht  listam  mais  de  200  políticos  e  valores  recebidos’  
UOL Noticias (23 March 2016) 
<https://fernandorodrigues.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2016/03/23/documentos-da-odebrecht-listam-mais-
de-200-politicos-e-valores-recebidos/> accessed 16 February 2018.  
570 Inquérito Administrativo n° 08700.009007/2015-04. Petrobras is a state monopolist firm in the gas 
supply market. The case discusses price discrimination and refusal to contract. 
571 To listen and read the whole conversation, see Folha de S. Paulo,  ‘Leia  na  íntegra  a  conversa  entre  




best   way’   to   talk   to   him   was   through   Loures.   Subsequently,   Batista   met   Loures and 
offered the quid pro quo agreement, and Loures accepted the deal not only in his but 
also   in  Temer’s   name,  according   to  Batista’s  perception.572 During a meeting with the 
businessman, Loures called the interim head of Cade, Gilvandro de Araújo, and asked 
Araújo  to  take  a  ‘sympathetic’  look  at  EPE’s  request  concerning  the  preventive  measure.  
To which the Cade head replied:  ‘ok’.573 
 According to Batista,  Loures’  contact  with  Araújo  had  a  positive  effect:  after  the  
call,   members   of   Cade   allegedly   warned   Petrobras’   lawyers   that   the   agency   could  
impose severe sanctions on the company.574 This arguably led Petrobras to enter into an 
agreement with EPE, under terms that interested Batista. Due to the new deal with 
Petrobras,   Batista’s   corporation   was   able   to   regain   profits   and   thus   the   businessman  
began to pay the promised bribe to Loures.575 
Cade denies any wrongdoing,576 and indeed, at least as of June 2018, apparently 
there is no evidence of illegality concerning the agency: Cade did not issue the 
preventive  measure  and   there   is  no  evidence  that  any  of  Cade’s  members  ‘warned’  the  
Petrobras’  lawyers,  as  Batista  has  claimed. 
In any event, the scandal shows that (i) elected politicians may have incentives 
to   influence   Cade’s   enforcement   because   it   potentially   generates   resources   (the   case  
involved bribes, but it could be other resources, such as legal campaign finance); and (ii) 
a contact made by an elected politician, or a member of his staff, has a special feature — 
                                                                                                                                                                            
<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2017/05/1885414-leia-na-integra-a-conversa-entre-o-
presidente-temer-e-joesley-batista.shtml> accessed 16 February 2018.   
572 MPF (Ministério Público Federal), Delação Premiada, Joesley Batista, Anexo 9.  
573 DPF (Departamento de Polícia Federal), Inquérito Policial nº 4483/DF (RE 91/2017-1), fls 858–
859.  
574 Procuradoria-Geral da República, Inquérito Policial n° 4483/DF (RE 91/2017-1), pg 19.  
575 Ibid.  
576 Cade   (Conselho  Administrativo  de  Defesa  Econômica),   ‘Esclarecimentos  do  Cade  sobre  o   termo  
delação  de  Ricardo  Saud’  (20  May  2017)  <http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/esclarecimentos-do-cade-
sobre-o-termo-delacao-de-ricardo-saud> accessed 16 February 2018.  
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Cade will inevitably have one of its members, usually its head, in frequent contact with 
politicians  to  discuss  matters  such  as  the  agency’s  budget,  and  this  politician  may  make  
comments or requests concerning a specific ongoing antitrust case, which will may have 
a  special  weight  for  the  agency’s  members (see section 6.3).  
 
6.5. Conclusion of the chapter 
I have discussed several ways in which political finance corruption can 
potentially harm the democratic integrity of antitrust enforcement. The harm may occur 
through the democratic controls on Cade: (i) the appointment process, (ii) budget and 
human resources setting, and (iii) the natural and tacit restraint that agency’s   officers  
may have regarding the political bodies. Moreover, the harm can also occur (iv) through 
the impact that political finance might have on the political pressures and contacts. 
However, we need to draw conclusions with caution: in practice, it is not very 
clear  to  what  extent  Cade’s  officers  are  naturally  and  tacitly  restrained  by  the  politicians  
that are seated in the Presidency of Republic and in the Congress.  
Similarly, although it is tempting to state that different parties in government 
may set different levels of budget, and that different levels of budget cause an increase 
or decrease of enforcement, perhaps we need more evidence before sustaining that the 
democratic integrity of antitrust enforcement was harmed in this aspect.  
Likewise, although the top five economic sectors in terms of donations seem to 
have a concern with antitrust enforcement, and although some politicians may have 
incentives to follow the corporate wishes, it is unclear how effective the political 
pressures or contacts on Cade really have been. 
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But we do have more evidence about the impact of Cade’s   composition   on  
antitrust enforcement. There are records of large Brazilian corporations lobbying elected 
politicians on the nominations, which indicates that those firms believe  that  the  agency’s  
composition matters. Politicians and their parties also have the same belief, as some 
reports indicate.   And,   perhaps   most   importantly,   firms   and   politicians’   beliefs were 
statistically proven to be accurate: empirical research of Moran and others on more than 
5,091 merger cases has found that enforcement varied according to the party that made 
the nomination.  
In this sense, if we have concluded in subsections 3.4.1 and 5.4.2 that war chest 
corruption apparently occurred in the federal elections between 1994 and 2014, 
obstructing the level playing field in elections, we may argue that the democratic 
integrity of antitrust enforcement was apparently impaired, since we do have evidence 
suggesting   that   Cade’s   composition,   chosen   by   the   elected   politicians,   impacts   the  
enforcement of the legislation.  
Elections  are  important.  Their  integrity  is  central  not  only  to  guarantee  people’s  
confidence in democracy, but also to foster people’s  trust  in  the  capitalist  democracy  set  
by the Brazilian constitution. Chapter four showed that different countries, including 
Brazil, have considered the appearance that political donations have harmed the 
integrity of elections as sufficient to justify political finance reforms. In this fashion, I 
have argued that the appearance of consequent lack of democratic integrity of the rules 
for capitalism and of their enforcement may be considered as additional justifications for 
the reform of political finance legislation. So far as competition law is concerned, we 
have seen in chapter five and this chapter six that the confidence we should have on the 
democratic integrity of the antitrust legislation and its enforcement has been impaired, at 
least partially.  
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But this (the harm on the confidence we should have on the democratic integrity 
of the rules of capitalism) is only one additional justification for a reform of the political 
finance legislation. As we will in the next part of the thesis, there are a few other ones, 
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We have seen in Part B of this thesis   that   election’s  appearance  of   integrity   is  
key to guaranteeing people’s   confidence   in   democracy,   and   that   political   finance  
corruption may harm that trust. We have further seen that political finance corruption 
may harm the confidence we should have in the democratic integrity of the rules of 
capitalism.  
In this aspect, if we want to protect the capitalist democracy established by the 
Constitution, perhaps we should try to have a political finance system which best avoids 
the  appearance  of  corruption.  Or,  based  on  Sartori’s  passage  quoted  in  the  epigraph,  we  
should make an effort to have legislation which foster the appearance of electoral 
integrity in the sense that elections actually reflect a free formation of public opinion. 
This is the scope of Part C of this thesis. Although recent political finance reforms did 
                                                             
577 Giovanni Sartori, Elementos de Teoría Política (Alianza Editorial 1992) 152.  
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ban corporate donations and establish spending limits, the current political finance 
system still largely allows economic inequality to be translated into political 
inequality578 and, as such, still largely permits the occurrence of political finance 
corruption, as will be addressed in this Part C. 
Perhaps  whenever  we  propose  our  ‘ideal’  political  finance  regulation,  we  reveal  
signs about the conception of democracy we have underlying it: the rules we propose 
will depend on our conception of democracy. The following proposal will be based on a 
Rawlsian conception of democracy — as such, it will be grounded on normative values 
that transcend the instrumental one mentioned in the paragraph above. But, as far as 
possible, I will also briefly discuss to what extent this proposal is compatible with a 
Schumpeterian conception of democracy, particularly when advancing practical 
regulation. 
Part C is organised as follows: the present chapter (seven) will propose a 
theoretical framework for an egalitarian regulation of economic resources to compete in 
politics. And the next two chapters — chapters eight and nine — will discuss its 
practical implications for political finance and media regulation.  
The present chapter is divided into two sections. Section 7.2 argues that the 
Brazilian Constitution has adopted an egalitarian model of electoral regulation, and 
discusses what that means and the philosophical justifications for it. And section 7.3 
discusses the foundations for a regulation of economic resources that may lead to 
concentrations of speech in political deliberation. In this respect, it acknowledges the 
organic link between political finance and media regulation in mass media democracies, 
and argues that both forms of regulation should   adopt   the   ‘free   formation   of   public  
opinion’  as  a  clear  paradigm, and construct precise rules taking that into account. 
                                                             
578 See chapter three. 
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Roberto Unger once said that reform proposals on democracy have been 
frequently labelled as either utopian or trivial. If one proposes something distant, people 
may say: interesting, but utopian. If one proposes something close, people may say: 
feasible, but trivial.579 I hope the following proposal falls somewhere between the 
utopian and the trivial.  
 
7.2. The Brazilian egalitarian model of electoral regulation 
After setting two models of electoral regulation, this section will discuss why the 
text of the Constitution shows that it has chosen an egalitarian one. Next, it will explore 
potential philosophical justifications for it. And then will try to define the exact meaning 
of that model in the light of terms used by the Constitution.  
 
7.2.1. The models of electoral regulation 
 Colin Feasby argues that there are two models of electoral regulation, broadly 
speaking: the egalitarian and the libertarian.580  
                                                             
579 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (Verso 2001) 29. 
580 Colin Feasby, 'Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the Administration of the Process of Democracy 
under the Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian Model' (1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 5 10. In order to 
set  his  models  of  electoral  regulation,  Feasby  finds  inspiration  in  Frederick  Schauer’s  egalitarian  and  
libertarian conceptions of democracy. Frederick Schauer, 'Judicial Review of the Devices of 
Democracy' (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 1326. It should be noted that other scholars have used 
several different terms to express these same ideas — for instance, the Spanish scholar Óscar Sánchez 
Muñoz calls the egalitarian model garantía de la opinión pública libre model  (the  ‘guarantee  of  free  
public  opinion’  model),  and  the  libertarian  model  as  libre mercado de las ideas (‘free  market  of  ideas’  
model). Óscar Sánchez Muñoz, La Igualdad de Oportunidades en las Competiciones Electorales 
(Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales 2007). Owen Fiss, Joshua Cohen and Aline Osório 
have used other terms to express these same meanings. Owen M Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 
(Harvard University Press 1996).  Joshua  Cohen,  ‘Democracy  v.  Citizens  United?’  (The  2011  Dewey  
Lecture in Law and Philosophy, 20 April 2011) <https://www.law.uchicago.edu/recordings/joshua-
cohen-democracy-v-citizens-united> accessed 7 November 2017. Aline Osório, Direito Eleitoral e 
Liberdade de Expressão (Fórum 2017).  
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The egalitarian model is based on three premises: (1) equality of liberty is more 
important than absolute liberty; (2) equality of liberty may only be achieved by limiting 
the freedoms of the wealthy; and (3) this may only be achieved through state action.581 
 By  contrast,  the   libertarian  view  holds  that  ‘the  citizen  as  a  voter  has  a  right   to  
uncontrolled  access  to  information’  because  ‘only  the  voter  can  decide  what  is  or  is  not  
relevant  to  that  voter's  decision’.582 Therefore, people should not trust government to set 
rules   for   the   election   of   future   governments   and   ‘any   manipulation   of   the   flow   of  
information affects the ability of the   electorate   to   be   sovereign’.583 Therefore, any 
attempt by the government to level the playing field in order to ensure all voices to be 
heard is illegitimate.  
 
7.2.2. The Brazilian egalitarian model established by the Constitution 
 Which model is embraced by Brazil?584 
 Brazil has a comprehensive Constitution, promulgated in 1988, which structures 
the state. In this regard, one of its aims is to protect society against the misuse of 
economic power.585  
 The   Constitution   not   only   establishes   that   the   ‘law   shall repress the abuse of 
economic power that aims at the domination of markets, the elimination of competition 
and   the   arbitrary   increase   of   profits’   (article 173, paragraph 4), but also that the law 
                                                             
581 Feasby, 'Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the Administration of the Process of Democracy under the 
Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian Model'. 
582 Ibid.  
583 Ibid.  
584 For a brief comparison between the egalitarian model in Canada and the libertarian model in the 
US — particularly after Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010) — see 
Robert C Post, 'Second Lecture: Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment' in Robert C 
Post (ed), Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, Harvard University Press 2014) 48.  
585 Carlos Ari Sundfeld, Fundamentos de Direito Público (4a edn, Malheiros Editores 2009) 55. 
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should  protect  the  ‘normality and legitimacy of the elections against the influence of the 
economic   power’   (art.   14,   paragraph   9).586 In other words, the Constitution aims to 
protect society not only against manifestations of abuse of economic power in economic 
markets, but also against manifestations of economic power in elections. 
It   should   be   highlighted   that   the   Constitution   uses   the   term   ‘abuse’   when  
referring to the manifestation of economic power in economic markets. The 
constitutional   text   also   uses   the   term   ‘abuse’  when   referring   to   the   ‘holding of office, 
position or job in  the  direct  or  indirect  public  administration’  (art.  14,  paras  9).587 
 However, the  Constitution  does  not  use  the  term  ‘abuse’  when  referring  to  the  
manifestation of economic power in elections. The constitutional text establishes that the 
law should protect elections against the mere ‘influence’ of economic power. This 
indicates that a mere influence of economic power is enough to attempt against the 
normality and legitimacy of an election. As put by Carlos Ayres Brito, former Justice of 
the Brazilian Supreme Court, the Constitution implies that any influence of economic 
power in elections is abusive.588  
 And,  in  order  to  protect  ‘elections  against  the  influence  of  the  economic  power’,  
state action is inescapable. Therefore, the Brazilian Constitution has adopted an 
egalitarian model of electoral regulation. 
 Surely it is impossible to insulate elections from all influence of economic 
power in a capitalist democracy. Economic power derives from wealth, and wealth will 
                                                             
586 Constituição Federal do Brasil, 1988 (emphasis added).  
587 (Emphasis   added).   According   to   the   Constitution,   the   law   should   protect   the   ‘normality   and  
legitimacy   of   elections’   against   ‘the   abuse   in   the  holding  of   office,   position   or   job   in   the   direct   or  
indirect  public  administration’. 
588 Carlos Ayres Britto,  ‘Empresa  que  financia  campanha  eleitoral  comete  abuso  de  poder  econômico’  
Consultor Jurídico (31 May 2015) <https://www.conjur.com.br/2015-mai-31/ayres-britto-empresa-
financia-campanha-comete-abuso-poder-economico> accessed 3 November 2018. For Britto, there is 
no  way  for  the  economic  power  to  participate  in  elections  without  ‘calling  the  shots’. 
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inevitably be distributed unequally in a capitalist society.589 Wealthy people will have 
more money to invest in education, for instance, which may reflect on their ability to 
influence elections.590 Similarly, liberal democracies (such as Brazil) have the free 
media as one of their pillars, and a significant part of the Brazilian media is privately-
owned. Privately-owned media corporations will inevitably use their economic power to 
influence the election because of the nature of their business.  
 That said, article 14 paragraph 9 of the Constitution indicates that law should 
insulate the electoral process from inequalities of wealth, as far as possible; at least if 
read from a Rawlsian perspective. To put it another way, the Constitution indicates that 
law should insulate the electoral process from inequalities of wealth, but within the 
practical limits of the Brazilian liberal democracy.591 In this regard, the egalitarian model 
of  electoral  regulation  does  not  require  the  state  to  interfere  with  a  newspaper’s  editorial  
discretion, for example. But it requires the state to work to guarantee a plural and diverse 
democratic debate within the limits delimitated by the liberal democratic framework, to 
which a free press is key.  
 Nonetheless, I must say: not everyone agrees with the way I have interpreted 
article 14 paragraph 9 of the Constitution.592 For instance, although justices Teori 
Zavascki593 and Gilmar Mendes594 acknowledged that Brazil has an egalitarian model of 
electoral regulation, they did so under a more Schumpeterian perspective of democracy 
(in the ADI 4650 case). They assumed that it was impracticable to prevent corporations 
                                                             
589 For a definition of economic power, see footnote 4. 
590 See subsection 7.3.6.  
591 For a definition of liberal democracy, see footnote 255.  
592 Disagreements on whether a given regulation promotes or undermine electoral integrity may be 
even more frequent in societies with deep political polarization. See Pamela S Karlan, 'Citizens 
Deflected: Electoral Integrity and Political Reform' in Robert C Post (ed), Citizens Divided: 
Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Harvard 
University Press 2014) 142.  
593 See, eg, STF ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 154–157.  
594 See, eg, ibid 248–249.  
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from intervening in elections, and argued that the goal of the law should be to assure a 
political competition framework that enables people to alternate the ruling party.595 For 
them, economic power in general (and corporations in particular) can influence 
elections, as long as they do not distort competition between political elites. In that 
sense, both justices argued in favour of equality of opportunity between political elites 
and the need for spending limits. Similarly, in the other main case decided by the Court 
after the 1988 Constitution concerning corporate donations (the ADI 1076-0, heard in 
1994), Justice Sepúlveda Pertence, who delivered the leading opinion of the majority, 
also implied an egalitarian model of electoral regulation within a Schumpeterian 
conception of democracy.596 In the two main cases after the promulgation of the 1988 
Constitution where corporate donations were directly discussed, no justice argued for a 
libertarian  model  of  electoral  regulation,  as  far  as  the  Court’s  dockets  show.   
 Thus, although as far as I can see it is not possible to argue that the Brazilian 
model of electoral regulation is a libertarian one because of the limitations imposed by 
the article 14 paragraph 9 of the Constitution, I must acknowledge that some lawyers see 
the Brazilian egalitarian model under a Schumpeterian conception of democracy.   
 
7.2.3. The philosophical justifications for an egalitarian model of electoral 
regulation 
  John  Rawls’   ideas  provide an important inspiration for an egalitarian model of 
electoral regulation.   As   Feasby   points   out,   Rawls’   ideas   are   quite   general.597 Thus, 
                                                             
595 The third opinion for the dissent, Celso de Mello’s, was quite short, which gave this reader no hint 
about his conception of electoral regulation. 
596 Although Mr Pertence argued that corporations should be allowed to donate (even though trade 
unions were banned), he reasoned that there should be a uniform and effective limit to private 
donations. STF, ADI 1076-0, Voto Justice Sepúlveda Pertence, parágrafo 12.  
597 Feasby, 'Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the Administration of the Process of Democracy under the 
Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian Model'. 
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although Rawls writes having the American First Amendment in mind, his points make 
sense in other contexts. In that sense, several scholars, such as Feres Júnior and San 
Assumpção,598 and justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court have used Rawls’  theoretical  
contributions to discuss the Brazilian state.599  
 For   Rawls,   “citizens   similarly   gifted   and  motivated   [should]   have   roughly   an  
equal   chance   of   influencing   the   government’s   policy   and   of   attaining   positions   of  
authority   irrespective   of   their   economic   and   social   class”.600 Therefore, under the 
egalitarian model, from a Rawlsian democracy perspective it is not  only  people’s  votes 
that should have the same weight, but in addition citizens should have roughly an equal 
chance of influencing  the  government’s  policy  and the Congress’ lawmaking (by being 
able to be heard in elections and in non-electoral political deliberation) and of 
occupying the institutionalised political power (that is, the executive and legislative 
branches).601  
 The   Brazilian   Constitution’s   choice   for   the   egalitarian model might actually 
reflect the justification for democracy itself. Whenever one holds power over another (be 
it in a family, in a state, and so forth), the problem of legitimacy arises. And, if we 
interpret the Constitution as the Brazilian social contract, the equalisation of political 
                                                             
598 See João Feres Júnior and San Romanelli Assumpção, 'Financiamento de Campanha, Mídia e 
Liberdade Política' in Marcus Ianoni (ed), Reforma Política Democrática: Temas, Atores e Desafios 
(1 edn, Perseu Abramo 2015). 
599 See, eg, STF, ADI 2566 Rel Min Alexandre de Moraes, Voto Vencedor Min Edson Fachin, DJ 
16/05/2018; ADI 4439, Rel Min Luís Barroso, Voto Vencedor Min Alexandre de Moraes, DJ 
27/09/2017; ADPF 54/DF, Rel Min Marco Aurélio, DJ 12/04/2012.  
600 Rawls, 'The Basic Liberties and their Priority' 73.  It  should  be  noted  that  Rawls’  standard  does  not  
establish that everyone should have equal political power all the time. Indeed, the egalitarian model of 
electoral regulation in every representative democracy allows unequal political power for politicians 
that were elected. Copp argues that this is justified because we want efficiency in carrying out 
political decisions  and  administering  the  state.  Therefore,  Copp  argues,  ‘our  equal  stake  in  society  is  
still properly acknowledged, provided that the power to elect people to positions carrying extra power 
is allocated equally among all of us, and provided that the people so elected only possess the extra 
power  for  limited  periods  of  time’.  Copp, 'Capitalism versus Democracy: The Marketing of Votes and 
the Marketing of Political Power' 90. 
601 The chance should be roughly equal because some personal circumstances (such as being a 
celebrity) and certain individual abilities (such as being charismatic) may help those people to have 
more influence.  
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power among citizens may come as a matter of logical fairness. This justification can be 
summarised as the following: (1) given that we have no option but to belong to some 
state; (2) given that the state organises the most basic aspects of our lives, which affect 
our life prospects in a fundamental way; (3) we should all have equal power over the 
state’s  decisions,  as  a  matter  of  fairness.602 
 Perhaps the Brazilian democracy also has a second justification under the 
egalitarian perspective, which is an instrumental one: by having equal opportunity to 
influence or occupy institutionalised political power, people hope that the state will be 
more responsive to their needs. The question is whether democracy is indeed more 
responsive than other forms of political regimes. Nevertheless, it is likely that the 
majority of Brazilians would not choose to have an authoritarian regime even if we had 
evidence that it delivers better policies than a democracy.603  
 In sum, I take the view that Brazilians regard that (i) political liberties are self-
justified; and (ii) political liberties, such as equal opportunity to influence or occupy the 





                                                             
602 See Copp, 'Capitalism versus Democracy: The Marketing of Votes and the Marketing of Political 
Power' 89.  
603 As of October 2018, 69% of voters think that the democratic regime is the best political regime for 
Brazil, according to Datafolha polling institute. This is the highest margin since 1989, when the first 
poll was executed. By contrast, only 12% of voters point to dictatorship as a better regime than a 
democracy. Another 13% of respondents said "whatever" political regime would work; and 5% 
prefered   not   to   answer.   Paulo   Passos,   ‘Democracia   tem   aprovação   recorde   no   Brasil’   Folha de S. 
Paulo (5 October 2018) <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/democracia-tem-aprovacao-
recorde-no-brasil.shtml> accessed 3 November 2018.  
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7.2.4. The definition  of  a  ‘normal’  and  ‘legitimate’  election 
 As  we  have  seen,   the  Constitution  establishes  that  elections  should  be  ‘normal’  
and   ‘legitimate’   and   that   law   should   protect   these   features   against   the   influence of 
economic power (article 14, paragraph 9). But what does that mean? 
  Under a Rawlsian conception of democracy, a normal and legitimate election 
can be characterised as one that assures three individual rights. Two of them relate to the 
opportunity of a given person to speak (and influence political deliberation). And a third 
one relates to the right to hear a balanced political deliberation. Finally, those three 
individual rights form together a fourth right: the collective right to a free formation of 
public opinion. 
 Both voters and candidates have a right to equal opportunity to speak. Equality 
between voters means that everyone should have equal opportunity to influence the 
government’s   policy   and   the   Congress’   lawmaking.   To   put   it   differently,   everyone  
should be able to speak and be heard in political deliberation. Equality between 
candidates, in turn, means that everyone should have an equal chance of occupying the 
executive or legislative branch. In this sense, a candidate should have a reasonable 
chance to deliver his political proposal and try to convince voters.  
 In addition, there is another right that relates not to the capacity of speaking 
effectively but to the right to hear a balanced political deliberation. Only by hearing a 
balanced political deliberation, can voters make a free and informed decision regarding 
whom to vote for: free in the sense that it should be free from the influence of economic 
power, as far as possible;604 and informed because voters should be reasonably informed 
                                                             
604 It   should   be   noted,   however,   that   a   free   vote   may   also   mean   ‘free   of   intimidation’,   which   is  
perhaps how the term is mostly applied when referring to free voting. See, eg, Graeme Orr, 'The Law 
of Electoral Democracy: Theory and Purpose' (2018) Working Draft for 'Constitution of Social 
Democracy' Workshop in Honour of Keith Ewing 3.  
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about different political proposals, arguments and narrative perspectives. And only when 
voters can make a free and informed decision, representative democracy is justified. 
Thus, even if a given voter chooses not to speak in political deliberation, he has the right 
to hear balanced political deliberation.605 
 A legitimate and normal election — in which everyone has an equal opportunity 
to speak and hear a balanced political deliberation — allows an appearance of a free 
formation of public opinion.606  
 So  far,  we  have  seen  the  meaning  of  a  ‘normal’  and  ‘legitimate’  election  under  a  
Rawlsian perspective of democracy. But under a Schumpeterian conception of 
democracy, those terms may have a different meaning. Under this view, elections are 
normal and legitimate as long as competition between political elites is not distorted, in 
the sense that the people have at least one option to alternate the ruling party. For them, 
economic power in general (and corporations in particular) can influence elections, as 
long as this does not distort the competition between political elites in that sense. Along 
these lines, the voter’s   choice should be free from the monopolisation of political 
speech; and informed by hearing at least two different political proposals, arguments and 
                                                             
605 Instrumentalists may argue that what must be relevant is the force of the argument or the report 
itself, not the number of times it has been conveyed. As argued by Lord Bingham of Cornhill, 
repetition may condition the citizen to accept an argument or a report. See, R (Animal Defenders 
International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15. Moreover, for 
instrumentalists,   if  we   have   in  mind  a  model   of   deliberative   democracy,   citizens  not   only   ‘have   an  
interest in seeing their preferred  option  represented  and  argued  for  as  well  as  possible’,  but  also  ‘also  
have an interest in being able to revise their view and, in particular, in being presented with the best 
possible   evidence   and   arguments   for   the   alternatives’,   as   Harry   Brighouse   argued. A collective 
decision made without equality in political deliberation is a weaker one because citizens might change 
their mind once confronted with alternative views. Therefore, citizens should have access to the 
arguments and counterarguments before a collective decision has been made, in order to produce a 
stable and strong collective decision. See Harry Brighouse, 'Political Equality and the Funding of 
Political Speech' (1995) 21 Social Theory and Practice 473 482. However, in my view, there is no 
guarantee  that  people  will  be  convinced  because  of  the  rational  ‘strength’  of  the  argument  rather  than  
other factors, such as the charisma of the speaker. In my view, citizens have the right to an equal 
opportunity to speak, even if this does not necessarily lead to a stronger and stable collective decision, 
due to the justification for the democracy itself as a form of legitimising the power of the state over 
citizens.  
606 For arguments on the importance of laws to enable a free formation of public opinion within the 
American context, see Post, 'Second Lecture: Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment'.  
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narrative perspectives. Thus, for those who hold a Schumpeterian perspective of 
democracy, public opinion is freely formed when there is a balanced political debate 
between at least two alternatives.  
 In  sum,  a  ‘normal’  and  ‘legitimate’  election  is one where there is an appearance 
of integrity in the sense that public opinion has been freely formed, either from a 
Rawlsian or Schumpeterian perspective of democracy. That is what infra-constitutional 
legislation should be concerned with.  
 
7.3. The regulation of the forum of political deliberation 
 Public opinion is formed within a public sphere, which I will call the forum of 
political deliberation. This section will begin by discussing what the ‘forum  of  political  
deliberation’  means.  Subsequently,   I  will  argue   that  there  are   two  regulatory areas that 
deal directly with the formation of public opinion: political finance and media 
regulation. After arguing that these regulations should not tolerate unlimited 
concentrations of political speech, I will then state what their principles should be. 
Finally, I will briefly discuss the present   proposal’s   temporal extent, limitations, and 
proper regulatory bodies.  
 
 7.3.1. The definition of the forum of political deliberation  
By  using  the  term  ‘forum  of  political  deliberation’,  I  mean  the  public  space  of  a  
given society where political speech is spoken and heard. Political speech is performed 
by (i) citizens who want to engage in political discussions; (ii) the media; and (iii) 
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political  parties  and  their  politicians.  I  label  it  as  a  ‘forum’,  and  not  as  a  ‘marketplace’  to  
reinforce the idea that money should have no relevance here.607    
In the past, the forum of political deliberation occurred in meeting places, such 
as public squares or coffee houses. But several authors, such as C. Wright Mills and 
Jurgen Habermas, have noted that the emergence of new forms of media largely 
transformed the public ‘into  mass’.608 Two-way communication between those in a society 
of communities contrasts with one-way communication in a mass society, where those who 
control or have access to the mass media have more opportunity to influence the formation 
of public opinion.609  
It is true that the rise of the internet has softened the ‘one-way’   communication  
characteristic of the mass society — now anyone can post something on social media or 
write a blog. Nonetheless, the one-way communication feature of mass society is still 
present nowadays. People watch the news, read newspapers, and listen to the radio. Media 
companies have resources to cover a whole range of topics and have a reputation for being 
trusted sources. In this sense, there is a significant distance between the power of 
                                                             
607 Furthermore,  by  using  the  expression   ‘forum  of  political  deliberation’,   I  want   to  distance  myself  
from   the   term   ‘marketplace   of   ideas’   introduced   by   American   Justice   Oliver   Holmes   because   the  
regulation proposed here is grounded on the normative principle of egalitarian democracy. Therefore, 
it is an end in itself, rather than a means to lead empirically to some desirable result. By contrast, 
Holmes  arguably  aimed   to  achieve   ‘truth’  as  a  result  of   the  competition  of   ideas  in  the  market.  See  
Vincent Blasi, 'Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas' (2004) The Supreme Court Review 1 3. Perhaps 
it is indeed likely that more people will consider the political decision a rational one if we have an 
egalitarian political deliberation, but this should not be the first justification of an electoral regulation, 
in my view — see subsection  7.2.3.  Moreover,  I  do  not  use  the  term  ‘ideas’  because  ideas  are  not  the  
only thing that matters in the political public debate. The mere reporting of news, from a given 
perspective,   is   relevant.   Ideas,   thus,   would   be   an   imprecise   term.  The   term   ‘speech’   or   ‘discourse’  
encompasses ideas, arguments and reports. Similarly to the term I use, Ron Levy and Graeme Orr use 
the denotation   ‘deliberative   forum’   to   include   the   ‘macro-level   public   discourse’,   such   as   election  
campaign and the involvement of citizens, civil society, the media, and so forth; in exchanging 
information, ideas, arguments, discourses, social perspectives, and so on. Ron Levy and Graeme Orr, 
Law of Deliberative Democracy (Routledge 2018) 124–125. 
608 According to Douglas Kellner, 'Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy' in Diana Boros and 
James M Glass (eds), Re-Imagining Public Space: The Frankfurt School in the 21st Century (Palgrave 
Macmillan US 2014); making reference to C Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford University Press 
1957), and Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society (MIT Press 1989). 
609 Kellner, 'Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy'. 
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communication of a television channel and the power of communication that most 
citizens have when reporting an event on social media (see subsection 8.3.2 for a deeper 
discussion).  
The current public space for political deliberation is primarily the media: 
television and radio stations, the internet, mass circulation newspapers, and, to a much 
lesser degree, large meeting places.610 Especially in the federal elections of countries 
such as Brazil, where the constituency is extensive and frequently populous, political 
parties’   events   (party   conventions,   rallies,   debates,   inaugurations,   visits,   public  
pronouncements, and so on) are now planned as events for the media.611 
It is hard to explain how exactly the formation of public opinion works in current 
societies. Sartori argues for a cascade model.612 This model describes the formation of 
public opinion as a series of descending processes in cascade, whose falls are contained 
at intervals by lakes, in which they are re-mixed. According to this cascade model, there 
are  five  ‘lakes’  (that  is,  levels).  In  the  first  level,  rests  the  economic  and  social  elites; in 
the second level, the political and government elites; and so on.613 I have some 
reservations about this model. For example, I am not entirely convinced that political 
and government elites are at a lower level than economic and social elites.  
In my view, the formation of public opinion works more as a model of several 
simultaneous waterfalls: various sources (businessmen, political leaders, the 
government, the media, celebrities, common citizens, community leaders, experts, and 
so   on)   are   ‘waterfalls’   that   simultaneously   throw   their   speech   in   several   independent  
lakes. These independent lakes eventually connect and mix, forming the public opinion 
                                                             
610 Brighouse, 'Political Equality and the Funding of Political Speech' 477.  
611 Lima, Grande Mídia vs. Nova Mídia na Política Brasileira. 
612 Sartori was largely influenced by a model proposed by Karl W Deutsch, The Analysis of 
International Relations (Prentice-Hall 1968).  
613 Sartori, Elementos de Teoría Política, 153.  
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of the demos, which will still have fragments. The problem is that these  ‘waterfalls’  are  
unequal. As I have just argued, there is a distance between the power of communication 
of a television channel and the power of communication that most citizens have when 
reporting an event on social media.  
Therefore, we need to make sure that the waterfalls are not overwhelmingly 
unequal   and   that   the   mainstream   mass   media   ‘waterfalls’,   which   are   more   powerful,  
represent diverse views.  
Perhaps, as Sartori argues, a complete autonomous public opinion might not 
exist or be possible.614 But certain norms should be established in the process of public 
opinion formation, particularly in elections, to boost the appearance of representative 
democracy’s  integrity.615  
 
7.3.2. The organic connection between political finance and the media  
Academics, politicians and law enforcers have largely neglected the fact that 
political finance and media regulation deal with the same object: the formation of public 
opinion.  
As such, they have an organic connection and may impact each other. For 
instance, setting low spending limits for political parties in elections suggests that the 
voice of the traditional media will increase in the forum of debate. And this may be a 
problem if the media lacks plurality of ownership and diversity of content. I will give a 
practical example: if the media is concentrated and conservative, setting a low spending 
limit for political parties (which will include the main progressive party), will likely 
enhance the conservative arguments in the forum of deliberation.  
                                                             
614 Ibid.  
615 Sánchez Muñoz, La Igualdad de Oportunidades en las Competiciones Electorales, 56. 
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Considering the organic connection between those two laws, the absence of 
media regulation (to foster plurality and diversity) undermines the justification of 
political   finance   regulation   as   an   instrument   to   give   ‘everyone   equal   opportunity   to  
influence  the  democratic  debate’  under  the  Rawlsian  conception  of  democracy.  After  all, 
in a mass society, media owners will inevitably have more opportunity to impact 
political deliberation than most citizens. And there will be even less equality of 
opportunity to speak in a given society that has an overwhelming concentration of media 
ownership.  
Similarly, the absence of media regulation undermines the justification of 
political   finance   regulation   as   an   instrument   to   give   everyone   ‘equal   opportunity   to  
compete   for   office’.   Say,   for   example,   that   the   media   is   concentrated   and   mostly  
conservative. The effectiveness of political finance legislation intended to equalise 
parties’  arms   to  compete  will  be  significantly   impaired  because  parties  and   candidates  
aligned with a conservative ideology will have a competitive advantage due to the 
support of the media.616 
Along these lines, so far as the right to hear to a balanced debate is concerned, 
political finance regulation is less effective if the country does not regulate the media. 
Even if political finance regulation is somewhat efficient (and even if legislation 
requires   some   media   to   act   with   ‘due   impartiality’),   people   will   not hear a balanced 
political deliberation if the media is concentrated and its content is lowly diverse. This 
will be explored in the next chapter. 
                                                             
616 Feres Júnior and Assumpção argue that, from a Rawlsian perspective, the problem of low diversity 
within   the  Brazilian  media   is   ‘analogous’   to   the   problem  of   political   finance.  Their   focus   is   on   the 
arguably competitive disadvantage that left-wing candidates and parties may have in Brazil due to 
lack of representation in the media. Feres Júnior and Assumpção, 'Financiamento de Campanha, 
Mídia e Liberdade Política'. 
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Under a Schumpeterian conception of democracy, both political finance and the 
media should be structured in a way to produce balanced competition that enables 
citizens to change the political elites who govern them. That means, in other words, that 
we should regulate the concentration of political speech even if we adopt a 
Schumpeterian perspective of democracy.  
 
7.3.3. The per se intolerance of concentration of political speech  
 Capitalist democracy has a constant within its system: competition on the merits. 
In the economic sphere, this means that firms should compete for the preference of 
consumers; competing on price and quality of products or services. In the political 
sphere, competition on the merits means that voters should choose the candidate most 
suitable for office, having in mind the attributes (such as policy proposals, experience, 
charisma, moral values, skills, and so forth) chosen by voters to be relevant.  
 Surely both democracy and capitalism presuppose some freedom to compete. 
Nonetheless, the degree of protection of that freedom is different. At least according to 
the hegemonic conceptions of political competition in democracy and economic 
competition in capitalism. 
When we talk about democracy in a liberal democracy, we are in the end talking 
about the formation of public opinion. That is, we talk not only about the freedom to 
compete in politics, but more specifically how that freedom interacts with the formation 
of public opinion. And it should be highlighted that this occurs even if we take a 
Schumpeterian conception of democracy — under this perspective, no political party 
should have 100% of the media or of political finance resources, since this would 
seriously impair the possibility of voting out the governing party of office. If, for 
instance,  a  television  corporation  has  100%  of  a  country’s  audience,  or  a  political  party  
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has 100% of the total electoral spending in an election, perhaps this country can no 
longer be called a liberal democracy — as Brazil, France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
the United States and many other countries currently are. Thus, an unlimited 
concentration of political speech on those terms is considered a harm per se.  
When we talk about capitalism in contemporary liberal democracy, in turn, 
hegemonic modern617 competition laws assume that some economic concentrations may 
benefit society, such as the concentrations derived from competition on the merits. 
Therefore, economic concentration is usually not considered a harm per se.  
Competition law has two main models around the world: the American and the 
German. The hegemonic versions of both models tolerate concentration of economic 
power derived from competition on the merits, to the point of monopolies.  
 
The US antitrust law model 
Perhaps  the  world’s  most  popular618 paradigm in contemporary competition law 
comes from the US model: consumer welfare, meaning the  maximisation  of  consumers’  
wealth as a result of efficiency (lower prices, better products, and so on).619 This 
paradigm, consolidated by the Chicago School of thought, tolerates unlimited economic 
concentration as far as consumer welfare is not harmed.  
                                                             
617 That is, the models of competition law that evolved after the Second War.  
618 Richard Whish, Competition Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 4. See also 'A 
Bundeskartellamt/Competition   Law   Forum   Debate   on   Reform   of   Article   82:   A   “Dialectic”   on  
Competing Approaches' (2006) 2 European Competition Journal 211 220.  
619 Whish, Competition Law, 4.  But  some  Chicago  School  scholars  often  mean  that  antitrust’s  goal  is  
producer or total welfare. For definitions and discussion about welfare standards, see, eg, Christopher 
Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Hart 2009), 15–16. 
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 It should be nonetheless pointed out that the US model tolerated concentration of 
economic power even when the Harvard School of thought620 — which is regarded as 
more interventionist than the Chicago School — prevailed among US antitrust 
authorities and courts.621 Although certainly some622 Harvard School scholars advocated 
for vigorous break ups of corporations even in case of market power resulted from 
competition on the merits,623 this view was not hegemonic.624 That is, it was not popular 
                                                             
620 The Harvard School is also frequently called as the Structuralist School due to its focus on the 
structure of the market. Operating through the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm, it 
assumes that some structures (ie, highly concentrated markets) lead to unwelcoming conducts (ie, 
anticompetitive firm behaviour), which in turn lead to poor performance (ie, higher prices and lower 
quality). For a description of that school of thought and references, see, eg, Roger van den Bergh, 
'Economic Approaches to Competition Law' in Roger van den Bergh, Peter D Camesasca and Andrea 
Giannaccari (eds), Comparative Competition Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017). In 
one of the most influential accounts of the Harvard School, Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner 
mentioned  as  antitrust’s  aim  ‘the  attainment  of  desirable  economic  performance  by   individual   firms  
and   ultimately   by   the   economy   as   whole’,  meaning   outcomes   like   ‘the   achievement   of   the   largest  
bundle of desired outputs from the available bundle of resources’  and  ‘growth  of  total  output  per  head  
and   development   of   new   cheaper   production   methods   and   new   improved   products’;;   but   they   did  
mention   other   aims   as   well,   such   as   ‘the   prevention   of   an   undue   growth   of   big   business,   viewed  
broadly in terms of the distribution   of   power   in   the   society   at   large’.  Carl Kaysen and Donald F 
Turner, 'Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis' in E Thomas Sullivan (ed), The Political 
Economy of the Sherman Act: The First One Hundred Years (Oxford University Press 1991). 
621 Courts are a central aspect of the US antitrust system.  
622 However, several other Harvard School scholars tolerated the monopolies that emerged from 
competition on the merits. For instance, although Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner argued in 1959 for 
vigorous antitrust enforcement with respect to big firms, the occurrence of competition on the merits 
(according to their conception of the term) was sufficient to rule out break up remedies. Their 
proposal for divestiture was restricted  to  those  firms  that  possessed  ‘unreasonable  market  power’.  And  
they   accounted   that   market   power   was   ‘reasonable’   if   it   was   ‘created   and   maintained,   entirely   or  
almost  entirely’  by  ‘low  prices  or  superior  products  attributable  to  the  introduction  of new processes, 
product improvements or marketing methods, or to extraordinary efficiency of a single firm in 
comparison   with   that   of   other   firms   having   a   substantial   share   of   market’;;   or   ‘ownership   of   valid  
patents,  lawfully  acquired  and  lawfully  used’;;  or are a result of the circumstances of sectors in which 
there is a dependency on size in relation to the market. See Carl Kaysen and Donald F Turner, 
Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis (Harvard University Press 1959) 265–269. See 
also ibid 100–119. Around 20 years later Donald Turner would advance a slightly different proposal 
— see footnote 627. 
623 For   instance,   in   the  late  1960s   the   ‘Neal  Report’,  written  by  a  group  of   lawyers  and  economists  
commissioned by president Lyndon Johnson to analyse the state of competition in American industry, 
suggested that the attorney general should have a mandate to combat oligopolies by ordering 
divestitures to the point that no corporation would end up with a market share exceeding 12%. See 
Herbert Hovenkamp, 'Introduction to the Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust & a Reprint of the 
Neal Report' (2009) 5 Competition Policy International. The report was fully reprinted (including 
their  proposal  of  a  draft  of  a  ‘Concentrated  Industries  Act’)  in  Phil C Neal and others, 'Report of the 
White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy' (1968) 2 Antitrust Law & Economics Review 11. A few 
years later, senator Philip  Hart  introduced  a  bill  (Senate  Bill  1167)  in  1973,  making  ‘it  unlawful  for 
any corporation or two or more corporations, whether by agreement or not, to possess monopoly 
power  in  any  line  of  commerce  in  any  section  of  the  country  or  with  foreign  nations’.  US  Congress,  
‘Industrial   Reorganization   Act   Senate   Bill,   1167’   <https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-
congress/senate-bill/1167> accessed 28 December 2018.  
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enough to be formalised into legislation and be enforced by the competition authorities 
and  courts.  Recently,  a   ‘New  Brandeis  Movement’625 has been taking place in the US, 
claiming  for  a  ‘neo-progressive  revival’626 of antitrust enforcement largely based on the 
Harvard School,627 and  the  abandoning  of  consumer  welfare  as  antitrust  law’s  main  goal.  
This movement, however, is far from hegemonic as of January 2019.  
 
The German competition law model 
The other main model of competition law — the German one — also tolerates 
economic concentration. Yes, it is true that the founding fathers of the Ordoliberal 
School of thought, centred on the ideas of a group of scholars from the Freiburg 
University in Germany in the 1930s,628 advocated for a limitation of all economic 
                                                                                                                                                                            
624 The efforts mentioned in the footnote above were unsuccessful: the bill did not pass, and courts 
remained suspicious about divesting a dominant corporation in the absence of an anticompetitive 
behaviour. Some judicial decisions from that time indeed ruled for the dissolution of a few dominant 
firms, but all those decisions were based on an anticompetitive conduct practiced by the corporation 
— see William E Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, 'Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal 
Thinking' (2000) 14 Journal of Economic Perspectives 43. Thus, the unconditional intolerance of 
some Harvard School scholars towards market power concentration (and their proposal to establish a 
cap regardless of anticompetitive conduct) was not the hegemonic US model.  
625 For an overview, see Lina Khan, 'The New Brandeis Movement: Americas Antimonopoly Debate' 
(2018) 9 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 131.  
626 Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (Columbia Global Reports 2018) 
145. For other analysis and proposals that fall under the new Brandeisian movement, see, eg, 
Teachout and Khan, 'Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power'; and Raghuram 
Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial 
Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity (Random House Business Books 2003) 296. 
627 In what is perhaps the most popular new Brandeisian proposal up to now, Tim Wu argues that the 
FTC should have power to break up corporations with monopoly power. Wu, The Curse of Bigness: 
Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. Wu makes reference to Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, who 
argued in 1978 that substantial and persistent monopolies could be broke down even if they emerged 
as  a  result  of  firms’  ‘superior  skills’.  Phillip Areeda and Donald F Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis 
of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, vol III (Little, Brown and Company 1978) 35–71. 
628 The   inability   of   the  Weimar   Republic’s   legal   framework   to   prevent   the   creation   and  misuse   of  
economic power influenced the Ordoliberals. For them, private economic power captured the Weimar 
state. The Ordoliberals argued that the state should impose a rigorous competition policy not only for 
economic prosperity, but also in order to preserve political institutions and a free society. For 
discussions about the Ordoliberal movement, see, eg, Angela Wigger, 'Competition for 
Competitiveness: The Politics of the Transformation of the EU Competition Regime' (PhD Thesis in 
Political Science, Vrije Universiteit 2008) 61–74; David J Gerber, 'Constitutionalizing the Economy: 
German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe' (1994) 42 American Journal of 




concentrations: even of those concentrations derived from competition on the merits.629 
However, original Ordoliberalism  was   ‘far   from   hegemonic   in  post-war  Germany’,   as  
Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger have put it.630 Thus, its influence was only 
partial. Although some original Ordoliberals indeed tried to introduce a provision 
granting the monopoly commission the right to deconcentrate large conglomerates in the 
first German post-war competition legislation, their proposal was shelved without a 
debate in parliament.631 Similarly, Ordoliberal influence on European Union competition 
law   was   only   partial.   To   use   Wigger’s   words,   ‘had   the   founding   fathers   [of  
Ordoliberalism] been taken seriously in the aftermath of the War, there would be no 
large corporations in the Europe of  today’.632 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that Ordoliberals changed their opinion about 
economic concentration: contemporary Ordoliberals tolerate it. While some important 
founding fathers of the Ordoliberalism, such as Walter Eucken, indeed advocated for the 
dissolution of corporations that had market power, even if acquired through competition 
on the merits;633 contemporary Ordoliberals generally have agreed that   ‘where  market  
                                                                                                                                                                            
Prometheus (Oxford University Press 1998) 232–265; Liza  Lovdahl  Gormsen,  '’Article  82  EC:  Where  
are we coming from and where  are  we  going  to?’'  (2006)  2  The  Competition  Law  Review  6; Gerhard 
Schnyder and Mathias M Siems, 'The Ordoliberal Variety of Neoliberalism', Banking Systems in the 
Crisis: The Faces of Liberal Capitalism (Routledge 2013); Elias Deutscher and Stavros Makris, 
'Exploring the Ordoliberal Paradigm: The Competition-Democracy Nexus' (2016) 11 The 
Competition Law Review 181. 
629 For a comparative analysis of the ideas of the Ordoliberals and the Brandeisian scholars of the 
Harvard School, see Daniel A Crane, 'Antitrust and Democracy: A Case Study from German Fascism' 
(2018) 18-009 595 University of Michigan Law & Economics Research Paper.  
630 Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger, The Politics of European Competition Regulation: A 
Critical Political Economy Perspective (Routledge 2011) 36.  
631 Ibid. For more details, see Wigger, 'Competition for Competitiveness: The Politics of the 
Transformation of the EU Competition Regime , 125–127; and Gerber, Law and Competition in 
Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus, 266–280.  
632 Wigger, 'Competition for Competitiveness: The Politics of the Transformation of the EU 
Competition Regime' 62. 
633 Peter Behrens, The 'Consumer Choice' Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact Upon 
EU Competition Law (Europa-Kolleg 2014) 16. See also Irene Oswalt-Eucken, 'Freedom and 
Economic Power: Neglected   Aspects   of   Walter   Eucken′   s   Work'   (1994)   21   Journal   of   Economic  
Studies 38 41. 
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power or even monopoly is the result of success on the market there is no justification to 
punish  it’.634  
Some enforcers of the German competition authority (Bundeskartellamt) have 
argued that their model of competition law has always considered consumer welfare as 
an underlying goal. In a conference of the International Competition Network (ICN) in 
2011, officers of the Bundeskartellamt have reported that, although the German 
legislation sets economic freedom (meaning   both   producers’   freedom   to   compete   and  
consumers’  freedom  to  choose  between  alternative  sources  of  supply635) as the primary 
goal   of   competition   law,   consumer  welfare   ‘has   always  been   an   important   underlying  
issue  for  German  competition  law’  and  “plays  an  important  role  in  Germany’s  work”.636 
Along these lines, performance-based competition (Leistungswettbewerb) is a core 
element of the German competition law model, as stated by senior officials of the 
Bundeskartellamt in an article written in 2005,637 meaning   that   ‘where  dominant   firms  
used performance-based methods of competition, they should be free to compete, even if 
their conduct  harmed  competitors’.638  
Thus, it seems safe to say that the hegemonic version of the German model of 
competition law has always tolerated unlimited economic concentration, if derived from 
the firm’s  better  performance. 
 
                                                             
634 Behrens, The 'Consumer Choice' Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact Upon EU 
Competition Law, 19. 
635 Ibid.  
636 (ICN) International Competition Network, Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare — 
Setting the Agenda (2011) 19. 
637 'A  Bundeskartellamt/Competition  Law  Forum  Debate  on  Reform  of  Article  82:  A  “Dialectic”  on  
Competing Approaches'.  
638 John Kallaugher and Brian Sher, 'Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary 
Abuse Under Article 82' (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 263 270 (as cited in 'A 





The hegemonic versions of the main models of competition law operate under a 
principle that has no place in political competition. My point is that competition law 
unlimitedly tolerates concentration of economic power derived from organic growth 
(that is, competition on the merits). More specifically: both hegemonic versions of the 
American and German models of competition law have allowed unlimited economic 
concentrations   as   long   as   this   is   a   result   of   the   firm’s   better   performance.   I   take   as 
‘hegemonic’ the ideas formalised into legislation and mostly enforced by competition 
authorities and courts. 
 Since 1994 (when Brazil first started to have a de facto competition law), 
Brazilian legislation and its enforcement have been basically based on the hegemonic 
versions of the US and German (European) models and there was no relevant innovation 
with respect to the tolerance of economic concentration.639 
I think it is rather difficult for the Rawlsian or Schumpeterian conceptions of 
democracy to allow such an unlimited toleration of concentration of political resources 
(even that resulting from competition on the merits) that exists in economic competition 
law, as this could harm the appearance of free formation of public opinion and, 
consequently, the appearance of integrity of elections. Therefore, regulation of political 
competition needs its own principles because, in politics, there should be caps to the 
resources to compete. 
 
 
                                                             
639 See, eg, Calixto Salomão Filho, Direito Concorrencial (Malheiros Editores 2013) and Paula 
Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste (6 edn, Editora Revista dos Tribunais 2013).  
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7.3.4. The principles of a regulation of the economic resources to compete in 
politics 
 In politics, no voice, or group of voices, should monopolise the forum of 
political deliberation. As put by Justice Bastarache J, from the Canadian Supreme Court, 
while delivering the opinion of the majority in Harper v Canada (AG), 
 
If a few groups are able to flood the electoral discourse with their message, it is 
possible,  indeed  likely,  that  the  voices  of  some  will  be  drowned  out  […].  Where  
those having access to the most resources monopolize the election discourse, 
their opponents will be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to speak and be 
heard.   This   unequal   dissemination   of   points   of   view   undermines   the   voter’s  
ability to be adequately informed of all views. In this way, equality in the 
political discourse is necessary for meaningful participation in the electoral 
process and ultimately enhances the right to vote.640 
  
Indeed, freedom of political expression implies that the discourse will be in fact 
heard. For how free is speech that cannot be heard?641 But,  of  course,  there  should  be  ‘no  
restrictions  on   the  content  of  speech’,642 so that regulations ‘favor  no  political  doctrine  
over  any  other’.643  
In this regard, the regulation proposed here has three dimensions: (i) the 
regulation of typical economic power with respect to political donations and 
                                                             
640 at para 72. 
641 Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech.  




expenditures; (ii) the regulation of the structure of the media; and (iii) the regulation of 
competition between political parties. The first two relate to the equality of opportunity 
for   ‘non-candidate’  citizens.  And   the   last   one   relates   to   the  equality   of   opportunity   for  
parties and their candidates. 
Each of those dimensions should have a guiding principle — even from a 
Rawlsian perspective of democracy, it does not seem reasonable to adopt a complete 
intolerance of concentration in the media sector and in the competition between political 
parties, as will be discussed in the coming chapters.  
Thus, when it turns to the traditional media, the foremost principle should be to 
work to establish, as far as possible, that media corporations have no more than 30% of 
the audience in their markets.  
The regulation of political parties, in turn, should assure that no party or 
electoral coalition should have more than 30% of the economic resources used to 
compete, that is, financial resources and access to the media.  
The idea that underlies those principles is that no one, or no group, should have a 
predominant influence on the formation of public opinion. The above-mentioned 
parameters (that is, 30% of the relevant resources) are proper from a Rawlsian 
conception of democracy, but they may be open to discussion: for those who hold a 
Schumpeterian conception of democracy, 50% of the relevant resources would be a 
more suitable limit.  
However, the proposal advanced here is less compatible with the Schumpeterian 
perspective when it comes to the regulation of typical economic power. Under a 
Rawlsian perspective of democracy, the regulation should aim that concentrations in the 
economic sphere do not concentrate the donations or expenditures in the political 
sphere. In my view, legislation framed to implement this principle could be an efficient 
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way to prevent the appearance of political finance corruption. As we have seen in 
chapters three, five and six, Brazil has had a legal framework that has allowed 
concentration of political donations, and, as a consequence, it permitted the occurrence 
of not only dependence and war chest corruption,  but  also  the  use  of  ‘on  books’  political  
donations as a platform for quid pro quo corruption schemes — such as the one 
concerning the construction cartel and Petrobras, and the scheme that helped JBS in the 
series  of  acquisitions  that  turned  the  company  the  world’s  largest  meat  producer.   
Brazil recently faced political finance reforms, but the legal framework still 
permits economic concentration to be transformed into concentrations of political 
donations: current campaign finance legislation still enables owners of large companies 
to donate a significant amount of money. And this means not only an open channel to 
dependence and war chest corruption, but also that the legislation still has a loophole 
that enables businessmen to practice quid pro quo corruption in the terms done by JBS 
and the construction cartel. The next chapter will argue that introducing legislation to 
control the concentration of political donations and expenditures could be an effective 
way to prevent dependence, war chest and quid pro quo corruption.  
The tools to implement the above-mentioned principles can be separated into 
two types. As Fiss explains, the state can increase the voices — ‘handout  megaphones’ 
— of those who might otherwise not be heard in the public space; and the state can 
restrict the voices that dominate the political discourse so that others may be heard as 
well.644 Thus, regulation should basically use mechanisms to enhance the weaker voices 
and impose limits on the louder ones.  
 
 
                                                             
644 Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech, 4. 
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7.3.5. The temporal extent  
 Elections are fundamental to any representative democracy. In Brazil, their 
importance   is   established   in   article   1   of   the   Constitution,   which   says   that   ‘all power 
emanates from the people, who exercise it by means of elected representatives or 
directly’.645 It is through elections that the people choose to whom they delegate their 
power, so that the elected representatives legislate and govern for the people. 
 Elections are fundamentally made of speech. Political parties and their 
candidates talk and write about their policy proposals, voters discuss them, and so forth. 
As elections are fundamentally made of speech, regulation of speech in elections is 
imperative (taking into account the terms of the Brazilian Constitution that have been 
advanced in this chapter).  
 Nonetheless, political speech occurs at all times in a democracy. Although 
political speech takes place especially during elections, there is also political 
deliberation in non-electoral periods. 
 Therefore, the regulation of political competition should mainly focus on 
elections, due to its key importance for representative democracy, but it should also take 
place during non-electoral periods.  
 There is no doubt that this temporal delimitation is aligned with a Rawlsian 
conception of democracy. Yet it is debatable if it would be compatible with the 
Schumpeterian perspective, since it has been famously been linked with the restrictive 
view of democracy being the right that people have to periodically ‘choose   and  
authorize  governments  to  act  on  their  behalf’.646 Nevertheless, one could make the case 
                                                             
645 Sole paragraph (emphasis added). Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988. 
646 Held, Models of Democracy, 142. 
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that, in order to be able to choose the political elites who will govern them, citizens need 
to be exposed to a minimally balanced political deliberation at all times.  
  
7.3.6. The limitations  
As we have seen earlier, the purpose of the present regulation (under a Rawlsian 
conception of democracy) is to insulate the political process from economic inequalities, 
so that these economic inequalities do not affect citizen and candidate equality of 
opportunity in political deliberation.  
However, this does not mean that the regulation will deliver complete insulation 
of the political process from the influence of economic power, as I have also mentioned 
previously. 
Firstly, in a capitalist society, corporations and businessmen will have an 
unequal influence on government, whatever insulation tool we use. As argued by 
Lindblom, corporations have a privileged position in capitalist societies (see section 
1.2). This is an important limitation that my regulation does not address. 
In this way, an important limitation of my proposal is that it does not give a 
solution   to   the   political   power   organically   enjoyed   by   ‘too-big-to-fail’   firms.   Even   if  
these companies do not make political donations, governments will depend on their good 
performance because their failure will have an impact on the national economy due to 
the thousands of jobs they generate (directly and indirectly), tax revenues, and so on. 
Along these lines, not only government but also society, in general, may place great 
attention on what those massive companies have to say. Therefore, too big to fail firms 
may have a preferential voice in the forum of political deliberation because of the 
‘content’   of   their   speech   and   this   is   a   problem   that   transcends   the   regulation   I   am  
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proposing. That is, the strength in the discourse of these too big to fail companies is not 
necessarily linked to the inequality of opportunity to speak.647 
Similarly, this proposal does not address the assumption that economic 
concentrations tend to generate political influence, or even further, that economic 
concentrations tend to generate political concentrations, as the founding fathers of 
Ordoliberalism and some Brandeisian scholars of the Harvard School have argued.648  
How that translation would actually work is a controversial and complex issue, which 
requires a detailed analysis that would exceed the strict word limit that this thesis is 
bounded by. Moreover, this problem is firstly concerned with the organisation of 
economic competition — the concern with the organisation of the political sphere is 
merely a corollary — and the discussion of how the economy should be organised is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Another limitation of my proposal is that it does not address socioeconomic 
inequalities.649 There is a consensus that capitalism leads to socioeconomic inequalities. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the justifications of a capitalist 
economic system, we need to acknowledge that inequalities exist and will perhaps 
always exist as long as we adopt this economic system. A certain degree of 
socioeconomic inequality will exist even if we adopt egalitarian economic policies for 
capitalism suggested by progressive economists, such as the ones famously advanced by 
Thomas Piketty.650 In this regard, significant inequalities in education may affect how 
                                                             
647 The exception to this rule is the media sector because, the larger a media company is, the greater is 
its opportunity to speak — but this is addressed by the regulation proposed here. 
648 For discussions on that theoretical assumption within the scholarship of both schools, see Crane, 
'Antitrust and Democracy: A Case Study from German Fascism' and Wu, The Curse of Bigness: 
Antitrust in the New Gilded Age, 53–58. For a discussion about that assumption within the Ordoliberal 
School, see Deutscher and Makris, 'Exploring the Ordoliberal Paradigm: The Competition-
Democracy Nexus'. 
649 As pointed out in footnote 234, Brazil is the 14th most unequal country in the world in terms of 
Gini index. 
650 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press 2017). 
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well   individuals   are   able   to   rationally   ‘develop   informed   political   views,   and   to  
transform  those  views  into  political  influence’  on  society.651   
 That said, since the Constitution establishes a capitalist economic system (article 
1, item IV; article 170) and simultaneously establishes that the law should protect the 
normality and legitimacy of elections against the influence of economic power (article 
14 paragraph 9), we should think about laws that may help to advance equality of 
opportunity within the political sphere, even if it will not deliver total insulation from 
economic inequalities.  
  I acknowledge that perhaps the reform of political finance does not totally 
prevent   people’s   distrust in democracy. Firms will always have a privileged voice in 
capitalist society. But it is an attempt (in my view, a valid one) to diminish this influence 
and  improve  people’s  trust,  even  if  this attempt does not totally exhaust the problem. 
 Lastly, I must point out that the regulation advanced here does not embrace 
lobbying. As mentioned in chapter five, Brazil does not have legislation that regulates 
lobbying activities. There is a lack of data regarding the practice. Therefore, a first step 
would be the introduction of legislation in order to regulate lobbying, making it 
transparent. The discussion of regulation concerned with the concentration of lobbying 
spending would be the second step, after data is generated and made accessible.   
 
7.3.7. The regulatory bodies 
Perhaps one of the most persuasive assumptions held by those who argue for 
libertarian views is that corporate power counterbalances state power. As famously 
argued by Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United States: by lowering 
                                                             
651 Brighouse, 'Political Equality and the Funding of Political Speech' 494. 
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the  voice  of  private  economic  power   in  political  deliberation,  we  ‘augment   the  always  
dominant  power  of  government’.652  
That is why the Brazilian egalitarian model of electoral regulation imposes the 
protection of public opinion formation from both the state and private economic power. 
Protection from private economic power has been extensively discussed throughout this 
thesis, but it must be pointed out that Brazilian legislation also protects the formation of 
public opinion from the influence of the state — for instance, the Elections Act 
establishes a series of prohibitions for public agents during elections (article 73).653 
 That said, whenever discussing the regulation of political competition, we should 
have in mind the risks of potential political power misuse. In this way, to avoid such 
risks, perhaps it is reasonable to adopt an independent and dispersed regulation.  
The enforcement of political finance legislation is already independent to a 
significant degree: the electoral courts, which are part of the judiciary, have the authority 
to enforce it in the Brazilian framework.654 
The problem seems to be larger with respect to the regulation of the media: there 
is no body with authority to regulate the media in Brazil. Thus, it might be reasonable to 
create an independent agency, similar to the one proposed by Alexandre Faraco,655 with 
authority to regulate the sector (that is, television, radio, the internet, and the press). An 
independent agency seems sensible, to prevent the misuse of media regulation against 
those who are not favourites of the government. For instance, we should avoid the 
partisan use of subsidies — when a given government grants subsidies only to media 
                                                             
652 Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, 110 S Ct 1391. 
653 See also section 9.2 
654 Brazil’s  judiciary  has  specialized  electoral  courts  established  by  the  Constitution  of  1988  (articles  
118–121).  
655 Faraco, Democracia e Regulação das Redes Eletrônicas de Comunicação: Rádio, Televisão e 
Internet, 195. Faraco rightly points out that no independent government agency is completely 




entities that are aligned with their ideology or use subsidies to undermine media 
corporations’   independence.656 The agency should have the final say in the 
administrative arena.657 Since judicial review is a right established by the Brazilian 
Constitution (article 5 item XXXV), any decision of the agency could be potentially 
reviewed by the judiciary. Due to the sensitive nature of media regulation, perhaps 
closer supervision and/or involvement of judicial bodies with a reputation for 
independence and integrity, such as the Supreme Court and the Superior Electoral Court, 
could be discussed. 
Finally, another feature that may help to avoid the misuse of political finance 
and media regulation by those who hold political offices (for self-benefit or to benefit its 
supporters, such as a television channel or newspaper) is the adoption of rules that are 
as objective as possible. An example of a highly prescriptive rule is the one setting a 
cap, such as the one stating that more than 30% of the audience in a media market 
represents  a  ‘predominant  influence  on  public  opinion’. 
 
                                                             
656 However, Rowbottom argues that is questionable if there is any evidence of state funds being used 
to undermine media independence in stable liberal democracies. See Rowbottom, Democracy 
Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 197. 
657 Perhaps the structure could be partially inspired by the German media concentration regulatory 
body (Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich — KEK), which was 
established in 1996 to secure the plurality of opinion in nationally-transmitted private television and 
prevent dominant influence on public opinion. KEK also has a transparency function — they have to 
provide an annual list of TV-services and their shareholders and publish every three years a detailed 
report on the state of media concentration and on measures to secure diversity of opinion in the 
private broadcasting sector, taking into account horizontal, cross-media and international 
concentration. KEK is composed of six experts in media and economic law, who are responsible for 
analysing mergers and acquisitions, and examine television licences before they are granted. See Peter 
Humphreys, 'Transferable Media Pluralism Policies from Europe', Media Power and Plurality 
(Springer 2015) 163.  
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7.4. Conclusion of the chapter 
Both political finance and media regulation deal with the same object: the forum 
of political deliberation. In other words, they both directly impact the formation of 
public opinion.  
In this fashion, I have argued that they should regulate the concentration of 
political speech in order to enable a free formation of public opinion.  
By adopting a Rawlsian interpretation of the Brazilian Constitution, I have 
argued that there should be no concentrations of private money in politics; no 
concentration of media resources; and no concentration of parties’ and   candidates’  
economic resources to compete. While promoting equality of opportunity (which helps 
to prevent the appearance of war chest corruption), the regulation proposed here also 
simultaneously work to ensure that an elected  politician’s  attitude  has  not  been  impacted  
by the influence of private economic resources (which helps to prevent the appearance 
of quid pro quo and dependence corruption). To put it differently, it is a regulation that 
aims to protect the appearance of electoral integrity (and, consequently, its legitimacy 
and normality) in the sense that public opinion has been apparently freely formed, in 
order to encourage people’s  trust  in  the  democratic  integrity  of  capitalist  democracy.  
However, even if we assume a Rawlsian perspective of democracy, it does not 
seem reasonable to adopt a complete intolerance of concentration in the media sector 
and in the competition between political parties, as will be discussed in the following 
chapters. Therefore, the principle in those arenas should be that no one, or no group, 









Hermann Heller once argued that political power struggled to distance itself from 
religious power after the Middle Ages; but since the beginning of the 20th century that 
struggle has been in relation to economic power.658  
The existence of that struggle (and importance of overcoming it) was assimilated 
by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which establishes that law shall protect the 
normality and legitimacy of elections against the influence of economic power. 
In the last chapter, I discussed the theoretical foundations of a Rawlsian 
interpretation of the above-mentioned constitutional provision and have proposed a 
paradigm for regulation: to control concentrations of political speech to enable the free 
formation of public opinion.  
This chapter will advance the implications of that paradigm for the regulation of 
political competition between non-candidate citizens and their groups.  
There are two main ways by which the wealth of non-candidate actors may 
influence the forum of political deliberation: by making a political donation or 
expenditure; or by having access to media resources. Therefore, this chapter is organised 
                                                             
658 Hermann Heller, Political Power, Gesammelte Schriften (2 ed, J. C. B. Mohr, 1992. V 3) 39 (as 
cited in Gilberto Berkovici, 'A Influência do Poder Econômico sobre o Poder Polı́tico' (2015) 274 
IBCCRIM 8 9). 
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into two  main  sections:  section  8.2  discusses  the  ‘typical’  economic  power;;  and  section  
8.3 analyses the media.  
 
8.2. The regulation of the typical economic power  
In this section, I will first argue that the concentration of political donations and 
expenditures might be a gateway for the occurrence of the three types of political 
finance corruption (quid pro quo, dependence and war chest). I will then propose a 
regulation to control the concentration of political spending. 
 
8.2.1. The occurrence of quid pro quo, dependence and war chest corruption  
 As we have seen (particularly in chapter three), dependence and war chest 
corruption have apparently occurred in Brazil and still might occur.  
Equally disturbing is the fact that some of the largest Brazilian corporations were 
part of quid pro quo corruption schemes, in which their economic concentration related 
to their concentration of political donations.  
 The JBS case is perhaps the foremost example. From 2007 to 2011, JBS 
acquired several companies and eventually became the world’s largest meat producer. 
Such concentration was supported by the federal state-owned Brazilian Development 
Bank (mostly known as BNDES659), who handed out R$ 8.1 billion (around £1.7 billion) 
in subsidised credits to JBS.660 And, in exchange  for  BNDES’  support,  the  controller  of  
                                                             
659 Acronym in Portuguese for Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social. 
660 See Reuters,   ‘Brazil   police   probe   BNDES   loans   to   JBS,   police   say’   (12   May   2017)  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-corruption-jbs-sa/brazil-police-probe-bndes-loans-to-jbs-
police-say-idUSE6N1H102N> accessed 3 November 2017.  
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JBS made political donations to the parties that formed the coalition government.661 To 
put   it   another   way,   JBS’   acquisitions   were   financially   supported   by   governmental  
subsidies and, in exchange, JBS agreed to make subsequent political contributions to the 
coalition government, as declared by the controller of the firm (Mr Joesley Batista) in a 
leniency deal. 
 Consequently,  JBS  not  only  became  the  world’s  largest  meat  producer,  but  also  
became   Brazil’s   top   political   donor   in   the   2014   elections.  Between the 2010 and the 
2014 elections, JBS increased its political donations from R$ 83 million (around £19.47 
million) to R$ 357.37 million (around £83.85 million).662 That is, the firm donated 330% 
more.  
Another leading example of the phenomenon of simultaneous economic 
concentration and concentration of political donations, through a quid pro quo scheme, 
is the cartel of construction corporations.663 The cartel made donations to the politicians 
and parties that formed the governing coalition, as part of a corruption scheme between 
the  construction  companies  and  Brazil’s  national   oil  company,  Petrobras. To make the 
cartel workable, construction companies corrupted not only high-ranking employees of 
Petrobras664 but also the politicians that gave political support for the appointment and 
                                                             
661 MPF (Ministério Público Federal), Pré-acordo de colaboração premiada, Srs Joesley Batista, 
Wesley Batista e Ricardo Saud <https://d2f17dr7ourrh3.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/ALERTA-JOTA.INFO-Leia-o-pr%C3%A9-acordo-de-
dela%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-Joesley-Batista.pdf> accessed 3 November 2017, fls 67. 
662 David   Friedlander,   ‘Maior   doador   de   campanhas   concentra   repasses   a   governistas’   Folha de S. 
Paulo (21 September 2014) <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/09/1519452-maior-doador-
de-campanhas-concentra-repasses-a-governistas.shtml> accessed 3 November 2017; O Estado de S. 
Paulo,   ‘Siga   o   dinheiro:   quem   doou   quanto   para   quem   (2014)’  
<http://estadaodados.com/doacoes2014/#.Wc6RJGiPKUk> accessed 3 November 2017. 
663 The construction cartel was a form of economic concentration because it enabled its members to 
maintain their dominance in the sector, harming the emergence of smaller companies and blocking 
entrants.  
664 They were responsible for the public bids for hiring engineering services, construction services and 
onshore industrial assembling held by Petrobras. 
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permanence of these employees.665 For each (overpriced) contract, construction 
companies paid 2 or 3% of the contract value to Petrobras employees and politicians.666 
Due to the amount of money that circulated (at least £2.2 billion667), some have 
wondered  if  the  scheme  has  been  so  far  the  ‘biggest  corruption  scandal  in  history’668 (see 
subsection 6.4.4 for more details about the case).669 
It should be noted that bribes in the form of political donations made by JBS and 
the construction cartel were frequently made on the books. In other words, although the 
political donations had a legal appearance, their motivation was illegal.  
One could argue that the law could simply ban donations from companies and 
businessmen that have contracts with the state. However, implementing such a ban does 
not prevent the rent-seeking that interests all kind of corporations and businessmen, 
such as the ones regarding tax, competition law, and so forth.  
The loose control of the concentration of political donations might be an open 
door for corruption, be it dependent, war chest or quid pro quo. And the numbers on the 
concentration of political donations in Brazil are impressive. JBS was responsible for 
around 8% of the total money used in the 2014 elections (which includes elections for 
the Presidency, Senate and Chamber of Deputies, in the federal arena, and the 
                                                             
665 Justiça Federal, 13ª Vara da subseção Judiciária de Curitiba, Sentença, Ação Penal nº 5036528-
23.2015.4.04.7000/PR, parágrafo 399 <https://www.conjur.com.br/dl/sentenca-odebrecht-lava-
jato.pdf> accessed 3 November 2017. 
666 Ibid, parágrafo 1028. 
667 Ernesto Londoño,  ‘Brazil  Shuts  Down  Successful Corruption-Fighting  Task  Force’  The New York 
Times (21 July 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/americas/brazil-corruption-lava-
jato.html> accessed 3 November 2017. 
668 Jonathan   Watts,   ‘Operation   Car   Wash:   Is   this   the   biggest   corruption   scandal   in   history?’   The 
Guardian.  
669 The symbiotic relationship between the construction cartel and the ruling political elites somewhat 
resembles the relationship between the cartel industries and the rise of the National Socialist party in 
Germany. I am obviously referring to its operationality; and not the content of   the   government’s  




Government and Legislative Assembly, in the state arena).670 More than 1/3 (34.5%, to 
be precise) of the politicians elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 2014 received 
donations from JBS.671 
The concentration of political donations has occurred also in contexts that did 
not involve quid pro quo practices. Many large corporations were big donors but were 
not involved in quid pro quo schemes (as of February 2019). For instance, Bradesco, one 
of the largest Brazilian banks, funded 22.07% of the politicians elected for the Chamber 
of Deputies in 2014;672 Vale, the largest mining company, funded 16.6% of the 
deputies;673 and so forth. As we have seen throughout this thesis, this might not be a quid 
pro quo issue, but it may be a problem of the appearance of dependence and war chest 
corruption.  
And, as we have seen in chapter three, although the Supreme Court has banned 
corporate donations in 2015 (ADI 4650), the current political finance legislation still 
enables wealthy individuals to donate a significant amount of money. As such, the 
legislation enables the concentration of political donations.  
Perhaps a way to help to prevent the occurrence of those quid pro quo, 
dependence and war chest corruption is to implement a tight control on the 
concentrations of political donations and third-party expenditures, which will be 
discussed in the next subsection.  
 
 
                                                             
670 O Estado de S. Paulo,  ‘Siga  o  dinheiro:  quem  doou  quanto  para  quem  (2014)’. 
671 Marco Aurélio Ruediger and others, Câmara Transparente (FGV DAPP 2017). 
672 José  Roberto  de  Toledo,  Lucas  de  Abreu  Maia  and  Rodrigo  Burgarelli,  ‘As  10  empresas  que  mais  
doaram   em   2014   ajudam   a   eleger   70%   da   Câmara’   O Estado de S. Paulo (3 November 2014) 
<http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,as-10-empresas-que-mais-doaram-em-2014-ajudam-a-




8.2.2. The control of the concentration of political donations and third-party 
expenditures 
If we take a Rawlsian perspective of democracy, there could be a twofold 
solution. The first step would be to implement vouchers.674 Or alternatively implement a 
tight  control   on   the  use  of  private  money  by  setting  uniform   low  caps   for   individuals’  
donations and expenditures.675 These strategies aim to equalise the opportunity to speak 
in the forum of political deliberation, by avoiding turning non-candidate   citizens’  
economic inequalities into inequalities in the political sphere.676 
Nevertheless,   by   implementing   campaign   vouchers   or   low  caps   to   individuals’  
donations/expenditures, we may still face the bundling problem. Therefore, the second 
step would be to introduce legislation to avoid such a risk: bundling practices should be 
banned.  
                                                             
674 Richard  Hasen’s  proposal  would  put   ‘public   financing  directly   in   the  hands  of  voters’.  Vouchers  
would give the same amount of money (say $100) to each voter. All other sources of campaign money 
(ie, private contributions, third-party expenditures, and use of own private resources) would be 
prohibited. Richard L Hasen, 'Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice 
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers' (1996) California Law Review 1 22; Hasen, Plutocrats 
United: Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American Elections, 89.  
675 The problem with this alternative is that it might diminish the opportunity of the lower classes to 
participate in politics vis-à-vis the vouchers alternative.  
676 Ron Levy and Graeme Orr rightly point out that, by limiting third-party expenses, we might end up 
raising the voice of political parties. See Levy and Orr, Law of Deliberative Democracy, 128–135. In 
my view, we might also eventually raise the voice of those citizens who are linked to media resources 
— for instance, media owners. This is indeed a problem. There will be either a system more focused 
on the protection of inter-inequality: the inequality between actors (ie, political parties/candidates, 
media owners, and those citizens who donate or expend); such as the one advanced by Levy and Orr. 
Or a regulation more aimed to protect the intra-inequality: the inequality within those actors (eg, an 
inequality between those citizens who want to donate or expend); such as the one advanced in this 
chapter. Perhaps the trade-off  will   depend  on   the   country’s   context.  Levy   and  Orr   opt   for  a  model  
intended to protect inter-inequality, but they mainly seem to have in mind developed English-
speaking countries (eg, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States), 
which have a quite lower level of economic inequality vis-à-vis the Brazilian one. In Brazil, where 
high levels of economic inequality and poverty exist, a model that does not aim to protect intra 
political inequality might be less justifiable. Another contextual issue that should be considered is 
that, in some of those English-speaking countries trade unions traditionally make donations to parties 
(eg, UK) or independent expenditures (eg, Australia). In Brazil, there are no such traditions. And, by 
adopting loose limits for third-party expenditures, there is a considerable risk that business will 
overflow the independent expenditures arena, as they overwhelmingly dominated the political 
donations arena from 1994 until 2014 (see chapters three and five). Finally, another thing that might 
have also to be considered during the trade-off is the emergence of social medias, where third-parties 
can divulge their positions to other people without making any expenditure. 
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 However, bundling might be subtle. For instance, the CEO of a corporation 
might  only  ‘suggest’  a vote for a candidate; or even infer, when communicating with the 
employees, that a future political scenario with a given candidate in office would be 
better   for   the   firm’s   business.   Thus,   even   if  we   ban   lobbyists   from   being   involved   in  
fundraising and bundling,677 there is a risk that companies and economic groups may 
incentivise their shareholders and employees to donate homogeneously. For instance, 
Grupo Pão   de   Açúcar,   Brazil’s   largest   supermarket   corporation,   has   151 thousand 
employees in the country.678 Say 100 thousand of   these  workers  accept   the  company’s  
(subtle) suggestion to donate their vouchers to a given presidential candidate. If we set 
the voucher  at  R$  100  (around  £23.40),  Pão  de  Açúcar’s  donation  would  be  around  R$  1  
million (around £234,310), which would certainly be relevant to political competition. 
Perhaps   we   could   call   this   phenomenon   ‘soft   bundling’.679 Nowadays, soft bundling 
does not seem a very common practice because today the caps for the use of private 
money are quite loose, but it could rise after the evolution of the legislation in the terms 
I have proposed. Therefore, we do not have enough information to provide a more 
precise analysis of what could be characterised as soft bundling and if it should be 
allowed or not.680  
                                                             
677 Hasen suggested this framework to the US. Hasen, Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the 
Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American Elections, 102. 
678 Luísa Melo, 'Por dentro do Grupo Pão de Açúcar, maior varejista do país' Revista Exame (13 
September 2016) <https://exame.abril.com.br/negocios/por-dentro-do-grupo-pao-de-acucar-maior-
varejista-do-pais/> accessed 29 May 2017.  
679 In Brazil, there are reports of businessmen trying to persuade employees to vote for a certain 
candidate. See, eg, Revista Exame,  ‘MPT  processa  dono  da  Havan  por  “coagir”  funcionários  a  votar  
em  Bolsonaro’   (3  October  2018)  <https://exame.abril.com.br/negocios/mpt-processa-dono-da-havan-
por-coagir-funcionarios-a-votar-em-bolsonaro/> accessed 11 January 2019. Moreover, some 
American CEOs have reportedly communicated their political preferences to employees and 
‘although   the   letters   may   not,   according   to   law,   intimidate   the   employees,   they   can   strongly  
communicate  a  preference  and  list  reasons  justifying  it’  — Teachout and Khan, 'Market Structure and 
Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power' 51. There are subtle ways to influence employers’   political  
preferences. For example, the letter above mentioned   may   be   sent   after   a   rise   in   the   employees’  
salaries or distribution of bonus. 
680 For instance, what is the difference between soft bundling and the legitimate manifestation of an 
opinion? If the CEO of a corporation only implies, in corporate communication, that a future political 




 The regulation of the concentration of political influence proposed in this section 
is certainly aligned with the Rawlsian conception of democracy. But it seems less 
aligned with a Schumpeterian one, since this perspective is less concerned with the 
translation of economic inequalities into politics.  
 
8.3. The regulation of the media 
 Besides those who donate or make an expenditure, non-candidate citizens who 
own or have access to media resources also have greater opportunity to influence 
political discussions because the media has a privileged position in the forum of political 
deliberation. The media is distinct from all other economic sectors due to its vital role in 
democracy: (i) media corporations hold the government to account and expose its abuses 
of power; (ii) they maintain an informed citizenry; and (iii) they divulge ideas.681 Its 
importance to democracy has been recognised not only by justices of the Brazilian 
Supreme Court,682 but also by many courts around the world.683 In this respect, even 
some Brazilian antitrust commissioners reported that they felt being pressured by the 
media while deciding some cases.684 
In this section, I will propose a regulation of political competition with respect to 
the  media,   based   on   the   citizens’   equality   of   opportunity.   Firstly,   I   will   briefly   set   a  
                                                                                                                                                                            
banned? We should also not confuse soft bundling with the natural alignment between people who 
view society from a similar perspective, as often people working together might have. After each 
election, the Superior Electoral Court could publish a detailed report on the state of the concentration 
of political donations (and possibly third-party  expenditures),  analysing  the  donations  from  a  ‘group’  
perspective, ie, analysing the individual political donations grouped together according to the 
professional and social conditions of the citizens (corporations where they work, trade unions, and so 
on). The more data we have on the soft bundling phenomenon and the natural alignment between 
people with similar views, the more knowledge we will have about the convenience of regulating the 
practice. 
681 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 174. 
682 See,  eg,  Justice  Joaquim  Barbosa’s  opinion  in  STF,  ADI  4650/DF.  
683 See, eg, the US Supreme Court in Buckley v Valeo, 19, 26; and the European Court of Human 
Rights in Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano v Italy [GC], no 38433/09, ECHR 2012. 
684 Anonymous former commissioners 1, 3 and 5. 
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theoretical background for media power and freedom of the press, in order to make 
explicit the assumptions upon which this proposal rests. Subsequently, I will explain the 
distinction made by the Constitution between broadcast and other types of media, and 
argue that television is the most influential media vehicle in the country. Next, I will 
claim that existing legislation is helpful but not enough: granting access to broadcast 
media and regulating its conduct are insufficient to satisfactorily equalise the 
opportunity to compete in the political arena, which may only be achieved by 
implementing measures to assure the plurality of ownership and diversity of content in 
the media sector. Finally, I will then discuss a media regulation based on plurality of 
ownership and diversity of content.  
 
8.3.1. Theoretical background 
There are two controversial topics when it comes to the media: (i) the extent to 
which the media, and media owners in particular, can influence public opinion; and (ii) 
the   extent   of   the   media’s   freedom   of   speech.   In   this   subsection, I will explain the 
libertarian and egalitarian views with respect to these topics and try to establish a 
synthesis that will ground the section.  
 
The   discussion   about   the   media   owners’   power   to   influence   public  
 opinion  
There are two competing views when it comes to the  media  owners’  power   to  
influence public opinion. The libertarian claims that a media owner cannot afford to 
publish only content with which he personally agrees. He must publish content that will 
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generate a satisfactory return to his investment.685 Under the libertarian view, the public 
sphere  works   like   a   commercial  market:   opinions   and  news’  perspectives   float   around  
freely and compete through the laws of supply and demand for the scarce resource of 
audience attention.686  
By contrast, the egalitarian argues that mass media owners are not neutral actors 
who coordinate the demand and supply of opinions in the forum of political deliberation, 
but are rather partial people that have the power to shape political and social realities.687  
I agree with Jacob Rowbottom that, in reality, those two perspectives co-exist, at 
least to a certain extent.688  
Firstly, the media owner can intervene in media content where such intervention 
will not turn away audiences who are valuable to advertisers, or where the changes 
caused by the intervention gain as many viewers as it loses.689  
If the market is concentrated, the audience may not have anywhere else to turn. 
For  example,   if  a  given  newspaper  “is  the  only   left-of-centre title, its readers have less 
scope   to   punish   the   owner’s   interventions   where   there   is   no   alternative   in   that  
market”.690 Therefore, while the audience may not approve of the   owner’s   actions, it 
may still read the newspaper because of a lack of other feasible alternatives.691  
                                                             
685 Copp, 'Capitalism versus Democracy: The Marketing of Votes and the Marketing of Political 
Power' 96. 
686 Mauersberger, Advocacy Coalitions and Democratizing Media Reforms in Latin America: Whose 
Voice Gets on the Air?, 21. 
687 Ibid 22. 
688 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 184. Rowbottom 
draws the first five conclusions that I use in this subsection.  
689 C Edwin Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 92. 
690 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 184.  
691 Ibid. This may be the case for the national market for Brazilian broadsheet newspapers. 
Progressive people may read the moderate conservative Folha de S. Paulo only because it is more 




Moreover, because the mainstream media corporations are usually ones that 
have greater financial resources to invest, they usually have high-quality coverage of 
non-political subjects, such as culture, sports, and so on. So, people might watch the 
television or buy the paper to access entertainment692 and then read or watch the news as 
a   consequence.   For   example,   many   people   who   watch   Globo   TV’s   high-quality soap 
operas (that are on air both before and after its main news program) may end up 
watching  Globo  TV’s  news. 
Therefore, even if media firms are constrained by market forces to respond to 
consumers and/or advertisers in relation to some content, media owners still hold much 
discretion over political content.693 In other words, they have considerable discretion to 
decide what should or should not be news; selecting, interpreting, and creating news.694 
Along these lines, they can give emphasis to a fact or opinion;695 or refuse to publish 
certain facts or opinions.696 
Perhaps a less disputable question is whether the media impacts the audience. I 
assume that it does. If one is informed only by certain perspectives, it is likely that these 
perspectives will influence one’s views on   the   facts.   However,   media   corporations’  
                                                                                                                                                                            
São   Paulo   (I   am   grounding   this   argument   on   the   newspapers’   political   alignment demonstrated in 
João Feres Júnior and others, 'A (in)clemente Mídia das Eleições.' (2014) XVII Insight Inteligência 
46). The rest of the newspapers may have a different level of investment capacity, which impacts the 
quality of the content. Thus, readers seeking high-quality national coverage of Brazilian politics may 
be   ‘trapped’. And, considering the audience that these large corporations have, perhaps few 
advertisers will stop advertising because they disagree with a given editorial line. They want their 
advertisements to have the largest impact possible.  
692 Copp, 'Capitalism versus Democracy: The Marketing of Votes and the Marketing of Political 
Power', 96.  
693 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 185. 
694 Sartori, Elementos de Teoría Política, 155.  
695 For instance, Azevedo argues that the Brazilian media had a leading role in president Fernando 
Collor’s  impeachment  in  1991,  by  mobilizing  public  opinion  and  putting  impeachment  on  the  agenda.  
Fernando Antônio Azevedo, 'Eleições Presidenciais, Clivagem de Classe e Declínio da Grande 
Imprensa' (2011) Revista USP 84 107.  
696 For example, in 1987, Globo TV, the largest Brazilian television channel, reportedly refused to 
transmit a landmark rally organised by the opposition in 1987, requesting open elections for the 
Presidency of the Republic. Instead, Fábio Comparato reports, that day the television channel 
preferred to transmit trifling news, such as the tricks used by an American Indian to sell coloured 
chicks; conversations a girl had with dolphins in the United States; and so forth. Comparato, 'Tocando 
no Ponto Nevrálgico: A Democratização da Informação e da Comunicação Social' 140.  
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power to influence elections is not absolute — in  2006,   the  Workers’  Party  candidate,  
Lula, won the elections despite arguably strong opposition from the mainstream media697 
(maybe this was only possible because the Workers’   Party   coalition   had   significant  
access to broadcast, as assured by the legislation,698 and Lula was the presidential 
candidate who received the largest amount of corporate donations).699 Along these lines, 
although media corporations seem to play an important role in  shaping   the  audience’s  
view, it seems too crude to suggest that the audience is totally passive to what media 
corporations publish.700  
That said, considering that (i) mass media corporations reach thousands and 
frequently millions of people and their political coverage has an impact on the audience; 
and (ii) media owners have a significant discretion to guide the political coverage of 
their corporations; I assume that media owners have an immense (but not absolute) 
power to shape public opinion.   
 
The  extent  of  the  media’s  freedom  of  speech 
 When   it   comes   to   the   extent   of   the  media’s   freedom  of   speech,   the   libertarian  
view is the one adopted by the mainstream media in Brazil. In short, the typical 
                                                             
697 Azevedo, 'Eleições Presidenciais, Clivagem de Classe e Declínio da Grande Imprensa'. See also 
Venício Artur de Lima, Jornais mais ideológicos e partidarizados (Observatório da Imprensa 2010). 
698 Gabriel   Mestieri,   ‘PT   passa   o   PSDB   pela   1ª   vez   em   tempo   de   TV,   mas   liderança   no   horário  
eleitoral  não  garante  vitória’  R7 (5 August 2010) <http://noticias.r7.com/brasil/noticias/com-dilma-pt-
tera-tempo-de-tv-maior-que-concorrentes-pela-1-vez-na-historia-20100801.html> accessed 3 
November 2017. 
699 Último Segundo,   ‘Confira   os   maiores   doadores   de   Lula   e   Alckmin   na   eleição’   Clicknews (29 
November 2006) <https://www.clickpb.com.br/politica/confira-os-maiores-doadores-de-lula-e-
alckmin-na-eleicao-11074.html> accessed 3 November 2017. Azevedo  argues  that  the  Workers’  Party  
won the 2006 and 2010 presidential elections because their government was delivering economic 
growth, which, according to him, would corroborate Lewis-Beck’s   argument   that   good   economic  
performance keeps the ruling party in office — Azevedo, 'Eleições Presidenciais, Clivagem de Classe 
e Declínio da Grande Imprensa', making reference to Michael S Lewis-Beck, Economics and 
Elections: The Major Western Democracies (University of Michigan Press 1990). Perhaps all these 
factors (access to broadcast, large funding and economic context) were relevant.  
700 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 184.  
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argument is that communication is a private matter and any form of regulation is 
interpreted as a form of censorship and a violation of freedom of speech.701 Therefore, 
freedom of the press is taken as a synonym for freedom of expression.  
 The mainstream media frequently illustrate their libertarian view with the 
argument that “the  best  control  is  the  citizens’  remote  control”.  To  put  it  differently,  the  
state  should  not   interfere  with   the  citizens’  remote  control.  This  argument   is  similar  to  
the libertarian one on political finance in the sense that the state does not have 
legitimacy to regulate the flow of information and that society will be better off without 
state interference.702  
However, the Brazilian Supreme Court has recently ruled that, when it comes to 
politics, freedom of speech needs to serve the enlargement of public debate, informing 
citizens with different policy proposals.703 As a consequence, in my view, the coverage 
of politics by the media should be plural and diverse, as well as the circulation of 
political ideas and opinions.  
Freedom of speech is still key, of course, and needs to be respected: there should 
be no censorship of content, as ruled by the Supreme Court.704 But, when it comes to 
politics, the laws that structure the media should be designed so as to foster plural and 
diverse political deliberation, under the egalitarian model of electoral regulation, either 
from the Rawlsian or Schumpeterian conceptions of democracy. 
 
 
                                                             
701 Mauersberger, Advocacy Coalitions and Democratizing Media Reforms in Latin America: Whose 
Voice Gets on the Air?, 173.  
702 See subsection 7.2.1. 
703 As argued by Justice Fux, while delivering the leading vote of the majority in STF, ADI 4650/DF, 
Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 50.  
704 STF, ADI 4451 MC, Rel Min Ayres Britto, DJ 13/09/2010; STF, ADI 4451, Rel Min Alexandre de 
Moraes, DJ 06/03/2018. 
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8.3.2. The constitutional distinction between broadcast and other media  
 The Brazilian Constitution makes a distinction between broadcast and other 
media. Unlike all other media, broadcast media is considered a public utility by the 
Constitution and therefore the Federal Government of Brazil has exclusive power to 
operate it, either directly or through authorisation, concession or permission.705 A 
possible justification for this distinction is that, unlike other media, broadcast depends 
on a scarce natural resource: the radio frequency spectrum.706 The transmission of 
information through airwaves requires occupying an area of the spectrum band, which is 
finite. This calls for the organisation, selection and supervision of who will occupy it.707 
And the Constitution has granted this duty to the state. 
 Being a constitutional public utility, free-of-charge access to radio and television 
are granted to political parties (article 17 paras 3). In addition, infra-constitutional 
legislation forbids paid political advertising in broadcast both during electoral and non-
electoral periods, and broadcasters must act with due impartiality during elections.708  
 This legal framework is adequate also because television is historically the 
media with the greatest impact on the formation of public opinion in the country.   
 
                                                             
705 Article 21 item XII. 
706 BBC, ‘The   Spectrum   and   Its   Uses:   A   simple   guide   to   the   radio   spectrum’   (2006)  
<http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rd/pubs/spectrum/bbc-the-spectrum-and-its-uses.pdf> accessed 4 
November 2017. 
707 Ivar A M Hartmann, 'Liberdade de Manifestação Política e Campanhas: É Preciso Aten c̜ão aos 
Algoritmos' in Joaquim Falcão (ed), Reforma Eleitoral no Brasil: Legislação, Democracia e Internet 
em Debate (Civilização Brasileira 2015) 156. 
708 The Brazilian framework is similar to the one in the United Kingdom in this aspect. British 
privately-owned broadcasters (and the publicly owned Channel 4) are required to provide fair access 
(Office of Communications Broadcasting Code, 27); paid political advertising is forbidden 
(Communications Act 2003, s319 (2) (g) and 321(2)); and free time is given to political parties for 
party and election broadcasts (Communications Act 2003 s333 and Office of Communications 
Broadcasting Code, 27). See Andrew Geddis, 'The Press: The Media and The 'Rupert Murdoch 
Problem'' in Keith D Ewing, Jacob Rowbottom and Joo-Cheong Tham (eds), The Funding of Political 
Parties: Where Now? (Routledge 2012). The BBC, although governed by another legal framework, 
also must obey similar rules on impartiality and fair access.  
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  The greater impact of broadcast television on public opinion  
Often   referred   as   the   ‘country of   television’,   Brazil   has   had   a   high   television  
viewership in comparison to other mass media sources, by international standards,709 as 
mentioned in chapter two. In a comprehensive poll about the habits of media 
consumption of the Brazilian population requested by the government in 2016, 63% of 
the Brazilian citizens said that television is their main source of information, while only 
26% said it was the internet, 7% said that it was the radio and 3% mentioned the 
press.710 To put it another way, the impact of the television was at least twice that of the 
internet.711 When asked about their top two main sources of information, television was 
mentioned by 89%, while the internet was mentioned by 49%.  
Nonetheless, the victory of Bolsonaro in the 2018 election for the Presidency led 
some hurriedly conclude that television is not that relevant anymore. Their main 
argument  was  that  Jair  Bolsonaro’s  coalition  had  derisory  free  airtime  in  the  broadcasts 
during the first round and won the election despite that. For those  analysts,  Bolsonaro’s  
victory could be largely explained by his great performance in social media, particularly 
on WhatsApp, where arguably fake news was spread in his favour.  
There are two problems with that argument. First, it ignores a key circumstance 
of the election: Bolsonaro was seriously stabbed while campaigning, which put his life 
in danger.712 Because of that unprecedented fact in the Brazilian presidential elections, 
                                                             
709 Ames, Baker and Rennó, 'The Quality of Elections in Brazil: Policy, Performance, Pageantry, or 
Pork?' 112.  
710 Presidência  da  República,  Secretaria  de  Comunicação  Social,  ‘Relatório  Final  Pesquisa  Brasileira  
de Mídia — PBM  2016’,  14.   
711 The numbers mentioned above refer mostly to free-to-air television. Around 27% of the population 
have premium television but very few mentioned it as their top source of information. Presidência da 
República,  Secretaria  de  Comunicação  Social,  ‘Relatório  Final  Pesquisa Brasileira de Mídia — PBM 
2016’. 
712 Dom  Phillips,   ‘Jair  Bolsonaro   stabbing:   knife   attack  plunges  Brazil's   election   into   disarray’   The 
Guardian.  Ernesto  Londoño  and  Shasta  Darlington,  ‘Jair  Bolsonaro,  Presidential  Candidate  in  Brazil,  
Is  Stabbed’  The New York Times.  
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he received vast favourable coverage from television channels from the day of the attack 
to the day of the first round of the election.713 The news essentially reported that the 
attack threatened his life and updates about his recovery were constantly given. Because 
he was constantly exposed to television, and in a favourable way, the knife attack served 
as an immensely effective political advertisement. Thus, due to the knife attack, 
Bolsonaro managed to overcome the above-mentioned weakness of his campaign, that 
is, low free airtime in broadcast in the first round. Moreover, Bolsonaro received large 
free airtime in broadcast in the second round, as granted by the legislation, so he did not 
have that competitive disadvantage when the election was in its final phase. Another 
factor  that  is  overlooked  by  those  analysts  who  have  professed  the  ‘death’  of  television  
is that Bolsonaro apparently had the support of the second largest714 television 
corporation in Brazil, Record TV.715  
Secondly, data on the impact of WhatsApp are mixed, to say the least. In a 
statistical survey conducted during the first round of the presidential election, only 11% 
of the voters said they often consumed information in WhatsApp to find out more about 
the presidential candidates, such as campaign proposals or information in general. By 
contrast, the top two sources of information mentioned by voters were related to 
television: 35% said they often watched TV news programs and 28% said they often 
                                                             
713 See Laboratory on Media and the Public Sphere (LEMEP) of the Rio de Janeiro State University 
(UERJ), (Manchetômetro) <http://www.manchetometro.com.br/> accessed 31 January 2019; 
searching  data  about  the  Globo  TV’s  news  program  Jornal  Nacional between 06 September (the day 
of the attack) and 06 October (the day before the first-round election). The coverage from Folha de S. 
Paulo, the most popular broadsheet journal, also had a similar pattern, with Bolsonaro having more 
than three times as many positive mentions as other candidates. Folha de S. Paulo,   ‘Críticas   a  
Bolsonaro   e   a   Haddad   têm   as   mesmas   proporções   na   Folha’   (12   October   2018)  
<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/criticas-a-bolsonaro-e-a-haddad-tem-as-mesmas-
proporcoes-na-folha.shtml> accessed 3 November 2018. 
714 In  terms  of  cumulative  audience  reach  (ie,  percentage  of  people  impacted  by)  of  the  corporation’s  
main news program. Kantar  Ibope  Media,  ‘Dados  de  audiência  nas  15  praças  regulares  com  base  no  
ranking consolidado — 22/10  a  28/10’  <https://www.kantaribopemedia.com/dados-de-audiencia-nas-
15-pracas-regulares-com-base-no-ranking-consolidado-2210-a-2810/> accessed 31 January 2019. 
715 As  mentioned  in  chapter  two,  two  events  were  apparently  crucial  to  Bolsonaro’s  victory:  the  Car  
Wash Operation (and other similar quid pro quo corruption scandals) and the knife attack. The 
traditional mainstream media heavily covered those two events in a way that eventually enhanced 
Bolsonaro’s  quality  as  a  candidate. 
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watched  parties’   free  airtime   in  television.716 Along these lines, some have pointed out 
that Fernando Haddad was only able to jump from 4% in August to 22% of vote 
intentions   in   October   because   he   used   the   extensive   Workers’   Party   free   airtime   in  
television.717 
Likewise, data do not seem to fully support the argument that fake news718 
spread through WhatsApp overwhelmingly impacted public opinion. Only 23% of voters 
said say they received WhatsApp content with criticism or attacks on presidential 
candidates the week before the first round. And only 6% of voters said that the content 
they received through WhatsApp helped them in the process of choosing the candidate 
to vote for.719 
Actually, there is a question of how much people trust the content they consume 
in social media. An online opinion poll commissioned in 2018 by the Reuters Institute 
for the Study of Journalism of the University of Oxford found that Brazilian internet 
users have almost two times more trust in news overall (59%), than in news consumed 
                                                             
716 Datafolha, ‘Programa   jornalístico   de   tv   é   a   principal   fonte   de   informação   sobre   os   candidatos  a  
presidente’   (11   September   2018)  
<http://media.folha.uol.com.br/datafolha/2018/09/12/f57e60bb0d259d2f9084d4f3ff460465mi.pdf> 
accessed 31 January 2019.  
717 O Estado de S. Paulo,   ‘Pesquisas   Eleitorais’  
<https://politica.estadao.com.br/eleicoes/2018/pesquisas-eleitorais/primeiro-turno/presidente/ibope> 
accessed 31 January 2019. 
718 ‘Fake  news’  are  ‘false  stories  that  appear  to  be  news,  spread  on  the  internet  or  using  other  media,  
usually created to influence   political   views   or   as   a   joke’.   ‘fake   news’   (Cambridge   Dictionary)  
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fake-news> accessed 31 January 2019. Fake 
news is part of the post-truth  phenomenon,   that   is,   ‘circumstances   in  which   objective   facts   are less 
influential  in  shaping  public  opinion  than  appeals  to  emotion  and  personal  belief’,  which  has  recently  
emerged   to   a   certain   extent.   See   ‘post-truth’   (OED Online, OUP) 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/58609044?redirectedFrom=post-truth#eid> accessed 6 November 
2017. 
719 G1,  ‘73%  dizem  que  não  receberam  conteúdo  no  WhatsApp  com  críticas  ou  ataques  a  candidatos  
na   semana   antes   do   1º   turno,   diz   Ibope’   (24   October   2018)  
<https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2018/eleicao-em-numeros/noticia/2018/10/24/73-dizem-que-
nao-receberam-conteudo-no-whatsapp-com-criticas-ou-ataques-a-candidatos-na-semana-antes-do-1o-
turno-diz-ibope.ghtml> accessed 3 February 2019. As of February 2019, empirical evidence on the 
impact of fake news is mixed, to say the least, also in the United States. See, eg, Andrew Guess, 
Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, 'Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence from the 
Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 US Presidential Campaign' (2018) European Research 
Council ; and Nir Grinberg and others, 'Fake News on Twitter during the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Election' (2019) 363 Science 374. 
253 
 
through social media (32%).720 This finding is aligned with the results of the already 
mentioned comprehensive poll requested by the Brazilian government in 2016, which 
found that most Brazilians always or often trust the information they get from television, 
radio and newspapers (54%, 57% and 59%, respectively); while only a minority always 
or often trust the information they get from the internet (20% always or often trust the 
information they get from websites, 11% from blogs, and 14% from social media).721  
Therefore, that indicates that news and arguments within the internet in general, 
and social media in particular, are more reliable if they were originally produced or 
reported by the traditional media. If the event or argument does not appear in one of the 
traditional media organisations, it ends up being seen as a less important event/argument 
(or not even an event/argument at all) by some people. As argued by Copp, 
 
If certain opinions are not discussed seriously in the major media, they 
may not be taken seriously by most voters who, because they have 
limited time to research political matters, accept the implicit verdict of 
the media as to what range of ideas is worth serious attention.722  
 
Thus, I have a sceptical view of the internet (and social media in particular),723 in 
the sense that the public debate that takes place in it is largely constrained by the 
traditional media (who produce what is seen by most people as the creditable news).724  
                                                             
720 Nic Newman and others, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018 (2018). 
721 Presidência  da  República,  Secretaria  de  Comunicação  Social,  ‘Relatório  Final  Pesquisa  Brasileira  
de Mídia — PBM  2016’,  28. 
722 Copp, 'Capitalism versus Democracy: The Marketing of Votes and the Marketing of Political 
Power', 96. 
723 For a good summary of the different views on the internet, see Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: 
Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 216. 
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Along these lines, it seems that people still heavily rely on the journalistic 
protocol. Actually, the slightest suspicion   that   some   people   were   relying   on   ‘news’  
produced without the journalistic protocol caused a sort of hysteria among members of 
the establishment, civil organisations, academics, and even in micro-social circles, such 
as groups of friends and families. In this fashion, it is symbolic that, for many (perhaps 
most) people, the remedy for fake news is to check the source. That is, check if the 
content was produced by the mainstream traditional media. To put it differently, for 
many, the solution to the immature use of new technology (that is, social media and 
messaging apps) is the strengthening of the role of traditional journalistic media. For 
example, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee appointed by the House of 
Commons  in  the  UK,  in  its  final  report  on  Disinformation  and  ‘Fake  News’,  concluded  
that   ‘social   media   users   need   online   tools   to   help   them   distinguish   between   quality 
journalism, and stories coming from organisations that have been linked to 
disinformation  or  are  regarded  as  being  unreliable  sources’.725 
To summarise, no doubt social media changed the dynamics of the flow of 
communication to a certain extent: (i) platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, enable 
easy direct communication between politicians and voters (making easier to 
communicate without the mediation of the traditional media or public funding); and (ii) 
these same platforms, along with WhatsApp, encourage communication between 
citizens (making it easier, for instance, to organise protests, deliberate and spread 
                                                                                                                                                                            
724 The news website UOL (owned by Folha, the largest Brazilian newspaper) is the third website 
with most access in Brazil, after Google and Facebook, which are websites that do not produce news, 
only distribute them. See Olhar Digital,   ‘Saiba   quais   são   os   sites   mais   acessados   do   Brasil’   (17  
February 2014) <https://olhardigital.com.br/pro/noticia/saiba-quais-sao-os-sites-mais-acessados-do-
brasil/40352> accessed 3 November 2017. It should be highlighted, however, that largely does not 
mean totally. Without a doubt, the internet has the merit of giving voices to new sources and voices.  
725 Digital,  Culture,  Media  and  Sport  Committee,  Disinformation  and  ‘fake  news’:  Final  Report  (HC  
2017-19, 1791) (emphasis added). The  committee  also  recommended  the  Government  to  ‘put  pressure  
on social media companies to publicise any instances of disinformation’  (paragraph 272). This could 
be extended to foreign influence; although, when looking to the Brazilian context, there are no reports 
of significant foreign influence in political campaigns as of February 2019. 
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rumours). Nonetheless, their limitations should not be overlooked: we must not 
overestimate their impact on public opinion. Firstly, as of February 2019, there is not 
enough data to safely claim that the internet has a greater reach than television as a 
media platform (in other words, that more people use the internet to consume political 
information than watch television). Secondly, the debate within the internet is largely 
constrained by the extent to which people trust the information and, as such, it is largely 
constrained by the content produced by the traditional media. 
Therefore, it seems that television is still the media with the largest impact on 
public opinion in Brazil with respect to the extent of its reach; followed by the internet, 
which continues to grow steadily. And, although the radio and the press have smaller 
audiences, they have an impact on the debate that takes place on the internet, because 
many believe that the traditional mainstream media is a trusted gatekeeper of the news 
and arguments that are worthy of debate.  
 
8.3.3. The limitations of the electoral legislation on the media  
 
 The regulation of broadcast during elections 
As we saw in chapter three and earlier in this chapter, legislation provides parties 
with free airtime in broadcasts during elections (while any paid political advertising is 
forbidden in broadcasts). There is no doubt this is sound policy.726  
Nonetheless, media corporations may still promote or block an issue, viewpoint 
or speaker, while covering politics.727 This is why the Elections Act regulates 
                                                             
726 See Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 21. 
727 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 178. 
256 
 
broadcaster conduct, to guarantee impartiality.728 Considering  that  Brazil’s  broadcasting 
is essentially performed by private corporations (as seen in chapter two), this regulation 
seems crucial.  
 Starting about three months before the election day, broadcasters are prohibited 
from giving privileged treatment to a candidate, party or coalition.729  
But does that work in practice? Although it may have helped in moderating the 
intensity of the bias,730 its limitation must be noted. Some bias remains. Data from the 
Laboratory of Media Studies and Public Sphere (LEMEP) of the State University of Rio 
de Janeiro731 shows that, during the presidential election of 2014, the most watched news 
program   in   the   country   (Globo  TV’s   Jornal Nacional) made unequal coverage of the 
two main candidates and their political parties: 
 
                                                             
728 Articles 8 and 45. 
729 Article 45 item IV. According to the opinion of Justice Ayres Britto, followed by the majority of 
the Supreme Court in 2010, radio and television broadcasters may transmit opinions or 
journalistically criticise the candidates/parties but they cannot, as a media corporation, clearly 
support, or repudiate, one of the candidates/parties of the elections. The decision of what can be 
interpreted as clearly supporting or repudiating one of the candidates/parties should be made a 
posteriori by the judiciary. STF, ADI 4451. It should be noted that the Elections Act forbids specific 
acts, such as: the transmission of programs presented or commented by a pre-candidate (article 45, 
paras 1); the transmission of programs that have a name which relates to a candidate chosen by 
convention, even if pre-existing, even if it coincides with the name of the candidate or with the 
nominal variation adopted by him (article 45 item VI); the transmission of images of popular 
consultation and polls in which it is possible to identify the interviewee (article 45, item I); and 
broadcast or divulge films, soap operas, series or any other program with an allusion or critique to a 
candidate or political party, even if it is concealed, except for journalistic programs or political 
debates (article 45 item V). Formerly, the legislation also established that broadcasters were 
prohibited from disseminating opinions favourable or contrary to any candidate, party, coalition, its 
organs or representatives (article 45 item III, final part); and from using montage or other audio or 
video technique that in any way degrades or ridicules candidate, party or coalition, or produces or 
sells a program for that purpose (article 45 item II). However, in 2010, the majority of the Supreme 
Court approved an injunction granted by Justice Ayres Britto suspending these two norms because 
they violated the constitutional rights to free speech, freedom of the press and information. In 2018, 
the Court confirmed the unconstitutionality of these two norms. See STF, ADI 4451. For a discussion 
about the case, see Osório, Direito Eleitoral e Liberdade de Expressão, 274. 
730 See Azevedo, 'Mídia e Democracia no Brasil: Relações entre o Sistema de Mídia e o Sistema 
Político' 108. 
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Therefore, even with impartiality rules, there was an apparent imbalance in the 
Jornal Nacional coverage: the centre-left  PT  (Workers’  Party)  and  its  candidate  received  
more negative coverage in comparison with the coverage of the main opposition party, 
the centre-right PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) and its candidate.  
 
 The regulation of broadcasts during non-electoral periods 
Broadcasters can also influence democratic deliberation during non-electoral 
periods. And the Brazilian legislation lacks any impartiality rules with respect to non-
electoral periods.  
Consequently, this has enabled Jornal Nacional to exercise its watchdog 
function with inconsistency, at least according to the LEMEP data. After May 2016, 
when the centre-left Dilma Rousseff732 stepped aside and the conservative Michel 
Temer733 took office, the news program diminished the intensity of its government 
criticism. While the second Rousseff administration had an average of 98 negative items 
per month, Temer’s Administration had an average of 40 negative items per month.734 
Unlike Brazil, there are countries, such as the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand, which require broadcasters to act impartially at all times.735  
However, their regulations also have limitations. I will take the United Kingdom 
as an example. British commercial broadcasters must obey specific regulation about 
political or industrial issues on which politicians, industry and/or the media are in 
                                                             
732 From  the  PT  (Workers’  Party). 
733 From the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement party). 
734 Laboratory on Media and the Public Sphere (LEMEP) of the Rio de Janeiro State University 
(UERJ). The last month of the Temer Administration analysed was October 2017, when I concluded 
the research for this chapter.  
735 Geddis, 'The Press: The Media and The 'Rupert Murdoch Problem'' 141.  
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debate.736 And on matters relating to current public policy, the  broadcaster’s  views  and  
opinions must be excluded from programmes737,  and  due  impartiality  ‘must  be  preserved 
on  the  part  of  any  person  providing  a  service’.738  
Nonetheless, the British media authority — Ofcom (Office of Communications 
Broadcasting) — concedes that these regulations have important limitations. Ofcom 
admits   that   the   Broadcasting   Code   allows   them   ‘to consider complaints about 
impartiality   or   accuracy   in   relation   to   specific   programmes’   but   does   not allow an 
analysis   of   ‘the   overarching   approach   of   a   channel,   for   example,   the specific news 
stories that it covers or its tone’.739  
Hence, British commercial broadcasters still have considerable space to shape a 
lot of the news coverage: which stories may be prioritised (which stories make the 
headlines or the order in which stories are presented);740 the whole selection of content 
itself (the selection or omission of news);741 the tone and level of depth of coverage (a 
channel could become more partisan by sensationalising news stories and could more 
                                                             
736 Office of Communications Broadcasting Code, 28.  
737 Ibid, 5.4. 
738 Ibid,   5.5.   On   such  matters   of   political   or   industrial   controversy,   and   current   public   policy,   ‘an  
appropriately wide range of significant views must be included and given due weight in each 
programme or in clearly linked  and  timely  programmes’  (p  30).  While news presenters and reporters 
in news programmes are forbidden from expressing their views and opinions (item 5.4),  ‘presenters  of  
personal view or authored programmes or items, and chairs of discussion programmes may express 
their own views on matters of political or industrial controversy or matters relating to current public 
policy’,  as  long  as ‘alternative  viewpoints  are  adequately  represented  either  in  the  programme,  or  in  a  
series of programmes taken as a whole’,   and   presenters   do   not   ‘use   the   advantage   of   regular  
appearances  to  promote  their  views  in  a  way  that  compromises  the  requirement  for  due  impartiality’ 
(p 29). During   elections,   ‘due   weight   must   be   given   to   the   coverage   of   larger   parties’   and  
‘broadcasters must also consider giving appropriate coverage to other parties and independent 
candidates  with   significant   views   and   perspectives’   (item  6.2)  — the Code then sets some rules to 
help to achieve these objectives.  
739 Ofcom, Public Interest Test for the Proposed Acquisition of Sky plc by 21st Century Fox, Inc 
(Office of Communications 2017), 9.11 (emphasis added). 
740 Ibid 85. 
741 Ibid 85. In this regard, Rowbottom observes that there is a problem on the account of which 
political or industrial issues are in debate. Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and 
Democratic Politics, 209. 
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deeply investigate certain issues);742 and the selection of speakers743 (the speaker of a 
given cause may be less articulate than the speaker for its competing cause). The 
Broadcasting Code does not cover those forms of impartiality.  
According to Ofcom, regulating such editorial discretion would raise serious 
concerns about freedom of speech.744  
Returning to Brazil, free speech is quite a sensitive topic for the country: until 
1985, Brazil faced an authoritarian regime that implemented censorship.745 Thus, 
enacting legislation introducing far-reaching impartiality obligations is likely to face 
understandable resistance.  
It is true that Brazilian legislation can be improved in some points without 
damaging free speech: the legislation can be extended to non-electoral periods; become 
more detailed by learning from the British experience; and require broadcasters to be 
transparent regarding the criteria they have used to select news.746 But, in any event, 
impartiality obligations will always be limited due to the protection of free speech.  
To summarise, I understand that the Brazilian impartiality obligations seem to be 
insufficient to satisfactorily guarantee the democratic function of broadcasters because: 
(i) at the moment they are limited to the conduct of broadcasts during elections; and (ii) 
even if we extend them to non-electoral periods and even if we introduce a more detailed 
legislation harmless to free speech to help to increase broadcaster impartiality, 
                                                             
742 Ofcom, Public Interest Test for the Proposed Acquisition of Sky plc by 21st Century Fox, Inc, 9.11. 
See also Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 209. 
743 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 209. 
744 Ofcom, Public Interest Test for the Proposed Acquisition of Sky plc by 21st Century Fox, Inc, 85. 
745 See, eg, Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, 'A Censura durante o Regime Autoritário' (1989) 4 Revista 
Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 21. A new Constitution was promulgated in 1967, in order to legalise 
the authoritarian state. That Carta created conditions to the promulgation of future legislation that 
established censorship in the country. During the 20th century, there was also censorship during 
Vargas’s   authoritarian   state   (1937–1945). See Lilia Moritz Schwarcz and Heloisa Murgel Starling, 
Brasil: Uma Biografia (Companhia das Letras 2015) 376.  
746 Perhaps broadcasters should be more transparent about what criteria they have used. And the 
criteria should be open to debate and modified in case their application is found to exclude any 
speaker. Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 210. 
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impartiality obligations will not be sufficient because there will always be some 
discretion afforded to broadcasters747 due to the protection of free speech. 
 
  The regulation of the internet and the press during elections  
 The Elections Act forbids any type of paid advertisement on the internet. 
However, it allows boosting of content748 (article 57-C), as long as there is disclosure to 
users that the dissemination of that content was paid for. Legislation should be 
continuously updated to nurture healthy political deliberation on the internet. It should, 
for example, ensure that all political messages on social media carry information 
about who produced them; and it should be a criminal offence to fail to identify the 
source of the message. Moreover, legislation should ensure that social media robots 
do not disfigure political deliberation online — a possible remedy is to require social 
media companies to implement security certificates, to ensure that a real person is 
behind the views expressed on the account. 
 And, while the legislation does not grant parties free access to the press, it 
permits candidates to pay at their own expenses for the publication of up to ten electoral 
advertisements, per newspaper or magazine, at different dates (article 43).749 However, 
as observed by Aline Osório, there are no restrictions in relation to the number of 
                                                             
747 The limited effectiveness of impartiality rules raises even more concern if we note that several 
congressmen own broadcast affiliate and/or retransmission stations (violating a constitutional ban, as 
we have seen in subsection 2.6.3). By being an owner of a television or radio station, the candidate 
has a greater opportunity to influence the formation of public opinion in his constituency vis-à-vis a 
candidate that is not. See footnote 135. See also Osório, Direito Eleitoral e Liberdade de Expressão, 
318.  
748 Boosting of content occurs when there is a payment to internet platforms, such as Google, 
Facebook, Twitter LinkedIn or WhatsApp, for them to boost a given content in order to reach people 
that would not normally be reached. See, also, Resolução nº 23551, de 18 de dezembro de 2017, do 
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, publicada no DJE-TSE, nº 26, de 5/2/2018, p 248–273, e DJE-TSE, nº 94, 
de 14/5/2018, 98–124. 
749 The maximum space, by edition, is 1/8 of the page of the broadsheet newspaper and 1/4 of the 
page of the magazine or tabloid. 
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newspapers and magazines.750 For instance, a candidate may publish ten electoral 
advertisements in the top ten Brazilian newspapers and magazines, totalising 100 
advertisements. 
 Therefore, the amount of money a party (and their candidates) has, impacts the 
volume of their voice on the internet (through the impulse of content) and in the press 
(through electoral advertisements), not mentioning the quality of their speech (that is, 
the quality of the video, audios, texts and images published). This shows the importance 
of regulating the equality of opportunity between parties and their candidates, which will 
be addressed in the next chapter.  
Lastly, it should be highlighted that there are no impartiality obligations within 
the press, or for contents produced exclusively for the internet. Thus, non-broadcasters 
have full freedom to support a party or a candidate. 
 
8.3.4. A proposal of measures to ensure plurality and diversity  
So far, I have argued that the legislation regarding access to broadcast and 
impartiality of broadcasters during elections is not (and will never be) sufficient to 
preclude  media  corporations’   influence  over   the  democratic debate. We have also seen 
that the electoral regulation of the internet and press are quite loose.  
As a corollary, in this subsection I will argue that the state should also 
implement  measures   to   ensure  plurality   and  diversity:   a   ‘negative’   one, by controlling 
media ownership concentration, in order to avoid concentrations that will harm the 
forum   of   political   deliberation;;   and   a   ‘positive’   one,   by   stimulating the creation and 
existence of alternative media corporations through subsidies, in order to enhance the 
                                                             
750 Osório, Direito Eleitoral e Liberdade de Expressão, 332–333. 
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media’s  plurality  of  ownership  and  diversity  of  content.  Brazil  currently  lacks  any  kind  
of media regulation in those terms.  
 
 The difference between the manifestation  of  the  media’s  economic   
 power in relevant markets and on public opinion 
 In  the  media  sector,  a  company’s  power  to   impact  public  opinion  may  be  quite  
independent of its market power. For example, if the largest local newspaper in 
Michigan buys the largest local newspaper in Florida, the antitrust authority may find 
that the acquisition will not result in anticompetitive effects since the newspapers 
operate in different relevant markets. The antitrust analysis will ignore, thus, that the 
acquisition  may  increase  the  corporation’s  power  over  public  opinion  within  the  broader 
national public sphere.751 If one media group owns the largest local newspapers of all the 
state capitals of the US,  the  relevant  markets  may  not  overlap,  but  the  owner’s  capacity  
to influence a presidential election would be evident.  
 Therefore, antitrust law has a limitation with respect to the media. Even if we 
apply the strictest antitrust enforcement (within the boundaries of the hegemonic 
versions of the antitrust models discussed in subsection 7.3.3), there could still be certain 
antidemocratic mergers and acquisitions that would be cleared. This is because the 
hegemonic versions of the main antitrust   models   are   not   concerned   with   the  media’s  




                                                             
751 Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters, 14. 
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 The criterion of impact on public opinion   
The importance of the media to democracy is recognised by the Brazilian 
Constitution: in my view (a Rawlsian one), its text imposes a twofold control of media 
concentrations. Firstly, so far as the economic aspects are concerned, the Constitution 
1988  sets  that  ‘social  communication  media  may  not,  directly  or  indirectly,  be  subject  to  
monopoly   or   oligopoly’   (article   220   paragraph   5).   Therefore,   when   it   comes   to  
broadcast, antitrust enforcement must observe this constitutional provision.752    
However, the economic aspects of media markets are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. What concerns this thesis is that the Constitution goes further and imposes a 
second step: a regulation of the media that goes beyond mere economic aspects.  
 As we have seen, article 14 paragraph 9 establishes that the law should protect 
elections from the influence of economic power, as far as possible, according to a 
Rawlsian interpretation of the constitutional text. Media companies are unquestionably a 
form of economic power.753 Not only is the media an economic power, but it is, by far, 
the one that most directly influences elections.  
 Considering that typical electoral regulation (that is, granting access to broadcast 
and regulating broadcasters’   conduct, and regulating advertisements in other forms of 
media) are  not  enough  to  satisfactorily  insulate  elections  from  the  influence  of  media’s  
economic power; it follows that a regulation of the media’s  structure is inescapable. This 
                                                             
752 For André Fernandes, article 220 paragraph 5 of the Constitution infers that the regulation of 
media ownership should be based on pluralism rather than efficiency. See André de Godoy 
Fernandes, 'Meios de Comunicação Social no Brasil: Promoção do Pluralismo, Direito Concorrencial 
e Regulação' (Tese de Doutorado em Direito, Universidade de São Paulo 2009). Alexandre Faraco has 
a similar view. Faraco, Democracia e Regulação das Redes Eletrônicas de Comunicação: Rádio, 
Televisão e Internet. I respectfully disagree. In my view, since article 220 paragraph 5 refers to 
economic concepts (ie, monopoly and oligopoly), it is referring to economic aspects of the media 
market. It is, in other words, implementing an economic limit on the concentration of the media 
market. In my view, it is the article 14 paragraph 9 of the Constitution which imposes a further step, 
transcending the economic analysis by demanding the democratic distribution of media resources and 
the adoption of the impact on public opinion as the proper paradigm for media regulation. 
753 As mentioned in footnote 4, I take economic power as a synonym for wealth power, that is, the 
power that derives from the private ownership of financial resources, or other forms of private assets.  
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is the only way  we  can  respect  the  Constitution’s  text,  which  expresses  the  intention  to  
avoid, as far as possible, the influence of economic power in elections. To put it 
differently,   by   reading   the   Constitution’s   text   under   a   Rawlsian   perspective   of  
democracy, the media sector should be structured in a way to diminish the influence of 
its economic power over elections.  
 In  this  way,  regulation  of  the  media’s  structure  should  be  considered  part  of  the  
egalitarian electoral regulation established by the Constitution. Assuming an egalitarian 
electoral regulation grounded on the Rawlsian principle that individuals should have 
equal opportunity to speak and be heard,754 media ownership should ideally be the most 
dispersed possible. Thus, media regulation   could   be   based   on   C.   Edwin   Baker’s  
principle of democratic media distribution. That   is,   ‘democracy   implies   as   wide   as  
practical   a   dispersal   of   power   within   public   discourse’,   which   leads   to   requiring   the  
maximum dispersal of media ownership.755  
 It should be remembered that regulation of the forum of political deliberation, 
which has the media as a pillar, is not concerned with the provision of commodities to 
consumers and prices.756 It is rather concerned with non-commodified values, such as 
democratic distribution757 and power to impact public opinion.758 And the democratic 
distribution principle is an end in itself, and not a means aimed to lead empirically to 
                                                             
754 See subsection 7.2.4. 
755 Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters, 7. 
756 Therefore,  my  regulation  of  the  political  debate  is  different  from  Stucke  and  Grunes’  proposal  of  a  
marketplace of ideas for the media, which is concerned with the diverse provision of commodities to 
consumers — Maurice E Stucke and Allen P Grunes, 'Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas' (2001) 
69 Antitrust Law Journal 249.  One  limitation  of  Stucke  and  Grunes’  model  is that it does not seem to 
take into account the impact of regional market power in the broader national public sphere, as 
described by the example above. 
757 Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters, 74.  
758 Ibid 272. 
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some desirable result.759 In   this   regard,   ‘normative   appeal,   not   empirical   evidence,  
provides its  justification’.760  
Nonetheless, as I have pointed out throughout Part C of this thesis, not everyone 
adopts a Rawlsian conception of democracy to interpret the Brazilian egalitarian model 
of regulation. For those who read article 14 paragraph 9 of the Constitution from a 
Schumpeterian perspective, the law should ensure that people hear a balanced 
deliberation between at least two alternative political elites. Therefore, even for some 
Schumpeterians, the Constitution may still imply that the law should be concerned with 
economic   power’s   impact   on   public   opinion   in   the   sense   of   pursuing a balanced 
deliberation between at least two political elites. In this way, I will also briefly discuss 
the extent to which a Schumpeterian perspective is compatible with the practical 
propositions that will follow below.  
 
The control of mergers and acquisitions  
 It is impossible to grant everyone a television or radio broadcasting licence in a 
country. It is also unlikely that everyone will have the resources to establish and run an 
effective newspaper, with the financial capacity to make the necessary investments to 
deeply investigate political facts and distribute the newspaper to a wide range of people. 
In that sense, a complete dispersal of media ownership could harm the   media’s  
watchdog role (that is, holding the state, particularly the government, to account and 
exposing its abuses of power), as well as its alleged function of helping the construction 
of a common national identity between the citizens of a country composed of different 
                                                             
759 See subsection 7.2.3. 
760 Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters, 8. In addition, empirical 
research on the formation of public opinion and elections is complex. For example, it may be hard to 
determine how many voters were affected and to what extent they were affected by this or that media 
structure. See subsection 4.3.1.  
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communities.761 Therefore, it seems impractical to completely disperse the traditional 
media markets.762  
 As a consequence, the principle of democratic media distribution mentioned 
above could be interpreted as a guarantee that media ownership is representative of the 
different groups in society.763 As  highlighted  by  Rowbottom,   ‘this does not mean that 
media ownership has to be formally allocated to different groups, but that a less 
concentrated media ownership makes it more likely that each major group will have its 
own media outlet’.764  
 Having in mind the impracticality of a complete dispersal of the traditional 
media markets, what should be a reasonable limit to ownership concentration in the 
traditional media markets? The German model for broadcasting, where 30% of the 
                                                             
761 See Faraco, Democracia e Regulação das Redes Eletrônicas de Comunicação: Rádio, Televisão e 
Internet, 103–168. 
762 Even within the internet, where everyone has an opportunity to speak, media corporations — such 
as Google and Facebook — have the power to organise the platform and, therefore, impact the 
dissemination of information. Consequently, they have the power to influence the chance of a given 
voice being heard. But large dispersal of the ownership of internet corporations would also be quite 
controversial because it is indisputable that society has benefitted from the unprecedented flow of 
information and communication among people that corporations, such as Google and Facebook, have 
allowed. In order to continue offering these services with quality, perhaps they need financial 
resources   to   invest.   In  addition,   ‘network  effects’  need   to  be  considered.  That  is,   the  more  users an 
online platform has, the greater its value for people. However, the power that platforms such as 
Google and Facebook have over the forum of political deliberation is something to be observed. The 
algorithm of these companies determines which websites, news, or posts will appear first to the 
internet user. This has been a matter of discussion in many countries. For instance, the Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee appointed by the House of Commons in the UK has 
recommended  that   social  media  companies  should  inform  “users  of  how   their   sites  work,  including  
(…)  the  way  in  which  algorithms  are  used  to  prioritise  certain  stories,  news  and  videos,  depending  on  
each   user’s   profile”,   as   well   as   how   their   curation   functions work (Paragraph 315). See Digital, 
Culture,  Media   and  Sport  Committee,  Disinformation  and   ‘fake   news’:   Final  Report   (HC  2017-19, 
1791). Along these lines, some scholars have suggested that leading scientific institutions should act 
as trustees of these  algorithms,  ‘in  order  to  create  sufficient  transparency  and  trust’.  See,  Dirk Helbing 
and others, Will Democracy Survive Big Data and Artificial Intelligence? (2017); Hartmann, 
'Liberdade de Manifestação Política e Campanhas: É Preciso Atenc̜ão aos Algoritmos'. Although 
relevant, this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is focused on media corporations that 
produce content (ie, the traditional media). I acknowledge that internet media corporations who do not 
produce  content  (but  nonetheless  manage  a  platform)  are  crucial  to  today’s  democratic  deliberations  
and, as such, should also be discussed. However, this is a complex topic because of economic (eg, 
network effects) and legal (eg, transnational regulation) features, which must be left to be properly 
addressed at another time.  
763 Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters, 11. 




aggregate audience765 is   assumed   to   represent   a   ‘predominant   influence   on   public  
opinion’,766 could serve as inspiration for Brazilian policymakers to consider and 
eventually  adapt  to  Brazil’s  circumstances.   
 Under this framework, mergers and acquisitions that will result in more than 
30% of the aggregate audience should not be cleared. Moreover, if a corporation already 
has more than this cap, competitors should have enough financial resources to compete 
effectively and try to reduce this margin. To achieve this objective, direct financial 
subsidies767 can be used to promote plurality and pursue diversity.768 Finally, another 
form of subsidy can be implemented by relaxing the media property of concentrated 
media corporations — in Germany, if an individual private television channel reaches 
10% of audience share, it is obligated to make available part of its airtime to an 
independent media service provider, chosen by regulators.769  
In Brazil, Globo TV has 56% of the preferences.770 Thus, not only is television 
the media source with the most impact on the Brazilian public opinion, it is also a 
market led by a private channel that has a predominant influence on public opinion. 
Therefore, in order to deconcentrate this sector according to a regulation based on the 
principle of democratic media distribution, it is required not only the control of mergers 
and acquisitions, but also policies to assure that different groups in society are granted 
television licences and financial public subsidies to compete effectively with Globo TV.  
                                                             
765 Aggregate audience means the average annual viewer rating of a company.  
766 Article 26 Section 2 of the Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (Interstate Broadcasting Agreement). For a 
discussion about the German legislation on media concentration, see Humphreys, 'Transferable Media 
Pluralism Policies from Europe' 163–164. 
767 Indirect subsidies are the ones assigned to all media entities regardless of the owner or content. For 
example, a tax break to all newspapers. Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and 
Democratic Politics, 197. However, they seem to be of little use if the scope is to stimulate diversity 
of content.  
768 Ibid 186.  
769 Article 26 section 5 of the Rundfunkstaatsvertrag. For a discussion on the topic, see Humphreys, 
'Transferable Media Pluralism Policies from Europe' 164.  
770 Presidência da República, Secretaria  de  Comunicação  Social,  ‘Relatório  Final  Pesquisa  Brasileira  
de Mídia — PBM  2016’,  17.   
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Although the German assumption of ‘predominant  influence  on  public  opinion’ 
is related to broadcasting, under the principle of democratic media distribution that 
assumption could be expanded to other media markets, such as the press. This could be 
done without undermining press watchdog power.  
Surely   the   cap   of   what   may   be   considered   ‘predominant   influence   on   public  
opinion’  is  open  to  discussion.  Under  a  Schumpeterian conception of democracy, the cap 
could be adjusted to 50%. To put it differently, it could be reasonable to establish that no 
private media should have more than 50% of the aggregate audience in their markets, to 
protect  the  possibility  of  political  elites’  alternation  in office.  
 
The deconcentration through subsidies 
Although radio and the press are more dispersed than the television sector (no 
media group has 30% or more of the preferences in those markets, according to some 
accounts771), direct subsidies to these media may also be necessary if we want to 
empower various groups of society with their own media and make it more likely that 
society will have a circulation of ideas and information from different perspectives, and 
consequently a media with an effective watchdog function whatever government is in 
power.772  
Besides empowering the various groups of society with their own media, 
subsidies may be helpful in guaranteeing that a plurality of media ownership translates 
                                                             
771 See   Presidência   da   República,   Secretaria   de   Comunicação   Social,   ‘Relatório   Final   Pesquisa  
Brasileira de Mídia — PBM  2016’. 
772 It should be noted that, although the newspaper market is more plural than the television one, the 
three largest broadsheet newspapers have had a similar conservative political alignment. For the 
plurality  of   the  market,   see  Presidência  da  República,  Secretaria  de  Comunicação  Social,   ‘Relatório 
Final Pesquisa Brasileira de Mídia — PBM   2016’,   22–23. For the diversity of the market, Feres 
Júnior and others, 'A (in)clemente Mídia das Eleições'. Of course, the media's conservative ideology 
is not a problem per se. The problem is the lack of other views. 
270 
 
into a diversity of content.773 Since a plural media sector remains exposed to market 
pressures, such as those from advertisers, it seems reasonable that certain media 
corporations receive direct subsidies to be able to produce diverse content.  
 When we talk about using direct subsidies to foster diversity of content, perhaps 
it is inevitable to ask: what level of diversity should be used as a standard to guide 
subsidy allocation? One  approach   ‘would  be   to   take   the   range   of   political   parties   as   a  
template   for   the   ideal   range   of   diverse   views’.774 Although Brazil currently has 35 
political parties (many lacking clear ideology patterns), political scientists have been 
able to classify the main ones according to their ideology.775 An alternative may be the 
use of the classic division of the political spectrum: left, centre-left, centre, centre-right 
and right.776  
 For the Schumpeterians who assume that competition between political elites 
should take the form of a rivalry between a more conservative group and a more 
progressive one, subsidies may be eventually suitable to assure the production of diverse 
journalistic information in those two perspectives. 
 Another question is the method to be used for the classification of media outlets. 
For existing media outlets, a possible method could be the valence analysis, such as the 
                                                             
773 For arguments questioning the idea that plurality of media ownership alone translates into a 
diversity of content, see Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic 
Politics, 187–189. For models that try to demonstrate why plurality of ownership does not necessarily 
turn into content diversity, see Faraco, Democracia e Regulação das Redes Eletrônicas de 
Comunicação: Rádio, Televisão e Internet, 121–131. 
774 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 198.  
775 See, Power and Zucco, 'Elite Preferences in a Consolidating Democracy: The Brazilian Legislative 
Surveys, 1990–2009'. A C Figueiredo and F Limongi, 'Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, 
and Party Behavior in Brazil' (2000) 32 Comparative Politics 151. See section 2.2 for a description of 
the Brazilian party system. 
776 An issue that might need to be addressed is whether groups whose proposals may be seen as anti-




one implemented by the Laboratory of Media Studies and Public Sphere (LEMEP).777 
For groups that are entering the market, a historical/sociological analysis may be 
suitable. 
 Choosing the appropriate criteria for the distribution of direct subsidies seems to 
be the greatest challenge for the implementation of this policy. What it seems safe to say 
is that the qualification criteria for direct subsidies must be as objective as possible, and 
be implemented by an independent regulatory body,778 in order to prevent the partisan 
use of public funds.  
In short, to avoid partisan media regulation, it seems reasonable to: (i) establish 
objective caps for media concentration; (ii) establish objective qualification criteria for 
financial subsidies; (iii) establish objective criteria for independent media access to the 
airtime of concentrated private broadcast corporations; (iv) establish objective criteria 
for the distribution of broadcast licences;779 and (v) grant the power to enforce those 
criteria to an independent regulatory body, like the one I briefly described in subsection 
7.3.7.  
 
Apart from partially funding private press organisations or broadcasters, another type of 
state financial subsidy can be provided through grants to fully fund a state-owned media.  
In an already polarised media environment like Brazil’s, media deconcentration 
may make the debate even more divided, making it less likely that the public will hear 
                                                             
777 In which three specialists analyse whether the  media’s  headlines  and  texts  are  positive,  negative,  
neutral or ambivalent to the image of the candidate, party, person or government to which it refers. 
Laboratory on Media and the Public Sphere (LEMEP) of the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), 
‘Metodologia’   (Manchetômetro) <http://www.manchetometro.com.br/index.php/objetivos-
metodologias/> accessed 9 November 2017. 
778 See subsection 7.3.7.  
779 Currently, the Ministry of Education has the authority to grant television concessions. For a 
discussion of the implications of this framework, see is Faraco, Democracia e Regulação das Redes 
Eletrônicas de Comunicação: Rádio, Televisão e Internet, 80–97.  
272 
 
competing arguments.780 Therefore, a public television channel may be useful as a forum 
for people to hear and evaluate competing views. The BBC (British Broadcasting 
Corporation) in the United Kingdom is perhaps the foremost example.  
 Once again, independence is key here. There are basically two ways to foster the 
independence of state-owned television channels. One is the British model, where the 
tradition has been to separate the state-owned media from political actors. The BBC is 
governed by an independent trust, run according to professional standards.781 Another 
model is the German one, where political parties participate proportionally in the 
independent managing body: each state-owned broadcaster is run by an independent 
body composed of representatives of the political parties and socially relevant groups, 
such as trade unions, churches, industrial and professional associations.782 
Brazil already has a national public television, but it arguably lacks 
independence and proper funding. Founded in 2007, the EBC (acronym in Portuguese 
for Empresa Brasileira de Comunicação), launched the first public national television 
channel,   ‘TV   Brasil’.   However,   according   to   media   scholars   such   as   Eugênio   Bucci,  
Alexandre   Faraco   and   Christof   Mauersberger,   EBC’s   legal structure is more of a 
governmental rather than a public independent broadcaster.783 Moreover, it apparently 
lacks proper funding: in 2013, EBC had a total budget of around £139 million,784 while 
                                                             
780 Rowbottom, Democracy Distorted: Wealth, Influence and Democratic Politics, 189.  
781 Ibid 200.  
782 Daniel C Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and 
Politics (Cambridge University Press 2004) 167–168.  
783 Eugênio Bucci, O Estado de Narciso: A comunicação pública a serviço da vaidade particular 
(Companhia das Letras 2015) 112–117. Faraco, Democracia e Regulação das Redes Eletrônicas de 
Comunicação: Rádio, Televisão e Internet 243–244. Mauersberger, Advocacy Coalitions and 
Democratizing Media Reforms in Latin America: Whose Voice Gets on the Air? 169.  
784 EBC,  ‘Qual  o  orçamento  da  EBC  nos  últimos  anos?  Qual  o  total  executado  no  mesmo  período?’  
<http://www.ebc.com.br/institucional/lei-de-acesso-a-informacao/qual-o-orcamento-da-ebc-nos-
ultimos-anos-qual-o-total-executado-no-mesmo> accessed 3 November 2017. Faraco argues that 
Brazilian   public   broadcasters   should   have   funding   that   is   independent   of   the   politicians’   annual  
decision on the distribution of public resources. Faraco, Democracia e Regulação das Redes 
Eletrônicas de Comunicação: Rádio, Televisão e Internet, 250.  
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the BBC had a budget of £2.4 billion to spend on television in the European financial 
year of 2013/14.785  
 
8.4. Conclusion of the chapter 
I have proposed a twofold approach to regulate the concentration of private 
donations and expenditures. The first step would be to implement vouchers or uniform 
low   caps   for   individuals’   donations   and   expenditures,   to   avoid   the   translation   of  
economic inequalities into political inequalities. The second step would be the 
introduction of legislation to avoid the risk of bundling.  
 The regulation proposed here has no relation to the question of how the economy 
should be structured. The only exemption concerns the media. The media is decisive for 
democracy. They reach thousands and frequently millions of people, and their political 
coverage has an immense power to shape public opinion.  
 Social media changed the dynamics of the flow of communication to a great 
extent: (1) online platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, enable direct communication 
between politicians and voters (making easier the communication between them without 
the mediation of the traditional media or public funding); and (2) those same social 
media platforms, along with WhatsApp, encourage communication between citizens 
(facilitating, for instance, the organisation of protests, deliberation and spread of 
rumours). However,   the   internet’s   limitations should not be overlooked, and we should 
not overestimate the impact of new media corporations on public opinion. Firstly, as of 
February 2019, television has a greater reach: evidence shows that more Brazilians 
consume news about politics through television than the internet. And, secondly, 
                                                             
785 Ashley  Kirk,  ‘How  does  the  BBC spend  its  £3.7bn  in  licence  fee  money?’  The Telegraph (14 April 
2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/14/how-does-the-bbc-spend-its-5bn-in-licence-fee-
money/> accessed 3 November 2017.  
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evidence suggests that the debate within the internet is largely constrained by how much 
people trust the information consumed and, as such, is largely constrained by the content 
produced by the traditional media published online (who produce, by far, the most 
trustworthy news in the eyes of most Brazilians). Traditional media corporations are, 
and apparently will still be, important for the formation of public opinion in Brazil even 
after the emergence of social media and messaging apps.  
           Therefore, the regulation of the traditional media advanced in this chapter is 
relevant to  the  country’s  democratic  deliberation. 
 Considering that the Constitution requires that elections should take place 
without the influence of economic power, as far as possible; and that the media is the 
form of economic power which most influences the forum of political deliberation; it 
follows that the Brazilian media structure should be designed in a way to mitigate the 
impact   of   media’s   economic   power   over elections. I have argued that the electoral 
legislation regarding media access and impartiality of broadcast corporations is not (and 
will   never   be)   sufficient   to   satisfactorily   mitigate   the   influence   of   media’s   economic  
power over elections. 
 Therefore, in accordance with the Rawlsian interpretation of the Constitution, I 
have  proposed  a  regulation  based  on  Baker’s  principle of democratic media distribution 
— that is, concerned with non-commodified values, such as democratic distribution and 
power to impact public opinion. However, as a complete dispersal of media structure is 
unsustainable (since, for instance, private media can be an effective instrument to hold 
the government to account), we should focus on having less concentration and 
stimulating diversity of content. 
In order to achieve that, there are two basic measures. A   ‘negative’   one:  
controlling media ownership concentration, in order to avoid concentrations that will 
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harm the forum of political deliberation — in this respect, perhaps Brazil could learn 
lessons with the regulation in Germany, where 30% of the audience in the broadcasting 
market   is  assumed   to   represent  a   ‘predominant   influence  on  public   opinion’.  Although 
the German assumption is related to broadcasting, under the principle of democratic 
media distribution that assumption could be expanded to other media markets, such as 
the press. Any merger above those limits would be rejected. For those who take a 
Schumpeterian perspective of democracy, that cap could be adjusted to 50%.  
And   a   ‘positive’   measure,   by   giving   ‘megaphones’   to   the   lower   voices.  
Distribution of subsidies is necessary not only to empower media outlets from different 
groups within society, but also to help to ensure that a plurality of ownership translates 
into a diversity of content (this might be suitable even for those Schumpeterians who 
support a competition between a more conservative and a more progressive political 
elite) — however, the greatest challenge for the implementation of direct subsidies 
seems to be the difficulty in choosing the appropriate criteria for distribution. Finally, it 
is also proper to consider the creation of an independent public television channel with a 
proper level of funding, as a forum for people to hear and evaluate competing views.  
The regulation of political competition between non-candidate individuals and 
their groups is important also because of its indirect impact on the equality of 
opportunity between those who pursue public office. Without a regulation of the 
concentration of political donations and expenditures, there is a greater risk of war chest 
corruption, which may benefit those parties and candidates that are aligned with the 
wealthy. And, without regulation of media structure and the diverse debate within it, 
there is a risk that the media will become concentrated and uniform, which may benefit 
the  parties  and  candidates  that  are  aligned  with  the  media’s  hegemonic  discourse.   
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As this chapter has focused on the non-candidate citizens’ opportunity to 
influence the forum of political deliberation, the next chapter will discuss how those 















In the last chapter, we focused on non-candidate citizens’   opportunity to 
influence democratic deliberation. But what about those citizens who want to run for 
office? This chapter will focus on them.  
Although crucial during elections, equality of opportunity between parties786 
must be in force at all times, including non-electoral periods. This principle covers the 
entire process of competition between parties: their registration, their funding, access to 
the media, the neutrality of the state (that is, governments must avoid using state 
resources to distort party competition), and so forth.787  
In this chapter, I will focus on the main economic resources of parties and their 
candidates to compete — that is, their financial funding and media access. Firstly, 
section 9.2 will very briefly explain the legal framework which structures the 
competition between parties in Brazil with respect to those resources. Secondly, I will 
argue in section 9.3 that the majorities in the Brazilian Supreme Court have consolidated 
a  principle  of  ‘graduated’  equality  of  opportunity  to  the competition between parties — 
                                                             
786 In Brazil, candidates are required to belong to a party to run for political office (article 14, 
paragraph 3, item V, of the Constitution of 1988). See section 2.2. 
787 In  this  respect,  see  Mr  Justice  Gilmar  Mendes’  opinion  in  STF,  ADIs  1351  e  1354,  Rel  Min  Marco  
Aurélio Mello, DJ 30/03/2007, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 146.  
278 
 
but that there has been a controversy within the Court between those majorities and 
those   justices  who   support   a   ‘full’   equality   of   opportunity. I will then suggest a legal 
framework to help to solve this controversy. Finally, I will briefly highlight the 
importance of effective sanctions in the electoral law arena and argue that the legal 
framework proposed here may help judges to overcome the usual hesitation with respect 
to applying severe sanctions. As discussed in chapter seven, the approach advanced here 
will be based on normative principles (such as the right to compete for office with equal 
opportunity   and   the  people’s   right   to   hear   a   balanced  political deliberation), 788 which 
may not be necessarily linked with consequential values (such as government 
responsiveness).789 
 
                                                             
788 Muñoz takes a similar approach. Sánchez Muñoz, La Igualdad de Oportunidades en las 
Competiciones Electorales, 23.  
789 Therefore, this viewpoint is different from instrumental approaches, such as the political marketers 
in the United States, who claim that the main objective of regulation of political competition is to 
foster accountability. For political market scholars, effective fair competition between political parties 
produces a free and uncorrupted choice by citizens, which, in turn, produces responsiveness. This 
means that competition in the political arena would allow the policy outcomes of the political process 
to be responsive to the interest and views of the citizens. Competition between political parties would 
enhance the ability of voters to vote officials out of office, in an after-the-fact capacity. For political 
marketers, this accountability to the electorate would be the prime guarantor of democratic 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, there are criticisms about this approach, such as a contestation of the link 
between competition and responsiveness. For a view of the political marketers approach, see Samuel 
Issacharoff and Richard H Pildes, 'Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process' 
(1998) Stanford Law Review 643 646; Samuel Issacharoff, 'Gerrymandering and Political Cartels' 
(2002) Harvard Law Review 593 615; Nathaniel Persily and Bruce E Cain, 'The Legal Status of 
Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms' (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review 775 
791. For a brief critique of the political marketer approach, see Richard L Hasen, The Supreme Court 
and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore (NYU Press 2006) 152. Yen-
Tu  Su  puts  the  political  marketer  approach  as  part  of  what  he  labels  as  the  ‘political  antitrust’  tradition  
under the American law of democracy. Su claims that several American scholars have worked on a 
modern   political   antitrust   aimed   to   protect   ‘competitive democracy from both excessive self-
interested political regulation and judicial over-constitutionalising  of  democratic  institutional  design’,  
which he argues can be seen as a confluence of the tradition of process-oriented theories of judicial 
review — influenced by John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
(Harvard University Press 1980) — and the tradition of theories of competitive democracy — 
influenced by Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy). Yen-Tu Su, 'Retracing 
Political Antitrust: A Genealogy and Its Lessons' (2011) 27 Journal of Law and Politics.   
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9.2. The Brazilian legislative framework on the competition between parties 
The Constitution, in its article 1 item V, establishes that the Federative Republic 
of  Brazil  is  a  ‘legal  democratic  state’  founded  on  political  pluralism.790  
To protect political plurality against the abuse of the state, the Elections Act 
1997 prohibits public agents from performing several practices during elections (article 
73). This provision aims to guarantee state neutrality and expressly justifies the ban on 
the basis   of   a   potential   impact   on   the   ‘equality   of   opportunity   between   candidates   in  
elections’.791  
                                                             
790 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988. 
791 Article 73 of the Lei nº 9504/1997. Eneida Salgado argues, however, that the legislation 
establishes exceptions that may give the incumbent an initial advantage, such as the use of official 
transportation (even though reimbursement is required), the use of residences and the use of materials 
and   services   that   do   not   ‘exceed   prerogatives’.   Salgado   highlights   that   there   is   great   difficulty   in  
drawing   the   line   between   the   state’s   compliance with the principle of publicity and the personal 
promotion of the public servant who might run for re-election — and this might be aggravated when 
the head of the executive branch is running for re-election. See Eneida Desiree Salgado, 'Princípios 
Constitucionais Estruturantes do Direito Eleitoral' (Tese de Doutorado em Direito, Universidade 
Federal do Paraná 2010) 275. Legislation addressing the potential use of state resources by 
incumbents for electoral purposes must be continuously readdressed and, if possible, improved. It is 
also   difficult   to   draw   the   line   between   the   state’s   principle   of   publicity   and   undue   influence   on  
elections when the police or another investigation department announces developments on 
investigations concerning the candidates, particularly during elections. See, for instance, the case 
involving Hillary Clinton and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States — Julia 
Edwards   Ainsley   and   Julia   Harte,   ‘FBI   investigated   over   pre-election   decisions   on   Clinton   email’  
Reuters (12 January 2017) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-clinton/fbi-investigated-
over-pre-election-decisions-on-clinton-email-idUSKBN14W2NT> accessed 26 October 2017. The 
influence of the police might also occur when the head of the executive is being pressured to step out 
of  office.  For  example,  some  argue  that  Lula’s  detention  by  the  police  — a week before a scheduled 
protest of opposition groups against Dilma Rousseff's administration — stimulated the population to 
join the protest (the date of the protest was announced in February 22; Lula was detained on March 4; 
and the protest occurred on March 13, 2016). The reason given by the authorities for the detention 
was unusual and controversial. Around 3.5 million people joined the anti-government rallies across 
the   country,   and   this   was   one   of   the   factors   that   influenced   Roussef’s   impeachment.   See   Zlata  
Rodionova,  ‘Former  President  Lula  is  detained  by  police  over  Petrobras  scandal’  The Independent (4 
March 2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/former-president-lulas-home-
raided-by-police-over-petrobras-scandal-a6911281.html> accessed 26 October 2017; and Jonathan 
Watts,  ‘More  than  a  million  Brazilians  protest  against  'horror'  government’  The Guardian (14 March 
2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/13/brazil-anti-government-protests-dilma-
rousseff-rio-de-janeiro>   accessed   26   October   2017.   For   some   of   the   legal   experts’   opinions   about  
Lula’s  detention,  see  Rodolfo  Borges,  ‘Juristas  questionam  legalidade  de  coerção para depoimento de 
Lula’   El País (4 March 2016) 
<https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2016/03/04/politica/1457122084_713393.html> accessed 26 October 
2017. Although these measures of independent agencies do affect the forum of political deliberation, 
this is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is the inequalities in political speech that emerge because 
of inequalities of wealth.  
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But the neutrality of the state is not enough to guarantee political plurality.  
To compete effectively in a democracy, political parties and their candidates 
must  be  able  to  reach  voters.  The  voter  must  get  to  know  the  candidates’  proposals. As 
once put by Justice Byron White in the US,  ‘communicating with potential voters is the 
heart  of  an  election  campaign’.792  
Funding and access to the media are key items to communicate with potential 
voters. That is why the Brazilian Constitution grants parties public funding and free 
access to free-to-air broadcasts (article 17 paras 3). Parties may also pursue private 
money and candidates may use their personal resources, as established by infra-
constitutional legislation. This legislation also guarantees transparency, so voters get to 
know how the parties and candidates are being funded, and recently established 
spending limits for parties and candidates.793 These aspects will be addressed throughout 
this chapter.  
 
9.3. The Brazilian Supreme Court and the principle of equality of opportunity 
between political parties 
 As many other constitutional courts around the world,794 the Brazilian Supreme 
Court has been trying to protect political competition. The Court has focused on the 
protection of political minorities and the openness of channels for political change.  
 The premise behind those efforts is that politicians and parties often act with 
excessive self-interest795 and that, as a consequence, large parties try to diminish the 
                                                             
792 Buckley v Valeo.  
793 For details, see chapter three.  
794 See Martin Morlok, 'A Comparative Presentation on Constitutional Courts as Guardians of 
Competition between Policial Parties' (2007) 13 Juridica International 94.  
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emergence and development of minorities. In other words, the majority often change 
legislation in self-benefit,  undermining  minorities’  opportunity  to  compete.   
 The distribution of party public resources granted by the Constitution has been 
one of the most controversial topics analysed by the Supreme Court. By analysing this 
issue,   the   Court   has   developed   a   principle   of   ‘graduated’   equality   of   opportunity  
between parties. 
 
9.3.1.   The   development   of   the   principle   of   ‘graduated’   equality   of  
opportunity  
 The development of the principle of graduated equality of opportunity in Brazil 
has had three waves: (i) the case ADI 1351 and 1354, decided in 2006; (ii) the case ADI 
4430 and 4795, decided in 2013; (iii) and finally the case ADI 5423 and 5491, decided 
in 2016. 
 
  Case ADI 1351 and 1354 
It all started in 2006, when the Brazilian Supreme Court took a ground-breaking 
decision, ruling that  the  ‘equality  of  opportunity  between  parties’  principle  is  part  of  the  
Brazilian constitutional order (ADI 1351 and 1354).796 
The Court held unconstitutional statutory provisions introduced by Congress that 
established a barrier clause for political parties797 to:   (i)   exercise   their   ‘parliamentary  
                                                                                                                                                                            
795 When articulating this assumption, lawyers, judges and legal scholars often make reference to Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review.  
796 STF, ADI  1351  e  1354.  Those  terms  were  quoted  from  Justice  Mendes’s  opinion,  ibid,  Inteiro  Teor  
do  Acórdão   140.   I   owe  much  of   the   structure   of   this   subsection   to   the   reading   of  Osório’s  Direito 
Eleitoral e Liberdade de Expressão. 
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working’;;  and (ii) receive public funding and free airtime in the broadcasts during non-
electoral periods.798 The legislation established that 99% of the non-electoral public fund 
should be distributed to the parties that fulfilled the conditions set by the barrier clause; 
and 1% of the fund should be distributed equally to all political parties. Moreover, the 
legislation established that the political parties that did not meet the requirements 
established by the barrier clause would have the right only to a two-minute program on 
the national free-to-air broadcast, per semester; while the political parties that achieved 
the requirements would have the right to a program on national free-to-air broadcast ten 
times higher, that is 20 minutes per semester, not mentioning additional 20 minutes for 
state free-to-air broadcasts and several others insertions of one minute or thirty seconds.  
Unanimously, the Court took the view that the barrier clause mitigated what was 
guaranteed to the political parties by the Constitution (exercise the parliamentary work 
after being elected, access to public funding, and free access to broadcast), and 
consequently deprived smaller parties of participation in the political arena.799 The 
justices ruled that the principle of equality of opportunity between political parties is part 
of the Constitution.800  
That decision turned out to be quite controversial: it was later regretted by some 
of the justices who took part in it. For them, it later came to light that perhaps the Court 
should have maintained the barrier clause, due to the excessive numbers of political 
                                                                                                                                                                            
797 Each party would have to obtain the support of at least 5% of the votes cast, distributed in at least 
1/3 of the states, with a minimum of 2% in each of them. 
798 The Brazilian legislation granted access to broadcast to all parties also during non-electoral periods 
at that time, but non-electoral access was later revoked by a reform of the legislation.  
799 According to the opinion of the reporter of the case, Justice Marco Aurélio Mello, followed 
unanimously by the other justices.  
800 For a summary of the arguments used by the Court, see Adriana Ancona de Faria, 'O Ativismo 
Judicial do STF no Campo Político-Eleitoral: Riscos Antidemocráticos' (Tese de Doutorado em 
Direito, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo — PUC/SP 2013) 110. 
283 
 
parties in Brazil, which has arguably been harming the party system and the system of 
government.801 
Hence,   the   Court’s   next   decisions   developed the view that the equality of 
opportunity for political parties prescribed by the Constitution is a graduated one.  
 
Case ADI 4430 and 4795 
The consolidation of the graduated equality of opportunity principle began in 
2013, with the case ADI 4430 and 4795, when the Supreme Court held that the criterion 
established by infra-constitutional legislation regarding the distribution of free airtime in 
broadcasts during elections — at that moment, 1/3 of the time distributed equally to all 
political parties and 2/3 of the time distributed in proportion to the number of 
representatives in the Chamber of Deputies during the last legislature — was in 
accordance with the Constitution.802  
Justice Dias Toffoli, who was the reporter for the case and the leading vote for 
the majority, argued that the criterion simultaneously (i) reserved a space for minorities 
and (ii) took into account the historical reality that some political parties have 
repeatedly been proven to have more representation within society.803 To put it another 
way, although the criterion divided the time unevenly among the political parties, it did 
not nullify the participation of the smaller political parties.804  
Therefore, the Court ruled that the principle of equality of opportunity between 
political parties should be graduated, taking into account factors such as historical 
context. 
                                                             
801 Osório, Direito Eleitoral e Liberdade de Expressão, 295.  
802 STF, ADIs 4430 e 4795, Rel Min Dias Toffoli, DJ 03/08/2012. 
803 Ibid, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 44. 
804 Ibid, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 46.  
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Finally,   it  should  also  be  noted  that  the  Court  decided  that  the  ‘1/3 of the time 
distributed equally to all political   parties’   shall   be   distributed   to   all   political   parties,  
regardless of representation in the Chamber of Deputies.  
 
Case ADI 5423 and 5491 
The principle of graduated equality of chance between political parties was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court in 2016, when deciding the ADI 5423 and 5491 case, 
which once again concerned the access of political parties to free-to-air broadcasts 
during elections. Several small political parties petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing 
that a new legislation introduced in 2015 violated the equality of opportunity to compete 
established by the Constitution.805 The new legislation increased the broadcast time for 
larger parties: it established that only 10% of the broadcast time would be distributed 
equally to all political parties during elections, instead of the previous 1/3; and 90% of 
the broadcast time during elections would be distributed in proportion to the number of 
representatives in the Chamber of Deputies of the last legislature, in place of the 
previous 2/3. 
The majority of the Court, once again led by Justice Tofolli, held that the new 
criterion was in accordance with the Constitution, basically by repeating the same 
rationale applied in 2013. That is: the new legislation aptly (i) considered the fact that 
some political parties, who have historically and repeatedly proven to have 
representation within society, should have more time; (ii) but simultaneously reserved a 
space for all minorities to compete, enabling a renovation of the representatives.806 
                                                             
805 Lei nº 13165/2015. 
806 STF, ADIs 5491 e 5423, Rel Min Dias Toffoli, DJ 30/08/2016. 
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Therefore, by referring to the ADI 4430 and 4795 case, the Court upheld the 
understanding that a graduated equality of opportunity is in accordance with the 
Constitution. 
The plaintiffs in the case also contested the cap introduced by the new legislation 
with respect to the broadcast time of coalitions in elections for President and the Senate. 
Formerly, the broadcast time was calculated based on the sum of the number of 
representatives of all parties of the coalition. Therefore, the more parties a coalition had, 
the better. But the new legislation introduced a cap: only the seats of the six largest 
parties of the coalition would count. For the plaintiffs, the smaller parties of a coalition 
of more than six parties would have their broadcast time shrunk by this new 
legislation.807  
On this issue, the majority of the Court led by Justice Tofolli held that the new 
legislation was constitutionally justified because it had the potential of protecting the 
party system, as well as the system of government. For Mr Tofolli, the legislation 
contributed to  eliminating  what  he  called  an  ‘anomaly’  of  the  Brazilian  party  system: the 
largest parties building an electoral coalition with several small parties, with the sole aim 
of having more time on the broadcast. He took the view that coalitions of parties occur 
for a purely pragmatic reason: several small   parties   ‘sell’   their   broadcasting   time   in  
exchange  for  subsequent  ‘favours’  in  government  (for  example,  a  public  office,  in  case  
the coalition wins the election).808 The result of this frequent electoral strategy is the 
formation of huge coalitions that often lack any ideological identification between the 
parties, which for Justice Tofolli reveals a deviation from the constitutional scope of 
political parties and coalitions, that of serving as the intermediary of popular 
representation by gathering shared principles and ideas. 
                                                             
807 STF, ADI 5423, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 5.  
808 See section 2.3.  
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Furthermore, Justice Tofolli argued that this practice has an additional negative 
impact on the party system because it encourages the proliferation of so-called partidos 
de aluguel (‘renting   political   parties’),   that   is,   political   parties   created   with   no  
ideological motivation. The sole purpose of these partidos de aluguel would be to feed 
the non-ideological huge coalition, that is, to sell their broadcast time (that they 
automatically earn after the party is created) in exchange for a place in public office if 
the coalition wins the election.  
Finally, Justice Tofolli argued that limiting the sum of the broadcast time of 
coalitions may also result in better protection of the stability of the system of 
government. For him, the Brazilian multiparty system enshrined by the Constitution has 
been   transformed   into   a   ‘pulverized’   party   system   (there   are   26   parties   with  
representation in Congress as of June 2018),809 which makes it difficult to approve bills 
(especially significant reforms) and stimulates a dynamic in which governing coalitions 




                                                             
809 See section 2.2. 
810 STF, ADI 5491, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 23–28. STF, ADI 5423, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 32–38. 
During the same session, the Court also decided an issue regarding participation in debates. The new 
legislation established that only political parties (or coalitions) with ten or more seats in the Chamber 
of Deputies would have a right to participate in electoral debates; and the majority of the Court 
decided that this introduction was in accordance with the Constitution. But the Court ruled that, if a 
given television company decides to invite to the debate a candidate of a party that has a 
representation of less than ten federal deputies, the other candidates could not veto his presence — see 
STF, ADI 5423; and STF, ADIs 5487 e 5488, Rel Min Rosa Weber, Voto Vencedor Luís Barroso, DJ 
15/02/2018; STF, ADI 5577, Rel Min Rosa Weber, DJ 15/02/2018. Therefore, a candidate from a 
smaller party would only participate in the television debate if the television company decided to 
invite him or if 2/3 of the parties with more than ten federal deputies agreed to invite him. A new 
legislation introduced in 2017 decreased this minimum number of deputies to five — Lei nº 
13488/2017. In my view, this provision shows the importance of plurality in the television sector. A 
plural structure   is   important   to   avoid   risks   of   television   owners’   partisan   decisions   that   will   harm  
those candidates which, although may have a good position in the polls, do not belong to parties that 
have more than five representatives and are against media interests.  
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9.3.2.  The  meaning  of  a  ‘graduated’  equality  of  opportunity 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court has ruled that all parties are entitled to 
party funding and free airtime in broadcast, regardless of representation in the Chamber 
of Deputies (see especially ADI 4430/4795). In this way, the Court decided in the ADI 
5105, in 2015, that once a political party is created, it has the right to participate in the 
political process by having reasonable access to public funding and to broadcast, both 
granted by the Constitution.811 In other words, it held that all minorities have a right to 
access public funding and broadcast.  
But the question is: how much (of public funding and broadcast) are minorities812 
entitled to have, in order to have the opportunity to develop? 
There are basically two possible approaches to answer this question. One is that 
political parties should operate under full equality of opportunity, as has been argued by 
Justice Marco Aurélio Mello.813 For Justice Mello, since the Constitution does not create 
‘first  and  second  class’  parties;;  and  since  all  parties  have  a  constitutional  right  to  party  
funding and access to free-to-air broadcasts; the distribution should be strictly equal.814 
If the infra-constitutional   legislation   grants   a   ‘privilege’   to   parties   with   more  
representation in Chamber of Deputies, this will tend to perpetuate the status quo, 
because these larger parties will have greater opportunity to address the people and, 
                                                             
811 STF, ADI 5105, Rel Min Luiz Fux, DJ 14/10/2015. As written by Justice Luiz Fux, the reporter of 
the case and the leading opinion for the majority, one thing is to create rigorous mechanisms for the 
creation, merger and incorporation of political parties, which may be in accordance with the 
Constitution; something quite different is, once the political party has been created, to create norms 
that  hinder  the  new  party’s  operation,  which  does  not  find  shelter  in  the  Constitution.  Inteiro  Teor  do  
Acordão 5.  
812 Both entrants and already established minorities.  
813 See ADIs 1351/1354, ADIs 4430/4795 and ADIs 5491/5423.  
814 STF, ADI 4430, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 180–181. Therefore, there would be no margin for the 
infra-constitutional legislator to distribute  parties’  resources  unequally.   
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therefore, to renew their representation — as argued by Justice Cezar Peluso, another 
supporter of this view.815  
Moreover, according to the supporters of full equality of opportunity, the 
problem of the pulverisation of the Brazilian party system should be fixed by tightening 
up the criteria for the creation of new parties,816 since the current ones would be 
arguably too loose.817 To put it differently, the problem of party system pulverisation 
should be fixed not by changing the distribution of public resources, but by tightening up 
the criteria for the creation of new parties.   
However, the approach that has prevailed within the Supreme Court is that 
parties should operate under a graduated equality of opportunity. In the Brazilian 
context, this has meant that the more seats the political party has in the Chamber of 
Deputies, the more public funding and broadcast time the party should have. This view 
has been famously advanced by Justice Gilmar Mendes since 2006, when the Court 
decided the ADI 1351 and 1354 case. Justice Mendes based his reasoning on the German 
experience: the introduction of the concept of abgestufte Chancengleichheit (graduated 
equality of chance) by the German Constitutional Court in 1962 and its consolidation 
with the enactment of the German Political Parties Act of 1967.818 The gradation of 
equal opportunity, as developed by the German Constitutional Court and established by 
the  German  Political  Parties  Act,  must  take  into  account  the  parties’  participation  in  the  
formation of political will, and the best criterion for measuring that would be electoral 
performance.819  
                                                             
815 Ibid 168–169. 
816 Ibid 180.  
817 Ibid 169.  
818 STF, 1351 e 1354, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 128–151. 
819 Ibid 134–137. 
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For the supporters of graduated equality of opportunity, a full equality of 
opportunity approach could stimulate the pulverisation of an already fragmented 
Brazilian party system. As summarised by Justice Tofolli, another supporter of the 
graduated approach,820 the largest Brazilian parties frequently build non-ideological 
coalitions  with  several  small  parties,   in  which  the   latter  ‘sell’  their  broadcast  time  (that  
they automatically earn after the party is created) in exchange for a place in public 
office.821 And an increased pulverisation would also have an impact on the system of 
government because it would be more difficult to approve bills. In sum, a graduated 
equality of opportunity between parties would protect the party system and, 
consequently, the system of government more than full equality of opportunity.  
 
9.4.  A  proposal  for  the  regulation  of  parties’  resources  to  compete 
Which principle should Brazil adopt: a full or a graduated equality of 
opportunity approach? As we have just seen, both have their disadvantages. Full equality 
of opportunity may harm the party system and the system of government, impairing the 
function of democracy. Graduated equality of chance, in turn, may harm the possibility 




                                                             
820 Justice Tofolli took the graduated equality of opportunity approach in the decisions of the ADIs 
4430/4795, in 2012, and ADIs 5491/5423, in 2016. Because he entered the Court in 2009, he did not 
take part in the decision of the ADIs 1351/1354 in 2006.  
821 Politicians may have incentives to open new parties because they may want to have a greater 
position of leadership within the party. See Sánchez Muñoz, La Igualdad de Oportunidades en las 
Competiciones Electorales, 28, 278–281. 
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9.4.1. A regulation based on party vouchers and control of influence over 
public opinion 
There is no easy way to solve this dilemma. But a solution could be the 
implementation of party vouchers (one for money and another one for time on 
broadcast), with caps.  
Party vouchers822 could help to solve the controversy regarding the distribution 
of  parties’  public  resources:  the  distribution would be put in the hands of the people. If 
voucher distribution takes place between elections (that is, around two years after each 
election), voucher distribution may be different from the representation in Congress (for 
which people voted two years earlier). It would not necessarily represent the same 
results of future elections either — it is perfectly possible that some people will decide 
to grant their voucher to one party (an emerging one) but prefer to vote for another (a 
more experienced and established one) when the time for election comes. Vouchers are 
best issued and redeemed before an election so that parties have the money they need to 
spend in the election. The administration should not be left too late in the electoral cycle 
for administrative reasons. Although Brazil has a system of compulsory voting, vouchers 
could be initially set as voluntary because one has the right to participate in the political 
deliberation only as a listener. It does not follow from compulsory voting that all aspects 
of the political process should be compulsory. Moreover, voluntary vouchers may help 
to minimise problems such as uneducated choices. 
                                                             
822 See  definition  at  footnote  674.  Richard  Hasen’s  proposal is for campaign vouchers for the United 
States’  elections.  In  Brazil,  vouchers  would  have  to  be  extended  to  the  parties’  public  funding  (which  
is granted at all times) and access to broadcasting. Thus, the term party vouchers would be more 
suitable. A discussion that should be addressed is what level of public funding parties and candidates 
need.  This   is   a  hard   question.  As  argued   by  Graeme  Orr,   ‘pragmatically,   it   is  almost   impossible   to  
devise a formula for what level of public funding a party needs year in, year out for its administration, 
membership  development,  conferences  and  policy  development’.  Orr, 'Full Public Funding: Cleaning 
Up Parties or Parties Cleaning Up?' 95. 
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However, although vouchers may be a good method to insulate the political 
sphere from inequalities in the economic sphere823 and to legitimise the distribution of 
parties’  public  resources,  it fails to provide a limit to inequality between political parties. 
For example, a given party or coalition could win 80% of all vouchers. This would make 
the party or coalition more likely to win the election not only because it was popular 
before the election, but also because it had a greater opportunity to compete (that is, 
more money and time on the broadcast). In a voucher system, the greater the number of 
supporters from the start, the more chance the party will have for gaining new adherents 
regardless of the rationality of their policy proposals,824 the work capacity of their 
candidate or other characteristics relevant to voters. Therefore, if we want to boost the 
possibility of minorities becoming majorities by competing on the merits, there must be 
a limit to the  concentration  of  parties’  public  resources  that  may  arise  from  vouchers.   
But what could be a reasonable limit? Or, to put it another way, how much 
public resources should a party be able to concentrate?  
When we talk about competition between parties we are concerned about their 
influence on the formation of public opinion. And, since we are talking about public 
opinion, a parameter that could be used as inspiration is the one used by KEK, the 
German regulator body for television concentration, who assumes that 30% of aggregate 
audience represents a  ‘predominant  influence  on  public  opinion’.825 We could adapt this 
parameter to party competition. Under this view, no political party or electoral coalition 
shall  have  more  than  30%  of  parties’  financial  resources  or  30%  of  broadcast  time.  This  
way, we would have a greater equality of opportunity — in the 2014 election for 
President,  for  instance,  the  incumbent  coalition  led  by  the  Workers’  Party  had  45.6%  of  
                                                             
823 Under   Hasen’s   proposal,   all   other   sources   of   campaign   money,   such   as   private   contributions,  
would be prohibited.  
824 Brighouse, 'Political Equality and the Funding of Political Speech' 478. 
825 See subsection 8.3.4.  
292 
 
the total broadcast time.826 A cap of 30% would be aligned more closely with the 
Rawlsian conception of democracy. But the exact cap is open to discussion. In this 
respect, the cap could be set at 50%, to be coherent with the Schumpeterian conception 
of   democracy.   Such   a   cap   on   political   parties’   resources,   based   on   their   influence   on  
public opinion, could help to protect the possibility of power alternation.  
At the same time, politicians and citizens might tend to open new parties only if 
they have grassroots in society. Otherwise, the party will receive an insignificant, and 
perhaps unsustainable, number of vouchers. And small parties will only adhere to 
coalitions with which they have genuine ideological affinities. Or else, they will risk 
losing their grassroots support.827 Consequently, this legal framework also could have 
the potential to protect the party system and the system of government. 
In sum, a legal framework that combines vouchers with a regulation of the 
concentration of parties’   resources   might   be   democratic,   enhance   the   possibility   of  





                                                             
826 TSE  (Tribunal  Superior  Eleitoral),  Assessoria  de  Comunicação,   ‘Horário  eleitoral  no  rádio  e  TV  
começa nesta terça-feira   (19)’   (17   August   2014)   <http://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/noticias-
tse/2014/Agosto/horario-eleitoral-no-radio-e-tv-comeca-nesta-terca-feira-19> accessed 26 October 
2017.  
827 If  we  are  concerned  with  people’s  trust  in  the  political  system,  Danielle  May’s  finding  that  public  
funding enhanced that trust in countries where parties were required to demonstrate some level of 
public support and the thresholds for eligibility were low is noteworthy. She focused her statistical 
research on data from Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. See, Danielle May, 'Political Party 
Funding and the Enigma of Trust' in Jonathan Mendilow and Eric Phélippeau (eds), Handbook of 
Political Party Funding (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018). I take that the proposal I present above 
complies with the requirements of showing public support and having low thresholds for eligibility. 
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9.4.2. A regulation based on the current hybrid system and control of 
influence over public opinion  
Although the implementation of party vouchers would be ideal, a control of 
concentrations   of   parties’   resources   could   also   be   implemented   within   the   current  
Brazilian hybrid framework. 
The more money a party has, the greater the opportunity it has to influence 
public opinion and reach potential voters, regardless of whether that money came from 
private or public sources. Under this scenario, not only would parties be limited to no 
more than 30% of the financial public funding (this is particularly important now that 
public money for parties has been substantially increased in the past few years828) and 
broadcast time, but parties would also be required to have no more than 30% of the total 
party spending in an election or during a non-electoral period. If we take the 
Schumpeterian approach of democracy, that cap could be set at 50%. 
 In a system with no party vouchers, typical electoral regulations are required to 
stimulate equality of opportunities between parties and candidates, if we take a Rawlsian 
perspective of democracy. The cap on individuals’ donations and third-party 
expenditures should be low, to help to avoid the risk of distorting competition in favour 
of parties aligned with the wealthy (in other words, war chest corruption). Similarly, a 
low cap on the use of own resources by candidates is important, otherwise, the wealthy 
candidate's immediate access to a substantial personal fortune will give him an initial 
advantage that his less wealthy opponent may never overcome.829 Nonetheless, perhaps 
those three regulation have no place in a pure Schumpeterian conception of democracy.  
                                                             
828 See chapter three.  
829 See, Mr Justice Thurgood Marshall in Buckley v Valeo. For a similar concern in the Brazilian 




A uniform and general spending limit, in turn, is a complex issue because if we 
set a very low cap, we may automatically increase the voice of media owners.830 This is 
particularly disquieting in Brazil, where several congressmen own broadcast affiliates 
and/or retransmission stations, and/or newspapers.831 If we set very low spending limits, 
we may decrease the chance of rivals having their voice heard at a level comparable to 
those politicians who own a media outlet. Thus, imposing quite low spending limits only 
makes sense in a more plural and diverse media structure, which is not the Brazilian 
case. Moreover, although it is controversial whether an incumbent has an inevitable 
competitive advantage and under what circumstances, we may end up favouring those 
who are in government. Thus, although spending limits are key to prevent an ever-
growing electoral cost — and Brazil already adopts spending limits, as we have seen in 
chapter three —, its exact cap is a complex matter which must be extensively discussed, 
particularly in  the  context  of  Brazil’s  media  structure.  
Transparency   is   another   ‘of   the   requirements   (of   function)   of   an   effective  
competition’.832 It may be key not only in the current hybrid system, but also in an 
exclusive public finance system — voters and the electoral court should know how the 
vouchers were distributed, so they know how public money is being spent.833 
Finally, under a Rawlsian perspective of democracy where everyone should have 
fair chances to run for political office, intra-party equality of opportunity is also 
important. 
 
                                                             
830 See subsection 7.3.2.  
831 See footnotes 135 and 747. 
832 Martin Morlok, 'Party Law as Competition Law' (2008) 2 Legisprudence 173 189. 
833 For the relationship between public funding and transparency, see Graeme Orr, 'Justifications for 
Regulating Party Affairs: Competition not Public Funding' in Keith D Ewing, Jacob Rowbottom and 
Joo-Cheong Tham (eds), The Funding of Political Parties: Where Now? (Routledge 2012) 248–249. 
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9.5. The sanctions  
Unlawful practices regarding competition between parties must be sanctioned 
with a certain rigour. Otherwise, the party or its candidate will compare the benefit of 
doing the illegal anticompetitive conduct, with the cost of a possible sanction, and 
decide that it is simply not worthy complying with the norm.  
The use of slush funds834 (known as caixa dois) is a popular concern in Brazil. 
The practice is sanctioned not only with the obligation of returning the illegal funds 
received from a prohibited source or their transfer to the National Treasury,835 but also 
with additional penalties.836 For instance, the party may lose its right to receive their 
share of the following year’s   party   fund,837 and party leaders may face personal 
accountability.838 Moreover, persons involved in the slush fund practice may face 
criminal fines and jail — although it is questionable if enforcement has been effective in 
this sense.839 Finally, depending on the severity of the circumstances (that is, if it was 
serious enough to tarnish the legitimacy of the election), the slush fund practice may be 
characterised as an electoral abuse of economic power and may result in the cancellation 
of the electoral victory.840 
                                                             
834 A slush fund  is  ‘an  amount  of  money  that  is  kept  secretly  for  illegal  or  dishonest  purposes’.  ‘slush 
fund’   (Dictionary   by   Merriam-Webster) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/slush%20fund> accessed 31 January 2019. In the Brazilian context, they 
usually mean off-the-books donations to parties and candidates. Estimates of the extent of slush funds 
are quite controversial, seem very imprecise, and often come from biased people (it seems difficult to 
hold an informer responsible for any uncertainty regarding a mere estimation). For some estimations 
in the Brazilian politics, see, eg, Carazza, Dinheiro, Eleições e Poder: As Engrenagens do Sistema 
Político Brasileiro, 35–36. 
835 This was the sanction established by the Superior Electoral Court to the election held in 2018, and 
it will probably be extended to future elections. Resolução nº 23553/2017. 
836 For  a  summary  of   the  penalties,   see  Marilda  de  Paula  Silveira,   ‘O  desafio  de  reconhecer  o  caixa  
dois’  Jota (24 September 2016) <https://jota.info/colunas/e-leitor/e-leitor-o-desafio-de-reconhecer-o-
caixa-dois-24092016> accessed 26 October 2017. 
837 Artigo 25, parágrafo único, Lei nº 9504/97 and artigo 77, parágrafo 4º, Res 23553/2017. 
838 Artigo 77, parágrafo 5º, Res nº 23553/2017. 
839 Article 350 of the Lei nº 4737, de 15 de julho de 1965, DOU 30/7/1965 (Electoral Code). 
840 Artigo 30-A da Lei nº 9504/97. Moreover, electoral abuse of economic power may result in an 




Slush funds are particularly worrying if they are linked with quid pro quo 
corruption, for obvious reasons. But proving the quid pro quo may be quite a complex 
task. 
Slush fund practices are no less disturbing if they result in war chest corruption, 
dominating the flow of communication and consequently distorting the electoral process 
itself.841 Therefore, it may turn the election illegitimate.  
However, it is unclear what is sufficient to distort an election. This is a decision 
to be made by the Brazilian electoral courts, and so far, they have been quite hesitant in 
cancelling elections that have been influenced by slush funds.842 If we want to have a 
genuine competition between parties, we must discuss a clear criterion to be applied in 
these cases.  
The framework advanced in this chapter suggests a clear criterion to solve that 
dilemma: an election should be cancelled if the slush fund allowed the candidate, party 
or  coalition   to  have  more   than  30%  of   the  election’s   total  spending. Since we assume 
that 30% of the resources represents a predominant influence on public opinion, having 
spent more than that indicates that the election has been distorted. If we want to adopt a 
Schumpeterian conception of democracy, that cap may be adapted to 50%.  
If the cancelation of an election sounds overly harsh, an alternative sanction 
could be the imprisonment of the party leader and the candidate. The important thing is 
that the sanction be severe, to stimulate politician compliance with the law.   
                                                                                                                                                                            
22 da Lei Complementar nº 64, de 18 de maio de 1990, DOU 21/05/1990; and artigo 14, parágrafo 10, 
da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, 1988. 
841 See chapter one for a more detailed definition of war chest corruption. 
842 See, Salgado, 'Princípios Constitucionais Estruturantes do Direito Eleitoral' 258–284. A 
paradigmatic case along these lines was the decision of the Superior Electoral Court to keep president 
Michel Temer in office, by dismissing the accusations of illegal campaign funding regarding the 2014 
election. The 4–3 majority of the Court basically dismissed the case relying on a procedural 
technicality, although there was robust evidence of illegal practices, such as a significant amount of 
slush fund. TSE, Aije n° 194358, Rel Min Herman Benjamin, DJE 12/09/2018, 48–54. 
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9.6. Conclusion of the chapter 
 The Brazilian Supreme Court has been ruling that all parties are entitled to a 
portion of public financial funding and free access to broadcasts, regardless of 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies. But the question is how much minorities are 
entitled to have. 
 Some justices have argued that political parties should operate under full 
equality of opportunity — that is, that distribution of public resources should be strictly 
equal. However, the approach that has prevailed within the majorities of the Court is that 
parties should operate under graduated equality of opportunity — that is, the more seats 
the political party has in the Chamber of Deputies, the more public funding and 
broadcast time the party should have. 
Both approaches have their disadvantages. Full equality of opportunity may 
stimulate politicians to open new parties, and this may harm the party system (encourage 
pulverisation) and consequently the system of government (it may become harder to 
form a governing majority in Congress), impairing the workability of the political 
system. Graduated equality of chance, in turn, may harm the possibility of power 
alternation — make it less likely that power alternation will occur. 
I have argued that a democratic solution to this controversy could be the 
implementation of vouchers (one for money and another one for time on broadcast) with 
caps. Party vouchers could help to solve the controversy regarding the distribution of 
parties’  public  resources  since  the  distribution  would  be  put  in  the  hands  of  the  people.  
But although vouchers are a good method to insulate the political sphere from 
inequalities   in   the  economic  sphere  and   to   legitimise   the  distribution  of  parties’  public  
resources, they fail to provide a limit to inequality between political parties.  
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Therefore, caps should be implemented to prevent predominant influence on 
public opinion. Under a Rawlsian perspective of democracy, a possible cap could be set 
at 30% — no political party or electoral coalition shall have more than 30% of party 
financial resources and 30% of broadcast time.  
The  control  of  the  concentration  of  parties’  resources  could  also  be  applied  in  the  
current hybrid Brazilian party funding legal framework. Under this scenario, parties or 
electoral coalitions would be limited to no more than 30% of total financial public 
funding, 30% of broadcast time and 30% of the total spending in an election. 
The adoption of this paradigm (that is, influence on public opinion) provides a 
concrete solution to a recurrent problem within the enforcement of electoral law: as in 
many countries, Brazilian judges have struggled to determine what level of illegal 
spending (such as the ones derived from slush funds) is sufficient to distort an election 
and, consequently, have hesitated in the implementation of severe sanctions, such as the 
cancellation of an electoral victory. The framework proposed in this chapter offers a 
response to this dilemma: a sanction should be severe if the illegal practice allowed the 
party or coalition to have more than 30% of the total electoral spending. Since it is 
assumed that 30% of the resources represent a predominant influence on public opinion, 
having spent more than that indicates that the election has been distorted. Under a 





The conclusions of the thesis 
 
 
10.1. The summary of the thesis 
Part A of the thesis discussed how the Brazilian law of democracy is framed, 
with a focus on political finance.   
The Brazilian federal electoral system appears to encourage the importance of 
money, as we saw in chapter two. Presidential candidates must reach potential voters all 
over the Brazilian territory (the fifth largest country in the world) and within its large 
population (the fourth largest electorate in the world). And candidates for Congress also 
have a large constituency: they need to reach potential voters all over the states where 
they run, which are usually large in terms of territory (for instance, larger than some 
European countries) and in terms of population (in the millions, most frequently). 
Although money is not sufficient to win elections, it is usually necessary, as the political 
science literature on Brazilian political finance shows;843 and, in any event, it is certainly 
a competitive advantage.   
The main source of money for Brazilian parties and candidates was corporate 
contributions, between the 1994 and 2014 general elections. For example: corporate 
donations accounted for 74% of Brazilian political party and candidate funding in the 
2010 general elections 844 and 76% in the 2014 general elections.845 For many, including 
                                                             
843 See subsection 5.4.2. 
844 Min Dias Toffoli, STF, ADI 4650/DF, Inteiro Teor do Acórdão 89. 
845 Carazza, Dinheiro, Eleições e Poder: As Engrenagens do Sistema Político Brasileiro, 43. 
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the majority of justices at the Brazilian Supreme Court in the ADI 4650 case, there was 
an appearance of war chest and dependence corruption. This was addressed in chapter 
three.  
 
Part B then discussed the possible implications of that political finance system 
based on corporate donations on the democratic integrity of a branch of law that 
underpins  the  country’s  capitalism:  antitrust.   
Chapter four started by asking why the appearance of political finance 
corruption might be enough to justify reforms to the regulation, as the Brazilian and 
Australian Supreme Courts have inferred and as the Canadian Supreme Court has 
expressly declared. And it concluded that appearance might be enough because, 
although dependence and war chest corruption are hard to measure scientifically, their 
appearance  affects  people’s  trust  in  the  integrity  of  elections.  If  people have less faith in 
the integrity of elections, they might feel less encouraged to meaningfully participate in 
democracy and, even worse, end up having less faith in their elected politicians. This can 
increase public support for non-democratic political regimes, which can eventually risk 
the continuation of the democratic system itself — a quite disquieting risk to take 
considering that not too long ago a military dictatorship was in force in Brazil. 
Nevertheless, a conclusion as to the appearance of political finance corruption must be 
made on reasonable grounds and be based on some social science evidence.  
 Chapter four also argued that the appearance of dependence and war chest 
corruption might result in a further problem: the appearance of corruption of the rules of 
capitalism. Elected politicians formulate many Brazilian capitalist rules and have the 
power to decide who will enforce them and how.  
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Chapter five then used a case study to analyse if we could discern any 
relationship between corporate donations and the softening of some provisions of the 
Competition Act 2011. Documentary research showed that business organisations have 
constantly lobbied against what they viewed as excessive interventions of antitrust bills 
throughout Brazilian history, and that CNI, the largest and most important Brazilian 
business association, continued that hegemonic lobbying pattern during the lawmaking 
of the Competition Act 2011.  
After looking at amendments proposed during the legislative process, we saw 
that the more money an elected congressman received from companies that had been a 
defendant in an antitrust case, the more he tended to be concerned about excessively 
punishing companies for anticompetitive practices while proposing or rejecting 
amendments on issues that involved the list of anticompetitive practices and the fines for 
anticompetitive practices of the consolidated bill. These concerns were generally in 
affinity   with   the   CNI’s   lobbying.   And   the   amendments   shaped   the   text   of   the  
Competition Act 2011. But, considering that it could not be scrutinised through 
statistics, the correlation found may be a matter of coincidence. Nevertheless, I asked: 
did the data shown undermine our ability to believe that corporate donations had nothing 
to do with a less interventionist Competition  Act  2011?  In  my  view,  the  answer  is  ‘yes’  
because of the possibility that dependence or war chest corruption might explain the 
pattern found.  
Chapter six, in turn, analysed if political finance corruption had any repercussion 
on the enforcement of antitrust legislation. In other words, once the legislation was 
already set, whether political finance corruption impacted its enforcement. I have 
discussed several ways by which political finance corruption can potentially harm the 
democratic integrity of antitrust enforcement. The harm may, in theory, occur through 
the democratic controls on Cade (the appointment process, the budget and human 
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resources setting process,  and   the  natural  and   tacit   restraint   that  agency’s   officers  may  
have towards political bodies); and through the impact that political finance might have 
on political pressures and contacts.  
However, I have argued, it is unclear how effective political pressures or 
contacts on Cade really have been; unclear to what extent Cade officers are naturally and 
tacitly restrained by the politicians seated in the Presidency of Republic and in the 
Congress; and we need more evidence on whether different parties in government may 
set different budget levels, and whether different levels of budget cause an increase or 
decrease of enforcement in practice.  
Nevertheless, we do have more evidence about the practical impact of Cade 
composition on antitrust enforcement: there are records of large Brazilian corporate 
donors lobbying the executive and senators on nominations to Cade, suggesting that 
those   firms  believe   that   the   agency’s   composition  matters;;   there   are   reports   indicating  
that  politicians  and   their  parties  also  believe   that  Cade’s  composition  matters;;  and   that  
belief shared by businessmen and politicians was statistically proven to be accurate in 
the empirical research of Moran and others on more than 5,091 merger cases, which 
found that enforcement varied according to the party that made the nomination.  
In this way, if we have concluded in chapter three that war chest corruption 
apparently occurred in federal elections from 1994 to 2014 (obstructing the level playing 
field), we may argue that the democratic integrity of antitrust enforcement was 
apparently impaired   because   of   the   practical   evidence   suggesting   that   Cade’s  
composition matters. 
Part   B,   in   sum,   argued   that   the   election’s   appearance   of   integrity   is   key   to  
guaranteeing people’s   confidence   in   democracy, and that political finance corruption 
may harm that trust. It further argued that political finance corruption may harm the 
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confidence we should have in the democratic integrity of the rules of capitalism and, 
thus, this could be considered as an additional justification for the reform of political 
finance legislation. Moreover, it has implemented case studies on the implications of 
apparent political finance corruption for competition law and concluded that the 
confidence we should have in the democratic integrity of its lawmaking and enforcement 
has been impaired, at least partially. That said, it should be highlighted that the case 
studies did not question the legitimacy of the legislation; or of its enforcement. I am also 
not disputing their lawfulness. My claim is less bold. My argument is that the 
appearance of their democratic integrity was harmed, at least partially, which might be 
an additional justification (but surely not the main one) for a reform of the law of 
democracy. 
 
If we want to protect the capitalist democracy established by the Constitution, perhaps 
we should try to have a political finance system which best avoids the appearance of 
corruption.  
Although recent political finance reforms did ban corporate donations and 
establish spending limits, the current political finance system still largely allows 
economic inequality to be translated into political inequality and, as such, still largely 
permits the occurrence of political finance corruption.  
Therefore, Part C asked how the Brazilian law of democracy should be framed in 
order to prevent the appearance of those kinds of corruption.  
I argued that the legislation should foster the appearance of electoral integrity in 
the sense that elections actually reflect a free formation of public opinion. Along those 
lines, I offered a reform of the Brazilian law of democracy in relation to economic 
resources that enable concentration of political speech. Consequently, I proposed a 
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regulation that went beyond political finance, by covering also media regulation, 
particularly of the traditional media. 
 Chapter seven focused on the theoretical foundations of the proposal. And, by 
adopting a Rawlsian846 interpretation of the Brazilian Constitution, it argued that there 
should be no concentrations of political speech derived from economic resources, 
meaning: no concentration of private money in politics; no concentration of media 
resources; and no concentration of political parties’ and   candidates’   economic  
resources to compete. However, a complete intolerance of concentration is not desirable 
in the media sector and in the competition between political parties, even when 
assuming a Rawlsian perspective of democracy. Therefore, chapter seven argued that the 
principle in those arenas should be that no one, or no group, should have resources that 
allow a predominant influence on public opinion. By focusing on promoting equality of 
opportunity (helping to prevent the appearance of war chest corruption), the regulation 
also ends up helping that private donations or expenditures do not change the elected 
politician’s  attitude  (helping  to  prevent  the  appearance  of  quid pro quo and dependence 
corruption). 
 Chapter eight then explored the implications of that paradigm for the political 
competition between non-candidate citizens and their groups. 
With respect to citizens who make a political donation or expenditure, I proposed 
a twofold regulation: the first step would be the implementation of vouchers or uniform 
low   caps   for   individuals’   donations   and   expenditures,   to   help   to   avoid   economic  
inequalities turning into political ones; and the second step would be the introduction of 
legislation aimed to avoid bundling.  
                                                             
846 As such, it was grounded on normative values that transcend the instrumental one mentioned. 
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With respect to the media, I argued that there is a constitutional reason why it 
should be considered part of the Brazilian electoral regulation: considering that the 
Constitution requires that elections should take place without the influence of economic 
power, as far as possible; and that the media is the form of economic power which most 
influences the forum of political deliberation; it follows that the Brazilian media 
structure should be designed so to mitigate the impact of media power over elections. 
Although the emergence of social media and messaging apps changed the dynamics of 
political deliberation, we should not overestimate its impact. Firstly, more Brazilians 
consume news about politics through television than the internet as of February 2019. 
Secondly, the discussion within the internet is largely constrained by the content 
produced by the traditional media published online (who produce, by far, the most 
trustworthy news in the eyes of most Brazilians). Therefore, regulation of the traditional 
media  is  still  important  to  the  country’s  democratic  deliberation. 
 Legislation regarding political  parties’  access to broadcast and the impartiality of 
broadcast corporations during elections is not (and perhaps will never be) enough to 
satisfactorily diminish the influence of media economic power over elections. Therefore, 
chapter eight suggested regulation of the traditional media based on democratic 
distribution and power to impact public opinion. Since it seems unsustainable to have a 
complete dispersal of media structure (because private media can be an effective 
instrument to hold the government to account), the proposal focused on reducing 
concentration. A negative measure was suggested: the regulation of media ownership 
concentration. In this respect, perhaps Brazil could learn lessons from Germany, where 
30% of the aggregate audience in the broadcasting market is assumed to represent a 
‘predominant   influence  on  public  opinion’.  Although the German assumption is related 
to broadcasting, under the principle of democratic media distribution that assumption 
could be expanded to other media markets, such as the press. Any merger above those 
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limits would be rejected. For those of a Schumpeterian perspective of democracy, that 
cap could be adjusted to 50%. And a positive measure could be the distribution of 
subsidies to not only empower media outlet to different groups within society, but also 
encourage the translation of plurality of ownership into diversity of content — however, 
the greatest challenge for the implementation of direct subsidies seems to be the 
difficulty in choosing appropriate criteria for distribution. Finally, it could also be 
appropriate to establish an independent public television channel with a proper level of 
funding, as a forum for people to hear and evaluate diverse views.  
The regulation of political competition between non-candidate individuals and 
their groups may be indirectly relevant to the competition between parties and their 
candidates: the regulation of the concentration of political donations and expenditures 
might be helpful to prevent the risk of war chest corruption (that could benefit parties 
and candidates aligned with the wealthy); and the regulation of the media structure and 
the diverse debate within it might be helpful to prevent a concentrated and uniform 
media   (which   could   benefit   parties   and   candidates   that   are   aligned   with   media’s  
hegemonic discourse).  
Finally, chapter nine discussed the direct implications of the public opinion 
paradigm for the political competition between political parties and their candidates. In 
this sense, it suggested vouchers (one for money and another one for time on broadcast), 
with caps. Vouchers would help to solve the controversy (within the Supreme Court and 
society   in   general)   regarding   the   distribution   of   parties’   public   resources   since   this  
distribution would be put in the hands of the people. However, to prevent predominant 
influences on public opinion, caps would have to be implemented. A possible cap could 
be set at 30% — no political party or electoral coalition shall have more than 30% of 
parties’  financial  resources  and  30%  of  the  broadcast  time.   
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Control of the concentration of party resources could also be implemented in the 
current hybrid Brazilian party funding system: no party or electoral coalition would be 
allowed to have more than 30% of the total financial public funding, 30% of the 
broadcast and 30% of the total spending in the election. 
The adoption of the public opinion paradigm offers an answer to the dilemma 
faced by Brazilian judges whenever they must determine what level of illegal spending 
(such as the ones derived from slush funds) is sufficient to distort an election. Under the 
public opinion paradigm, that level is clear: if the illegal practice allowed the candidate, 
party or coalition to have more than 30% of the total electoral spending, there is a 
presumption that it has distorted the election. Under a Schumpeterian perspective of 
democracy, that presumption could be adjusted to 50%.  
 
10.2. The challenges ahead  
 There are many ways how future research can help us to understand, in one way 
or another, some of the topics addressed in this thesis.  
 To help the understanding of the legislative process of the Competition Act 2011 
addressed in chapter five, it could be useful future research to interview relevant actors 
who took part in that process, to hear their perspectives. In addition, a new dimension of 
empirical studies could emerge if lobbying practice starts being regulated in Brazil, 
generating data that will produce more information about the activity.  
 Moreover, future research has much to explore in relation to the repercussions of 
elections on antitrust enforcement discussed in chapter six. For instance, future empirical 
research about whether cartel and abuse of dominant position enforcement have varied 
according to the administration that was in office would be welcomed. Empirical 
research on antitrust enforcement could also address the role of donations.  
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 Also relating to empirical studies, research could be expanded to determining 
causal relationships with respect to dependence corruption (by isolating money as the 
sole factor that altered the decision-making of an elected politician), war chest 
corruption (by exploring the subtle ways in which political advertising influences human 
behaviour) and media structure (by exploring the causal relationship between media 
content and political results), as far as feasible.  
When it comes to the discussions addressed in Part C (chapters seven, eight and 
nine), research could evolve along at least three lines of investigation — all of them 
concerned with the organisation and distribution of resources in the economic sphere 
and how they somehow translate to the political sphere. 
 Firstly,  the assumptions held by some antitrust scholars that economic 
concentrations tend to generate political influence, or as some have argued even further, 
economic concentrations tend to generate political concentrations, will be left to 
another discussion. Possible future investigations could focus on whether those 
assumptions are always true; and, if so, how that works in practice. In other words, what 
is the modus operandi: if it is a structural problem (such as the too big to fail issue); or if 
larger corporations tend to make more political donations and independent expenditures; 
or if larger firms tend to make other types of political spending; or if it is all those things 
together. Moreover, there is a need to establish whether different corporations 
have different modus operandi. 
 Secondly, academic research could also expand in determining how, and to what 
extent, socioeconomic inequalities constrain participation in the forum of political 
deliberation. In this way, the limitations underprivileged people may face in political 
participation regarding their lack of political donations and expenses and, in a broader 
deliberative sense, whether and how underprivileged individuals face a competitive 
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disadvantage when formulating political arguments because of potential adversities on 
education, could be discussed.  
 Thirdly, it is to be observed how internet deliberation will evolve, as will its 
impact be on political deliberation generally. Depending on how the internet evolves, 
discussions will be necessary as to whether there should be a democratic control of the 
algorithms of online platforms such as Facebook and Google. This could be nominating 
scientific institutions to act as trustees of these algorithms, in order to enhance 
transparency and public trust. A particular challenge in relation to algorithms is that it is 
a transnational issue: the corporations are frequently American but operate worldwide, 
impacting many countries. Another topic awaiting observation is the evolution of the 
fake news phenomenon, especially with respect to its extent.  
 Finally, future research could also incorporate discussions about the impact that 
independent government bodies have on the forum of political deliberation, such as the 
release of investigations by the police during elections.  
 Democracy is in constant evolution. Political deliberation is frequently impacted 
by the emergence of new technologies — although we should be careful not to 
overestimate their actual impact. And economic power will always try to find a loophole 
in legislation to support political parties and their politicians — as coined by Keith 
Ewing, political finance regulation is like a game of chess with contested moves to 
intractable problems.847 The transformation of democracy, in these ways, is endless. 




                                                             
847 Interview with Keith Ewing, 2015 (as cited in Sam Power, 'The British Party Funding Regime at a 




Questionnaire about political pressure sent to former commissioners of Cade 
(See section 6.1 of the thesis) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 





Understanding the political pressure on CADE 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in this research project, which forms part of my 
PhD   research   at  King’s  College   London.  You   should   only   participate   if   you  want   to.  
Choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide 
whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The aim of this study is to provide a better understanding of the political pressure on 
CADE. I am specifically interested in analysing which economic sectors are the ones 







Why have I been invited to take part? 
 
You are a former commissioner of CADE. As a former commissioner of CADE, you are 
in a unique position to provide information about whether political pressure on CADE 
has been taking place, and if so by whom and in what form. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part. You should read this 
information sheet and if you have any questions you should ask the research team.  
 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
You will receive an e-mail by Bristol Online Survey (BOS), so you can complete an 
anonymous and confidential online survey.   
 
The survey will take approximately 10 minutes. 
 
You will be basically asked questions about contact made by politicians. There is also 
one question about the media coverage of antitrust cases. 
 
Even if you have decided to take part, you are still free to stop your participation at any 
time during the online survey, without giving reason. The information provided during 
the questionnaire will not be considered until you submit the survey.  
 
Once you submit the survey, you will not be able to withdraw because the survey is 
anonymous.  
 
The submission of the questionnaire implies consent. Withdrawal is not possible after 







What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part? 
 
The information I get from the study will help to further understand the political 
pressure on CADE. Furthermore, I will provide you with a summary of a final report 
describing the main findings. The main disadvantage to taking part in the study is that 
you will be donating around 10 minutes of your time to take part. 
 
There are no foreseeable risks in participating in the study. However, this researcher 
believes that there is no method that can guarantee 100% anonymisation and 
confidentiality and therefore the absolute absence of risks in this sense. All methods 
(online survey, physical mail or reunite all former commissioners in a room to 
respondent the questionnaire) have their weakness. Therefore, this researcher believes 
that would be dishonest to guarantee the absolute nonexistence of risks.  
 
Having that in mind, however, this researcher is adopting the best to his knowledge 
online platform: the Bristol Online Survey (BOS), an online survey tool produced and 
run by the University of Bristol, and used in around 130 UK universities. BOS is an 
online survey tool designed for Academic Research. It is frequently used by many 
academic researchers on sensitive topics — possibly even more sensitive than the ones 
asked in this survey.  
 
BOS is designed to protect respondent anonymity. BOS does not use cookies for 
survey completion and external tracking software such as Google Analytics is not 
supported on BOS surveys. Additionally, I cannot access any information about 
respondents’   IP   addresses   (see   https://www.onlinesurveys.ac.uk/help-
support/respondent-anonymity-and-bos/). 
 




Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
No data will be able to be linked back to any individual taking part in the survey. All 




Moreover, while reporting the research findings, I will not quote anything that you 
possibly write. What is said in the survey is regarded as strictly confidential and will be 
held securely until the research is finished.  
 
No data will be accessed by anyone other than me and information will be handled in 
accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 and the Brazilian Internet 
Bill of Rights (Law n. 12.965/2014).1 In addition, the replies to the questionnaires will 
come to me as anonymous. Therefore, even I will not know what you have specifically 
replied.  
 
Data will be presented together for all of the participants, thus, there will be nothing that 
would identify an individual. You will not be identifiable in any part of the work. In 
other words, it will not be used in a manner which would allow identification of your 
individual responses. 
 
There will not be   any   kind   of   comparison   between   ‘the   CADE   appointed   the   Social  
Democrat  Party  (PSDB)’  and  ‘the  CADE  appointed  by  the  Workers  Party  (PT)’.  There  
will not be any kind of party comparisons.  
 
Having that in mind, the economic sectors that have made political pressure will be 
listed in a generic way, so that it will not be possible or that it will be greatly minimised 
any form of identification of period, even if directly. Most, if not all, of the largest 
economic sectors in Brazil have had many cases during both administrations. In this 
sense,  all  data  will  be  presented  as  ‘since  1994'.  This  is  an  example  of  a  conclusion  that  
the study aims: ‘since  1994,  the  X  economic  sector  have  put  political  pressure  on  CADE  
X times, through congressmen'. 
 
                                                             
1 All survey responses will be collected by BOS over encrypted SSL (TLS) connections. As stated by 
BOS: 'SSL is the standard technology for establishing an encrypted link between a web server and a 
browser. It ensures that sensitive information can be transmitted securely. All communications within 
onlinesurveys.ac.uk are also sent over SSL encrypted connections. BOS user passwords are encrypted 
using PBKDF2 with a SHA256 hash and a random salt' (see https://www.onlinesurveys.ac.uk/help-
support/bos-security/).  
All data will be stored on servers located at the University of Bristol, United Kingdom. According to 
BOS,  'access  to  sensitive  data  via  BOS  is  strictly  limited  to  BOS’s  support  and  technical  teams.  This  
access is only permitted when it is at the request of the client concerned or necessary for the 
investigation of operational issues (or when required by law). The BOS servers and backups are 
accessible only by members of the BOS technical team and other authorised members of IT Services 
within the University of Bristol (such as systems administrators or those responsible for maintaining 
the backup service).[...] All new staff at the University of Bristol, including casual staff, are given a 
contract of employment containing a confidentiality clause and are made aware of their 
responsibilities toward restricted university data and personal data as part of their induction process. 




You  will  not  be  asked  to  give  any  congressmen’s  name  or  name   the  case   in  which  the  
pressure took place. You will be able to skip any question. 
 
I will keep self-identified contributions or contributions that have identified others as 
confidential. 
 
In sum, confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be possible to 
identify you in any publications. 
 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The  data  collected  will  be  collected  and  analysed  at  King’s  College  London.  As  referred,  
data will be presented together for all of the participants, thus, there will be nothing that 
would identify an individual. You will not be identifiable in any part of the work. 
 
The final report will summarise the main findings. This report will be sent to you. The 
report might be used in my PhD thesis, and might also be written up as a research paper 
for publication in an academic journal. It is possible that my thesis will be published as a 
book, which would include points of the final report. You will not be identified as 
having taken part in the study. 
 
 
How is the project being funded? 
 




Who should I contact for further information? 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact 
me using the following contact details:  
 
Arthur Guerra de Andrade Filho 
315 
 
The Dickson Poon School of Law   







If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the 
conduct of the study you can contact King's College London using the details below for 
further advice and information: 
Professor Keith D. Ewing  
The Dickson Poon School of Law   


















THE CONTENTS OF THIS FORM ARE ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENTIAL. 
INFORMATION IDENTIFYING THE RESPONDENT WILL NOT BE DISCLOSED 





 Questions are multiple choice. In other words, you always can choose more than 
one answer.  
 All questions have space for comments. Please comment, if you would like to.  






While working as a Commissioner in CADE 
 
 
1. Have you ever been contacted by any of the following regarding an antitrust case to 
be decided by CADE: 
 
 
a) A politician. 
b) A  member  of  the  politician’s  staff. 
c) A person who claimed to be acting on behalf of a politician  
d) A political party. 
e) A lobbyist. 
f) None. 
g) I  don’t  remember.   
h) I  don’t  know. 
i) Skip this question.  
 
  






2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, and if the person making the contact was a), b) or 
c), was the politician(s): 
 
 
a) A member of the legislature. 
b) A member of the executive. 
c) Other. Please specify:_____________________________. 
d) I  don’t  remember. 
e) I  don’t  know.   
f) Skip this question. 
 




3. If the answer to question 1 is yes, when was the contact made: 
 
 
a) Before a case was heard. 
b) While a case was being heard. 
c) After a case was heard. 
d) Other. Please specify:_____________________________. 
e) I  don’t  remember.   
f) I  don’t  know. 
g) Skip this question. 
 
 




4. If the answer to question 1 is yes, to which sector(s) did the case(s) relate: 
 
 







f) Other. Please specify:_______________________________. 
g) I  don’t  remember.   
h) I  don’t  know.   
i) Skip this question. 
 
 




5. If the answer to question 1 is yes, what was/were the reason(s) for the contact? Please 
specify as fully as possible. 
 
 








a) More funding and/or human resources to CADE. 
b) Political support for the approval of a competition bill (or a specific provision of 
the competition bill) that will benefit or is in the interests of the competition 
authority. 
c) Political support for the reappointment process or the appointment for another 
job after the mandate. 
d) Less funding and/or human resources to CADE. 
e) Make  a  law  to  curb  the  CADE’s  powers. 
f) Open a CPI (Congressional Committee of Investigation) about the case. 
g) I  don’t  remember. 
h) Skip this question. 
 
 






7. In what circumstances do you think it would be improper for any of the categories of 
persons in Question 1 to contact a Commissioner? 
 
 
Skip this question. 
 
8. If you have been contacted by any of the foregoing categories of person, did you 
consider any of the contacts to be improper in any way? Please give reasons.  
 
 





During the process of nomination of your name to CADE by the president of the 
Republic and subsequent approval by the Senate: 
 
 
1. Did anybody contact you EXPLICITLY offering his/her support to your nomination 




c) Skip this question.  
 









a) A politician. 
b) A member of the politician staff. 
c) A person who claimed to be acting on behalf of a politician  
d) A political party. 
e) A lobbyist. 
f) I  don’t  know. 
g) I  don’t  remember.   
h) Skip this question. 
 




3. If the answer to question 1 is yes, and if the person making the contact was a), b) or 
c), was the politician(s): 
 
g) A member of the legislature. 
h) A member of the executive. 
i) Other. Please specify:_______________________________. 
j) I  don’t  remember. 
k) I  don’t  know.   
l) Skip this question. 
 
 




4. If the answer question 1 is yes, to which sector(s) did the case(s) relate: 
 





o) Other. Please specify:__________________________________. 
p) I  don’t  remember.   
q) I  don’t  know.   











1. Have you ever felt pressured to make a decision because of the media's opinion about 




c) Skip this question.  
 
 
Please comment, if you would like to: 
 
 
2. If the answer to question 2 is yes, in how many cases did you feel pressured? 
 


















Ato Complementar nº 4, de 20 de novembro de 1965, DOU 22/11/1965 
 
Ato Institucional nº 2, de 27 de outubro de 1965, DOU 27/10/1965, republicado em 
28/10 e 05/11/1965 
 
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, DF: Senado Federal, DOU 
5/10/1988 
 
Decreto nº 5687, de 31 de janeiro de 2006, DOU 01/02/2006 
 
Decreto-Lei nº 869, de 18 de novembro de 1938, DOU 21/11/1938 
 
Decreto-Lei nº 7666, de 22 de junho de 1945, DOU 22/06/1945 
 
Decreto-Lei nº 236, de 28 de fevereiro de 1967, DOU 28/2/1967 e retificado em 
9/3/1967 
 
Emenda Constitucional nº 25, de 15 de maio de 1985, DOU 16/5/1985 
 
Emenda Constitucional nº 97, de 4 de outubro de 2017, DOU 05/10/2017 
 
Lei Complementar nº 64, de 18 de maio de 1990, DOU 21/05/1990 
 
Lei Complementar nº 78, de 30 de dezembro de 1993, DOU 05/01/1994 
 
Lei nº 1164, de 24 de julho de 1950, DOU 26/07/1950 
 
Lei nº 4137, de 10 de setembro de 1962, DOU 27/11/1962 e retificado em 30/11/1962 
 
Lei nº 4117, de 27 de agosto de 1962, DOU 17/12/1962 
 
Lei nº 4740, de 15 de julho de 1965, DOU 19/07/1965 
 
Lei nº 4737, de 15 de julho de 1965, DOU 30/7/1965 
 




Lei nº 6767, de 20 de dezembro de 1979, DOU 20/12/1979 
 
Lei nº 8078, de 11 de setembro de 1990, DOU 12/09/1990 
 
Lei nº 8158, de 8 de janeiro de 1991, DOU 9/1/1991 
 
Lei nº 8884, de 11 de junho de 1994, DOU 13/6/1994 
 
Lei nº 9019, de 30 de março de 1995, DOU 31/03/1995 
 
Lei nº 9096, de 19 de setembro de 1995, DOU 20/9/1995 
 
Lei nº 9504, de 30 de setembro de 1997, DOU 01/10/1997 
 
Lei nº 13488, de 6 de outubro de 2017, DOU Edição Extra de 6/10/2017 
 
Lei nº 12529, de 30 de novembro de 2011, DOU 01/11/2011 e retificado em 02/12/2011 
 
Lei nº 12527, de 18 de novembro de 2011, DOU 18/11/2011 
 
Lei nº 12875, de 30 de outubro de 2013, DOU 31/10/2013 
 
Lei nº 13105, de 16 de março de 2015, DOU 17/03/2015 
 
Lei nº 13165 de 29 de setembro de 2015, DOU 26/11/2015 
 
Lei nº 13487, de 6 de outubro de 2017, DOU Edição Extra de 06/10/2017 
 
Resolução nº 23551, de 18 de dezembro de 2017, do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 
publicada no DJE-TSE, nº 26, de 5/2/2018, p 248–273, e DJE-TSE, nº 94, de 14/5/2018, 
98–124 
 


















Communications Act 2003 
 































STF, ADI 1076-0/DF, Rel Min Sepúlveda Pertence, DJ 07/12/2000 
 
STF, ADI 1094-8/DF, Rel Min Carlos Velloso, DJ 20/04/2001 
 
STF, ADIs 1351 e 1354, Rel Min Marco Aurélio Mello, DJ 30/03/2007 
 
STF, ADI 4451 MC, Rel Min Ayres Britto, DJ 13/09/2010 
 




STF, ADIs 4430 e 4795, Rel Min Dias Toffoli, DJ 03/08/2012 
 
STF, ADI 5105, Rel Min Luiz Fux, DJ 14/10/2015 
 
STF, ADI 4650/DF, Relator Min Luiz Fux, DJ 04/03/2016 
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STF, ADI 4439, Rel Min Luís Barroso, Voto Vencedor Min Alexandre de Moraes, DJ 
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STF, ADIs 5487 e 5488, Rel Min Rosa Weber, Voto Vencedor Min Luís Barroso, DJ 
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STF, ADI 4451, Rel Min Alexandre de Moraes, DJ 06/03/2018 
 
STF, ADI 5617/DF, Rel Min Edson Fachin, DJ 23/03/2018 
 
STF, ADI 5394/DF, Rel Min Alexandre Moraes, DJ 06/04/2018 
 
STF, ADI 2566 Rel Min Alexandre de Moraes, Voto Vencedor Min Edson Fachin, DJ 
16/05/2018 
 
STF, RE 664189 
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